ORDER This petition has been filed for initiating a proceeding of contempt against the opposite parties for alleged violation and disobedience of order dated 25.06.2012 by which this Court allowed CWJC No.9625 of 2010, quashed the impugned order of the Government of Bihar dated 06.11.2009 as well as the decision of the Board of Directors of Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘BSMDC’ for the sake of brevity) dated 19.03.2010 and gave the following directions:- (i) Respondent no.5 is also directed not to give effect to its decision dated 04.05.2011 which suffers from the effects of lis pendens and according to respondent no.5 itself no step had been taken by the authorities in furtherance thereof. (ii) Furthermore, respondent nos.1 and 2 are directed to forthwith enter into Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with the petitioner in terms of the bid document issued by respondent no.1 vide Annexure-3 and as per the draft prepared by respondent no.2 and duly accepted by the petitioner vide letter dated 07.12.2009 and issue Letter of Intent in respect of the petitioner’s duly accepted highest bid submitted against the bid document which was a concluded, binding and legally enforceable contract which has already come into existence by and between the petitioner and respondent no.1 in relation to the subject coal block project. (iii) Respondents nos. 3 and 4 are also directed to pave the way for respondent no.1 to enter into and to incorporate a Joint Venture Company (JVC) with the petitioner in a time bound manner for the exploration, development, mining and selling of coal from the subject coal block in terms of the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association already prepared by respondent no.2 and duly accepted by the petitioner vide letter dated 07.12.2009 2. Against the aforesaid judgment of this Court, respondent no.1 and respondent nos. 3 and 4 filed separate Letters Patent Appeal bearing L.P.A.No.1117 of 2012 and L.P.A. No.1176 of 2012 respectively which were heard together by a Division Bench of this Court which was pleased to dismiss both the appeals vide order dated 30.08.2012 with the following observations:- “We find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Without interfering with the reliefs granted to the writ petitioner we make it clear that if some minor creases remain to be ironed out, the concerned parties will do so by a reasonable procedure and by agreement. It is accordingly dismissed. Without interfering with the reliefs granted to the writ petitioner we make it clear that if some minor creases remain to be ironed out, the concerned parties will do so by a reasonable procedure and by agreement. In the result, the appeals are dismissed but there shall be no order as to cost. Before parting with the order we clarify that if respondent no.2 to the writ petition, the Consultant to the corporation has already fulfilled all its obligations then it will not be required do any thing further.” 3. The said order of the Division Bench was not challenged by the respondents before the higher court and even the limitation for filing Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court expired in November, 2012 and hence order of this Court dated 25.06.2012 passed in CWJC No.9625 of 2010 attained finality. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that thereafter the petitioner moved before the Chief Secretary, Bihar on several occasions including 21.11.2012 and 12.01.2013 and hence when nothing was done by the authorities in compliance of the order of this Court the petitioner was constrained to file this contempt petition on 06.02.2013. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent nos.3 and 4 in their show cause specifically admitted non-compliance of the order of this Court and did not even deny the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the respondents. He further submitted that the doctrine of merger did not affect the jurisdiction of contempt of the learned Single Judge which had decided the original case, namely writ petition, by a clear order which was merely affirmed by the Division Bench. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner averred that filing of a petition for review of the order of the Division Bench passed in the Letters Patent Appeal also did not affect the jurisdiction of contempt of this Court especially when the review petition was filed much earlier in the year 2012 by the respondents, whereas the petitioner had filed this contempt petition in February, 2013, but the said review petition was never pressed by the respondents nor any step was taken by them for early hearing, nor even any interim order was passed therein. 7. 7. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a clear case of contempt is made out as the respondents have intentionally violated the specific directions of this Court for which they have to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no.1, namely B.S.M.D.C., vehemently opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner and stated that if the order of a Single Judge of this Court merges with the order of the Division Bench of this Court it becomes the order of the Division Bench by the doctrine of merger and contempt petition would lie before the Division Bench. He submitted that in the instant case the order of the Division Bench dated 30.08.2012 is a long and well considered order dismissing both the Letters Patent Appeals and affirming the judgment of the Single Jude dated 25.06.2012 and hence for the purposes of contempt also order of the Division Bench is the main order to be complied and hence, if at all, the petitioner had to file a contempt petition he should have filed it before the Division Bench and not before the Single Judge for alleged disobedience of order passed in writ petition. 9. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 claimed that in the above mentioned situation, this MJC petition is not maintainable before a single Judge rather it can only be considered by a division bench of this Court. With respect to his point regarding doctrine of merger he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of Kunhayammed and others Vs. State of Kerala and another reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 . 10. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 averred that against the order of the Division Bench dated 30.08.2012 dismissing L.P.A.No.1117 of 2012 and L.P.A. No.1167 of 2012, two review petitions were filed bearing Civil Review No.515 of 2012 and Civil Review No.112 of 2013 by respondent no.3 and respondent no.1 respectively much before the filing of this contempt petition by the petitioner. Hence, the said review petitions were not for mere excuses rather in both of them interlocutory applications for stay had been filed which were both defect free. Hence, the said review petitions were not for mere excuses rather in both of them interlocutory applications for stay had been filed which were both defect free. In furtherance thereof the respondents had also moved before the Division Bench for early hearing of the Civil Review petitions, but their prayers were refused and they would be again moving the Court for the said purpose. 11. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 argued that in the aforesaid circumstances this contempt petition is premature and cannot be decided at this stage as any allegation of contempt raised by the petitioners would be subject to the decision of the aforesaid civil review petitions. In this connection, he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. and another Vs. Sachidanand Dass and another reported in 1995 Supp (4) S.C.C. 465 and another decision of the Apex Court in case of Suresh Chandra Poddar Vs. Dhani Ram and others reported in (2002) 1 S.C.C 766 . 12. Learned counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4, who are authorities of the State of Bihar, reiterated the arguments raised on behalf of learned counsel for respondent no.1 and argued that on both the counts mentioned above, this contempt petition is not maintainable as firstly due to doctrine of merger, order of the Single Judge having merged with the order of the Division Bench passed in L.P.A. the contempt petition, if any, would lie before the Division Bench and not before the Single Judge and secondly the Civil Review petitions for review of the judgment of the Division Bench passed in the L.P.A. being pending for hearing, this MJC petition is pre-mature till the said civil review petitions are decided. Hence, he prayed that this MJC petition be kept for consideration after disposal of the review petitions. 13. Considering the averments made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record it is undisputed fact that the order in question dated 25.06.2012 passed by this Court in CWJC No.9625 of 2010 has not been complied by the opposite parties. 13. Considering the averments made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record it is undisputed fact that the order in question dated 25.06.2012 passed by this Court in CWJC No.9625 of 2010 has not been complied by the opposite parties. The only defence of the opposite parties in the aforesaid situation is technical in nature that such MJC petition is not maintainable before the Single Judge, rather it would be maintainable only before a Division Bench as the order in question passed by the Single Judge had been affirmed by a Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal and that the MJC petition is premature as the order of the Single Judge and the order of the Division Bench had not attained finality because the respondents have filed civil review petitions which are pending before a Division Bench of this Court. 14. So far the first objection raised by learned counsel for the opposite parties with respect to doctrine of merger and non-maintainability of this petition against the order of the Single Judge is concerned, learned counsel for the opposite parties have relied upon a decision of the Apex court in case of Kunhayammed and others (supra). In the said decision itself it has been clearly held that doctrine of merger was not of universal or unlimited application and its applicability has to be determined keeping in view the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the forum and the content and subject matter of challenge. It has been further held in the said order that when an order is affirmed by the appellate forum, in such situation application, if filed for review, will have to be filed before the appellate forum as the decision of the appellate forum existed for that purpose. However, the contempt is completely a different matter and the court derives its jurisdiction for the said purpose under the Contempt of Courts Act and as such it is completely unaffected by the doctrine of merger. 15. The Apex Court in exactly similar matter has decided Contempt Petition (Civil) No.43 of 2009 in Civil Appeal No.6694 of 2000 (Jayabrata Bhattacharjee Vs. 15. The Apex Court in exactly similar matter has decided Contempt Petition (Civil) No.43 of 2009 in Civil Appeal No.6694 of 2000 (Jayabrata Bhattacharjee Vs. Ashok Kumar and Ors.) vide order dated 30.03.2009 and held that as it had dismissed the appeal preferred by the D.D.A. against the judgment and order dated 23.07.1999 passed by the Delhi High Court, the contempt petition would be maintainable before the High Court and the petitioner may, therefore, file an appropriate contempt petition before the High court whose order had been affirmed by the Apex Court. 16. In this case, it is quite apparent that the claim of the petitioner had been decided by a Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 25.06.2012 passed in C.W.J.C. No.9625 of 2010 which had been fully affirmed even by the Division Bench and hence the petitioner was quite justified in filing this MJC petition for contempt before the Single Judge. 17. So far the second objection raised by learned counsel for the opposite parties that the MJC petition is premature due to civil review petitions is concerned, learned counsel for the opposite parties have relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court in case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. and another(supra) and Suresh Chandra Poddar(supra). 18. In case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. and another(supra), the Apex Court had held that wherever the order whose disobedience is complained of, is appealed against and stay of its operation is pending before the appellate Court, it will be appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint for contempt as the taking up of contempt matter first may cause serious prejudice. In such a situation, it is quite apparent that the said order of the Supreme Court was passed with respect to a situation where the order of the Single Judge was challenged in an appeal and hence during the pendency of the stay petition filed in that appeal, the contempt matter may not be decided. Here in the instant case, the order of the Single Judge has already been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench and the said appellate order has not even been challenged before the higher court, namely the Apex Court. Hence, the said order of the Apex Court is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 19. Here in the instant case, the order of the Single Judge has already been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench and the said appellate order has not even been challenged before the higher court, namely the Apex Court. Hence, the said order of the Apex Court is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 19. In case of Suresh Chandra Poddar (supra), the Apex Court held that without consideration of the stay matter speeding up of contempt proceeding against any person is not proper as the very order in question is yet to become final and at any rate, the first court should have directed the appellant to implement the direction in absence of stay order from the appellate court within a time frame fixed by it. Here also the matter is completely different as against the order of this court neither any appeal is pending nor any petition for stay filed in the appeal remains to be heard, hence this case law also is not attracted to the facts of this case. 20. From the aforesaid facts and the principles of law relied upon by learned counsel for the opposite parties it is quite apparent that they are trying to confuse the appellate jurisdiction with the review jurisdiction. The law is well settled that an appeal provided in the statute is the continuation of the original case and in the instant case the Division Bench had decided the Letters Patent appeal as per the provisions of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court Rules, which not having been challenged has attained finality. On the other hand, the review is not a right guaranteed by the Letters Patent nor it can, in any way, be termed as continuation of the original case. The review can be filed only in very stringent circumstances as provided in law, hence review petitions cannot be equated with the appeals. 21. Furthermore, the right of review is completely different from a right of appeal as a review is filed before the same Court which had passed the order concerned and hence it is quite distinguishable from an appeal which has to be filed for consideration before another Court. 21. Furthermore, the right of review is completely different from a right of appeal as a review is filed before the same Court which had passed the order concerned and hence it is quite distinguishable from an appeal which has to be filed for consideration before another Court. Furthermore, the right of review is merely a right for being heard on certain limited points before the same Court which heard the matter originally and in that sense this is a matter of procedure. On the other hand, a right of appeal is a right to be heard against the original order on all or any point before a higher Court and as such it is a substantive right and not a matter of mere procedure. In the said circumstances, the second objection of the opposite parties is also frivolous and misconceived. 22. So far the facts of the case as admitted by the opposite parties also are that the CWJC No.9625 of 2010 was allowed by this Court on 25.06.2012 and LPA No.1117 of 2012 and L.P.A. No.1176 of 2012 filed by two sets of opposite parties against the said order were dismissed by a common order by the Division Bench dated 30.08.2012 affirming the order of the learned Single Judge. Thereafter the petitioner gave notices to the opposite parties on 21.11.2012 and 12.01.2013 for complying the order of this Court dated 25.06.2012 according to which directions given therein were to be complied forthwith. Hence sufficient occasion and time was given to the opposite parties for compliance of the said order, but it miserably failed to comply the said order and the petitioners was constrained to file this contempt petition on 06.02.2013. 23. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, a clear case of contempt and disobedience of the order of this Court is made out against the opposite parties as per the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. However, since the opposite parties appear to be confused due to misunderstanding of the doctrine of merger and the principles involved in premature filing of cases as discussed above, this Court feels that a chance be given to the opposite parties to comply the afore-mentioned order of this Court dated 25.06.2012 passed in CWJC No.9652 of 2010 as the confusion of the aforesaid principles of law have been removed by the aforesaid findings. 24. 24. Hence, as a matter of last indulgence, time till 1st of July, 2013 is granted to the opposite parties to comply the said order positively by that date failing which stringent action shall be taken against them under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act 1971. 25. Let this case be placed under the same heading retaining its position on 10th of July, 2013 when both the parties would file their affidavits with respect to latest development.