PAM Infrastructure Projects Ltd. v. Lourdes Textile Pvt. Ltd.
2013-09-06
PRASENJIT MANDAL
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Prasenjit Mandal, J. 1. This application is at the instance of the defendant no.2 and is directed against the order dated April 12, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 10th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No.2738 of 2010 thereby rejecting an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. Now, the question is whether the impugned order should be sustained. 3. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials on record, I find that the plaintiff/opposite party no.1 herein instituted the aforesaid suit for permanent injunction and other consequential reliefs. By an agreement dated July 23, 2001 between the defendant no.2 and the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the defendant no.1 had granted the exclusive right of construction of a commercial complex at the suit premises as described in the schedule to the plaint in favour of the defendant no.2. After the completion of the said commercial complex, an agreement dated September 26, 2006 was held between the defendant no.2 and the plaintiff relating to providing for car parking space, demarcation of open terrace, other rooms, etc. and the according to the said agreement, the plaintiff took possession of the areas mentioned in the said agreement but failed to pay the balance amount of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- by April 2007 and the defendant No.2 had appropriated the sum of Rs. 30 lakh paid by the plaintiff as pre-determined liquidated damages in terms of the agreement. The defendant no.2 terminated the said agreement and thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the said suit praying for reliefs already stated. 4. In that suit the defendant no.2 filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was rejected by the impugned order. 5. In order to appreciate the matter in dispute, it will be proper to set out the reliefs sought for in the plaint:- (a) A permanent injunction restraining the defendants from asserting, that the plaintiff failed or neglected and/or were not ready and willing to perform its part of the said agreement and/or that the plaintiff was in possession or occupation or had the use of the said additional facility and/or that the defendants are not entitled to refund the said sum of Rs.
30 lakhs, paid in terms of the said agreement and/or the plaintiff is not entitled to adjust its claim for refund of the said sum of Rs. 30 lakhs, against the amount of money, paid as rent, in respect of the 1st floor of the said premises, by the plaintiff to the defendant no.2; (b) Costs of the suit; (c) Such further or other relief or reliefs that the plaintiff may be entitled to in law or equity. 6. I also think that now it will be proper to mention the arbitration clause of the agreement dated September 26, 2006. 8. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8.1 All disputes and differences between the parties hereto as regards the interpretation, scope or effect or any of the terms and conditions herein contained or as regards the rights and liabilities of the parties or in any way touching or concerning the said ADDITIONAL FACILITIES shall be referred to Arbitration and the same shall be deemed to be a reference within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any other statutory modification or enactment thereto for the time being in force. 7. Narrating the facts as recorded above, Mr. Saptangsu Basu, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has contended that in order to avoid the arbitration clause of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no.2, the suit has been framed in the above manner impleading the Kolkata Municipal Corporation as the defendant no.1. This has been done to drag the litigation for a longer period. He has also contended that in an identical situation, this Bench has allowed an application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act in C.O. No.1029 of 2012. 8. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Basu has submitted that the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 should have been allowed. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhis Das Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party, has supported the impugned order. He has contended since the reliefs have been sought for against both the defendants, the arbitration clause will not apply in the circumstances. 10.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhis Das Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party, has supported the impugned order. He has contended since the reliefs have been sought for against both the defendants, the arbitration clause will not apply in the circumstances. 10. From the above facts and circumstances, it is clear that though the agreement dated September 26, 2006 held between the defendant no.2 and the plaintiff lays down the mode of resolution of the dispute, in order to avoid the arbitration clause, the defendant no.1 has been added so as to oust the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to be appointed in respect of the dispute between the defendant no.2 and the plaintiff. The plaintiff has given a colourful shape of the plaint to show that he has sought for reliefs against both the defendants, though the dispute is between the defendant no.2 and the plaintiff. Therefore, it is obvious that the plaint has been couched in such a manner so as to wriggle out of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 11. When the plaintiff has filed the suit in such a fashion according to the decision dated November 20, 2012 of an unreported case of Romola Bhattacharjee v. Twilight Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. in C.O. No.1029 of 2012, this Bench has held that the findings of the learned Trial Judge that the bifurcation cause of action cannot be done, cannot be supported. Without any bifurcation, the arbitrator to be appointed could well decide the dispute involved in the matter. Accordingly, the order of the learned Trial Judge was set aside and the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was allowed. The fact of the present case is similar to that of the said C.O. No.1029 of 2012. Therefore, in my view, the findings of the learned Trial Judge cannot be supported. 12. The question is, thus, answered. 13. The application, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside. The application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act stands allowed. 14. The learned Trial Judge is, therefore, directed to do the needful for referring the parties to arbitration in accordance with law. He shall pass appropriate orders in the said title suit. 15. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 16.
The application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act stands allowed. 14. The learned Trial Judge is, therefore, directed to do the needful for referring the parties to arbitration in accordance with law. He shall pass appropriate orders in the said title suit. 15. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 16. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the learned Advocates for the parties on their usual undertaking.