JUDGMENT JAWAD RAHIM, J.-Plaintiff is in second appeal against the judgment in R.A.320/98 dated 9.9.2009 on the file Civil Judge (Junior Divn.), Kolar, reversing the judgment of the trial Court in O.S. 200/95, thereby dismissing the suit and declining to grant the order of injunction as sought for. 2. Heard learned counsel on both sides. Perused records made available in supplementation thereto. 3. As could be seen from the records, appellants filed suit seeking an order of permanent injunction restraining the respondent by name Upendra Rao (since deceased) with the assertive contention that he is the owner of the property described in the schedule having acquired it as a share in the decree for partition passed by the Court in O.S. 149/73 which decree was implemented and he was put in possession. He has cultivated land with dry crops and planted eucalyptus trees to the extent of one acre on the northern side and is paying land revenue to the Government. RTC and mutation extracts in respect of the schedule property were produced alongwith the plaint to testify his possession and title. He also alleged defendant had no manner of right, title and possession and has attempted to interfere with his possession and if he succeeds, he will be put to irreparable loss. 4. On being summoned, Upendra Rao entered contest denying plaint averments and also the claim of the plaintiff that he is the owner of the schedule property in Survey No. 26 of Karahalli village having acquired the same under a partition deed. He categorically averred that the schedule property as also a larger extent of land was Shanbog Inamland; his father-Venkataramaiah was registered as Shanbog Barawardar of Karahalli village and alongwith his family members, he enjoyed physical possession for over 100 years. lands in Survey Nos. 45, 69 and 79 of Karahalli village were Inam lands and his grandfather-Appanna was in physical possession, and after him his father-Venkataramaiah and after him, he (defendant) is enjoying half share as Firka Hissedar with Guddo Tata @ Gurappa Firka Hissedar to the extent of 1/8th share; the land was cultivated by Kembodiramaiah, Venkataramanappa, and Ananthapadmanabha Rao and Venkataramanachar, Firka Hissedar of 1/8th share. 5. However he admitted Narayanappa-the father of the plaintiff was Firka Hissedar entitled to 1/8th share equivalent to 13.4 guntas of the suit property. 5. However he admitted Narayanappa-the father of the plaintiff was Firka Hissedar entitled to 1/8th share equivalent to 13.4 guntas of the suit property. Despite such admitted fact, he alleged plaintiff has no manner of right, title and interest and after the death of defendant's father, defendant alongwith his elder brother-Vasudeva Rao were in settled possession. Later Vasudeva Rao executed a relinquishment deed in his favour, thereby conferring upon him the entire extent. On this basis he claimed to be in possession of 1 acre 5 guntas of land. He further averred in the year 1982, he had planted eucalyptus trees and sold two crops; now the other crop is also ready. 6. Based on the material propositions in the pleadings, learned trial Judge framed the following issues: '1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in lawful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property? 2. Does the plaintiff prove the interference of the defendant? 3. What order or decree?' and applying the evidence tendered by the parties, decreed the suit granting the order of injunction. 7. Assailing it the legal heirs of the defendant were in appeal before the first appellate Court who, on re-appraisal of the evidence on record, has allowed the appeal and reversed the finding of the trial Court. Aggrieved by it, plaintiff is in this appeal. 8. The appeal has been admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law: '1. Whether the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that no reliance could have been placed by the trial Court on Exs.P1, P2 and P3? 2. Whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in ignoring the decree passed in O.S. No. 149/73?' 9. Learned counsel, Sri Varadarajan for the appellant while reiterating the case as projected by the plaintiff before the trial Court, would contend, a well reasoned judgment of the trial Court has been unjustifiably reversed by the appellate Court ignoring the material evidence produced by the plaintiff. The second ground is, appellant had sought permission to lead additional evidence through his application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. which the appellate Judge has dismissed without assigning proper reasons. He would submit, the only defence of the defendant was the land is Inam land and his application was still pending consideration. The second ground is, appellant had sought permission to lead additional evidence through his application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. which the appellate Judge has dismissed without assigning proper reasons. He would submit, the only defence of the defendant was the land is Inam land and his application was still pending consideration. The appellate Court has erroneously relied on such statement to hold he was in possession, thereby eschewing material evidence which was on record proving possession of the plaintiff. He would draw my attention to the entries in RTC and other revenue records showing mutation in the name of the plaintiff to show prima facie possession. He would submit, the appellate Court has commented on the reasoning of the trial Court which observation is not only factually incorrect but unsustainable in law. He therefore, seeks reversal of the judgment of the appellate Court. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent-defendant has supported the impugned judgment with the assertive contention that the plaintiff had failed to establish title and possession of the land in question. The judgment and decree in O.S. 149/73 obtained by him is between proximately related persons in which the respondent was not impleaded. Such judgment, even if it declared the rights of the parties, it was a judgment in personem and not a judgment in rem and would not bind the defendant. Plaintiff therefore had to establish through independent evidence the factum of possession which he had failed. She would submit, the trial Judge had erroneously decreed the suit based on stray admissions in the cross-examination of the defendant that some revenue records stood in the name of the plaintiff. Such finding of the trial Court necessarily needed interference and is rightly set aside by the appellate Court. She would further submit, the defendant was in possession was well established as he had produced before the trial Court revenue records at Exs.D1 to D3 and Patta Book at Ex.D4 to show his name was entered as occupant and cultivator of the land in question dispelling all contentions of the plaintiff about his possession. She would submit, in a suit for injunction, the question of title could not have been gone into and therefore based on proof of possession, a decision had to be taken. She would submit, in a suit for injunction, the question of title could not have been gone into and therefore based on proof of possession, a decision had to be taken. The trial Court had decreed the suit only on the basis that by the judgment passed in O.S. 149/73, plaintiff had acquired title over the property without proof of possession and thus the judgment was not tenable. 11. The contentions of both sides have received my consideration and I have examined the reasons assigned by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court in supplementation to the material on record. 12. No doubt it is a settled principle of law that in a suit for injunction simplicitor, the question of title could not have been gone into. But incidental reference has to be made to the evidence as to title. In the instant case, the plaintiff has approached the Court deriving title and possession from the judgment and decree in O.S. 149/73 in which admittedly defendant was not a party. But merely because he was not a party, could such decree be eschewed or ignored? There can be no dispute that in a suit for injunction, the factum of possession is relevant and important. Once he establishes it, he will be entitled to protection of possession. The plaintiff may discharge the initial burden of proof by independent evidence and may also use admissions in the written statement of the defendant. In this case, the plaintiff through his ocular testimony and the documentary evidence like RTC and mutation extracts, has proved the factum of possession. Besides, he has relied on certain admissions in the written statement. 13. The categorical averments in the written statement would show that the defendant does not dispute plaintiff certainly has a share in the property in question. In paragraph 7 he has averred as under: "The plaintiff has suppressed the real state of affairs. The true facts are, the suit schedule property bearing S. No. 26 of Karahally Village, being a shanubogue Inam land. The father of defendant, Venkataramanaiah, regd. Shanubogue Barabardar of Karahalli village, alongwith his family members enjoying the land more than 100 years alongwith other survey Nos. 45, 69 and 79 of Karhally village which are also inam lands. The true facts are, the suit schedule property bearing S. No. 26 of Karahally Village, being a shanubogue Inam land. The father of defendant, Venkataramanaiah, regd. Shanubogue Barabardar of Karahalli village, alongwith his family members enjoying the land more than 100 years alongwith other survey Nos. 45, 69 and 79 of Karhally village which are also inam lands. As per the settlement during the period of Appanna, father of Venkataramanaiah, the defendant enjoying 1/2 share in said survey number, as a Firka Hissedar, alongwith 10 Guddotata alias Gurappa, Firka Hissedar of 1/8th share (13.4 guntas) now cultivating by one kembodi Ramaiah (2) Venkataramanappa, Firka Hissedar of 1/8th share, now enjoying by Ananthapadmanabha Rao (3) Venkatarmanachar, Firka Hissedar of 1/8th share now cultivating by Kembodi Ramaiah and (4) S. Narayanappa, the father of plaintiff, Firka Hissedar of 1/8th share, i.e., 13.4 guntas, now cultivating by one Venkatesh s/o. Doddamuneppa." From the extracted portion of the facts pleaded in the written statement, it is evident defendant has in unequivocal terms admitted that S. Narayanappa (father of the plaintiff) was F. Hissedar of 1/8th share in the schedule property. This would undoubtedly imply that Narayanappa was entitled to 1/8th share in the property in question which is equivalent to the share claimed by the defendant in the earlier part of the written statement. It is not in dispute plaintiff is son of Narayanappa and therefore his contention that he had filed suit seeking a share supports his version. No doubt defendant has averred that 1/8th extent of share is now under the cultivation of Venkatesh, s/o Doddamuneppa, but there is no evidence to substantiate that contention. 14. This is not a case where the plaintiff has no semblance of right, title and interest. In fact, defendant himself admits plaintiff's father had 1/8th share in the property in question and has admitted in paragraph 8 of the written statement that he and his brother succeeded to the share of his father-Venkataramaiah and based on the relinquishment deed executed by his brother-Vasudeva Rao, he (Upendra Rao) applied to the competent authority for registration of occupancy rights as early as in the year 1961. He admits till date no re-grant has been made and the proceedings are still pending. He admits till date no re-grant has been made and the proceedings are still pending. From such admitted facts in the written statement itself, it is evident plaintiff claims to be in possession by virtue of the right his of succession from his father. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has no semblance of right, title and interest since he also claims to have acquired the property by succession. Besides, it is material to note, the application for grant filed by the defendant several years in the past either in 1961 or 1981 is said to be still pending and no order has been passed re-granting the land to him. Therefore, there is absolutely no material evidence in favour of the defendant about title or possession. 15. The question before the trial Court was, who was in possession before filing of the suit. It is a settled principle of law that no co-sharer could be permitted to dispossess or interfere with the possession of another co-sharer. Admittedly the property in Survey No. 26 was Inam land and was subject to the provisions of Land Revenue Act and till re-grant is made, the defendant cannot be said to have any definite share, whereas the plaintiff has secured in his favour judgment and decree in O.S. 149/73 showing division of properties by metes and bounds and Ex.D15 produced by him shows he was put in possession of the land in question. In this fact situation, the appellate Court was in error in reversing the finding of the trial Court to hold plaintiff was not in possession. At the most, a conditional order of injunction could have been passed while protecting possession of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff could have been put to terms not to dispossess the defendant from the portion in his occupation, if any. 16. It must further be noticed plaintiff sought to produce additional evidence which the appellate Judge has not granted by his slip-shod order. Paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment shows learned appellate Judge has summarily rejected the application without considering the grounds enumerated in the application. 16. It must further be noticed plaintiff sought to produce additional evidence which the appellate Judge has not granted by his slip-shod order. Paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment shows learned appellate Judge has summarily rejected the application without considering the grounds enumerated in the application. It is extracted hereunder: "I.A. No. 4 is filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of CPC by the appellant seeking permission to produce pottigi register copy and Barabaluthi register copy, Xerox of which was produce before the Trial Court on the ground that the father of LRs namely original appellant had not filed the certified copies and therefore they are now producing the same. The present application is resisted by denying the said contentions and facts are stated and even if the appellant is having a right which will be only 1/9 share and not more than that. The documents are of no use for the proof of the case of the parties and therefore I.A. No. 4 be dismissed". 17. It must further be noticed defendant while opposing I.A.4, had reiterated that the plaintiff may be having 1/9th share in the property in question. This shows the suit was not frivolous nor the claim of the plaintiff untenable. Since it was only for bare injunction and as the plaintiff had proved prima facie physical possession based on the judgment in his favour and also documents to show he obtained possession in execution of the decree in O.S. 149/73, he was entitled to protection of his possession. 18. Being of that view, I am satisfied the judgment of the appellate Court is not sustainable. It is therefore set aside. The judgment dated 24.10.1998 passed by the trial Court is restored. However, it is made clear the decree in favour of the plaintiff is only for protection of his interest in the schedule property and not to be misused in respect of the other land in which the defendant may have interest. 19. With the above observation, the appeal is disposed of. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.