JUDGMENT : R. Mala, J. The civil miscellaneous appeals arise out of fair and decretal order dated 3.12.2007 made in M.C.O.P. Nos.137 and 138 of 2003 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub-Court), Cheyyar. 2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: Selvamani and Annamalai are the petitioners in M.C.O.P. Nos. 137 and 138 of 2003. On 7.9.2002, at about 7.30 p.m..B while Selvamani was riding Hero Honda bearing registration No. TN 25-X 6561, which was belonging to respondent No.11 and insured with respondent No.2, along with Annamalai as pillion rider on Cheyyar-Vandavasi Road, at that time, one boy who was riding cycle suddenly crossed the road, due to which the two-wheeler dashed against the cyclist and the petitioners fell down and sustained injuries. The case has been registered in Crime No. 794 of 2002 under sections 279 and 337, Indian Penal Code, on the file of Cheyyar Police Station. 3. At the time of accident, Selvamani, petitioner in M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003, was aged about 20 years and he was a rice and paddy merchant and thereby earning a sum of Rs. 8,000 per month. Since he has sustained grievous injuries, which led to permanent disability, he claimed a compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000. 4. At the time of accident, Annamalai, petitioner in M.C.O.P. No. 138 of 2003, was aged about 35 years and he was a mason by profession and thereby earning a sum of Rs. 5,000 per month. Since he has sustained grievous injuries, which led to permanent disability, he claimed a compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000. 5. The insurance company, respondent No. 2, filed a detailed counter disputing the petitioners age, avocation and their income. In para 7 of the counter, it was specifically mentioned that the accident occurred only due to rash and negligent act of Selvamani-petitioner, who suffered minor injury. Hence, the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation. Further, he disputed the nature of injuries, period of treatment, percentage of disability and loss of earning power and prayed for dismissal of the petitions. 6. The Tribunal after considering oral and documentary evidence of PW 1 to PW 3 and RW 1 and Exhs. PI to P25 and R1 to R3 awarded a sum of Rs. 91,685 and Rs. Further, he disputed the nature of injuries, period of treatment, percentage of disability and loss of earning power and prayed for dismissal of the petitions. 6. The Tribunal after considering oral and documentary evidence of PW 1 to PW 3 and RW 1 and Exhs. PI to P25 and R1 to R3 awarded a sum of Rs. 91,685 and Rs. 91,690 respectively payable by both the respondents, against which the present appeals have been preferred by the insurance company, respondent No. 2. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Selvamani, respondent No. 1 in C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008, who drove the two-wheeler, alone is responsible for the accident. Hence, the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the compensation, since the petitioner Selvamani is a wrongdoer. Therefore, he prayed for allowing of this appeal. To substantiate his argument, he relied upon the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, 2007 ACJ 1284 (SC). 8. Refuting the same, learned counsel for petitioners, respondent No. 1, submitted that in respect of C.M.A. No. 3432 of 2008, since the petitioner was the pillion rider, the appeal itself is liable to be dismissed. In respect of C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008, petitioner Selvamani was the rider of two-wheeler and the accident occurred only due to sudden crossing of the road by the cyclist. Hence, the negligence is not on the part of the rider of two-wheeler. Therefore, the Tribunal correctly awarded compensation and hence, it does not warrant any interference. To substantiate his argument, he relied upon Bhagyalakshmi v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 (1) TN MAC 659 (SC). 9. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and the materials available on record. 10. In respect of M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003, the petitioner Selvamani is the rider of two-wheeler and he was examined as PW 1. In respect of M.C.O.P. No. 138 of 2003, the petitioner Annamalai is the pillion rider and he was examined as PW 2. Even if the court comes to the conclusion that the rider of the two-wheeler is responsible for the negligence, the owner of two-wheeler, respondent No. 1 in Tribunal, is vicariously liable to pay compensation and the insurance company, respondent No. 2 in Tribunal, is to indemnify the same. 11. Even if the court comes to the conclusion that the rider of the two-wheeler is responsible for the negligence, the owner of two-wheeler, respondent No. 1 in Tribunal, is vicariously liable to pay compensation and the insurance company, respondent No. 2 in Tribunal, is to indemnify the same. 11. On perusal of the claim petitions, it is revealed that the petitions have been filed under section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act. As per section 163-A (2) of the Act, in any claim for compensation under subsection (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. So the claimant need not prove the negligence of the owner of the vehicle. If the application is filed under section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, they have to prove the negligence on the part of the driver and owner of the vehicle is vicariously liable to pay the compensation. In the case on hand, the petitions have been filed under section 166 of the Act. So it is the duty of the petitioners to prove the negligence. 12. A combined reading of sections 165 (1) and 166 (1) clearly suggests that the person who himself caused the accident and out of whose own act loss allegedly occurred to him, is not supposed to be a person coming within the scope, ambit and purview of either section 165 (1) or section 166 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. He cannot, therefore, accuse himself of rashness or negligence and attempt to get compensated for his own fault. These two aforesaid sections clearly suggest that a person can approach a Claims Tribunal by way of filing an application only if such a person accuses another person of doing a civil wrong to him, resulting in loss to him, which he requires to be compensated for. The doing of civil wrong by the wrongdoer against the applicant in a petition under section 166 (1) is the sine qua non of initiating an action. The doing of civil wrong by the wrongdoer against the applicant in a petition under section 166 (1) is the sine qua non of initiating an action. It is inconceivable that a person initiates action against himself by pleading that it was because of his fault that loss was caused to him and that he should be asked to compensate himself. It is not that such a person has no remedy in law. If a person is driving a motor vehicle and, even if by his own negligence or rashness accident occurs to his vehicle resulting in loss to him, either by way of damage to the vehicle or the goods being carried thereon, he can always lodge a claim with the insurer of the vehicle to compensate him towards the loss occurring which, in terms of the insurance policy, the insurer is obliged to indemnify. If the insurer refuses to indemnify such a loss, it is always open to such a person to take legal recourse by approaching a civil court by filing a civil suit. That is an appropriate remedy. Taking recourse to section 166 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act was neither an appropriate remedy nor a desirable course of action in such a case. 13. On perusal of judgment, in para 15, the Tribunal has held as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) In the above para, it was specifically mentioned that on the instruction given by the owner of the vehicle, respondent No. 1 in Tribunal, Selvamani, PW 1, drove the two-wheeler and Annamalai, PW 2, was a pillion rider. Suddenly, a boy came on his cycle, crossed the road and the two-wheeler hit the cyclist and the petitioners fell down and sustained injuries. But whereas no specific finding has been given by the Tribunal in respect of negligence. As already stated that since claim petitions have been filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the duty of the claimants to prove the negligence and thereafter only they are entitled to compensation. Admittedly, the Tribunal has not given any findings in respect of negligence. So I am of the view that the Tribunal has committed an error by awarding compensation without giving any findings in respect of negligence. 14. On the side of the petitioners, F.I.R., Exh. P1, has been marked. Admittedly, the Tribunal has not given any findings in respect of negligence. So I am of the view that the Tribunal has committed an error by awarding compensation without giving any findings in respect of negligence. 14. On the side of the petitioners, F.I.R., Exh. P1, has been marked. The alleged occurrence had taken place on 7.9.2002 at 1930 hours and the complaint was lodged by the father of the cyclist on the same day at 2300 hours. In Exh. P1, it was mentioned that on 7.9.2002, at 7.30 p.m., when a boy, namely, Ramadoss, who was riding his cycle, came from Cheyyar to Vinayaga-puram and when he was nearing Anakkavur Union Bank, at that time, the two-wheeler which was coming from opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner, hit against the cyclist and the cyclist, rider and pillion rider of the two-wheeler sustained injuries. It is an admitted fact that said Ramadoss also filed a claim petition. So this court has to decide as to how the accident has taken place. 15. As per the evidence of Selvamani, PW 1, the two-wheeler is belonging to the respondent No.1 and on behalf of the respondent No.1, the petitioner rode the two-wheeler for his work and he possessed valid driving licence at the time of accident. The cyclist, who suddenly crossed the road, hit against the two-wheeler, due to which both the petitioners fell down and sustained injuries. But in the affidavit filed in support of the claim petition itself, petitioners stated that the case was registered in Crime No.794 of 2002 under sections 279 and 337, Indian Penal Code before Cheyyar Police Station. But no reason has been assigned as to why no complaint has been lodged by the petitioners. Except ipse dixit of the petitioners, no other evidence has been let in by them. Annamalai, PW 2, who was the pillion rider, in his evidence, stated that since the cyclist suddenly crossed the road, the accident occurred. 16. In the claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003, on p. 5 of the common typed set of papers, it was stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) 17. In the claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 138 of 2003, on p. 14 of the common typed set of papers, it was stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) 18. In the claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003, on p. 5 of the common typed set of papers, it was stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) 17. In the claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 138 of 2003, on p. 14 of the common typed set of papers, it was stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) 18. But in the examination-in-chief of PW 1, he stated that the boy crossed the road and dashed against the two-wheeler. So it is appropriate to incorporate the following portion from the evidence of PW 1: (Omitted as in vernacular) In his cross-examination, PW 1 stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) PW 2 in his examination-in-chief stated as follows: (Omitted as in vernacular) So there are two contradictory statements in the petitions and oral evidence. 19. Per contra, N.P. Kesavan, RW 1, who was working as Development Officer in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., in his evidence stated that the two-wheeler was insured with their company. The cyclist, namely, Ramadoss, filed an application in M.C.O.P. No. 543 of 2002, which was pending. He has further stated that no vehicle number and name of the accused have been mentioned in F.I.R., Exh. P1. But in his cross-examination, he stated that the two-wheeler bearing registration No. TN 25-X 6561 belonged to one Kiru-bakaran, who is the respondent No. 1 in Tribunal, and it was insured with insurance company, respondent No. 2. 20. Admittedly, the complaint was filed by father of the boy, namely, Ramadoss, the cyclist. But the petitioner who drove the two-wheeler has not filed any complaint. Even no document was marked to prove the damages to the vehicle and rough sketch was also not marked. Wound certificate, Exh. P5, of Selvamani, PW 1, only has been marked, in which it was stated that he was alleged to have sustained injuries near Anakkavur Union Bank, when he was coming on his two-wheeler with Annamalai, when he was hit by bicycle at around 7.30 p.m. on 7.9.2002. Except ipse dixit of petitioners, no other evidence has been let in by the petitioners to prove the negligence on the part of cyclist. 21. Considering the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and Exh. PI, since the applications have been filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the duty of the claimants to prove the negligence. 21. Considering the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and Exh. PI, since the applications have been filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is the duty of the claimants to prove the negligence. In my view, Selvamani, PW 1, alone drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the cyclist and fell down and sustained injuries. He might have seen the boy, who crossed the road, he could very well have averted the accident. Therefore, the accident occurred only due to rash and negligent driving of the rider of the two-wheeler. Since Selvamani, PW 1, himself is a wrongdoer, he is not entitled to any compensation. But Annamalai, PW 2, is a pillion rider and since the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of petitioner Selvamani, PW 1, the owner of the two-wheeler is vicariously liable to pay the compensation and the insurance company is liable to indemnify the same, since the two-wheeler is insured with the appellant insurance company. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant insurance company relied upon the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, 2007 ACJ 1284 (SC), in which it was stated that for negligent driving leading to car colliding with tree, insurance company is not liable. As per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, 2004 ACJ 1 (SC), the insurance company was liable to pay the amount awarded even if there was breach of a policy condition and if there was a dispute between the insured and insurer, it had to be fought elsewhere and they cannot be denied the benefit of the insurance. The insured himself was driving the two-wheeler at the time of accident. So the claimants were obliged to prove the negligence of the driver and the principles of general law in that regard have not been jettisoned by the Motor Vehicles Act. On the other hand the law expounded by this court earlier had been accepted by the legislature by enacting section 163-A of the Act. Para 9 of the decision in Meera Variyal (supra) is extracted hereunder: "(9) Before we proceed to consider the main aspect arising for decision in this appeal, we would like to make certain general observations. On the other hand the law expounded by this court earlier had been accepted by the legislature by enacting section 163-A of the Act. Para 9 of the decision in Meera Variyal (supra) is extracted hereunder: "(9) Before we proceed to consider the main aspect arising for decision in this appeal, we would like to make certain general observations. It may be true that the Motor Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to claims for compensation arising out of accidents, is a beneficent piece of legislation. It may also be true that subject to the rules made in that behalf, the Tribunal may follow a summary procedure while dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation under the Act should ignore all the basic principles of law in determining the claim for compensation. Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is insured with the insurance company and is being driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the primary liability under law for payment of compensation is that of the driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the insurance company. A third party for whose benefit the insurance is taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that driver was negligent in driving the vehicle resulting in the accident; that the owner was vicariously liable and that the insurance company was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently, satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general principles, one would expect the driver to be impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for an accident that has occurred due to alleged negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded when a claim is being filed? As we have noticed, the relevant provisions of the Act are not intended to jettison all principles of law relating to a claim for compensation which is still based on a tortious liability. Why should not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded when a claim is being filed? As we have noticed, the relevant provisions of the Act are not intended to jettison all principles of law relating to a claim for compensation which is still based on a tortious liability. The Claims Tribunal ought to have, in the case on hand, directed the claimant to implead Mahmood Hasan who was allegedly driving the vehicle at the time of accident. Here, there was also controversy whether it was Mahmood Hasan who was driving the vehicle or it was the deceased himself. Surely, such a question could have been decided only in the presence of Mahmood Hasan who would have been principally liable for any compensation that might be decreed in case he was driving the said vehicle. Secondly, the deceased was employed in a limited company. It was necessary for the claimants to establish what was the monthly income and what was the dependency on the basis of which the compensation could be adjudged as payable. Should not any Tribunal trained in law ask the claimants to produce evidence in support of the monthly salary or income earned by the deceased from his employer company? Is there anything in the Motor Vehicles Act which stands in the way of the Tribunal asking for the best evidence, acceptable evidence? We think not. Here again, the position that the Motor Vehicles Act vis-a-vis claim for compensation arising out of an accident is a beneficent piece of legislation, cannot lead a Tribunal trained in law to forget all basic principles of establishing liability and establishing the quantum of compensation payable. The Tribunal,in this case, has chosen to merely go by the oral evidence of the widow when without any difficulty the claimants could have got the employer company to produce the relevant documents to show the income that was being derived by the deceased from his employment. Of course, in this case, the above two aspects become relevant only if we find the insurance company liable. If we find that only the owner of the vehicle, the employer of the deceased, was liable, there will be no occasion to further consider these aspects since the owner has acquiesced in the award passed by the Tribunal against it." 23. If we find that only the owner of the vehicle, the employer of the deceased, was liable, there will be no occasion to further consider these aspects since the owner has acquiesced in the award passed by the Tribunal against it." 23. Considering the above decision, I am of the view, pay and recover does not arise in this case, because the petitioner Selvamani himself is a wrongdoer. Hence, the petitioner Selvamani in M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003 (C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008) is not entitled to any compensation, since the owner of the two-wheeler is not vicariously liable to pay compensation and the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the same. 24. In respect of the petitioner Annamalai in M.C.O.P. No.138 of 2003 (C.M.A. No. 3432 of 2008), he was the pillion rider and was traveling on the two-wheeler, which was belonging to respondent No. 1 and insured with respondent No. 2. 25. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners, respondent No. 1, reported in Bhagyalakshmi v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 (1) TN MAC 659 (SC). He submitted that it is a package policy and the insured is also entitled to compensation and for that reason, he relied upon para 14 of the above judgment, which is extracted hereunder: "(14) The policy in question is a package policy. The contract of insurance if given its face value covers the risk not only of a third party but also of persons traveling in the car including the owner thereof." In the above decision, it was specifically mentioned that the vehicle had been driven by the driver and it dashed against the tree and the owner is one of the occupants. Since the policy is a package policy, the contract of insurance if given its face value covers the risk not only of a third party but also of persons traveling in the car including the owner thereof. The owner of the vehicle therein is only a passenger and he is not tortfeasor or wrongdoer. But here, Selvamani, PW 1, is a wrongdoer because of his rash and negligent driving only, the accident has occurred. So he is not entitled to any compensation. 26. As per the dictum laid down in Oriental Insurance Co. The owner of the vehicle therein is only a passenger and he is not tortfeasor or wrongdoer. But here, Selvamani, PW 1, is a wrongdoer because of his rash and negligent driving only, the accident has occurred. So he is not entitled to any compensation. 26. As per the dictum laid down in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, 2007 ACJ 1284 (SC), since the claim petitions have been filed under section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, the claimants ought to have proved the negligence. The manner of accident has proved that Selvamani, PW 1, alone rode the two-wheeler in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the cyclist, due to which the cyclist, the rider and pillion rider, PW 2, of two-wheeler sustained injuries. But no complaint has been preferred by Selvamani, PW 1. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has committed an error in not giving any findings in respect of negligence. Since the claim petitions have been filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Tribunal ought to have given findings in respect of negligence, because it is the duty of petitioners to prove the negligence and thereafter, he is entitled to the compensation under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 27. As discussed above, the accident occurred only due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner Selvamani, PW 1. Since PW 1 is a wrongdoer, he is not endtied to any compensation. So respondent No. 1 in C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008 is not entitled to any compensation for his own wrong. 28. In respect of respondent No. 1 in C.M.A. No. 3432 of 2008, the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of Selvamani, PW 1. So the owner of two-1 wheeler is vicariously liable to pay the compensation and the insurance company, respondent No. 2, is liable to indemnify the same. Hence, respondent No. 1, PW2, in C.M.A. No. 3432 of 2008 is entitled to compensation as awarded by the Tribunal and appellant, respondent No. 2 herein, is liable to pay the same. 29. In fine, C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008 allowed without costs and the fair and decretal order passed in M.C.O.P. No. 137 (12003 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub-Court), Cheyyar, is hereby set aside. 30. In fine, M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003 is dismissed without costs. 31. 29. In fine, C.M.A. No. 3431 of 2008 allowed without costs and the fair and decretal order passed in M.C.O.P. No. 137 (12003 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub-Court), Cheyyar, is hereby set aside. 30. In fine, M.C.O.P. No. 137 of 2003 is dismissed without costs. 31. C.M.A. No. 3432 of 2008 is dismissed with costs, confirming the judgment and decree dated 3.12.2007 made in M.C.O.P. No. 138 of 2003 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub-Court), Cheyyar. 32. The connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.