JUDGMENT 1. The captioned two Second Appeal arise out of common judgment and order dated 5th February, 1999 passed by learned IInd Extra Assistant Judge in Regular Civil Appeal being Appeal No.14 of 1996 and No.7 of 1996 preferred by original defendant No.5 State of Gujarat, and original defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat, Moviya, in Regular Civil Suit No.157 of 1986 instituted by two plaintiffs. In the suit the plaintiffs-employees claimed declaration for entitlement for the pay scales as per the Pay Commission’s Award. 1.1 Original defendant No.5 State of Gujarat is the appellant in Second Appeal No.124 of 1999, and original defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat is the appellant in Second Appeal No.45 of 2001. They have challenged the impugned judgment and order of the first appellate court rejecting their abovementioned respective appeals. 2. Both the appeals came to be admitted on the following common substantial questions of law formulated by the court. (i) Whether the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat vs. R. K. Soni reported in AIR 1984 SC 161 is applicable to the present case or not, and whether the respondents are part of Panchayat Services? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case both the courts below have erred in holding that the suit is maintainable without giving statutory notice to the defendants under section 80 of CPC as the action denying to give benefit of Sarala and Desai Pay Commission award to the plaintiffs is unconstitutional and without jurisdiction? (iii) Whether both the courts below have erred in reviewing the judgment and decree passed by the lower court in Regular Civil Suit No. 157 of 1986 when it was dismissed earlier as there was apparent error on the face of record of the case? 3. The relevant facts in the backdrop and with reference to which the aforesaid substantial questions of law arise, may be set out in the beginning. 3.1 The Civil Suit was instituted before the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Gondal, District Rajkot. The two plaintiffs – (i) Wagheji Odhavji Garala and (ii) Bai Ujeeben Naranbhai, prayed for declaration and injunction that the action on part of the respondents in withholding the Pay Commission benefits and in paying fixed salary was illegal. 3.1 The Civil Suit was instituted before the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Gondal, District Rajkot. The two plaintiffs – (i) Wagheji Odhavji Garala and (ii) Bai Ujeeben Naranbhai, prayed for declaration and injunction that the action on part of the respondents in withholding the Pay Commission benefits and in paying fixed salary was illegal. A direction was sought against defendants to require them to work out fixation of salary and to pay all consequential benefits to the plaintiffs from date of their appointment. It was the case that plaintiff No.1 was serving as a Fitter in the Water Works Department under the defendant No.1-Movaiy Gram Panchayat, whereas plaintiff No.2 was a Safaiwala in the same Panchayat. It was the case of the plaintiffs that as they were full time employees of the Gram Panchayat, they were entitled to pay scale of Rs. 260-400 and Rs. 196-232 as per Desai Pay Commission respectively. It was averred that Sarala Pay Commission was brought into force from 1967 and thereafter Desai Pay commission was made effective from 1.1.72. It was the case that since the plaintiffs were serving in the organisation of Panchayat since more than 20 years, they ought to have been paid the salary as recommended by the Pay Commission and not the fixed amount as they were being paid. 3.2 In the various averments and in the plaint, a case was pleaded that the plaintiffs who were the Panchayat employees, were required to be treated at par in the matter of pay scale with the employees of the State Government and ought to have been given the pay scales in as per the Pay Commission scales. Reliance was placed on decision in R. K. Soni Vs. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1984 SC 161 ). It was contended that Gram Panchayat adopted a hostile approach in not availing the said benefits to the plaintiffs. 3.3 The original suit was instituted by the two plaintiffs. However, during the pendency of the Second Appeals, plaintiff No.2 Ujiben Naranbhai died. No heirs of said plaintiff No.2 Ujiben Naranbhai are brought on record. 3.4 Defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat in its written statement refuted the case of the plaintiffs contending that the plaintiffs were not permanent employees of the Panchayat. It was denied that they were entitled to pay scale as per Desai Pay Commission. No heirs of said plaintiff No.2 Ujiben Naranbhai are brought on record. 3.4 Defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat in its written statement refuted the case of the plaintiffs contending that the plaintiffs were not permanent employees of the Panchayat. It was denied that they were entitled to pay scale as per Desai Pay Commission. It was contended that earlier also a suit was instituted which was of similar nature and that suit being pending, the subsequent suit was not maintainable and was barred by Order II Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The defendant No.4 State of Gujarat filed its written statement at Exh. 16 and contended that the suit as instituted was not maintainable since statutory notice under section 80 of CPC was not given before institution of the suit. It was contented that defendant No.1 Panchayat was a statutory body and the State Government had no direct or indirect financial control over the Panchayat. As was denied by the Panchayat in its written statement, the defendant State Gujarat similarly denied that the plaintiffs were permanent employees of the Panchayat. It was denied that they were entitled to Sarala Pay commission or Desai Pay Commissions pay scales. 3.5 Defendant No.3 District Panchayat also contested the suit by filing written statement (Exh.75), raising similar contentions. It was additionally contended that the suit was bad for want of issuance of service under section 320 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961. The Trial Court framed issues at Exh. 108. It held that the suit was bad for non issuance of notice under section 80 of the Code as well as in absence of notice under section 320 of the Panchayats Act. The issues as to whether the plaintiffs were the permanent employees of the Gram Panchayat and whether they were entitled to the Pay Commission pay scales were answered in the negative. The trial court noticed that plaintiffs were paid fixed consolidated pay. Plaintiff No.1 was drawing Rs. 400 p.m. while plaintiff No.2 was drawing 200 p.m. It came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that either of the plaintiffs was a permanent employee of the Gram Panchayat. 3.6 In support of the suit prayers, the plaintiffs had relied on Resolution dated 24.06.1983 (Exh. 95) passed by the State Government pursuant to the decision in R. K. Soni (supra). 3.6 In support of the suit prayers, the plaintiffs had relied on Resolution dated 24.06.1983 (Exh. 95) passed by the State Government pursuant to the decision in R. K. Soni (supra). In that regard the Trial Court recorded a finding that the benefit was given thereunder to the employees allocated to the local cadre of the Panchayat and their pay scales were ordered to be revised in accordance with the policy direction in the said resolution. The trial court referred to the clause 14 of Exh.95 Resolution and noticed that employees belonging to certain categories were not held entitled for the benefit of revision in the pay scale. It was found that employees receiving consolidated pay scale as the fixed salary were excluded from the purview of the said Resolution. It was recorded that since the plaintiffs were paid consolidated pay, they were paid out of contingency grant and were excluded from Gujarat Panchayat Absorption (Rules), 1965 framed under Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961. For such and other reasons elaborated in para 13 of the judgment, the trial court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs claimed. The suit of the plaintiffs came to be dismissed on 22.11.1991. 3.7 It appears that after dismissal of the suit on 13.12.1991, the plaintiff moved an application of the review of the Trial court judgment under Order XLVII Rule1 of the code of CPC. A review of trial court’s abovesaid judgment was sought for on the ground that the Gram Panchayat had resolved by resolution No. 44 dated 28.06.1983 that plaintiff No.1 be given pay scale of Rs. 260-400 and the plaintiff No. 2 also be given the revised scale. It was contended in the review application that the said Resolution No. 44 was in the custody of Panchayat and therefore the plaintiffs had no knowledge about passing of such Resolution. It was contended that the Resolution was a document going to the root of the matter. Pursuant to the said review application, the court directed Gram Panchayat to produce on record the Resolution in question dated 28.06.1983 bearing No. 44. Thereafter, it was produced on record. 3.8 The aforesaid Review application No. 1 of 1991 came to be allowed by learned Civil Judge on 29.12.1995. Pursuant to the said review application, the court directed Gram Panchayat to produce on record the Resolution in question dated 28.06.1983 bearing No. 44. Thereafter, it was produced on record. 3.8 The aforesaid Review application No. 1 of 1991 came to be allowed by learned Civil Judge on 29.12.1995. The reviewing court relied on the said Resolution No. 44 and observed that had it been produced earlier by the Panchayat, the fresh exercise could have been avoided. The reviewing court found that because of the resolution having been passed by the Panchayat, the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief in the suit. It directed therefore that the defendant Gram Panchayat and the State Government were jointly liable to extend prescribed pay scale as recommended by the Pay Commission and the plaintiffs were entitled to be given such benefits right from their initial appointment. Direction was given to calculate arrear and pay the same, within stipulated time. It was further directed that the arrears will be paid with 18% interest. It was next directed that the State shall not put forward excuse that it was not responsible for extending the said benefit to the plaintiffs. 3.9 It may be noted that while the plaintiffs moved the Review Application on 13.12.1991, they had also preferred a regular appeal before the appellate court under section 96 of the Code, being Regular Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1991, against the judgment and order of the Trial Court dismissing the suit. 3.10 In course of the hearing of the review application, it was pointed out to the review-court that Resolution No. 44 was cancelled by the Gram Panchayat by another Resolution No. 93 dated 20th November, 1995. The Reviewing Court observed that cancellation being after a long time and ex parte, such a unilateral action was arbitrary, and could not be allowed to stand. Hence, it refused to recognize the same. Consequently, by virtue of the aforesaid order dated 29th December, 1995 passed in the Review application, the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed in terms of the order passed in the review application, as noted above. 3.11 Rejecting the respective Regular Civil Appeals preferred by the defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat and defendant No.4 State of Gujarat, the first appellate court took view that the plaintiffs as employees of the defendant Movaiya Gram Panchayat and were entitled to the Pay Commission Awards. 3.11 Rejecting the respective Regular Civil Appeals preferred by the defendant No.1 Gram Panchayat and defendant No.4 State of Gujarat, the first appellate court took view that the plaintiffs as employees of the defendant Movaiya Gram Panchayat and were entitled to the Pay Commission Awards. It further held that the trial court had rightly reviewed its judgment and order. With regard to aspect of maintainability of the suit for want of notice under section 80 of the Code and further for want of notice under section 320 of the Panchayat Act and the first appellate court held that the institution of the suit without those notices was not bad because the action of the Pachayat denying the benefit to the plaintiffs was arbitrary and unconstitutional. On the cancellation of Resolution 44 was cancelled by subsequent Resolution, the first appellant court took the same view that it was passed as late as in the year 1995, the litigation had continued for more than 10 years, and it violated the principles of natural justice. The cancellation of the Resolution was accordingly not taken into account by the first appellate court as well. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. D. M. Thakkar for M/s Thakkar Associates appearing for the Gram Panchayat in appeal No. 45 of 2001, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Janak Raval for the State in Second Appeal 124 of 1999 and learned advocate Mr. M.D. Rana appearing in both the appeals for original plaintiffs. 4.1 Learned advocate for the appellants in the respective appeals, firstly submitted that the provisions of section 80 of the Code as well as that of section 320 of the Panchayat Act, 1960 were mandatory, which were not complied with. It was submitted that before instituting suit against the respondent State and Panchayat necessary notices under the respective provisions were not given, therefore, the suit itself was not maintainable. Learned advocate for the appellant Gram Panchayat in support of his contention relied on the decision in Bishandayal and Sons vs. State of Orissa [ (2001) 1 SCC 555 ]. He further relied on another Apex Court decision in Coal Mines P. F. Commr. Thr. Board of Trustees vs. Ramesh Chandra Jha [ (2012) 2 SCC 67 ] to contend that on notice under section 80 of the Code was not just procedural formality but was an obligatory requirement. He further relied on another Apex Court decision in Coal Mines P. F. Commr. Thr. Board of Trustees vs. Ramesh Chandra Jha [ (2012) 2 SCC 67 ] to contend that on notice under section 80 of the Code was not just procedural formality but was an obligatory requirement. By placing reliance on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat vs. (Smt.) Ramilaben Rajnikant A. Patel [ 2013 (1) GLH 198 ]. Learned advocate for the appellant emphasised the very proposition and further contended that not only that notice under section 80 CPC was necessary but it was required to be addressed specifically on particular issue for cause of action for which the suit was to be instituted. Yet another decision in District Panchayat vs. Vasantgauri wife of Babulal Dave [2008 (3) SCC 477] was relied on regarding requirement of notice under section 320 of the Panchayat Act. 4.2 It was next contended on behalf of the appellants that not only that the order passed in the review application was not sustainable in law but the review application itself was not competent. It was submitted in that regard that when the application for review was filed, by the plaintiffs, had already preferred regular appeal against judgment and order of the trial court before the appellate court. It was submitted that in view of the provision of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code, the review application was rendered not maintainable. It was submitted that review against the decree and order was competent only where no appeal has been preferred. 4.3 Learned advocate for the appellants further submitted that subsequent cancellation of Resolution No. 44 by another Resolution was an important subsequent development. Once that fact was pointed out to the reviewing court, there was no question of entertaining the review. It was submitted that the first appellate court perpetuated the same mistake of ignoring the subsequent development whereby the Panchayat had cancelled Resolution No. 44. Learned advocate for the appellants submitted that substantial question of law was accordingly framed whether both the courts below erred in reviewing the judgment of the trial court in Regular Civil Suit No. 157 of 1986. It was submitted that because of the said subsequent event, neither the Review could have been allowed nor the Regular Civil Appeal could have been rejected by the first appellate court. It was submitted that because of the said subsequent event, neither the Review could have been allowed nor the Regular Civil Appeal could have been rejected by the first appellate court. 4.4 Learned advocate for the original plaintiffs countering the above contention of the appellants submitted that the requirement of notice under section 80 of the Code before institution of the suit was deemed to have been waived because order dated 22.07.1980 below Exh. 6 was passed whereby the court had granted the necessary relief while deciding the Exh. 5 application. It was also submitted that the provisions of section 80 were later amended, and the suit for urgent relief could have been filed with the leave of the court without serving a notice under section 80(1), CPC. It was submitted that therefore it cannot be said that the suit was not maintainable. 4.5 Resolution No. 44 was directed to be produced by the court after review application was filed, by addressing a letter to the Secretary, Panchayat Department (Exh. 44) dated 16.10.1995. It appeared that thereafter Resolution No. 44 was produced alongwith Purshish at Exh.45 and with list of documents at Exh. 46. State filed its reply (Exh.50) to the aforesaid application filed by the plaintiff wherein it was inter alia contended that against judgment and order sought to be reviewed, the plaintiffs had already preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1991, and therefore, review application was not maintainable. It was further contended that plaintiffs were employees serving on fixed consolidated salary; they were appointed by the Panchayat without obtaining permission from competent authorities and had not followed requisite rules and procedure for appointment before recruiting them. It was contended that therefore services of the plaintiffs could not be termed as regular, or legal and that they were not full time permanent employees. 4.6 Learned advocate for the respondents-original plaintiffs contended that when the action on part of the Panchayat in not granting the pay scales to the plaintiffs was illegal and void, notice under section 80 of CPC was not required to be insisted upon. 4.6 Learned advocate for the respondents-original plaintiffs contended that when the action on part of the Panchayat in not granting the pay scales to the plaintiffs was illegal and void, notice under section 80 of CPC was not required to be insisted upon. For emphasing the entitlement of the plaintiffs-employees to get the pay scales as per the Pay Commission Award, learned advocate for the respondents pressed into service decision in R K Soni (supra) and submitted that in that decision it is held that the members of the Gujarat Panchayat services are required to be treated at par with the Government servants. In furtherance, decision in Civil Misc. Petition No. 1610 of 1983 dated 1.8.91 of a division bench of this court was relied on wherein division bench directed to grant the benefit to the petitioner of that application on the principles of Supreme Court decision in R K Soni (supra). According to him, the resolution for giving pay scale on the basis of the Sarela and Desai Pay Commissions Awards was rightly passed and the courts below rightly held to give effect to that Resolution in favour of the plaintiffs. 4.7 In order to counter the contention of learned advocate for the appellant that the review application was not maintainable because before appeal was preference by the plaintiff, it was submitted by learned advocate for the respondent that on the same date when the review was filed, the appeal was withdrawn. Submitting that there is no bar in entertaining the review application, he relied on a decision in M/s Thungabhadra Industries vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh [ AIR 1964 SC 1372 ]. Decision of this court in Badrunnisha Mohammad Swikadar vs. Keshiben Jethalal Parmar and another, [2000 AIH (C) 3589] was relied on to submit that once the appeal was withdrawn, the review application could have been entertained under Order 47 Rule 1. 4.8 Learned advocate for the respondents next submitted that review was rightly allowed because the Resolution which was the basis of the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit, remained in the custody of Panchayat and was not produced. 4.8 Learned advocate for the respondents next submitted that review was rightly allowed because the Resolution which was the basis of the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit, remained in the custody of Panchayat and was not produced. It was submitted that subsequent cancellation of the Resolution by the Panchayat was not required to be considered because it was on the face of it arbitrary and was without affording opportunity of hearing to the plaintiffs, and further that it was passed after passage of 10 years of litigation. 5. Having noted the facts and the contentions canvassed, adverting first to the issue whether review application was maintainable when appeal was filed. That issue is concomitant to and concocted to the third substantial question. The following observation in M/s Thungabhadra Industries (supra) clarifies the position of law “crucial date for determination whether or not the terms of Order XLVII Rule 1(1) of Civil Procedure Code are satisfied is the date when the application for review is filed. If on that date no appeal has been filed, it is competent for the court hearing the petition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, subject only to this, that if before the application for review is finally decided, the appeal itself has been disposed of, jurisdiction of the court hearing the review petition would come to an end.” 5.1 The underlying object of order 47 Rule 1, CPC in providing that review application will not lie when the appeal against the order of decree sought to be reviewed has been preferred, is to avoid duality of decision. Mere filing of an appeal may not ipso facto render the application for review not entertainable. As is clear from the above-quoted observations of the Apex Court in M/s Thungabhadra Industries (supra) that if before the application for review is decided, the appeal is disposed of, jurisdiction of court hearing review petition would come to an end. Therefore if the appeal preferred was taken up for hearing, then review cannot be entertained and review jurisdiction would be barred. In the present case, it is not in dispute that simultaneously with filing of the review application, the appeal preferred was withdrawn on the same date. Therefore there was no bar in considering the review application. 6. Therefore if the appeal preferred was taken up for hearing, then review cannot be entertained and review jurisdiction would be barred. In the present case, it is not in dispute that simultaneously with filing of the review application, the appeal preferred was withdrawn on the same date. Therefore there was no bar in considering the review application. 6. Turning now to the question whether the suit was maintainable without giving statutory notice under Section 80 of the Code. The said section contemplates that no suit against the Government or against a Public Officer in respect of any act done by the Government or such Public Officer in his official capacity shall be instituted until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been served by giving the notice to the office of the Government/Public servant concerned. In Bihari Choudary v. State of Bihar[ AIR 1984 SC 1043 ], the court considered very issue whether in absence of notice under Section 80 of the Code the suit could be said to be validly instituted. In that case, the appellant's suit was for relief of declaration of title and delivery of possession of the suit properties with recovery of mesne profits. With regard to the compliance of the requirement of Section 80 of the Code, the court observed that a suit against the Government or Public Officer to which the requirement of a prior notice under section 80 of the Code is directed, cannot be validly instituted until the expiration of period of two months next after the notice in writing has been delivered. It was observed that in absence of such notice, the suit has to be dismissed as not maintainable. It was observed that in absence of such notice, the suit has to be dismissed as not maintainable. 6.1 The object of the provision and the position requiring its compliance was highlighted in Bihari Chowdhary (supra) in the following words, "The effect of the Section is clearly to impose a bar against the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer in respect of any act purported to be done by him in his official capacity until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the Secretary to Government or Collector of the concerned district and in the case of a public officer delivered to him or left at his office, stating the particulars enumerated in the last part of sub-section (1) of the Section. When we examine the scheme of the Section it becomes obvious that the Section has been enacted as a measure of public policy with the object of ensuring that before a suit is instituted against the Government or a public officer, the Government or the officer concerned is afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the claim in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed and if it be found to be a just claim, to take immediate action and thereby avoid unnecessary litigation and save public time and money by settling the claim without driving the person, who has issued the notice, to institute the suit involving considerable expenditure and delay. The Government, unlike private parties, is expected to consider the matter covered by the notice in a most objective manner, after obtaining such legal advice as they may think fit, and take a decision in public interest within the period of two months allowed by the Section as to whether the claim is just and reasonable and the contemplated suit should, therefore, be avoided by speedy negotiations and settlement or whether the claim should be resisted by fighting out the suit if and when it is instituted. There is clearly a public purpose underlying the mandatory provision contained in the Section insisting on the issuance of a notice setting out the particulars of the proposed suit and giving two months time to Government or a public officer before a suit can be instituted against them. There is clearly a public purpose underlying the mandatory provision contained in the Section insisting on the issuance of a notice setting out the particulars of the proposed suit and giving two months time to Government or a public officer before a suit can be instituted against them. The object of the Section is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation." 6.2 The requirement of notice envisaged under Section 80 of the Code underlines a kind of public policy which seeks to check on one hand unnecessary litigation, and on the other hand its object is to put the Government or the Public Officer to notice of the proposed litigation so that if possible the litigation can be short-cutted but by taking appropriate action in advance at their end. With regard to the grievance voiced the case in Bihari Chowdhary (Supra) was dealing with the section prior to the amendment in the Code. However, the Apex Court observed that even under the amended provision, the position remained unaltered in so far as the suit of such nature was concerned. 6.3 Undisputedly, in the present case, no notice under Section 80 was given. The plaintiffs claimed a relief of declaration and injunction that they were entitled to be paid the revised pay as per the Pay Commission Award. The suit of such nature for revision of pay as claimed could not be characterised as one for which sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the Code may be made applicable. The subject matter and the prayer of the plaintiffs were not one where the urgency for seeking relief was of the degree that it would justify non-giving of notice provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 80. On the contrary, when the plaintiffs-employees were seeking revised pay scales from the Government, a prior notice could have helped in processing their claim and the merits thereof at the end of the competent authority. On the contrary, when the plaintiffs-employees were seeking revised pay scales from the Government, a prior notice could have helped in processing their claim and the merits thereof at the end of the competent authority. The contention of learned advocate for the respondent was that after the amendment, a suit to obtain urgent order or relief with leave of the court without notice was permissible, and therefore, absence of notice would not render the suit bad, cannot be countenanced in the facts and circumstances and having regard to the very nature of the dispute and the relief sought for, which were not of the kind which may permit dispensing with a prior notice under sec.80, CPC. 6.4 Merely because the court entertained Exh. 5 application it could not be said that the notice which was required under section 80(1) was dispensed with. Nor the mere non-return of the plaint by the trial court would amount to condoning the requirement of prior notice. In the circumstances, therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs was not one which was validly instituted and it would have been properly dismissed on that count. 7. Next and the main question in the compass of the matter is whether the courts below erred in reviewing the judgment and decree, and whether in that context, the impugned judgment of the first appellate court would be sustained. As noted above, the whole basis of the claim of the plaintiffs was to give Desai Pay Commission pay scales as per Resolution No. 44. The said Resolution passed on 28th June 1983 in Meeting No. 3 of the Panchayat was on record. It proposed to give the revised pay scales to five different employees which included the two plaintiffs. It was resolved to make the employees permanent in the set-up. It was the case of the defendant No. 1-Gram Panchayat that the rights of the plaintiffs to get the revised pay scales under the said Resolution had not finally accrued therefrom because approval of the State Government was yet to be obtained. The said right did not crystalised at any subsequent time. It was pointed out that pursuant to the said Resolution none of the employees mentioned therein got the benefit. The Resolution passed by the Panchayat remained as it was without any further action thereupon. There was no further activation of what was provided therein. The said right did not crystalised at any subsequent time. It was pointed out that pursuant to the said Resolution none of the employees mentioned therein got the benefit. The Resolution passed by the Panchayat remained as it was without any further action thereupon. There was no further activation of what was provided therein. At the best, it reflected an inchoate right for the plaintiffs, if at all was. It was never to be the foundation for any relief granted by the court of law. 7.1 In view of above position emerging, it could not be said that there was any crystalise right available for flowing from the Resolution of the panchayat. It was a mere Resolution passed which was subject to the approval of the State Government. The contents thereof could be conferred by way of right to receive the pay-scales by the plaintiffs. Therefore and in that view, decision in R.K. Soni (supra) could not be said to be of any help to the plaintiffs in getting the relief claimed in the suit. 7.2 Besides the above, after the dismissal of the suit, when the judgment and order was subjected to a review application by the plaintiffs, in the review proceedings it was pointed out on behalf of the Panchayat that the Resolution No. 44 dated 28th June 1983 aforesaid was subsequently cancelled by the Panchayat and the General Body of the Panchayat had passed another Resolution dated 28th November 1995 cancelling Resolution No.44. The said subsequent Resolution was relied on, and was placed on record. On perusal of the record, it is found to be part of the record. The review application was decided on 29th December 1995 and the court by decreeing the suit and extending the benefit of pay scales, issued directions to the Government authorities. It was on the basis of Resolution No.44, which stood cancelled, as noted above, on the date of passing of the order in the review application. 7.3 The subsequent events do have bearing in the matter of relief to be granted by the courts. In P.Shree Ramesh v. VR 1987 SCC 654 the court permitted to raise ground on the basis of subsequent event which was not setup earlier and taking note of the subsequent event, the court allowed the ground to be raised for the purpose of relief. In P.Shree Ramesh v. VR 1987 SCC 654 the court permitted to raise ground on the basis of subsequent event which was not setup earlier and taking note of the subsequent event, the court allowed the ground to be raised for the purpose of relief. In Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal [ (2001) 2 SCC 762 ] the Supreme Court inter alia observed that the court should examine whether the alleged subsequent event has no material bearing on the issues involved or would materially affect the result of the suit. 7.4 In Kedar Nath Agarwal v. Dhanraji Devi [ (2004) 8 SCC 76 ] the Supreme Court observed, " ..... by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well settled on the point, and it is this: The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: (i) The relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or (iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties." 7.5 In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders [(1975) (1) SCC 770 it was observed, "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the dectoral remedy. " 7.6 In State of Haryana Vs. Dr. M.P.Mohla [ (2007) 1 SCC 457 ] the Supreme Court touched the issue whether a review was maintainable with regard to subsequent event. While holding in the facts of that case that a mere clarificatory order in respect of applicability of Rule could not be a ground to review, it, however, observed that although subsequent event may have some relevance, but the same must have a direct nexus with the judgment sought to be reviewed. 8. Reverting back to the facts of the case, the cancellation of Resolution on the basis of which the plaintiffs had rested their relief was no more in existence. It had been cancelled when the reviewing court passed the order. The whole premise of the rights claimed in their suit was absent. The Resolution No.44 was the basis for the plaintiff for claiming the relief. The cancellation thereof by subsequent Resolution had a direct nexus with the judgment sought to be reviewed. Once the factum of cancellation of Resolution No. 44 was before the court and the cancelling Resolution dated 28th November 1995 was also before the court on record, the suit could not have been decreed exercising powers of review. It could be said that the whole substratum of the claim for revised pay scale was not in existence once the Resolution No.44 stood cancelled. The subsequent event of cancellation of the Resolution had a material and decisive effect on the rights of the parties. It had a clearly preventive effect on the grant of relief prayed for in the suit. The first appellate court committed the same error, and perpetuating the same, it dismissed the appeals of the Panchayat and the State Government. It was equally not open to the first appellate court to disregard the said subsequent development. 9. It had a clearly preventive effect on the grant of relief prayed for in the suit. The first appellate court committed the same error, and perpetuating the same, it dismissed the appeals of the Panchayat and the State Government. It was equally not open to the first appellate court to disregard the said subsequent development. 9. The reasoning of the reviewing court as well as the first appellate court that the cancellation was ex-parte and was arbitrary and consequently it was permissible to disregard it was against the basic tenets of the substantive procedure in civil law to claim rights and seek relief by the parties. A party in civil litigation claiming rights have to seek them in certain manner required under law which are the substantive requirements as such to be followed. In this regard the following observations in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [ AIR 2002 SC 665 ] which again are with reference to the courts power to take notice of the subsequent events, deserves a notice, "Subsequent event may be one purity of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under O.6, R.17 of the C.P.C. Such subsequent event the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. The decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings the Courts would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief." 9.1 In the facts of this case, it was plaintiffs suit wherein they had claimed the relief of declaration that they are entitled to the revised pay scales. The subsequent cancellation of the Resolution on which they had relied on and rested their relief, when the same was cancelled, that fact ought to have been incorporated raising a challenge to such cancellation by amending the pleadings. No such application for amendment was moved. On the other hand, the defendants had relied on the factum of the cancellation and the resolution subsequently passed in that regard placing the same on record. It was a subsequent event of a factual kind. It had direct bearing on the rights of the plaintiff as the basis for the entitlement was cancelled. It was for the plaintiffs to incorporate the challenge to the said subsequent fact and contend, if they wanted to, that the cancellation of earlier resolution was illegal and notwithstanding the cancellation, they were entitled to seek relief on the basis of the original Resolution. They ought to have formally challenged the Resolution of 1995. The courts on their own could not have without any pleading or prayer on the part of the plaintiffs in that regard reason that the action was arbitrary and therefore, required to be blinked at or overlooked. In the wake of existence of the Resolution dated 28th November 1995, which was never challenged by the plaintiffs in their suit, granting of review application on that basis and dismissing the appeals by the first appellate court was a manifest error committed by the courts. 10. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, both the appeals deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, Second Appeal No. 124 of 1999 preferred by the State Government as well as Second Appeal No. 45 of 2001 preferred by the Gram Panchayat are hereby allowed. Consequently, order dated 29th December 1995 passed in Review Application No. 1 of 1991 decreeing the Regular Civil Suit No. 157 of 1986 in terms of the order passed in the review, as well as the common judgment and order dated 5th February 1999 of the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Gondal in Regular Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1996 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1996 are hereby set aside. The Registry shall send back Record and Proceedings. Appeals allowed.