Judgment :- 1. The Petitioner/A1 has focussed the instant Criminal Revision Petition as against the Judgment dated 15.10.2012 in C.C.No.12 of 2011 passed by the Learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Eraniel. Further, the Petitioner/A1 has sought the relief of 'Honourable Acquittal' from this Court instead of the Acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt' granted to him by the trial Court in the criminal case. 2. The Learned Judicial Magistrate, Eraniel, while passing the judgment in C.C.No.12 of 2011, on 15.10.2012, has inter alia observed that the witnesses P.Ws.1 and 2 have not deposed in favour of the prosecution side and also that P.W.1 has turned hostile and also that based on P.W.3 Head Constable's evidence alone, it cannot be concluded that the occurrence has taken place and ultimately held that the charges levelled against A1 and A2 have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution based on evidence and documents and ultimately granted 'Benefit of Doubt' to them and acquitted them under Section 248(1) of Cr.P.C., holding that the offences alleged against the Petitioner/A1(about whom we are concerned in this Revision Petition) under Sections 341, 324 and 506(i) of I.P.C. has not been established and also that the offences under Sections 341, 323 and 506(i) I.P.C. in respect of the second Petitioner is concerned have not been established. 3. The Learned counsel for the Petitioner/A1 submits that the Petitioner/A1, even though has been acquitted by the trial Court in C.C.No.12 of 2011 by means of the judgment dated 15.10.2012, the said Acquittal is only based on the fact that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the Petitioner/A1 is concerned in respect of the offences alleged against him and ultimately, the trial Court has not accorded the relief of 'Honourable Acquittal' and more so, the Acquittal granted by the trial Court to the Petitioner/A1 in the criminal case in C.C.No.12 of 2011 operates as a stigma dis-entitling the Petitioner/A1 to seek future/further employment prospects in his career. 4. In this connection, this Court aptly points out the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police and Others Vs. Sandeep Kumar reported in(2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 644 at 645 to 647, whereby and whereunder, in paragraph Nos.9 to 12, it is held as follows: "9. 4. In this connection, this Court aptly points out the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police and Others Vs. Sandeep Kumar reported in(2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 644 at 645 to 647, whereby and whereunder, in paragraph Nos.9 to 12, it is held as follows: "9. In this connection, we may refer to the character “Jean Valjean” in Victor Hugo's novel Les Miserables, in which for committing a minor offence of stealing a loaf of bread for his hungry family Jean Valjean was branded as a thief for his whole life. The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him as a criminal all his life. 10. We may also here refer to the case of Welsh students mentioned by Lord Denning in his book Due Process of Law. It appears that some students of Wales were very enthusiastic about the Welsh language and they were upset because the radio programmes were being broadcast in the English language and not in Welsh. They came up to London and invaded the High Court. They were found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to prison for three months by the High Court Judge. They filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Allowing the appeal, Lord Denning observed: “I come now to Mr Watkin Powell's third point. He says that the sentences were excessive. I do not think they were excessive, at the time they were given and in the circumstances then existing. Here was a deliberate interference with the course of justice in a case which was no concern of theirs. It was necessary for the Judge to show—and to show to all students everywhere—that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at the course of justice in this land—and I speak both for England and Wales—they strike at the roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. But now what is to be done? It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. But now what is to be done? The law has been vindicated by the sentences which the Judge passed on Wednesday of last week. He has shown that law and order must be maintained, and will be maintained. But on this appeal, things are changed. These students here no longer defy the law. They have appealed to this Court and shown respect for it. They have already served a week in prison. I do not think it necessary to keep them inside it any longer. These young people are no ordinary criminals. There is no violence, dishonesty or vice in them. On the contrary, there was much that we should applaud. They wish to do all they can to preserve the Welsh language. Well may they be proud of it. It is the language of the bards—of the poets and the singers—more melodious by far than our rough English tongue. On high authority, it should be equal in Wales with English. They have done wrong—very wrong—in going to the extreme they did. But, that having been shown, I think we can, and should, show mercy on them. We should permit them to go back to their studies, to their parents and continue the good course which they have so wrongly disturbed.” (Vide Morris v. Crown Office, QB at p. 125C-H.) In our opinion, we should display the same wisdom as displayed by Lord Denning. 11. As already observed above, youth often commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Sections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.” 5. Further, in the decision in D.MAHADEVAN Vs. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.” 5. Further, in the decision in D.MAHADEVAN Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, MYLAPORE, CHENNAI 4 reported in (2008) 4 MLJ – 88, it is held as follows: “By virtue of Rule 13 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, a person involved in a criminal case shall not be treated as involved in the criminal case if he had honourable acquittal”. 6. Moreover, this Court quotes the order passed in Crl.R.C.(MD) No.1002 of 2008 dated 13/7/2010 between V.NAVANEETHAKRISHNAN Vs. THE STATE, THROUGH, THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SANKARANKOVIL POLICE STATION, TIRUNELVELI DISTRICT, at paragraph No.5, it is observed hereunder:- “5. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, would place reliance upon a decision of this Court in Crl.R.C.No.289 of 2008, SomasundaramVs. The State, dated 28.02.2008, wherein after referring and following a decision of this Court, expunging the findings leading to acquittal of the petitioner, concluded that the petitioner has to be acquitted honourably. A Division Bench decision followed by the learned Judge reported in 2005 (5) CTC – 672 (The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sriperumbudur Sub-Division, I/c. Chengalpattu Sub-Division, Kancheepuram District Vs. W.D.Sekaran and another is as follows:- “In the light of our discussion, it is clear that it is not axiomatic that in all cases where the criminal proceedings based on the very same set of facts ended in acquittal, the departmental action should not be proceeded with. As rightly observed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. H.A.Munaf and another, 2002 (3) LLJ 66, cited supra, if the acquittal in the criminal proceedings is not a honourable one, it is always open to proceed with the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal has not gone into the above relevant aspects and committed an error in quashing the charge memo at the threshold.” 7. The aforesaid decision in Somasundram's case has been later followed by this Court in Crl.R.C.No.400 of 2008 (Kasinathan Vs. The State through the Sub-Inspector of Police, Checkanurani Police Station, Madurai District) dated 27.08.2008 wherein, it is held thus:- “7. The aforesaid decision in Somasundram's case has been later followed by this Court in Crl.R.C.No.400 of 2008 (Kasinathan Vs. The State through the Sub-Inspector of Police, Checkanurani Police Station, Madurai District) dated 27.08.2008 wherein, it is held thus:- “7. On a perusal of entire records and the judgment of the trial Court, this Court could not find any material against the petitioner. These circumstances of this case warrant expunging of findings available in the trial Court judgment as to the granting 'Benefit of Doubt' for acquittal of this petitioner. In consonance with the earlier view of this Court in this regard and as to the circumstances available in this case, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has to be acquitted honourably and acquitted as such. The findings of the Court below as regards acquittal on the ground of 'Benefit of Doubt' stands expunged. The revision deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed.” 8. It is to be noted that the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of 'Acquittal' under Sections 232, 235, 248, 255 and 300. Also, the word 'Discharge' is employed under Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In fact, Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code enjoins a Court of Session to discharge an accused, if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted, it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. Indeed, Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, enjoins a Court of Session to order the acquittal of a person, if after taking the evidence for prosecution and the defence on the point, it considers that there is no evidence to show that the Accused committed the offence. A competent Court as per Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code is entitled to pass an order of discharge prior to the recording of the evidence and the acquittal order as per Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, can be passed after the evidence for the prosecution is so recorded. 9. Likewise, Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, enjoins the Learned Judicial Magistrate to discharge the Accused, if after taking into account the Police report and the documents transmitted along with it as per Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he opines that the charges against the Accused to be an futile one. 9. Likewise, Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, enjoins the Learned Judicial Magistrate to discharge the Accused, if after taking into account the Police report and the documents transmitted along with it as per Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he opines that the charges against the Accused to be an futile one. As regards the case instituted otherwise than on Police report also, the Learned Judicial Magistrate is empowered to discharge the Accused, if after taking of the evidence as is referred to under Section 244 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he considers that no case against the Accused has been made out. In this regard, it is relevant for this Court to point out that an acquittal mentioned under Sections 248 and 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a Judicial Magistrate in a warrant or summons case, the same is only after trial. 10. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, it is evident that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 speaks only of 'Acquittal' and not as 'Honorary Acquittal' or Acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt'. No doubt, these concepts have been evolved by 'Courts of Law' due to lapse of time. The main reason as to why the Criminal Procedure Code has not made as a difference/distinction between an acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt' and 'Honorary Acquittal' is to ensure that no person shall be tried for the second time in respect of the same offence for which he is tried and convicted and acquitted once. No wonder, the concept of acquittal is an acquittal is a development of the principle of 'Double Jeopardy' as per ingredients of Section 300 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the considered opinion of this Court. 11. Also, this Court cites the decision in HAFIZUDDIN INAYATULLAH KAZI Vs. J.C.AGARWAL AND OTHERS {1980 (Vol.41) INDIAN FACTORIES AND LABOUR REPORTS – 171, wherein at special page 172, it is held as follows:- “It is very difficult to define what is the meaning of the word, 'honourable acquittal'. In my view it will depend on the fact and circumstances of each case as to whether a person can be said to have been discharged or acquitted honourably or not. In my view it will depend on the fact and circumstances of each case as to whether a person can be said to have been discharged or acquitted honourably or not. In my view, though it is very difficult to define precisely what is meant by the words 'honourably acquitted', it is safe to say that if an accused is acquitted or discharged because of some technicality not having been complied with or on the ground that though there is some evidence against him, he must be acquitted by giving 'Benefit of Doubt', it may not amount to an honourable acquittal. However, if an accused is acquitted after full consideration of evidence because the prosecution witnesses were disbelieved and the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges it would amount to honourable acquittal. It is difficult to understand what more is required for honourable acquittal of the accused than acquittal of the accused on disbelieving the prosecution evidence in toto. In the present case, though there are some observations made at the end of the judgment by the High Court acquitting the petitioner which may appear to be ambiguous, if the judgment is read as a whole, there can be little doubt that the accused was acquitted not by giving 'Benefit of Doubt', in spite of there being some evidence against him, but because the prosecution failed to prove the case against him. In the instant case the judgment clearly acquits the accused not on some technical ground or not because there was evidence both ways but the evidence of prosecution being found slightly wanting, the 'Benefit of Doubt' was given to petitioner. The judgment clearly establishes that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the case against accused No.3, the petitioner and if this is not honourable acquittal, it is difficult to say what can be said to be the honourable acquittal. The decision, if any, arrived in the facts of such a judgment cannot be said to be reasonable and therefore, cannot be said to be bona fide and it discloses non-application of mind. (1972 S.L.R. 44 and (1934) 61 I.L.R Cal.168 Followed.” 12. Continuing further, this Court relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER Vs. RAGHAVA RAJGOPALACHARI 1972 SLR – 44 at special page 47, wherein, in paragraph 9, it is held hereunder:- “9. (1972 S.L.R. 44 and (1934) 61 I.L.R Cal.168 Followed.” 12. Continuing further, this Court relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER Vs. RAGHAVA RAJGOPALACHARI 1972 SLR – 44 at special page 47, wherein, in paragraph 9, it is held hereunder:- “9. It seems to us that if on reading judgment and order which acquits as government servant it appears to the government or the competent authority that the government servant has not been fully exonerated of the charge levied (sic) to come to the conclusion that clause (b) would apply and not clause (a). This conclusion is strengthened by the wide discretion given to the competent authority under clause (b). Acting under clause (b) the competent authority is entitled to give if the circumstances so warrant, the whole of the pay and allowances and also treat the whole of the period of absence from duty as period spent on duty.” 13. Also, in paragraphs 10 to 13, it is held thus:- “10. In this particular case if one reads the judgment of this Court is K.R.CHARI Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (supra) {1963 (1) SCR – 121}, it seems that the Government was entitled to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had not been honourably acquitted within the meaning of clause (a). This Court held that in the absence of valid sanction the charges against the petitioner under Section 161 and Section 165 could not have been tried and that it rendered the proceedings against the petitioner in respect of these two charges without jurisdiction. Accordingly his trial in respect of these two offences was held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. Regarding the charge under Section 467 this Court held that the High Court erred in law in making a finding against the petitioner in respect of the charge under Section 467 as well as the alternative charge under the relevant Defence of India Rules because the finding the High Court on the essential part of the prosecution story in respect of the charge under Section 467 really rested on the evidence of the accomplice uncorroborated by any other evidence. This Court then considered the question as to whether a retrial of the petitioner for the offence under Section 161 should be ordered. This Court then considered the question as to whether a retrial of the petitioner for the offence under Section 161 should be ordered. In this connection, this Court refused to order a retrial because of the following reasons:- “Two facts have weighed in our minds in coming to the conclusion that a retrial need not be ordered in this case. The first consideration is that the accused has had to face a long and protracted criminal trial and the sword has been hanging over his head for 14 years. The accused was suspended in 1947 and since then these proceedings have gone on all the time. The second factor which has weighed in our minds is that though the prosecution began with a charge of a comprehensive conspiracy supported by several instances of bribery, on the finding of the High Court it is reduced to a case of bribery offered by two persons, and then again the substantial evidence is the evidence of accomplices supported by what the High Court thought to be corroborating circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that is clause (b) that applies. 11. There was some argument before us as to the interpretation of the word 'otherwise' occurring in clause (b). It seems to us that the word “otherwise” means, in the context 'in cases not covered by Cl (a)”. 12. If Clause (b) applies we can find no defect in the order of the Government dated January 28, 1964. It was for the Government to consider what proportion of pay and allowances should be given and what period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty. 13. The learned counsel for the State sought to argue before us that the date 16th March 1954' occurring in the order dated January 28, 1964, was mentioned due to mistake and the proper date which should have been mentioned was the date of superannuation, namely, June 30, 1953. He says that the order dated July 23 1953 continuing the services of the petitioner after the date of superannuation was bad in view of the ruling of this Court in State of Assam Vs. Padma Ram Borth AIR 1965 SC 473 . But we are unable to appreciate how he is entitled to raise the point. The Writ was brought to challenge this order. Padma Ram Borth AIR 1965 SC 473 . But we are unable to appreciate how he is entitled to raise the point. The Writ was brought to challenge this order. No such petition, even if it be competent, was filed by the State itself. The respondent to a Writ Petition cannot be allowed to attack its own order as a respondent.” 14. That apart, this Court cites the decision THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SRIPERUMBUDUR SUB-DIVISION, I/C. CHENGALPATTU SUB-DIVISION, KANCHIPURAM DISTRICT Vs. W.D.SEKARAN AND ANOTHER {2006 (5) CTC – 672 (DB), wherein, it is held that “It is not axiomatic that in all cases where criminal proceedings based on very same set of facts ended in acquittal, departmental action should not be proceeded with.” Also, it has held that “If acquittal is not a honourable one, it is always open to employer to proceed with departmental proceedings.” 15. Added further, this Court makes a pertinent reference to Rule 14 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, which reads hereunder:- “14 (b). No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service by direct recruitment unless he satisfies the appointing authority. (i). that he is of sound health, active habits and free from any bodily defect or infirmity unfitting him for such service; and (ii). that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service; and (iii). that such a person does not have more than one wife living. Explanation: (1) A person who is acquitted or discharged on 'Benefit of Doubt' or due to the fact that the complainant “turned hostile” shall be treated as person involved in a criminal case. Explanation: (2) A person involved in a criminal case at the time of police verification and the case yet to be disposed of and subsequently ended in honourable acquittal or treated as mistake of fact shall be treated as not involved in a criminal case and he can claim right for appointment only by participating in the next recruitment.” 16. From the cursory perusal of the Rule mentioned supra, it is categorically clear that an individual, who is acquitted or discharged on 'Benefit of Doubt' or due to the fact that the Complainant has turned hostile shall be treated as one who is involved in a criminal case. From the cursory perusal of the Rule mentioned supra, it is categorically clear that an individual, who is acquitted or discharged on 'Benefit of Doubt' or due to the fact that the Complainant has turned hostile shall be treated as one who is involved in a criminal case. A reasonable apprehension/genuine apprehension of the second Revision Petitioner/A2 cannot be brushed aside so lightly in regard to the fact that the Acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt' affects her future prospects/future endeavours in seeking employment opportunities/employment pursuits. Only under these backdrops, the second Revision Petitioner/A2 has approached this Court for getting the relief of modifying the order of 'Benefit of Doubt Acquittal' into that of 'Honorary Acquittal'. 17. In any event, it is for the authorities/Employer while recruiting/appointing a candidate for a certain post in a service to take into account of the past or present conduct and to act/take a call in the matter in issue as per prevailing Rules and Regulations. 18. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NEW DELHI Vs. BHOPAL SINGH PANCHAL {(1994) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES – 541}, wherein at special page No.542, it is held that “When the High Court acquitted the respondent-employee giving 'Benefit of Doubt', the bank rightly refused to reinstate him in service on the ground that it was not an honourable acquittal as required by Regulation 46 (4).” 19. At this stage, this Court deems it appropriate to cite the following decisions to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice. (a). In the decision GOBIND CHANDRA SAMARSINGH MOHAPATRA Vs UPENDRA PADHI AND ANOTHER {(AIR 1960 ORISSA 29 (V 47 C S)}, it is held hereunder: “In a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, where the complaint was made by the defendant-complainant on facts based on his personal knowledge the burden of proof is different from a case where the complaint is based on information believed to be true. In the case of complaint based on personal knowledge if the trial ended in acquittal on merits, there would be a presumption in favour of the plaintiffs that there was no probable and reasonable cause for the accusation.” (b). In JOGENDRA GARABADU AND OTHERS Vs. LINGARAJ PATRA AND OTHERS Vs. In the case of complaint based on personal knowledge if the trial ended in acquittal on merits, there would be a presumption in favour of the plaintiffs that there was no probable and reasonable cause for the accusation.” (b). In JOGENDRA GARABADU AND OTHERS Vs. LINGARAJ PATRA AND OTHERS Vs. LINGARAJ PATRA AND OTHERS {(AIR 1970 ORISSA 91 (V 57 C 36)}, wherein at special page Nos.96 and 97, in paragraph Nos.16 and 17, it is observed and laid down as follows:- “16. What the words “acquittal on merits” precisely connote have not been dealt with in any of the decisions. Reference was made to a decision of our High Court reported in (1959) 25 Cut LT 366 = (AIR 1960 Orissa 29) where a distinction has been made between “acquittal on grounds of extreme weakness of the prosecution evidence” and “acquittal by giving benefit of doubt.” It has been observed that while the former will amount to an acquittal on merits, the latter will not. For this purpose, it was observed that the criminal court judgment can be gone through to find out the reasons for the acquittal, though the reasonings and conclusions therein cannot be relied upon as conclusive or decisive in the civil suit claiming damages for malicious prosecution. 17. It is well settled that in every suit for malicious prosecution, the Civil Court must hear the evidence on both sides and decide for itself independently whether or not the prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause and malicious. It is equally well settled that the judgment of the criminal Court is evidence and conclusive at that to show the acquittal of the plaintiffs as a fact in issue which is one of the essential elements to be determined in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. No doubt the judgment of a criminal Court is admissible to show certain facts and circumstances, such as, the names of witnesses examined, the documents exhibited or that the acquittal was on some technical grounds without going into the evidence or on the merits of the evidence, but in our opinion, the reasonings and conclusions in the judgment of a criminal Court cannot be gone into to determine whether the acquittal resulted on account of the prosecution evidence being weak, insufficient or doubtful. Therefore, the words “acquittal on merits” must mean an acquittal after trial on a consideration of the evidence as distinguished from and in contradistinction to acquittals which occur due to certain technical defects, such as, want of sanction etc. There seems to be no authority, and in our opinion, no adequate justification to make a further distinction between acquittals on weakness of prosecution evidence, acquittals by giving benefit of doubt or acquittals on sufficiency of evidence and holding that only some of them will amount to acquittals on merits and others not. Embarking on making such a distinction will necessarily mean utilisation of reasonings and conclusions in the criminal Court judgment by the civil Court in the trial of the suit which is not permissible.” (c). In DHANJISHAW RATTANJI KARANI Vs. BOMBAY MUNICIPALITY AND OTHERS {AIR (320 1945 BOMBAY 320}, wherein at special page Nos.321, it is held as under:- “The term “criminal charge” includes all indictments involving either scandal to reputation or the possible loss of liberty to person. At the same time there are many regulations which the State has laid down for the public convenience and of which the infraction is punished by a fine but which it is apprehended could not give rise to an action for malicious prosecution on the ground of scandal to reputation; for instance a man's reputation would hardly suffer because he was proceeded against for laying a drain pipe in an improper manner or keeping a pig in an improper place. In all these cases if the prosecutor set the law in motion maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, an action of malicious prosecution would like. No action for malicious prosecution or for any other malicious proceeding which involves a judicial decision of any question at issue between the parties will like, until or unless the prosecution or other proceeding has been terminated in favour of the person complaining of it. Sometimes, however, from the circumstances of the case it is impossible that the proceeding in question should have been determined in the plaintiff's favour. Thus, if his house is ransacked under a search warrant and nothing is found there to incriminate him, the matter goes no further but it cannot be said to be decided in his favour. Sometimes, however, from the circumstances of the case it is impossible that the proceeding in question should have been determined in the plaintiff's favour. Thus, if his house is ransacked under a search warrant and nothing is found there to incriminate him, the matter goes no further but it cannot be said to be decided in his favour. Yet in such a case he would have a right of action if malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause were shown. So long as proceedings are pending, no action lies on the ground that they have been wrongfully instituted. It must, however, appear that they were brought to a legal end, even though the end might not be a final and conclusive one. It would be enough if the prosecution has been discontinued or if the accused person has been acquitted by reason of some formal defect in the indictment, or if a conviction has been quashed for some technical defect in the proceedings. The judgment of the criminal Courts would be conclusive for the purpose of shewing that the prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff. It is for the civil Court, however, to go into all the evidence and decide for itself whether there was want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution and whether there was also malice.” (d). In RATILAL BHANJI MITHANI Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (AIR 1979 SUPREME COURT – 94), wherein at special page Nos. 94 and 95, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed and held thus:- “Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under S.227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to the stage of S.253 and discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of charge, if the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in Ss.254 to 258 to a logical end. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of charge, if the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in Ss.254 to 258 to a logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit or convict th accused unless he decides to proceed under Ss.349 and 562 of the Code of 1898 (which correspond to Ss.325 and 360 of the Code of 1973). Excepting where the prosecution must fail for fundamental defect, such as want of sanction, an order of acquittal must be based upon a 'finding of not guilty' turning on the merits of the case and the appreciation of evidence at the conclusion of the trial. If after framing charges the Magistrate whimsically, without appraising the evidence and without permitting the prosecution to produce all its evidence, 'discharges' the accused, such an acquittal, without trial, even if clothed as 'discharge' will be illegal.” 20. This Court has also heard the Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side). 21. In the instant case on hand, the trial Court has inter alia observed that P.Ws.1 and 2 have not deposed in favour of the prosecution and further only on the basis of evidence of P.W.3 Head Constable, it cannot be concluded that the occurrence has taken place and resultantly, opined that the charges levelled against the Petitioner/A1 has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him under Sectioon 248(1) of Cr.P.C., by giving him the 'Benefit of Doubt'. The 'Benefit of Doubt' Acquittal accorded to the Petitioner/A1 by the trial Court in its judgment in C.C.No.12 of 2011 on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case, is only to be construed as one of 'Honorary Acquittal'. Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Revision Petition succeeds. 22. In the result, the finding rendered by the trial Court in so far the Petitioner/A1 that he is acquitted of the charges levelled against her based on 'Benefit of Doubt' is modified to the effect that she shall stand acquitted 'honorably'. Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Revision Petition succeeds. 22. In the result, the finding rendered by the trial Court in so far the Petitioner/A1 that he is acquitted of the charges levelled against her based on 'Benefit of Doubt' is modified to the effect that she shall stand acquitted 'honorably'. Also, before parting from the case, this Court makes a significant observation that the Petitioner will show her exemplary conduct beyond reproach by turning a new leaf in his future career/endeavours.