Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Union Of India
2013-06-18
NAVIN SINHA, VIKASH JAIN
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL ORDER NAVIN SINHA, J. I.A. No. 1524 of 2013 has been filed for condoning the delay for approximately 59 days in preferring this Appeal. I.A. No. 1525 of 2013 has been filed for staying the operation of the judgment under Appeal. 2. Having considered the submissions of the parties, we condone the delay and proceed to decide the Appeal on merits. There is thus no need to dispose I.A. No. 1525 of 2013 separately. 3. We have heard counsel for the Appellant and for the Respondents. 4. The present Appeal arises from order dated 11.10.2012 in C.W.J.C. No. 4145 of 2009 declining to interfere with the award dated 30.09.2008 delivered by the Industrial Tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No. 14(C) of 2007 except to the extent that it modifies the quantum of wages to be paid from 1993 to February 2006. 5. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that even if removal of respondent no. 3 was in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, considering that he was engaged on daily wage, the question of reinstatement does not arise. Without prejudice to the same, it is submitted that the Tribunal had in fact never ordered reinstatement but only payment of compensation. The learned Single Judge has travelled beyond the award by opining that the Tribunal had directed reinstatement. It was next submitted that the Tribunal had awarded wages of 15 days on the prescribed rate of Rs. 50/- per day for each completed year of service from 1993 to February 2006 which works out to approximately Rs. 9,715/- in total. Holding the same to be unreasonable and arbitrary, the learned Single Judge has yet quantified it higher at Rs. 5,000/- per annum instead of reducing it and which now works out to Rs. 65,000/- in total. Reliance has been placed on (2009) 15 SCC 327 (Jagbir Singh vrs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board), (2010) 6 SCC 773 (Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal vrs. Santosh Kumar Seal), and (2012) 1 SCC 558 (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vrs. Man Singh). 6. Learned counsel for respondent no. 3 submitted that even a daily wage qualifies as a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, if he fulfills the requirements for the same. That the respondent is a “workman” as a fact is not disputed by the Appellants.
Santosh Kumar Seal), and (2012) 1 SCC 558 (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vrs. Man Singh). 6. Learned counsel for respondent no. 3 submitted that even a daily wage qualifies as a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act, if he fulfills the requirements for the same. That the respondent is a “workman” as a fact is not disputed by the Appellants. The finding of fact that Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was not complied with is also not in dispute. The Tribunal has therefore committed no error in directing reinstatement which only means he stands relegated to his position as a daily wage. The direction of the learned Single Judge for 15 days wages for each completed year of service as quantified by the Tribunal was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary and has been enhanced to Rs. 5,000/- per annum. Considering the quantum and the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge, it may not be interfered with. Reliance was placed on (2010) 3 SCC 192 (Harjinder Singh vrs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation), (2011) 6 SCC 584 (Devinder Singh vrs. Municipal Council, Sanaur). It was lastly urged that the Appeal itself should not be entertained relying on a Division Bench decision in 2004 (3) PLJR 402 (M/s Deep Prabha Cinema vrs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court). 7. A person appointed on daily wage does not hold any post. Such appointments are made in the exigency of service for meeting the temporary needs of the employer. There can be no assumption or presumption that the need is permanent which itself militates against the concept of daily wage appointment. The respondent employee was engaged in the Divisional Office as a daily wage worker/messenger. The fact that he may qualify within the definition “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act for invoking Section 25F of the Act, would not automatically mean that reinstatement must also follow as a matter of course irrespective of the need by the employer of such a daily wage employee. In other words, the daily wage cannot be thrust upon an unwilling employer irrespective of the requirement. 8. That question is no more res integra in view of (2006) 4 SCC 1 ( Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi).
In other words, the daily wage cannot be thrust upon an unwilling employer irrespective of the requirement. 8. That question is no more res integra in view of (2006) 4 SCC 1 ( Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi). We may only refer to a Full Bench decision of this court in C.W.J.C. No. 267 of 2010 and analogous cases containing a very detailed discussion in the matter analyzing more than one judgment of the Supreme Court in this regard. 9. The judgment in M/s Deep Prabha (supra) that if the award has been upheld by the writ court it should not be interfered with in Appeal as it would play up havoc with employer- workman relationships and it would be the death knell of a worker merely because the employer had the means to do so, unfortunately cannot be followed by us in view of the change in the trend of judicial thinking with regard to the nature of relief to be granted to persons like the respondent daily wage employee even when there has been a breach of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 10. The discussion has been very succinctly distinguished in the case of Jagbir Singh (supra) noticing the change in trend of judicial thinking at paragraph-7 as follows:- “7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 11. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Santosh Kumar Seal (supra) observing at paragraph-9 as follows:- “9.
Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice. 11. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Santosh Kumar Seal (supra) observing at paragraph-9 as follows:- “9. In the last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate. Yet again in Man Singh (supra) it has been observed at paragraphs 4 and 5 as follows:- “4. This Court in a catena of decisions has clearly laid down that although an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not be passed. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 5. In view of the aforementioned legal position and the fact that the respondent workmen were engaged as “daily wagers” and they had merely worked for more than 240 days, in our considered view, relief of reinstatement cannot be said to be justified and instead, monetary compensation would meet the ends of justice. 13. The reliance by the respondent no. 3 on Harjinder Singh (supra) has no relevance to the present controversy as it related to an order of reinstatement in context for violation of Section 25G of the Industrial Distputes Act. The case of Devinder Singh (supra) is again distinguishable on its own facts. Relief came to be granted primary for the reason that the High Court had suo motu raised the issue of the initial engagement itself being contrary to law when the fact that the respondents had themselves engaged the employee contrary to the ban on employment, was not a properly noticed and appreciated. In the present case, it is apparent from the award itself that it was an admitted fact that no appointment letter was even issued to respondent no. 3 much less any procedures followed for appointment even on daily wage. 14. Since we have denied reinstatement find no reason to interfere with that part of the order of the learned Single Judge fixing the compensation of Rs.
3 much less any procedures followed for appointment even on daily wage. 14. Since we have denied reinstatement find no reason to interfere with that part of the order of the learned Single Judge fixing the compensation of Rs. 5,000/- for 15 days wages for each completed year of service from 1993 to February 2006. 15. In the result, we set aside the order under Appeal to the extent that it directs reinstatement but decline to interfere with the modification of the award to the extent discussed above. 16. The Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.