Manoj Misra, J.:—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned A.G.A for the State.2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.8.2012 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Temporary,(Ex-Cadre-1), Court No.14, Gorakhpur in Criminal Revision No. 281 of 2011 as also the summoning order dated 10.4.2009 passed by the Judicial Magistrate-I,Gorakhpur in Complaint Case No.1295 of 2008 whereby the revisionist has been summoned under section 138 of the N.I. Act.3. The facts, as they appear on record, are that the opposite party No.2 filed a complaint on 17.9.2008 against the petitioner under section 138 of the N.I.Act. In the complaint it was alleged that a cheque dated 19.7.2008 for Rs.12,03,926.00/- on Punjab National Bank, Bank Road Branch, Gorakhpur issued in favour of the complainant by the petitioner in lieu of? supplies made by the complainant against various invoices detailed in complaint, returned unpaid. It? was alleged that the cheque was deposited for collection with Syndicate Bank, Gorakhpur and it was returned by the Punjab National? Bank, Bank Road, Gorakhpur on 21.7.2008 with the remark ‘’Exceed Arrangement’. The? information? of its dishonor was received from the Banker on 23.7.2008. Consequently, a notice for payment of the cheque amount was dispatched on 20.8.2008 to the accused under registered post but even after expiry of the notice period no payment was made as a result, the complaint? was? filed.4. It appears from the order sheet? produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner,? during the course of arguments, that the complaint was presented on 17.9.2008? on which date the Presiding Officer was not present. Accordingly, 18.10.2008 was fixed. Again, on 18.10.2008, the Presiding Officer was absent. Consequently, 4.12.2008 was fixed. On 4.12.2008 it appears that again on the absence? of the Presiding Officer, 19.12.2008 was fixed. On 19.12.2008 it appears that the Presiding Officer passed an order directing for recording of statement under section 200 Cr.P.C. After recording the statement under section 200 Cr.P.C, the learned Magistrate summoned the petitioner under section 138 of the N.I. Act.5. Challenging the summoning order the petitioner preferred a revision which was dismissed.6. Assailing the orders passed by the courts below, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the complaint there is no averment with regard to the service of notice of demand, therefore, the complaint was not legally maintainable. Challenging the summoning order the petitioner preferred a revision which was dismissed.6. Assailing the orders passed by the courts below, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the complaint there is no averment with regard to the service of notice of demand, therefore, the complaint was not legally maintainable. In the alternative, it was submitted that admittedly the notice of demand was dispatched on 20.8.2008 whereas the complaint was filed on 17.9.2008 even before the expiry of one month from the date of dispatch of notice, therefore, even if it is assumed that the notice of demand, sent under registered post to the addressee, had been served on the addressee, in due course of time, the period for such service should be taken as 30 days from the date of dispatch as has been laid in the case of Subodh S. Salakar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah and another, AIR 2008 SC 3086 ,? therefore,? the? complaint was premature and no cognizance could have been taken on such a complaint.7. Per contra, the learned A.G.A submitted that from the order sheet? it appears that the court took cognizance on 19.12.2008 as that was the date when the court first applied its mind on the complaint allegations and proceeded to fix a date for recording the statement under section 200 Cr.P.C. It has been stated that since the date i.e 19.12.2008 is about two months after expiry of period of one month from the date of dispatch? of the notice, it cannot be said that the complaint was premature. Further, the learned A.G.A pointed out that in view of the decision of the apex court in the case of C.C Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Mohd. & another (2007)6 SCC 555 ? what is required to be stated in the complaint is? the manner and the mode in which the notice of demand is issued. And since the notice of demand was issued under registered cover, a presumption with regard to its service could be drawn by virtue of section 27 of the General Clauses Act and, as such,? the? complaint cannot be said to be defective.8. the manner and the mode in which the notice of demand is issued. And since the notice of demand was issued under registered cover, a presumption with regard to its service could be drawn by virtue of section 27 of the General Clauses Act and, as such,? the? complaint cannot be said to be defective.8. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, since in the present case the cognizance was taken nearly two months after expiry of period of one month from the date of dispatch of notice of demand, it cannot be said that the complaint was premature. In the case of Nar Singh Das Tapadia Vs. Goverdhan Das Partani and another? reported in 2000 (7) SCC 183 it has been held that where? the complaint is filed before? arising of cause of action in terms of proviso (c) of section 138 of the N.I.Act instead of dismissing the complaint, taking cognizance could? be postponed till the arising of cause of action. It has also been held that mere filing a complaint does not mean to take the cognizance. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narsing Das (Supra) even if it is assumed that the complaint was filed before the arising? of cause of action under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I.Act, the cognizance was taken nearly two months after the expiry of period of one month from the date of dispatch of the notice, therefore, on that? count the proceedings cannot be faulted. As regards the contention that there is no averment in the complaint with regard to the service of notice? suffice? it to say that in the light of the decision of? apex court in the case of C.C. Alavi Haji (supra) the essential ingredient? that is required to be stated in the complaint is the mode and the manner in which the notice of demand has been given. In paragraph 8 of the complaint, it has been clearly mentioned that a registered notice was dispatched on 20.8.2008 vide registered post at the given address of the petitioner. Since the notice was dispatched under registered cover and the postal receipt of dispatch as well as? the copy of the notice was brought on record which disclosed the address of the petitioner, the law would raise? Since the notice was dispatched under registered cover and the postal receipt of dispatch as well as? the copy of the notice was brought on record which disclosed the address of the petitioner, the law would raise? a presumption, though rebuttable, with regard to service by virtue of section 27 of the General Clauses Act.9. In? this view of the matter, a prima facie case is made out for proceeding against the petitioner and as such the issuance of summons under section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be faulted.10. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed._____________