Judgment Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. These Misc. Civil Applications have been filed by the assesses seeking recall of our common order dated 17th January 2012, passed in respective Tax Appeals. A short ground raised in these review petitions is that this Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Tax Appeals filed by the Revenue. In order to consider this contention, few facts would be necessary, which are as follows:- 1.1 All the appeals were filed by the Revenue challenging different orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal {"Tribunal" for short}. Since the central issue was common, all the appeals were disposed off by a common judgment. The assesses were engaged in manufacturing activities. Their industrial units were located at Daman a Union Territory. They filed returns of income of respective years and claimed deduction under Section 80IB of the Income tax Act, 1961 ["Act" for short]. At the level of the Tribunal, such claim was granted. Revenue filed several appeals against the judgments of the Tribunal contending that the conditions for claiming deduction under Section 80IB of the Act were not fulfilled. The case of the Revenue was that necessary license and permits for commencing manufacturing activities were not obtained. 1.2 After service of notice of admission of the appeals on the assesses, we proceeded to dispose of the appeals by the said common judgment dated 17th January 2012 and in some cases, when found in our understanding appropriate, allowed the Revenue's appeals. In these appeals, the assesses have now filed respective review applications asking us to withdraw our order on the ground that the industries being located at Daman, the appeals against the judgments of the Tribunal were maintainable only before the Bombay High Court. This Court thus did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeals. This is a short ground, which has given rise to a lengthy debate before us. 2. Learned senior Advocate Shri Mihir Thakore appearing for the assesses raised the following contentions:- {a} In terms of Section 269 of the Act, "the High Court" in the present set of cases must mean, "The High Court of Bombay". {b} In view of the above, this is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and not the one of territoriality, and therefore, principles enshrined in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure {"Code" for short} would not apply. {b} In view of the above, this is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and not the one of territoriality, and therefore, principles enshrined in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure {"Code" for short} would not apply. {c} In any case, Section 21 of CPC would not apply to the proceedings arising under the Income Tax Act. {d} Even if such provisions do apply, they were meant to apply at an appellate or revision stage and not in a review petition. {e} In support of his contentions, he relied on the following decisions:-- In case of Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein, the Apex Court observed that when a decree is passed without jurisdiction, it is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. In case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Limited & Anr., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 791 , wherein the Apex Court observed that the suit for specific performance can only be instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction and hence can only be instituted in a Court having territorial jurisdiction where the property is situated and even by agreement of parties, jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a Court which otherwise has no jurisdiction. 3. On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri Manav Mehta appearing for the Revenue contended that this Court has no power to review an order passed in the Tax Appeals filed under Section 260A of the Act. 3.1 Learned Counsel further contended that the issue pertains to territorial jurisdiction, any objection on the ground of territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In the present case, the respondents not having raised such an objection at an earlier stage, cannot now in a review petitions, raise such an objection. 4. In so far as the stand of the applicants that the appeals were wrongly filed before the Gujarat High Court, we have no hesitation in accepting the same at the outset. 4.1 Section 269 of the Act defines "High Court" and provides, inter alia, that the High Court means, "in relation to the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman & Din, the High Court at Bombay". 4.1 Section 269 of the Act defines "High Court" and provides, inter alia, that the High Court means, "in relation to the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman & Din, the High Court at Bombay". In that view of the matter, appropriately the Revenue should have filed the Tax Appeals before the Bombay High Court. Unfortunately, we did not notice this issue. It was never brought to our notice either by the Revenue or by the assessee concerned. When subsequently in other matters of Income Tax and Central Excise, such an issue was raised and we had an occasion to examine the same, we had formed an opinion that it would be the Bombay High Court which would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the appeals. We had, in a large number of cases, under such circumstances, diverted the parties be it the Revenue or the assessee-before the appropriate Court. 4.2 The question in the present case is, despite such conclusion, should we recall our previous order which decided the appeals on merits by way of a final judgment. In order to examine this, we would like to first deal with the Revenue's contention that these review petitions are not maintainable. 4.3 Section 260A of the Act pertains to "Appeal to High Court". Sub-Section (1) thereof provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-Sections (2) to (6) of Section 260A particularly provide for the procedure and powers of the Appellate Court. Sub-Section (7) which is of importance for us, reads thus: "[7] Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this Section." In terms of Section 260A(7), provisions of Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals to the High Court would as far as may be applied in the appeals filed under Section 260A of the Act also. This, of course, is subject to anything otherwise provided under the Act. This, of course, is subject to anything otherwise provided under the Act. 4.4 Two things thus emerge-firstly, that the provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals to the High Court apply to all appeals filed under Section 260A of the Act and that if there is nothing inconsistent in the Act, it would be the provision contained in the Act, which would apply. 4.5 Under the Code of Civil Procedure, any judgment or order passed by the High Court, as an appellate Court, is subject to review by itself. Such review is not confined only to a procedural review but the powers extend to substantive review as well. Under the circumstances, we do not see how the Revenue can contend that the power of review in a judgment rendered in a Tax Appeal is not available to the High Court. There is nothing in the Act which suggests to the contrary. 4.6 Let us examine how different High Courts have viewed this issue. In case of D.N. Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr., reported in [2010] 325 ITR 349 [Patna], the Full Bench of Patna High Court considered such an issue. On the premise that the High Court as a constitutional Court has an inherent power to review its own order, the Court held as under:- "In view of the aforesaid clear pronouncement of law, we have no scintilla of doubt that the High Court can entertain the application for review arising out of a judgment passed under Section 260A of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, the decisions rendered in Bihar Rajya Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank Simitte (supra), Bibhay Kumar Sah (supra), J.B. Associates (P) Limited and Bengali Singh (HUF) through Bengali Singh [2010] 325 ITR 350 (Patna) are overruled and any decision following the said line of decisions would be deemed to have been overruled. The reference is answered accordingly." 4.7 In case of Deepak Kumar Garg v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in [2010] 327 ITR 448 (MP), Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled otherwise. It was held that the power of appeal and review are statutory powers and can be conferred by a particular statute if so provided specifically. No inherent power of review are available in a Court and they must be conferred by the law. It was held that the power of appeal and review are statutory powers and can be conferred by a particular statute if so provided specifically. No inherent power of review are available in a Court and they must be conferred by the law. In the said decision, there was, however, no reference of Section 260A(7) of the Act. 4.8 In case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Damodardas Rathi [HUF] reported in [2010] 1 DLT ONLINE 157 (MP), the Madhya Pradesh High Court made a brief reference to Section 260A(7) of the Act and concluded that the Court would have no power to review an order passed in Tax Appeal passed under Section 260A of the Act. 4.9 The issue was also examined by the Bombay High Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. West Coast Paper Mills Limited, reported in [2009] 319 ITR 390 [Bom.], the Court noted the provisions contained in Section 260A(7) of the Act to hold that the power of substantive review had not been conferred under the Act, the review is not maintainable. 4.10 This decision was followed in subsequent decision by the same High Court. In case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Automobile Corporation of Goa Limited, reported in [2012] 206 Taxman 640 (Bom.), the decision of Full Bench of Patna High Court was noticed but in view of decision of the same Court in case of West Coast Paper Mills [Supra], the High Court dismissed the review petitions as not maintainable. 4.11 In case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. ICICI Bank Limited, reported in 231 CTR 439, the Supreme Court made a brief reference to the review and granted liberty to the Department to move the High Court by way of review. We are conscious, this decision does not lay down a ratio that the High Court has power to review. However, there was a passing reference of a review to be filed before the High Court. 4.12 In view of our above discussion, we would adopt the view of the Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in case of D.N. Singh [Supra]. We have also given our own independent reasons. However, there was a passing reference of a review to be filed before the High Court. 4.12 In view of our above discussion, we would adopt the view of the Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in case of D.N. Singh [Supra]. We have also given our own independent reasons. We may record that the Patna High Court had not relied upon Section 260A(7) of the Act, which in our opinion, is an additional ground to believe that the High Court does enjoy the power of review not only as a constitutional Court, but as specifically vested by virtue of Sub-Section (7) of Section 260A. 4.13 This brings us to the central controversy, namely, should we exercise such powers in the facts of the present case. In this context, we have no hesitation in turning down the first contention of Shri Thakore that the objection of the assessee is with respect to inherent lack of jurisdiction of the High Court. Article 226 of the Constitution, while recognizing the powers of the High Court to issue writs, also provides territorial limit within which such powers can be exercised. Likewise, Section 260A of the Act, while authorizes the aggrieved party to appeal to the High Court against any judgment of the Tribunal, Section 269 lays down the territorial limits of the High Court. In case of cause arising out of union territories of Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu, appropriate High Court is the High Court of Bombay. In essence thus, the issue pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. We do not see how merely because in terms of territorial jurisdiction, the appeals were filed before the wrong Court it becomes an issue of inherent lack of jurisdiction. In this context, therefore, we need to ascertain whether in terms of Section 21 CPC, such contention can be raised at this belated stage. 4.14 Though vehemently contended by learned Counsel Shri Thakore that the principles contained in such provision would not apply to the appeal and review filed in terms of Section 260A of the Act, we hold a different view. 4.15 Several High Courts of the country have taken a view that the principles contained in Section 21 CPC apply also to special statutes. 4.15 Several High Courts of the country have taken a view that the principles contained in Section 21 CPC apply also to special statutes. Division Bench of our own High Court in case of Shah Harichand Ratanchand v. Virbhai & Ors., reported in AIR 1975 Guj. 150 held that the principles contained in Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code would also apply to the special statutes. It was a case where the question of custody of a minor under the Guardians and Wards Act was at stake. In a proceeding arising under this Act, the question of territorial jurisdiction of the District Court arose. It was in this context, the Court examined whether the principles enshrined in Section 21 CPC would apply. The Court held and observed as under:-- "There was nothing compelling in the context making this Section inapplicable, especially as Section 21 is a transcendental provision which is made in the Code only to see that on ground of such technicalities as to the question of local or territorial jurisdiction, the orders of the Court are not rendered null and void. It was a curative provision to see that the technicalities do not prevail when there was no failure of justice. Therefore, when this essential condition in Section 21 was not fulfilled as to there being consequent failure of justice, the appellate Court was bound to resort to this curative provision in Section 21 before declaring the order of the District Court to be null and void by upholding the point about territorial jurisdiction. The order was on merits after due hearing and, therefore, on a mere technical ground it could not be held to be a nullity when there was no consequent failure of justice whatever. Therefore, as per the settled legal position, the learned Single Judge, with great respect, was in error in holding that the decree passed by the Palanpur District Court was a nullity which could not be cured by resorting to this curative provision of Section 21 of the Code. Therefore, as per the settled legal position, the learned Single Judge, with great respect, was in error in holding that the decree passed by the Palanpur District Court was a nullity which could not be cured by resorting to this curative provision of Section 21 of the Code. In that view of the matter, although the learned Single Judge was right in the view that the proper Court in this case would have been Mehsana District Court, in view of the fact that there has been no consequent failure of justice, the order of the Palanpur District Court should have bee no maintained and the matter must have been decided on merits." 4.16 We may also refer to certain High Court decisions:- In case of Ashfaq Ali Beg alias Naney Pahlawan & Ors., reported in AIR 1945 Allh. 309, the learned Single Judge held that Section 21 CPC applies in case of suits brought under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. The fact that the provisions of Section 21 are couched in a mandatory language is not reason for holding that the Section is not applicable to the suits filed under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. This decision was approved by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Bal Mokand v. Jiwan Ram & Ors., reported in AIR 1948 Allh. 58, wherein the Court held that Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code is applicable even to the proceedings under the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act or the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. IT was held as under:- "11. It is argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are held applicable by virtue of Section 7, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, only so far as the primary Court is concerned. They can have no application to the appellate Court. This agreement is plausible and a close examination of the relevant provisions of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, the Debt Redemption Act and the Code of Civil Procedure will reveal its fallacy. There is, in the first place, no specific provision for the procedure to be followed in appeals, and yet there is a Section providing for a right of appeal. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that the procedure, provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, should apply. If this interpretation is not permissible, there will be no provision for the procedure in appeal. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that the procedure, provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, should apply. If this interpretation is not permissible, there will be no provision for the procedure in appeal. It is, therefore, obvious that S. 21, Civil P.C., has application even to proceedings under the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act or the U.P. Debt Redemption Act." In case of Rabindranath Batik v. Smt. Pramila Bala Barik, reported in AIR 1979 Orissa 85, the Division Bench applied the principle contained in Section 21 CPC to a proceeding arising for restitution of conjugal rights arising under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was observed as under:- "In view of what has been stated by this Court in that case, undoubtedly the appeal in the instant case against the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge should have been laid before the District Court. But such an objection having not been raised and the present appellant having allowed the appeal to be heard by the learned Judge, we do not think it would be appropriate to vacate the decree of the learned Single Judge on that lone ground. We would like to point out that in the memorandum of letters patent appeal no such contention has been raised and there is force in the contention of the Counsel for the respondent that the learned Single Judge was not a Court having no jurisdiction and the decree rendered in the first appeal cannot be held to be a nullity. We would not, therefore, entertain the argument of Counsel for the appellant that the appellate decree should be vacated on the ground that the first appeal did not lie to this Court." 5. Majority of the High Courts of the country thus have taken a view that the principles contained in Section 21 CPC apply also to special statutes. Independently also, in terms of Sub-Section (7) of Section 269 A of the Act, such principles shall have to be applied in the present case. 5.1 Courts have also taken a view that the principles underlying Section 21 CPC would apply also to appeal proceedings. Reference in this regard be made to the following decisions:- In case of Makhanlal Lolaram & Ors. 5.1 Courts have also taken a view that the principles underlying Section 21 CPC would apply also to appeal proceedings. Reference in this regard be made to the following decisions:- In case of Makhanlal Lolaram & Ors. v. Pancham Lal Sheoprasad, reported in AIR 1933 Nagpur 318, the learned Single Judge held that the principles of Section 21 of CPC would apply even to proceedings other than original suits and the objection as to jurisdiction which was not taken in lower appellate Court cannot be taken in second appeal. In case of Bahrein Petroleum Co. Limited v. P.J. Pappu & Anr., reported in AIR 1966 SC 634 , it was observed that where the defendants neither reside nor carry on business, nor any part of the cause of action arose within local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, such Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, it is always open to the defendants to waive this objection, and if they do so, they cannot subsequently take the objection. Section 21 of the Code provides an exception and a defect as to the place of suing, that is to say, to the local venue for suits, cognizable by the Courts under the Code may be waived under this Section. The waiver under Section 21 is limited to objection in the appellate and revisional Court. Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Section 15 to 20 may be waived. Independently of this Section, the defendant may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it. 5.2 Sub-Section (1) of Section 21 CPC provides that, "no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 5.3 The Courts have however drawn a clear distinction between a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court or of technical defect such as territorial jurisdiction. 5.4 As held by the Supreme Court in case of Kiran Singh & Ors. 5.4 As held by the Supreme Court in case of Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , a defect of jurisdiction-whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very Authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. However, the Court drew distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, which is considered technical. Reference in this regard can be made to a decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 199 : AIR 1993 SC 2094 . It is also held that objection to the territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest opportunity and further that there must be failure of justice. 5.5 In case of Koopilan Uneen's daughter Pathumma & Ors. v. Koopilan Uneen's Son Kuntalan Kutty dead by L. Rs. and Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1683 , it was observed that:- "..In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional Court, the fulfillment of the following three conditions is essential:- (1) The objection was taken in the Court of first instance. (2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. (3) There has been a consequent failure of justice. All these three conditions must coexist." 5.6 In case of Smt. Pushpa Sharma v. Gopal Lal Rawat, reported in AIR 1986 Rajasthan 187, the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court observed that, "..as a general rule where a suit is filed on the basis of tenancy and relationship of landlord and tenant then such suit should be decided on the basis of tenancy alone, and it should not be converted into a title suit. However, in a given case, if the defendant himself sets up a title adverse to the plaintiff and/or does not raise an objection in framing an issue on the basis of title and leads evidence with full knowledge and the trial Court gives an adverse finding on such issues against the defendant, then the defendant cannot be permitted to advance the plea in the appellate Court or Revisional Court that no decree for possession can be granted in such a case. It would be a different matter where the trial Court may suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction not falling within the purview of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the defendant may make out a clear case of prejudice with no fault or laches or acquiescence on his part. 5.7 In case of George v. Thekkekkara Vareed, reported in AIR 1979 Kerala 1, it was observed that whether it was a jurisdictional defect or a procedural illegality or irregularity, in either case, correction by an appellate Court was open; it is generally, especially in the latter case, only where the defect complained of has occasioned a failure of justice. 6. It can thus be seen that the principles analogous to those flowing from Section 21 of CPC are applied to various situations not only to the proceedings arising out of the Code but also in special statutes. There is no reason to limit its application to review proceedings. In the present case, the objection to the lack of jurisdiction was never raised till the appeals were heard and finally decided. It is not the case of any of the assesses that he was not duly served with the notice of the Court or even after service, was prevented for sufficient cause to appear before the Court. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 21 CPC, we find that such objection cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. We do no see any failure of justice. On all counts, therefore, review petitions must be dismissed. They are accordingly dismissed. In Favour of Department.