JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Bist, J. Present petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the judgment and order dated 15.03.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge/F.T.C. Ist Dehradun, by which the Rent Appeal No.177 of 2000 filed by the respondent/landlord was allowed and the shops in question were released in favour of the respondent/ landlord. 2. Brief facts of the case, as narrated, are that on 21.09.1998 the respondent/landlord filed a release application under Section 21 of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 registered as P.A. Case No.84 of 1998 “Shri Prithpal Singh Kohali Vs. Shri Daljeet Singh” before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun on the ground that the same is bona-fide required by him for his son, namely, Amardeep Kohli alongwith his wife Mohanjeet Kohli to start their clinic at Dehradun. The said release application was contested by the petitioner/tenant on the ground that the need of the landlord for the disputed accommodation is neither bona-fide nor genuine. The landlord filed his affidavit 47ka and affidavit of his son Amardeep Singh Kohli 48ka, as evidence in support of the release application. The petitioner/tenant also filed his affidavit 61ka, affidavit of Shri Harvinder Singh (witness) 62ka, as evidence in support of the written statement. On the basis of the evidence on record filed by both the parties and after considering the case of the parties, the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun vide order dated 25.07.2000 dismissed the release application filed by the respondent/landlord and held that the need of the landlord is not real, bona-fide and acute. Aggrieved by the order-dated 25.07.2000 passed by the Prescribed Authority, the respondent/landlord preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 177 of 2000 before the District Judge, Dehradun. During the pendency of the appeal, Dr. Amardeep Singh (son of landlord) and his wife Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur filed their joint affidavit 40ka on 13.11.2003, alleging therein that they are working at Ludhiana, as time gap arrangement till some suitable accommodation is made available at Dehradun. The petitioner filed his affidavit 51ka along with annexure on 09.09.2004 and controverted the facts mentioned in the affidavit 40ka filed by the landlord. Thereafter, on 26.05.2011 the landlord moved an application 103ka along with affidavit of Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur (104 ka). In her affidavit, Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur stated that her husband died in a road accident, leaving behind him his wife (Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur) and two children, namely, Km. Thereafter, on 26.05.2011 the landlord moved an application 103ka along with affidavit of Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur (104 ka). In her affidavit, Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur stated that her husband died in a road accident, leaving behind him his wife (Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur) and two children, namely, Km. Amrin Kaur aged about 13 years and a son Master Tejas Singh Kohli. In her affidavit, she further stated that inspite of sudden death of her husband, her need to settle alongwith her children at Dehradun with her father-in-law Pritpal Singh Kohli and establish her clinic in the accommodation in question, still subsists. She further stated that she alongwith children does not want to live with her parents at Ludhiana and is keen for education of her children in some good Public School at Dehradun, as Dehradun has acquired the status of Education Hub. She also stated that after the death of her husband, she is confirmed in her mind and decision to live with her father-in-law and settle in Dehradun and to carry on her medical practice at Dehradun. In rebuttal, the petitioner filed his affidavit and documentary evidence and controverted the facts mentioned by the landlord. On 15.03.2012, the learned Additional District Judge/ F.T.C. 1st, Derhadun allowed the Rent Control Appeal No. 177 of 2000 preferred by the respondent/landlord and set-aside the order dated 25.07.2000 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the accommodation in question was released in favour of the landlord. Against the order-dated 15.03.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge/F.T.C. Ist Dehradun, present petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. Shri S.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that that the release application has been filed with malafide intention and based on oblique motive. He submitted that the son of the landlord, namely, Dr. Amardeep Singh Kohli was married with Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur R/o Ludhiana on 03.11.1996 and both of them permanently settled in Ludhiana. They were neither interested nor wanted to settle in Dehradun. The landlord has not come with clean hands and moved the release application only on the false and frivolous grounds, simply to evict the tenant under one pretext or the another. Unfortunately Dr. Amardeep Singh died on 11.04.2011 in a road accident and after his demise, his wife Dr. They were neither interested nor wanted to settle in Dehradun. The landlord has not come with clean hands and moved the release application only on the false and frivolous grounds, simply to evict the tenant under one pretext or the another. Unfortunately Dr. Amardeep Singh died on 11.04.2011 in a road accident and after his demise, his wife Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur along with two children has settled with her parents at Ludhiana and never visited to her in-laws house at Dehradun either in the life time of her husband or thereafter. She is still permanently settled in Ludhiana. He submitted that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur was, in fact, neither interested nor is still interested to settle in Dehradun. Averments made in the application as well as in the affidavits are in fact not true. The said application as well the affidavit was filed simply to give colour to the release application. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from the perusal of the judgment of the Appellate Court, it is crystal clear that the landlord has miserably failed to prove his bona-fide need and there is ample accommodation in his possession. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner relied upon paragraph no.12 of the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1596 “Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal” and submitted that appellate Court wrongly allowed the release application ignoring the fact that element of need is missing in this case. Same is quoted below: “The question would still remain whether there were proper grounds on which this finding of fact could be interfered with by the High Court. It is now well settled by several decisions of this Court including the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case, 1966 MPLJ 26 (SC) and Smt. Kamla Soni's case, C.A. No.2150 of 1966, D/-26.9.1969= (reported in AIR 1969 NSC 186) that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation in the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. It is for the court to determine the truth of the assertion and also whether it is bona fide. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business, that would not be enough to establish that he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide. The word “required” signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show — the burden being upon him — that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business. The Additional District Judge did not misdirect himself in regard to these matters, as for example, by misconstruing the word “required” or by erroneously placing the burden of proof on the appellant and no error of law was committed by him in arriving at the finding of fact in regard to the question of bona fide requirement of the respondent, which would entitle the High Court in second appeal to interfere with that finding of fact.” 4. By referring the judgment in the case of Rakesh Kumar Joshi Vs. Narendra Kumar, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the High Court should take into consideration the factual aspect of the matter also, particularly having regard to the findings of fact arrived at by the prescribed authority and writ petition cannot be dismissed without closer scrutiny of findings. He further submitted that in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chandra Gupta, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “the High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the rent controller on the touchstone of ‘whether it is according to law’ for that the limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence i.e. for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the rent controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available, therefore the High Court should have considered that the lower courts had failed to consider the requirement of the section regarding availability of reasonable accommodation”. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner contended that it is settled law that bona-fide need is the foundation of the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for eviction of tenant, without it the application cannot be allowed. He submitted that in case the landlord failed to establish his bona-fide need, the hardship as well as comparative need shall not be considered. In the present case, the landlord has miserably failed to prove his bona-fide and genuine need therefore, the Appellate Court has committed illegality while allowing the appeal and the finding of the Appellate Court, regarding the need of the landlord, is totally perverse and erroneous. He argued that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority was based on evidence and law, which need not require any interference by the Appellate Court, but the Appellate Court committed illegality by interfering with the same. He argued that there is no alternative accommodation in possession of the tenant except the property in question and there is a great burden on him to support his family which consist of himself, his eldest son Harpal Singh, his wife and two major children, who are residing in House No. 245, Patel Nagar, Dehradun, and the said house is hardly sufficient for their residence. He submitted that from the perusal of the evidence on record, it is clear that the hardship of the tenant is greater, as the landlord has failed to establish his bona-fide need. He argued that the Appellate Court did not consider the provisions of Rule 16 (2) of the Act, which were argued before the Appellate Court and totally ignored the same, while allowing the appeal. He submitted that the order impugned is totally illegal, arbitrary and erroneous, which is totally based on assumption and is not sustainable under law and is liable to be quashed. 5. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that in any case, after the death of Dr. Amardeep Singh (son of the landlord), the bonafide need of the landlord is no more in existence, as the accommodation in question cannot be released for the need of Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur (widow of late Amardeep Singh). Shri Jain vehemently argued that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur is daughter-in-law of the landlord and after the death of her husband, she is no more a family member. He submitted that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur (widow of late Amardeep Singh). Shri Jain vehemently argued that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur is daughter-in-law of the landlord and after the death of her husband, she is no more a family member. He submitted that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur does not come under the definition of ‘family’, as defined in Section 3 (g) of the Act. He argued that on this ground alone, the petition deserves to be allowed and the release application should be dismissed. In support of his submission, he relied upon the cases reported in A.R.C. 1994 (2) 1 Ram Nath Yadav Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer and A.R.C. 1995 (1) 220 Harish Tandon Vs. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad. 6. Respondent filed counter affidavit, in which it is stated that the present petition filed by the petitioner/ tenant is against a detailed and well considered finding of fact, whereby the Appellate Court found that need of the landlord is bonafide and the ingredients of comparative hardship is also in his favour. In view of findings of fact, coupled with the fact that during long pendency of the proceedings before the Courts below the tenant has not tried to get any alternative accommodation, the petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that petitioner is a tenant of one shop leading into another room. These are not two different shops as alleged in the petition. All the attending facts relating to bonafide need were elaborated in the release application. It is submitted that the need of the landlord is bonafide. It is also submitted that objection to the release application were filed on incorrect facts. The averments that the landlord filed release application with incorrect fact and with unclean hands were denied. The affidavits filed by the landlord/respondent show that need of the respondent is bonafide and shop was required bonafidely. The affidavits further reveal that ingredients of comparative hardship is in favour respondent. It is submitted that the findings of the prescribed authority were against weight of evidence on record. The prescribed authority recorded a perverse finding of fact and wrongly recorded that need of landlord was not bonafide. Similarly finding about comparative hardship is against weight of evidence. It is further submitted that the averments made in the petition are misconceived and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. The prescribed authority recorded a perverse finding of fact and wrongly recorded that need of landlord was not bonafide. Similarly finding about comparative hardship is against weight of evidence. It is further submitted that the averments made in the petition are misconceived and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. Shri Arvind Vashisht, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that shop in question is infact bonafide required by the landlord. A person is not supposed to sit idle and die before the shop is actually released in his favour. The temporary work cannot do away or mitigate landlord’s need of shop. He submitted that after death of her husband, Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur returned to Dehradun and is settled there with her in-laws. Affidavit dated 15-02-2012 filed by the petitioner is false and is based upon on incorrect facts. As a matter of fact, the need of the landlord has increased meanwhile. He contended that the landlord has produced ample evidence to prove his bonafide need and comparative hardship and the appellate Court has recorded a finding after due appreciation of evidence. He submitted that the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no relevance in the present case. The petitioner has not pointed out any illegality or perversity in the order and has not pointed out any piece of evidence, much lesser than material piece of evidence, which the Appellate Court below failed to appreciate and therefore, the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court below cannot be upset in this writ jurisdiction. He further submitted that the Prescribed Authority recorded a perverse finding of fact and wrongly recorded a finding that need of landlord was not bonafide. Similarly finding about comparative hardship is against weight of evidence, while the Appellate Court, after due appreciation of evidence on record, recorded correct findings of fact. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner has not made any attempt to get alternative accommodation during these 14 years of pendency of the release application. There are innumerable accommodations available in Dehradun and this mere fact shows that case of petitioner is not acceptable and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the papers available on record. 9. There are innumerable accommodations available in Dehradun and this mere fact shows that case of petitioner is not acceptable and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 8. I have considered the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the papers available on record. 9. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner gave emphasis on the argument that Dr. Mohanjeet Kaur, being widow, does not come under the definition of family. He submitted that the widowed daughter-in-law is not family member of landlord and therefore, accommodation in question cannot be released for the need of daughter-in-law. According to him, widow of the deceased son has a legal right of residence in that building. In support of this submission, he referred to two judgments. (i) A.R.C. 1994 (2) 1 (Ram Nath Yadav) (ii) A.R.C. 1995 (1) 220 (Harish Tandon). In Harish Tandon’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that son-in-law shall not be deemed to be a member of the family within the definition as given in the Act under Section 3 (g). The Hon’ble Supreme Court has not dealt the status of widowed daughter-in-law. In the case of Ram Nath Yadav, the Allahabad High Court has held that in respect of a residential building, widowed daughter-in-law having a legal right of residence has been included in the definition of the ‘family’ in relation to the landlord. The Allahabad High Court further held that in so far as non-residential buildings are concerned, she can have no legal right, as her right was only limited to maintenance by the father-in-law and this while defining ‘family’ in so far as non-residential buildings are concerned, she has not been rightly included. 10. For proper appreciation of this argument Section 3 (g) of the Act is being quoted below: “3(g) “family” in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means, his or her- (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building ;” 11. Though, it is true that legislature has not put widow of deceased son in Section 3 (g) of the Act, but this Section has taken care of such daughter-in-law by mentioning ‘any female having a legal right of residence in that building’. In my view, widow of a deceased son comes under the meaning of family, as defined under Section 3 (g) of the Act. In Indian society, a girl, after her marriage, leaves her parental house permanently and becomes family member of her husband’s family. She eats there, sleeps there, lives there and dies there. Even her last rites are performed by her in-laws family at their place. Considering all this, how could this be said that after the death of her husband, she has become outsider and is no more a family member? I am unable to understand how status of daughter-in-law in her family can change after the death of her husband, when status of her son remains the same. I am not in agreement with the Allahabad High Court that legal right of widowed daughter-in-law is only limited to maintenance by the father-in-law. Therefore, the argument of learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that after the death of Dr. Amardeep Singh (son of the landlord), the bonafide need of landlord’s widowed daughter-in-law could not be considered, is rejected. 12. Other judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner, do not help the petitioner, as the learned Appellate Court has decided the question of bonafide need objectively by discussing the need of landlord in detail. In the present case, after the death of Dr. Amardeep Singh (son of the landlord), his wife Dr. Mohanjeet Kohli wants to settle in Dehradun alongwith her children and old father-in-law and wants to establish clinic in the accommodation in question. She also wants to give education to her children in good Public School in Dehradun. All these facts are sufficient to prove the genuine need of landlord. Infact, at present, the need of landlord has increased. The finding of learned Appellate Court on bonafide need of the landlord is correct. 13. On comparative hardship also, I find that finding of lower appellate Court is well reasoned. After filing of release application, no sincere efforts have been made by the tenant to search alternative accommodation. Only one application for allotment was given by him before the District Magistrate on 29.05.2000. 13. On comparative hardship also, I find that finding of lower appellate Court is well reasoned. After filing of release application, no sincere efforts have been made by the tenant to search alternative accommodation. Only one application for allotment was given by him before the District Magistrate on 29.05.2000. This is not sufficient. The landlord, in his affidavit 9-ga, submitted that at nearby place, there were shops available in shopping complex, which petitioner could purchase. On the other hand, widowed daughter-in-law of the landlord is in acute need of the accommodation in question for her need. Though, the petitioner will face hardship in shifting his business to another place, but his comparative hardship is less than of the landlord. 14. In view of above discussion, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner is granted six months’ time to vacate the premises in question, provided he gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority to this effect within a period of six weeks from today. 15. No order as to costs.