Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. The writ petition having been restored vide order of date, as requested by the parties, I proceed to decide this writ petition finally at this stage. 2. Heard. 3. Petitioner is a landlord of accommodation in question which is said to be used as godown. Petitioner seeks release thereof under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") on the ground that he has no accommodation to park his motor vehicle and parking thereof in open causes serious safety and security risk. Therefore, the accommodation needs be released on account of his personal need. 4. Prescribed Authority, found the need and requirement of petitioner-landlord genuine and bona fide, and, in absence of any other accommodation available to petitioner, decided the issue of comparative hardship also in his favour and allowed Release Application vide judgment and order dated 14.11.1990, directing the respondent-tenant to vacate premises and hand over its vacant possession to petitioner-landlord. 5. Aggrieved thereto, respondent-tenant preferred Rent Appeal No. 198 of 1990 which came to be decided by 3rd Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur vide judgment dated 1.5.1999. 6. Lower Appellate Court held that requirement of an accommodation for the purpose of parking motor vehicle is not a residential need and it is always open to landlord to park his vehicle in open or to make any other arrangement and referring to some assumptions and presumptions that in these days, in multi-storied buildings, no garage is made available for parking etc., he allowed the appeal and set aside Prescribed Authority's order dated 14.11.1990 as a consequence whereof, petitioner's Release Application stood rejected. 7. Learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that it is a concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below that besides accommodation in question, there was no other accommodation available to petitioner-landlord to use the same as garage for parking his motor vehicle. He further submitted that requirement of garage is a need of residential purposes and an open space cannot be treated to satisfy requirement of garage. He placed reliance on this Court's decision in Chakresh Chand Jain Vs. VIII Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others 1991 (1) ARC 41 and submitted that the observations of lower Appellate Court are wholly conjectural. He further submitted that requirement of garage is a need of residential purposes and an open space cannot be treated to satisfy requirement of garage. He placed reliance on this Court's decision in Chakresh Chand Jain Vs. VIII Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others 1991 (1) ARC 41 and submitted that the observations of lower Appellate Court are wholly conjectural. Even otherwise, the same is legally incorrect and contrary to law and, therefore, impugned appellate judgment is liable to be set aside. 8. From the perusal of impugned judgment, it cannot be disputed that both the Courts below found that petitioner-landlord did not possess any other covered accommodation to be used as garage for parking his motor vehicle. Now, the only up for consideration question is, whether use of alleged godown as garage will be a necessary residential requirement so as to bring the application within the ambit of Section 21 (1) (a) of Act, 1972. 9. Here is not a case where petitioner was not found to possess any motor vehicle or it was a mere desire. The term "bona fide requirement", though cannot be treated to be a mere desire but where there is an element of need shown by landlord, it deserves due respect by the Courts and cannot be declined on flimsy, artificial and imaginary reasons. 10. In Smt. Gindori Devi Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, and others 1979 (UP) RCC 599, it was held: "It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bona fide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the word "required" has also been interpreted in several cases, and the connotation of the said word shows that the landlord must need the premises. In order to succeed in such an application, it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the streets. The connotation of the word "need" or "requirement" should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the ipse dixit of a landlord, but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed." 11. In Jayant Kumar Vs. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the ipse dixit of a landlord, but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed." 11. In Jayant Kumar Vs. Prescribed Authority & others, 1979 (UP) RCC 132, the Court took the view: "It is, however, not necessary that the landlord must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of a landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need." 12. The word ''bona fide' means genuinely, sincerely i.e. in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. This very phrase has been subject matter of interpretation in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Kumar Shah Vs. District Judge, Varanasi AIR 1976 All. 328 . The Court held this phrase to mean to need genuinely or in good faith and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive. 13. In N.S. Dutta & others Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others 1984 (1) ARC 113, similar view was taken. Same view has been expressed by Apex Court in Bega Begum and others Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan and others 1986 CSFBRC 346. 14. The question in respect to the need of godown to be used as a garage for parking vehicle has been considered by this Court in Chakresh Chand Jain (supra) and in para 19 and 20, this Court said as under: "19. In the last, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in the present days for want of the accommodation most of the people are keeping their cars in open on the road, and why special treatment should be given to the landlord. The submission is also devoid of merit. In a case reported in AIR 1971 Delhi 272, Sudershal Lal Aggarwal v. Girdhari Lal Jain, the Court had the occasion to consider a similar contingency and found: "The need of the landlord to keep his car in the garage is a necessary incidence of the residence of the landlord in the main house and, therefore, the garage is wanted by the landlord, for occupation as a residence. Whether the need is bona fide can be judged from his status and the way of his life which would show whether he is using the car in the ordinary way and not in any forced or mala fide way. The open compound of the house is not a reasonable accommodation because the car will be exposed to sun and rain. Security for the car and convenience of the landlord should also be considered." 20. The view taken in the case of Sudhershan Lal Aggarwal (supra) is a complete answer to the contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner and needs no further discussion, being devoid of merit is rejected. 15. I find no reason to take a contrary view to what has been expressed in Chakresh Chand Jain (supra). Further in view thereof, the findings otherwise recorded by lower Appellate Court on the question of comparative hardship also cannot sustain. Once it is clear that petitioner-landlord has no other appropriate accommodation and the tenant has not made any effort to find out any alternative accommodation, this question also has to be answered in favour of petitioner-landlord. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned appellate order dated 1.5.1999 (Annexure 6 to writ petition) is hereby set aside. Judgment and order of Prescribed Authority dated 14.11.1990 (Annexure 4 to writ petition) is hereby restored and confirmed. Sudhir Agarwal, J.— This is an application seeking recall of my order 3.12.2012, whereby writ petition was dismissed on merits, though in absence of learned counsel for petitioner. Cause shown for non appearance is sufficient. Order dated 3.12.2012 is hereby recalled. This application, accordingly, stands allowed. _____________