JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This revision is directed against the judgment, dated 17.01.2006, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla, in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 47-S/14 of 2003. Key facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that R.S. Puran Mall Trust, Shimla filed a petition through its Secretary against the respondent-tenant on the following grounds, as stated in paragraph No. 18 of the petition which reads as under: (i) The building in question, bearing Municipal No. 91, Lower Bazar, Shimla is a very old construction which have out lived its life span. It is in a very dilapidated condition. It was constructed more than 100 years back. It stood constructed in mud mortar and is Dhazi construction from foundations. The entire premises in occupation of the respondent in ground floor are also in a very dilapidated condition and may give way at any time. The entire woodwork of the said tenanted premises has rotten and building is out of plumb. The building and tenanted premises are unsafe and unfit for human habitation and requires to be reconstructed from foundations on old lines as permissible under law. Therefore, the premises in occupation of respondent are bonafide required by the petitioner trust for reconstruction on old lines from foundations. (ii) The petitioner Trust wants to reconstruct the entire said building alongwith the premises in occupation of the respondent on old lines, which reconstruction work cannot be carried out unless the premises are vacated by the respondent. Therefore, the premises in occupation of the respondent are bonafide required by the petitioner for reconstruction on old lines. The building have out lived its economic life, therefore, the same is to be reconstructed with in R.C.C. frame work. The petitioner Trust is a charitable trust. The income from the building in question is spent and used in various welfare causes of the society. The petitioner Trust is also initiating eviction proceeding against the other tenants in the said building on the same ground. The petitioner trust have consulted an expert engineer in this behalf who is entrusted with work of seeking sanction from M.C. Shimla for reconstruction of the building on old lines. Necessary plan is being got sanctioned for the said reconstruction work. The petitioner Trust has sufficient funds for carrying out the proposed reconstruction work of the said building. The petitioner trust have consulted an expert engineer in this behalf who is entrusted with work of seeking sanction from M.C. Shimla for reconstruction of the building on old lines. Necessary plan is being got sanctioned for the said reconstruction work. The petitioner Trust has sufficient funds for carrying out the proposed reconstruction work of the said building. The building in question have been found to unsafe and unfit for human habitation by the Expert Engineer who will submit his report after he is allowed to inspect the building and premises from inside by the respondent and tenants with permission of this Court. Thus, the premises are bonafide required by the petitioner for reconstruction on old lines. (iii) The respondent has failed to pay the arrears of rent of the said premises despite requests made by the petitioner. The respondent is also liable to pay the statutory increase in the rent which is permissible under the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act from the date of tenancy 10% increase is payable after every five years from the date of tenancy as per details given below:- 2. The petition was resisted by the tenant. According to the tenant, all the trustees have not signed the petition and the President and the Secretary of the trust could not become the landlord of the premises. It is also submitted that the condition of the building was good and it did not require any re-construction and rebuilding. It was denied that the building was 100 years old. The building was neither unsafe not unfit. It was denied that the reconstruction could not be carried out till the premises were vacated by the tenant. It was denied that the building has outlived its economic life. According to the tenant, the landlords have no sufficient funds for carrying out the repairs. It was denied that the tenant was liable to pay increased rent of 10% from the year 1972. 3. Rejoinder was filed. The learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, H.P. framed the issues on 21.06.2002. The learned Rent Controller allowed the petition on 01.08.2003. Feeling aggrieved by the order, dated 01.08.2003, the tenant filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla. The same was allowed and the order, dated 01.08.2003, was set aside. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been filed. 4. Mr. The learned Rent Controller allowed the petition on 01.08.2003. Feeling aggrieved by the order, dated 01.08.2003, the tenant filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla. The same was allowed and the order, dated 01.08.2003, was set aside. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been filed. 4. Mr. Ashok Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently argued that the Secretary was competent to file the petition on behalf of the Trust. He further contended that the landlord has duly proved that the building was bonafide required for rebuilding and re-construction, which could not be carried out without evicting the tenant. He lastly contended that the building has become unsafe for human habitation. He has supported the order, passed by the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, H.P., dated 01.08.2003. 5. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate, has supported the judgment, dated 17.01.2006, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla. According to him, the trust could not file the petition through the Secretary. He then contended that the landlord has failed to prove that the building was bonafide required for rebuilding and reconstruction. He lastly contended that the building was safe and has not outlived its life. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records carefully. 7. PW-1, Shri Sanjeev Kuthiala, has deposed that the trust was a charitable trust. He was an honorary Secretary of the trust. A resolution was passed in his favour vide Ex. PW 1/A. He was aware of the facts. The rent was received by the trust. The ground floor was in possession of the tenant since 1972 @ Rs. 1150/- per annum + 8% tax. The tenant is also liable to pay 10% increased rent. The building was 100 years old. It was constructed of wood and Dhaji walls. The walls and floor is of wood and soil. The building is in dilapidated condition. The wood has rotten and the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. He has proved the photographs Ex. PW 1/C to Ex. PW/J. The trust wanted to reconstruct the building on old lines and the same could not be carried out without the premises being vacated by the tenants. The foundation and pillars are to be raised from the shop of the tenant. The building maps have already been submitted to the Municipal Corporation. PW 1/C to Ex. PW/J. The trust wanted to reconstruct the building on old lines and the same could not be carried out without the premises being vacated by the tenants. The foundation and pillars are to be raised from the shop of the tenant. The building maps have already been submitted to the Municipal Corporation. The trust is in possession of sufficient funds. The trust has also filed cases against the other tenants before the learned Rent Controller. The tenant was in arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.01.1997. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the entire building was on rent. He has denied the suggestion that building was not 100 years old. He has also denied that the building was not constructed with mud mortar and wood. He has denied the suggestion that the building has not become dilapidated. He has also denied that the building has not become unsafe or unfit. He has also denied that the building cannot be reconstructed without vacating the upper portion of the building. He has also admitted that the walls of the building cannot be tinkered till the upper portion is vacated. 8. PW-2, Ramesh Chand, has deposed that the landlord has submitted the building map on 26.04.2001 vide Ex. PW 2/A. The objections were raised on 21.06.2001, 22.10.2001, 19.01.2002 and 12.07.2002. The building maps were re-submitted by the landlord on 19.07.2002 after removing the objections. 9. PW-3, Sh. Vivek Karol, has deposed that he is a Civil Engineer. He has proved the report Ex. PW 3/A. According to him, the building was 80 to 90 years old. It was in bad shape. The walls have developed cracks. The wood work was also rotten. The ceiling was also damaged. He has visited the premises. According to him, re-construction could not be carried out until the building was vacated by the tenant, including by other tenants. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the premises cannot be demolished till the upper portion of the building is demolished. He has admitted in cross-examination that he could see the premises from inside. 10. Sh. Amarjeet Singh has appeared as RW-1. He has testified that the shop was in perfect condition. It was safe and fit for human habitation. He has admitted that the building was 80 years old. It was made of wood and Dhaji. The wood was in good condition. It was not rotten. 10. Sh. Amarjeet Singh has appeared as RW-1. He has testified that the shop was in perfect condition. It was safe and fit for human habitation. He has admitted that the building was 80 years old. It was made of wood and Dhaji. The wood was in good condition. It was not rotten. According to him, the building could be re-constructed without getting it vacated. According to him, the landlord has not got the building maps approved. He was not in arrears of rent. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that the building was taken on rent in 1947 from the trust. The rent was paid up to 1985. He used to pay rent by way of cross-cheque. He used to maintain the records of rent, but he has not brought the same at the time of recording his statement. The building was owned by the trust. He did not know who was authorized to file the eviction petition. In his cross-examination, he has denied that the building was not in good condition. 11. RW-2, Shri R.B. Saxena, has proved his report Ex. RW 2/A. He has inspected the premises on 18.04.2003. He has inspected the building from inside and outside. The building was fit and safe for human habitation. The building was not required for reconstruction. He has also inspected the premises of other tenants. The condition of roof was bad and it requires repairs. 12. What emerges from the statements of PW-1, Sh. Sanjeev Kuthiala and PW-3, Sh. Vivek Karol, is that the building is 80-100 years old. It has outlived its economic life. The walls were made of mud water. It has developed cracks. The condition of the roof was also very bad. According to them, re-construction could not be carried out without the building being vacated. The landlord was in possession of sufficient funds for the reconstruction of the building. The building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. RW-2 has also admitted that the condition of the roof was not good. The building plans have been resubmitted by the landlord and the same were pending before the Municipal Corporation for approval. 13. The Court has also gone through the photographs placed on record. From the visual expressions, it is proved that the building is in dilapidated condition. The re-construction cannot be carried out without the building being vacated by the tenant. The building plans have been resubmitted by the landlord and the same were pending before the Municipal Corporation for approval. 13. The Court has also gone through the photographs placed on record. From the visual expressions, it is proved that the building is in dilapidated condition. The re-construction cannot be carried out without the building being vacated by the tenant. The landlord has proved that the premises are required bonafide for the purpose of reconstruction and re-building and the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The learned Appellate Authority has erred in law while reversing the findings of the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, H.P. on the issue that the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation and for the purpose of re-construction and re-building. 14. Now, the Court will advert to the question whether the petition on behalf of the Secretary was maintainable or not. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala has been authorized to file the eviction petition vide resolution Ex. PW 1/A. According to paragraph No. 14 of the eviction petition, the shop premises were rented out to the tenant on 15.08.1972. The photo copy of the rent note was submitted. The tenant has denied the deed of tenancy and according to him, the rent note has not been supplied to him. 15. The tenant has filed an application under Order 6 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, the copy of the resolution and map has not been supplied. The landlord has filed reply to the same. The application was disposed of by the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla on 04.03.2002. The learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla has passed the following order: Respondent moved an application under Order 6 Rule 10 C.P.C. for direction to the petitioner to supply the copies and also disclosed all the names of the trustees. In the reply the names of trustees have been disclosed by the petitioner. It is further stated by the petitioner in the reply that respondent has paid rent to the petitioner and as such relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. I have gone through the documents placed on the record, perusal of which reveals that relevant documents have already been placed on the record. Names of the trustees have been disclosed by the petitioner in the reply. As such, application rejected. Reply be filed on 9.4.2002. 16. I have gone through the documents placed on the record, perusal of which reveals that relevant documents have already been placed on the record. Names of the trustees have been disclosed by the petitioner in the reply. As such, application rejected. Reply be filed on 9.4.2002. 16. The tenant has also moved an application u/s 65 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was disposed of on 19.06.2003. The learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla has passed the following order: Respondent has withdrawn the application moved by him u/s 65 of the Evidence Act as the certified copy of the trust deed has already been placed on record by the petitioner which has been exhibited as RX. Accordingly, application is dismissed as withdrawn. The respondent is directed to place on record the Hindi version of the trust deed Ex. RX which is in Urdu and for arguments to come up for 7.7.2003. 17. Mr. Ashok Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the premises were let out on the basis of the lease deed executed between the Secretary of the Trust and M/s. Dayal Sons on 15.08.1972. It is also stated in paragraph No. 14 of the petition, as discussed hereinabove, that the premises were rented out to the tenant on 15.08.1972 and the photo copy of the rent note was submitted with the application. The copy of the lease deed is on record at page No. 62 of the paper-book, but it has neither been exhibited nor marked. Only copy of the trust deed is marked as RX. 18. RW-1, Sh. Amarjeet Singh, in his cross-examination has deposed that the building was taken on rent in 1947 and the rent was paid up to 1985. He used to pay the rent by way of cross cheque and the trust used to issue him receipt. He used to maintain the records of rent, but he had not brought the same at the time of recording his statement. In case the tenant was in possession of the receipts, he ought to have produced the same before the Court alongwith other records maintained by him. 19. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the present petition could not be filed through the Secretary. All the trustees were required to file the eviction petition. In case the tenant was in possession of the receipts, he ought to have produced the same before the Court alongwith other records maintained by him. 19. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the present petition could not be filed through the Secretary. All the trustees were required to file the eviction petition. He has relied upon Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. Section 48 is corollary to Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. 20. Section 47 reads as under: S. 47. Trustee cannot delegate: A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger, unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the delegation is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation. Explanation.-The appointment of an attorney or proxy to do an act merely ministerial and involving no independent discretion is not a delegation within the meaning of this section. It is evident from the plain language of Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 that a trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger. There can be delegation in the regular course of business and if the delegation is necessary. 21. In the instant case, a resolution has been passed by all the trustees authorizing PW-1, Sanjeev Kuthiala, to file an eviction petition. It will amount to delegation of powers to the honourary Secretary in regular course of business. It is not practicable for all the trustees to pursue the legal remedies. They have passed a resolution authorizing PW-1, Sh. Sanjeev Kuthiala to file an eviction petition. This delegation was necessary and permissible u/s 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. According to the explanation of Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the appointment of an attorney or proxy to do an act merely ministerial and involving no independent discretion is not a delegation within the meaning of this Section. 22. This delegation was necessary and permissible u/s 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. According to the explanation of Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the appointment of an attorney or proxy to do an act merely ministerial and involving no independent discretion is not a delegation within the meaning of this Section. 22. The lease deed has not been proved either by the landlord or the tenant, but the Court, in order to do complete justice, has taken cognizance of the same to ascertain whether the rent was being paid by the tenant to the Secretary, who has entered into a lease with the tenant or not. The tenant has deposed that he was maintaining the regular accounts of the rent. However, he has not produced the receipts of the same. He was found to be in arrears of rent by the learned Rent Controller. A presumption can be drawn that since the lease deed was entered into between the Secretary and the tenant, the rent was also being paid to the Secretary. 23. The term "landlord" has been defined u/s 2(d) of the Act as under: 2(d) "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorized, a specified landlord, and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord It is evident from the plain language employed in Section 2(d) that any person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheikh Abdul Kayum v. Alibhai, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 309 have explained Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 as under: 16. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheikh Abdul Kayum v. Alibhai, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 309 have explained Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 as under: 16. There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt about the correctness of the legal position that trustees cannot transfer their duties, functions & powers to some other body of men and create them trustees in their own place unless this is clearly permitted by the trust deed, or agreed to by the entire body of beneficiaries. A person who is appointed a trustee is not bound to accept the trust; but having once entered upon the trust he cannot renounce the duties and liabilities except with the permission of the Court or with the consent of the beneficiaries or by the authority of the trust deed itself. Nor can a trustee delegate his office or any of his functions except in some specified cases. The rules against renunciation of the trust by a trustee and against delegation of his functions by a trustee are embodied, in respect of trusts to which the Indian Trusts Act applies, in Ss. 46 and 47 of that Act. These sections run thus: 46. A trustee who has accepted the trust cannot afterwards renounce it except (a) with the permission of a principal Civil Court of original Jurisdiction, or (b) if the beneficiary is competent to contract, with his consent, or (c) by virtue of a special power in the instrument of trust. 47. A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger, unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the delegation is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation. 17. It is true that S. 1 of the Indian Trusts Act makes provisions of the Act inapplicable to public or private religious or charitable endowments; and so, these sections may not in terms apply to the trust now in question. These sections however embody nothing more or less than the principles which have been applied to all trusts in all countries. These sections however embody nothing more or less than the principles which have been applied to all trusts in all countries. The principle of the rule against delegation with which we are concerned in the present case, is clear: a fiduciary relationship having been created, it is against the interests of society in general that such relationship should be allowed to be terminated unilaterally. That is why the law does not permit delegation by a trustee of his functions, except in cases of necessity or with the consent of the beneficiary or the authority of the trust deed itself; apart from delegation "in the regular course of business" that is, all such functions which a prudent man of business would ordinarily delegate in connect ion with his own affairs." 26. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, (2001) 9 AD 307 have held that a person need not necessarily be the owner in order to be covered by the definition of landlord u/s 2(c) of E.P. Rent Act, 1949. Their Lordships have held as under: 8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord: (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of 'landlord', Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so, that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category, the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2, a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases, a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2, a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases, a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act, the Legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act. 10. A plain reading of the provisions extracted above makes it clear that to claim a relief thereunder, a person must be a landlord within the meaning of the terms in section 2(c); his being owner of the premises is neither a pre-requisite nor a relevant factor. 15. From the above discussion, it follows that such a truncated meaning of the term landlord' cannot be imported in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act having regard to the width of the language employed therein and there is no other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for purposes of section 13(3)(a) thereof to an owner of the premises alone. The appellant has been paying monthly rent of the premises to the respondent from 1976. The respondent is thus the landlord of the premises under the Act and is entitled to seek relief u/s 13(3)(a) of the Act. In this view of the matter, we find no illegality in the order of this High Court under challenge. The appeal is without merit and it is liable to be dismissed. 25. The learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Mrs. Yashoda Raju Vs. A. Kuselan, AIR 2004 Mad 106 has held that the landlord though not the owner, is entitled to file eviction petition against the tenant, if tenant had recognized that person as landlord. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 5. 25. The learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Mrs. Yashoda Raju Vs. A. Kuselan, AIR 2004 Mad 106 has held that the landlord though not the owner, is entitled to file eviction petition against the tenant, if tenant had recognized that person as landlord. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 5. It is more relevant to look into the provisions of Section 2(6) wherein the definition 'landlord' includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent for a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive rent, if the building were let out to a tenant. 7. As rightly pointed out by both the Courts below, the petitioner is estopped from taking a different stand, which is made clear u/s 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act contemplates that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; 8. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act sets out in clear term that during the continuance of tenancy, a tenant cannot be permitted to deny the title of the landlord. The decision of the Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Atyam Veerraju and Others Vs. Pechetti Venkanna and Others, AIR 1966 SC 629 as follows: 13. Having regard to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, during the continuance of the tenancy, a tenant will not be permitted to deny the title of the deity at the beginning of the tenancy. In 19 CWN 1207 (Privy Council) the Privy Council observed: A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title however defective it may be so, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord." The ratio laid down in the above judgment by the Honourable Supreme Court is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstance of the case on hand. 26. The learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Rameshwar through Lrs. Vs. 26. The learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Rameshwar through Lrs. Vs. Shyampati and Others, (2004) 3 RLW 1959 has held that the persons who for time being are receiving or are entitled to receive rent on their own account or as an agent of owner would be landlords. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. In view of the definition of the "landlord" the submission of learned counsel for the appellants is correct that the landlord should not necessarily be the owner of the suit premises and the persons who for the time being are receiving or are entitled to receive the rent on his own account or as an agent of the owner would be the landlords of the tenant under the Act. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the denial of the title of the plaintiffs in the instant case does not attract the provisions of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act as neither the defendant has renounced his character as such, nor he has set up the title in himself, rather in reply of para 1 of the plaint it was simply stated in written statement that the owner of the shop was Smt. Durga Devi and now is her son Chaturbhuj. Reliance is place upon Sheela and Others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1264 wherein while dealing with the provisions of Section 12(1)) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paras No. 11 & 12 as under: 11. What is denial of the landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy and what impact it has on the landlord's right to evict and tenant's liability for eviction under the Act 12. It is pertinent to note that denial of title of the landlord or disclaimer of tenancy is not a such set out as a ground on which tenant may be evicted u/s 12 of the Act. Section 12(1)(c) provides inter alia that a tenant incurs liability for eviction if the tenant or any person residing with him has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. A tenant's denial of the landlord's title and/or disclaimer of tenancy has been held to be an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. A tenant's denial of the landlord's title and/or disclaimer of tenancy has been held to be an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. IN a series of decisions, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has consistently taken this view and we wee no reason to make a departure therefrom. It has to be seen how and in what manner a denial of title or disclaimer by tenant would attract applicability of Section 12(1)) of the Act? In our opinion, the denial or disclaimer to be relevant for the purpose of Section 12(1)) should take colour from Section 116 of the Evidence Act and Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 116 of the Evidence Act embodies therein a rule of estoppel. No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. This estoppel so long as it binds, the tenant excludes the tenant from raising a plea disputing the title of his landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. It flows as a corollary therefrom that the roof of landlord-tenant relationship tantamount during the continuance of the tenancy so far as the tenant is concerned. It is significant to note that on the phraseology of Section 116 of the Evidence Act the rule of estoppel applies so long as the tenancy is not terminated and the rule estops the tenant from laying challenge to the ownership of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. But the rule of estoppel as incorporated in Section 116 is not exhaustive and it may be extended or suitable modified in its application to other situations as well, retaining the basic feature of the rule. Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that a lease of immovable property determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act in so far as relevant for our purpose, provides that a lease of immovable property determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. The provision contemplates two fact situations which entail the lessee having renounced his character as such and they are: (i) when the lessee sets up a title in a third person, or (ii) when he claims title in himself. In either case, the tenant has disputed and denied the title of his landlord because a title in third person or title in himself cannot coexist with the title in the landlord. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kesharlal H. Pardeshi v. Vithal S. Patole (2005) 10 SCC 249 have again explained the term 'landlord' as under: 5. The term "landlord" has been defined in clause (3) of Section 5 of the Act. any person who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person" is also included in the definition of "landlord". This definition of "landlord" has been overlooked by the High Court. 6. We are of the opinion that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution ought not to have interfered with the findings arrived at by the two courts below and then recorded a finding of its own holding that the appellant is not the landlord which finding is also inconsistent with the definition of "landlord" in clause (3) of Section 5 of the Act. The finding of the High Court cannot be countenanced. 28. The learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Satish Kumar and Another Vs. Shri Nanu Ram Jain Charitable Trust and Another, (2009) 154 PLR 367 has held that the Secretary of the Trust, who gave the premises on rent and was receiving rent from tenant, was competent to file an eviction petition without joining the other trustees. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 4. Shri Nanu Ram Jain Charitable Trust and Another, (2009) 154 PLR 367 has held that the Secretary of the Trust, who gave the premises on rent and was receiving rent from tenant, was competent to file an eviction petition without joining the other trustees. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 4. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner pointed out that all the petitions have been filed at the instance of a person claiming to be a Secretary of the Trust. The details of the resolution authorizing the Secretary had not been filed. The petitions also did not contain the details of other trustees and the petition filed without impleading all of them as petitioner was not competent. The learned counsel relied on the decision of a Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in Atmaram Rachhodbhai Vs. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin and Another, AIR 1973 Guj 113 Full Bench to bring home the point that a suit instituted without making all the Trustees as parties was not maintainable. The issue arose in an ejectment suit filed after statutory notice by one of the Trustees to a Trust and the competence of the person to pursue the litigation in the absence of all the trustees. The Full Bench ruled that one co-Trustee could not give a valid notice to quit determining the tenancy and that such notice must be given by all the co-Trustees unless the instrument of Trust otherwise provided. He also relied on another decision in Mandir Jamuna Dass Jawaharlal S. Sanatam Dharam Mahabir Dal Trust v. Shankar Dass, 2003(1) RCR (Rent) 582 that action under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 for eviction of a tenant could not be filed by the Trust in its own name without impleading all the Trustees. Adverting to the recital in the trust deed the Court found that it had not provided that one of the Trustees could file a suit for ejectment. 5. In my view, the trappings of a Civil action through suit will be attracted to the provisions of Order 31 Rules 1 and 2 shall not be applicable to rent control proceedings. Adverting to the recital in the trust deed the Court found that it had not provided that one of the Trustees could file a suit for ejectment. 5. In my view, the trappings of a Civil action through suit will be attracted to the provisions of Order 31 Rules 1 and 2 shall not be applicable to rent control proceedings. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have approached the issue from the point of view of the fact that under the Haryana Urban (Rent Control and Eviction) Act, 1973, the landlord is defined as a person, who is entitled to receive rent and adverting to the admission of the tenant that he had been paying rent only to the Secretary of the Trust, they held that petition at the instance of such Secretary was maintainable. Further the authorities below also approached the issue from the fact that the tenant had executed a rent note in favour of Secretary of the Trust, Although the document was not registered and consequently, the term of the lease deed itself could not be admitted in evidence, the fact that the document had been executed in the name of Secretary of the Trust was definitely only a collateral purpose to the transaction of lease itself. The institution of the proceedings by the Secretary of the Trust when such a person had been admitted to be the landlord was, therefore, definitely maintainable. The orders of the Courts below upholding the maintainability of the petitions at the instance of the Secretary of Trust, are therefore maintained. 29. A similar objection was also taken by the tenant in Brij Lal and Others Vs. Rai Sahib Puran Mall Trust Dharamshala, Shimla and Others, (2011) 3 ShimLC 577 that the petition on behalf of the President was not maintainable for eviction. This Court rejected the contention. The tenants filed an SLP The same was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This Court has held as under: 9. Firstly, the Court will advert to the question of maintainability of the eviction petition filed on behalf of the landlords. 10. Shri Sanjay Kuthiala has appeared as PW-2. According to him, he was fully authorized by the Trust through resolution Ex. PW-2/A by all the trustees to institute the petition. Ex. PW 2/A has been duly proved. He also proved in evidence certified copy of the trust deed Ex. 10. Shri Sanjay Kuthiala has appeared as PW-2. According to him, he was fully authorized by the Trust through resolution Ex. PW-2/A by all the trustees to institute the petition. Ex. PW 2/A has been duly proved. He also proved in evidence certified copy of the trust deed Ex. PW-2/B. He has also testified that the petitioner No. 2 (in Rent petition) was the President of the Trust. According to him, the premises were residential in nature, but the same were used by the tenants for commercial purposes. The tenants were indulging in the business of beddings and cots. According to him, they have converted room No. 18 into bathroom and toilet, which has caused seepage. Room No. 25 has been converted into a store. In the corridor of rooms No. 24 and 25, the tenants have kept Takhtposhes and cots, which has caused obstruction for the ingress and egress to the yatries staying in the Dharamshala. The Takhtposhes, when rented out, were being lifted by the tenants through staircase and passage of Dharamshala, which causes damage to the property of Dharamshala, as a result of which, its value and utility had been impaired. The use of the tenanted premises has been changed from residential to commercial without the oral or written consent of the landlords. A suggestion was put to PW-2, whereby he has admitted that Latur Chand, father of the tenants was the tenant of Dharamshala. He has denied the suggestion that the tenants were using the tenanted premises for residential purposes. PW-3 Sushil Kumar Sood has deposed that he was supplying the beddings to the visitors staying in Dharamshala. The tenants were carrying on the business of supply of Takhtposhes, beddings and those were kept in the corridor, which has caused obstruction in the ingress and egress to the visitors and persons passing therefrom. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority has omitted to take into consideration Section 2(d) of the Act in its right perspective. 30. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand alias Prem Nath Vs. Shanta Prabhakar (Smt), AIR 1997 SC 4367 while interpreting Section 14(3)(c) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 have held that there is no requirement to go into the condition of the building. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. 30. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand alias Prem Nath Vs. Shanta Prabhakar (Smt), AIR 1997 SC 4367 while interpreting Section 14(3)(c) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 have held that there is no requirement to go into the condition of the building. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. From the above analysis, it will be seen that the condition of the building is required to be considered when the application falls under the abovementioned Category (ii). Admittedly, the application for eviction in the present case falls under Category (iv) and there is no requirement in such cases to go into the condition of the building. It is true that this Court has held that the requirement of the condition of the building is a vital factor whether such requirement is specifically stated in the Section or not. It must be remembered that the decision of this Court was rendered while interpreting Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Act which is not in pari materia with the Himachal Pradesh Act. In other words, there are no different categories as set out above in the Tamil Nadu Act as in Himachal Pradesh Act. 31. Similar principles have been reiterated by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagat Pal Dhawan Vs. Kahan Singh (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, (2002) 9 JT 387 as under: 6. Section 14(3)(c) provides inter alia that a landlord may apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of tenancy premises in case of any building or rented land being required bona fide by him for the purpose of building or rebuilding which cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated. The provision does not have as an essential ingredient thereof and as a relevant factor the age and condition of the building. The provision also does not lay down that the availability of requisite funds and availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authority must be proved by the landlord as an ingredient of the provision or as a condition precedent to his entitlement to eviction of tenant. The provision also does not lay down that the availability of requisite funds and availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authority must be proved by the landlord as an ingredient of the provision or as a condition precedent to his entitlement to eviction of tenant. However still, suffice it to observe, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, the court may look into such facts as relevant, though not specifically mentioned as ingredient of the ground for eviction, for the purpose of determining the bona fides of the landlord. If a building, as proposed, cannot be constructed or if the landlord does not have means for carrying out the construction or reconstruction obviously his requirement would remain a mere wish and would not be bona fide. 7. Metal ware & Co.s case deals with section 14 of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 where recovery of possession by landlord from the tenant is contemplated if the building is bona fide required for the immediate purpose of demolishing it (emphasis supplied). This Court held in Metalware & Co.'s case that a building which, looking at its age and nature of construction, was not required to be demolished then the necessary ingredient of the provision was not satisfied. Metalware & Co.'s case is a two-judge bench decision which was considered by a three-judge bench in P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd., wherein this Court clarified that condition of the building cannot alone be the determining factor of bona fides of the landlord though it may be taken into consideration as one of the various circumstances such as the capacity of the landlord, the size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment of capital on reconstruction. 8. The constitution bench in Vijay Singh & Ors. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, authoritatively pronounced that for granting permission u/s 14(1)(b) of Tamil Nadu Act the relevant factors are (i) bona fide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants; (ii) the age and condition of the building; and (iii) the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building. However, the constitution bench cautioned that these are only some of the illustrative factors to be taken into consideration alongwith other factors and no court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. 9. So is the view taken in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Venkatesha Gupta & Ors., and in Harrington House School v. S.M. Ispahani & Anr. The fact that demolition and reconstruction would result in modernization, making additional space available and/or would augment the earning of the landlord is relevant factors for determining the bona fides of the requirement for demolition and reconstruction. 10. The locality where the premises are situated has, with the lapse of time, become a busy commercial locality. The structure of the building is more than 100 years old. It is in mud mortar and with slates' roofing. Instead of outdated two floor space, the landlord proposes to construct a modem three-storeyed building which would obviously provide additional space and much better return to the landlord. The landlord has stated that he had no other residential house of his own available with him and having reconstructed the building he would like to shift his residence too in his own newly constructed house. The bona fides of such a requirement could not have been doubted solely on the ground that the structure of the building, though old and outdated, had not gone so weak as was needed to be demolished immediately. 11. So far as the neighbours are concerned, none has objected to the proposed reconstruction. In any case that is a matter to be settled by the landlord with his neighbours. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted during the course of hearing, and rightly in our opinion, that even if the neighbours were not agreeable to have the common wall demolished and replaced by a new wall the appellant was prepared to raise additional walls of his own next to the common walls, if any, and rest his entire structure on such walls. This obviates the need of proving consent of the adjoining building owners for the proposed reconstruction. 14. In the abovesaid circumstances we are clearly of the opinion that relief of eviction as sought for could not have been denied to the appellant. This obviates the need of proving consent of the adjoining building owners for the proposed reconstruction. 14. In the abovesaid circumstances we are clearly of the opinion that relief of eviction as sought for could not have been denied to the appellant. There is no material available to hold that the landlord has something else in his mind such as getting rid of the tenant without raising construction. Sub-section (5) of section 14 of the Act protects the interest of the tenant by guarding against malafide evictions. It provides that where a landlord has obtained possession of the building or rented land for the purpose of building or rebuilding and puts the building to any other use or lets it out to any tenant other than the tenant evicted from it, the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of such building or rented land and the controller shall make an order accordingly. This provision would not permit the building from which the tenant is being evicted being subjected to any other user or misuse. 32. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 5. S. Venugopal Vs. A. Karruppusami and Another, AIR 2006 SC 1930 have held that for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, there is no requirement that the building should be in a dilapidated condition. Even if a building is not in a dilapidated condition, it may be demolished for the purpose of erecting a new building on the same site. Their Lordships have held as under: 10. It is true that in granting permission u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act, all relevant materials for recording a finding about the requirement of the landlord for demolishing the building and reconstruction of a new building have to be taken into account. The Rent Controller reached the conclusion that the landlord bona fide requires the premises for demolition and reconstruction of a new building. This Court has observed in Vijay Singh etc. etc. Vs. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1997 SC 47 that the court must take into account the bona fide intention of the landlord, the age and condition of the building, and the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building. This Court has observed in Vijay Singh etc. etc. Vs. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, AIR 1997 SC 47 that the court must take into account the bona fide intention of the landlord, the age and condition of the building, and the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building. These are some of the illustrative factors which have to be taken into account and, they are by no means conclusive. 11. In the instant case, we find that the property owned by the landlord, whatever may have been its value in the past, has acquired commercial value and, therefore, the landlord wishes to demolish the old single-storey structure and to construct a multi-storeyed building which may fetch him higher rent, apart from serving his own needs. The landlord had already applied to the competent authorities and got the plans approved. Taking into consideration all these reasons, we are convinced that the landlord bona fide intends to demolish the old building and to construct a new one. Raising funds for erecting a structure in a commercial centre is not at all difficult when a large number of builders, financiers as well as banks are willing to advance funds to erect new structures in commercial areas. This is apart from the fact that the landlord has himself indicated that he was willing to invest a sum of Rs. One-and-a-half lakhs of his own, and he owns properties and jewellery worth a few lakhs. 12. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the landlord established his case that he required the premises for its demolition and erection of a new building on the same site. 33. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishwamitra Ram Kumar Vs. Vesta Time Company, (2007) 5 JT 266 have held that an intention to put the building to better use by way of earning better income consistent with the developments in the locality, cannot be held to be not a bonafide intention, unless of course there is some clear material negativing the bona fides of such an intention. Their Lordships have further held that the developments in the surrounding areas should also be taken into consideration while adjudging the bona fides of the claim for eviction on the ground of reconstruction. The 'condition of the building' is a larger concept which includes considerations of social surroundings and allied factors. Their Lordships have further held that the developments in the surrounding areas should also be taken into consideration while adjudging the bona fides of the claim for eviction on the ground of reconstruction. The 'condition of the building' is a larger concept which includes considerations of social surroundings and allied factors. Where the building is very old and incongruous with the social setting and the surroundings of the place, the Court has got to take a more liberal view in applying the provision of law. Their Lordships have held as under: 16. No doubt, the landlord still intends to occupy the floors other than the ground floor for residential purposes. But, so long as he is in a position to satisfy the requirement of Section 18A of the Act consistent with the building to be put up in terms of the relevant building laws, it could not be held that the claim for eviction on the ground of rebuilding is not bona fide. After all, the building is 100 years old. It is situated in a growing city like Calcutta and it is fetching a meagre income for the landlord by way of rents. Surely, an intention to put the building to better use by way of earning better income consistent with the developments in the locality, cannot be held to be not a bona fide intention, unless of course there is some clear material negativing the bona fides of such an intention. We do not see anything in the present case which would militate against the bona fides of that intention of the landlord. Coupled with this, is the fact that the landlord wants to occupy the upstair portions of the building after reconstruction. Clearly, he cannot do so now, by building over the existing structure, in view of its location and in view of the absence of a staircase to go upstairs and the age of the structure. It is no doubt true that a shop room is in possession of the landlord, the same having been vacated by a tenant and the claim for eviction relates to the other seven rooms in the possession of tenants. It is no doubt true that a shop room is in possession of the landlord, the same having been vacated by a tenant and the claim for eviction relates to the other seven rooms in the possession of tenants. Even if a staircase is provided in that portion in the possession of the landlord, the question still remains whether he could be permitted to put up one or more floors in the building as proposed by him in view of the relevant Building Rules and their possible violation. Thus, viewed from these angles, which are relevant considerations as indicated by the decisions referred to by us earlier, it cannot be said that the need put forward by the landlord is not a bona fide one. We are therefore of the view that the High Court and the trial court were not justified in finding that the bona fides of the claim u/s 13(1)(f) of the Act for eviction of the tenants is not made out by the landlord. 17. The landlord in his evidence has held out that he has the means to undertake the reconstruction. Before the Appellate Court, he has also produced some evidence in that regard. These are days when finances for such construction activity are more easily available as judicially noticed by one of the decisions. We see no justification for doubting the financial capacity of the landlord to rebuild. The landlord has shown that he has got the validity of the approved plan for rebuilding extended. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in not accepting the evidence produced by the landlord in appeal. We are satisfied that the landlord has made out the ground for eviction u/s 13(1)(f) of the Act on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. We reverse the finding of the High Court in that regard. 34. In the instant case, the tenant has not denied the relationship of landlord-tenant. The Landlord has also placed on record the copies of the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller evicting other tenants from the same building, i.e., premises bearing No. 91/1, Lower Bazaar Shimla. 35. We reverse the finding of the High Court in that regard. 34. In the instant case, the tenant has not denied the relationship of landlord-tenant. The Landlord has also placed on record the copies of the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller evicting other tenants from the same building, i.e., premises bearing No. 91/1, Lower Bazaar Shimla. 35. The first and second proviso have been added u/s 14(3)(c) as under: Provided that the tenant evicted under this Clause shall have the right to re-entry on new terms of tenancy, on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant, to the premises in the re-built building equivalent in area to the original premises for which he was a tenant: Provided further that in case of nonresidential premises, the landlord shall not compel the tenant for a change of business under the new terms of tenancy; By way of first proviso, the tenant has been given the right of re-entry on new terms of tenancy on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord and tenant, to the premises in the re-built building equivalent in area to the original premises for which he was a tenant. This proviso has been added to safeguard the interests of tenant, who is liable to be evicted by the landlord on the ground of premises being required by the landlord bonafide for the purpose of building or rebuilding under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The balance has to be struck between the rights of the landlord and tenant. Under the first proviso, the tenancy rights are temporarily suspended and these will revive immediately after reconstruction of the building. There are certain loopholes in the proviso. What would be the new terms of tenancy vis-a-vis old tenancy. The period within which the construction would be commenced by the landlord after the premises are handed over to him by the tenant has not been spelt out. There is no time limit prescribed for the construction of the building. Though there is a provision that the premises in the rebuilt building should be equivalent in area to the original premises for which a person is a tenant, but it is not stated whether it would be in the same place as in the original tenancy or the premises can be shifted. Though there is a provision that the premises in the rebuilt building should be equivalent in area to the original premises for which a person is a tenant, but it is not stated whether it would be in the same place as in the original tenancy or the premises can be shifted. In case hypothetically if the shop is in bazaar and the tenant is not re-inducted in the same shop facing bazaar, the business would become uneconomical. In case the building is in the ground floor on the main road and the tenant is provided the premises in the first and second floor, it will also be oppressive and harsh to the tenant. 36. The learned Single Judge in Lawrence Mascarenhas Vs. Ignatius Pereira, AIR 1973 Kar 324 has held that tenant evicted for purpose of demolition and reconstruction is entitled to the area and place that was in his occupation before eviction. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 20. The next question for determination is whether the defendant has a right to give any portion of the newly constructed building to the plaintiff in the upstairs. Mr. Holla strenuously contended that such a choice is open to the defendant under the law, but he is unable to point out any provision of the Act which gives the defendant-landlord any such right. One must remember that before the demolition of the building in question, there was no upstairs. The plaintiff was occupying a portion determined above in the ground floor. It must therefore logically follow that he is entitled to that area carved out in the ground floor and not anywhere else. The entitlement of the plaintiff for the accommodation is in relation to the place and the area in which his former tenement was situate. The defendant in my opinion, has no right to offer to the plaintiff any area of his choice. He is bound in law to give the plaintiff the approximate area which was in his occupation on which the new building has been constructed. Therefore, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration that he is entitled to get the plaint schedule premises as tenant thereof on a fair rent to be fixed by the Court and for possession of the plaint schedule premises which has been coloured red in the plaint plan. 37. Therefore, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration that he is entitled to get the plaint schedule premises as tenant thereof on a fair rent to be fixed by the Court and for possession of the plaint schedule premises which has been coloured red in the plaint plan. 37. The learned Single Judge in Tara Singh Vs. Wahid Bi, AIR 1973 AP 273 while interpreting Section 12 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 has held that tenant's eviction u/s 12 is temporary as he is entitled to reoccupy premises after re-pairs/reerection. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 3. The first contention before me on behalf of the petitioner was that an order of eviction cannot be passed again u/s 10 of the Act as the petitioner has handed over possession of the premises in pursuance of the order passed in O.P. No. 1/68 filed u/s 12 of the Act. Before I proceed to consider this contention, it is necessary to read Sections 10 and 12 of the Act. The relevant portion of Section 10 which deals with eviction of tenant reads as follows:- Section 10(1): A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Sections 12 and 13: Provided that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said Sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. 2. A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied. 2. A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied. (i) that the tenant has not paid or rendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, or xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that in any case failing under clause (i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender rent was not willful, he may notwithstanding anything in Section 11, give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. 4. Section 12 which deals with recovery of possession by landlord for repairs, alterations or additions or for reconsideration is as follows: Section 12(I): "Notwithstanding anything in this Act on an application made by a landlord the Controller may if he is satisfied. (a) that the building is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs, alterations or additions which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated; or (b) that the building consists of not more than two floors is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to delivery possession of the building to the landlord before a specified dated. 2. 2. No order for recovery of possession under this section shall be passed unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building on completion of the repairs, alterations, or additions or the new building on its completion will be offered to the tenant who delivered possession in pursuance of an order under sub-section (a) for his re-occupation before the expiry of such period as may be specified by the Controller in this behalf. 3. In case the tenant to whom the building or the new building, as the case may be is offered under sub-section (2) by the landlord does not want to occupy it the landlord shall give notice of vacancy in writing to the authorised officer under sub-section (1) of Section 3. 4. Nothing in this Section shall entitle the landlord who has recovered possession of the building for repairs, alterations or additions or for reconstruction to convert a residential building into a non-residential building or a non-residential building into a residential building unless such conversion (is) permitted by the Controller at the time of passing an order under sub-section (1)". 5. A plain reading of Section 10(2)(I) will show that the eviction of tenant must inevitably follow if he is found to have committed willful default in payment of rent. Section 12 on the other hand, deals only with recovery of possession by landlord for repairs, alterations or additions or for reconstruction. This recovery of possession is only for a limited purpose of carrying out the repairs, alterations, or additions to the building and this order under sub-section (1) is only passed on the under taking given under sub-section (2) by the landlord to the effect that he will offer the building to the tenant who delivered possession under sub-section (1) for reoccupation after the completion of the repairs. Therefore, it is clear that there is no outright order of eviction of the tenant u/s 12 as postulated u/s 10(2)(I) of the Act. The right that has been conceded to the landlord u/s 12 is for a limited purpose and that is to enable the landlord to renovate the building and not to exclude the tenant forever under the guise of repairs or renovation of the building. The right that has been conceded to the landlord u/s 12 is for a limited purpose and that is to enable the landlord to renovate the building and not to exclude the tenant forever under the guise of repairs or renovation of the building. Therefore, the fact that possession was delivered to the landlord in pursuance of the order u/s 12 of the Act is not a bar eviction u/s 10(2)(I) of the Act as long as the landlord satisfied the Court that the tenant committed a willful default in payment of rent while he continued to be a tenant in the premises. In this case, the petitioner was found to have committed willful default in payment of rent during the period from February 1968 to September 1968 while he was in occupation of the premises as a tenant. Therefore the order of eviction passed u/s 10 920(1) of the Act on the ground of willful default is a valid and lawful one. 38. The learned Single Judge in Smt. Chandravalli Bai Purshotham dass Vs. Poonamchand Mittalal, AIR 1976 Mad 65 has interpreted Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as under: 3. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench made it clear that there is in-built in the Section 14(1)(b) of the Act a safeguard under which the tenant could take shelter so as to thwart any pretences on the part of the landlord in the matter of the demolition of the building for purposes of reconstruction. The lever that is provided in the section is so obvious for, the tenant can seek for restitution, if the landlord who has to peremptorily give an undertaking as provided for in Section 14(2) fails to demolish the same within the prescribed time. The landlord should make it appear that his intention, ever since he entered his petition for eviction at the threshold of the Rent Controller's Court till the date when he physically and practically began to demolish his own property was that the building has to be demolished for purposes of reconstruction. Whatever reason might prompt an individual to destroy his own property that cannot be the subject matter of investigation by a Court of law. Whatever reason might prompt an individual to destroy his own property that cannot be the subject matter of investigation by a Court of law. It is in this sense the halo of bonafides, which plays a very prominent part in so far as petitions under the other sections of the Act are concerned, sinks, in my opinion, more or less to an insignificant level. In view of the fact that the landlord comes forward openly and publicly to demolish and destroy his property, that would not be a case which is automatically illustrative of the mala fides of the landlord. In such circumstances, there cannot be any acid test to measure the bona fides of the landlord in the matter of such eviction. It is this which was made clear in the Division Bench Judgment. Inspite of it the appellate authority though that since the respondent was occupying only a part of the building and as the landlord has sought for eviction of the respondent only from that part of the building, it would be necessary to investigate further whether the landlord is inclined to demolish the other portions of the building which is not the subject matter of the enquiry at all. Apparently, the learned Judge did not bear in mind the definition of a building in the Act as given out in Section 2(2) of the Act which says 'building' means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non residential purposes and includes. The statute therefore recognizes a part of a building as a building. If this unit which has been given out as a measure in the statute itself is borne in mind then the question whether the landlord is inclined to demolish the other portions of the building and whether he is going to file eviction petitions against the other tenants in the building is outside the purview of enquiry. In so far as the respondent is concerned, he is occupying a 'building' within the meaning of the Act and petitioner as landlord can u/s 14(1)(b) file an application seeking for eviction of the tenant in occupation of that 'building' for purposes of demolition and reconstruction. This is so because a part of a building is also a building. In so far as the respondent is concerned, he is occupying a 'building' within the meaning of the Act and petitioner as landlord can u/s 14(1)(b) file an application seeking for eviction of the tenant in occupation of that 'building' for purposes of demolition and reconstruction. This is so because a part of a building is also a building. The learned appellate Judge, therefore did not bear in mind the fundamentals which govern the position in such circumstances, and he has erred in exercising his power of remit on the basis of the observations already referred to. The order of the appellate authority is, therefore, set aside and the revision petition is allowed. The counsel for the respondent requests time to vacate. Obviously his client is serious to vacate the premises. Taking this aspect into consideration the respondent is granted four month's time to vacate. No costs. 39. The learned Single Judge in Pooranchand Khubchand and others Vs. Chandu alias Abdul Salam, (1977) ILR (MP) 462 has held the tenant to be entitled for compensation under Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in case the landlord fails to reinduct the tenant. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 8. All that a tenant can be expected to do to fulfil the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act is that he should be ready and willing to place the landlord in possession of the premises and to make offer thereof. He cannot be expected to put the landlord forcibly in possession of the premises. Possession cannot be forced upon on an unwilling landlord. 11. I, therefore, agree with the Courts below that in the circumstances of the case, the respondent should be deemed to have fulfilled the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act and is as such entitled to claim the benefit of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act. 13. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed and the order of the Courts below is modified. The direction of the Courts below to the plaintiffs to put the respondent in possession of the accommodation is hereby set aside and instead the plaintiffs are directed to pay a sum of Rs. 500 as compensation to the defendant-respondent. I make no order as to costs of the appeal in the circumstances of the case. 40. The direction of the Courts below to the plaintiffs to put the respondent in possession of the accommodation is hereby set aside and instead the plaintiffs are directed to pay a sum of Rs. 500 as compensation to the defendant-respondent. I make no order as to costs of the appeal in the circumstances of the case. 40. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Srinivasa Rao Vs. K.M. Narasimhaiah and Anr, (1989) 1 JT 229 have held that under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, the tenant is entitled to a premises reasonable comparable or corresponding, not identical, to the premises occupied by him in the old building after re-induction. Their Lordships have held as under: 8. In the case before us the decree against the appellant was passed under the provisions of S. 21(1)(j) of the Karnataka Rent Act. The appellant-tenant gave notice of his intention to occupy the tenement in the new building as required under the provisions of S. 27 of the said Act. This is the undisputed position. In view of this, under the provisions of S. 28 of the said Act, the appellant became entitled to occupy a tenement in the new building. The only question before us is as to what is the nature of the tenement to which he is entitled. There is nothing specific in this connection in the language of Ss. (1) of S. 28. However, a fair commonsense reading of the provisions of Ss. (Dot S. 28 would show that a tenant against whom eviction decree has been passed under S. 21(1)(j) and who has given notice as contemplated under S. 27 of that Act would be entitled to a tenement in the new building which could be said to be reasonably comparable to or to reasonably correspond to the tenement in respect of which the decree was passed. It appears to us that the learned Judge of the High court who delivered the impugned judgment has based it on the consideration of a question which really was not material, namely, whether the appellant was entitled to get an identical shop in the new building, whereas the real question was as to whether he was entitled to a comparable shop. On the facts of the present case, it can be seen that the original shop occupied by him admeasured 17 x 9 and was facing the Belepet Main Road. The shop which respondent 1 has offered to the appellant was only admeasuring 11 6"x8 6" and was not facing the Belepet Main Road but was on the rear of the new building. We fail to see how this shop can be considered as comparable to shop originally occupied by the appellant. Moreover, it is not as if comparable shops were not available. In fact, respondent 1 constructed several shops of 9 x 16 facing the Belepet Main Road, one of which he has given in a hurried manner, as set out earlier, to respondent 2, probably with a view to forestall the claim of the appellant. In these circumstances, we fail to see how the appellant could be compelled to accept the shop offered by respondent 1, which is in no way comparable. The provisions referred to earlier clearly suggest that, at the least, the appellant was entitled to a shop as reasonably corresponding to the original shop occupied by him as the circumstances would permit. It may be clarified here that it is not the appellants case that he is entitled to an identical shop but that he was entitled to a comparable shop. It was submitted by Mr. Kaushik, learned counsel for respondent 2 that as far as the shop given to him is concerned, which is claimed by the appellant, he has already obtained tenancy of the said shop from respondent I and there is no reason why his tenancy should be disturbed. It is urged by him that there are a number of similar shops constructed by respondent I-landlord facing the Belepet Main Road and there is no reason why his shop should be picked out for being given to the appellant. In our view, whatever might be the merits of this submission, it is not open now to respondent 2 to make this submission or resist the claim of the appellant. Respondent 2 was joined as a party in the revision petition disposed of by a division bench of the Mysore High court as set out earlier, which was between the same parties and which decision we have already discussed in some detail earlier (reported in K. Sreenivasa Rao v. K.M. Narasimhiah). Respondent 2 was joined as a party in the revision petition disposed of by a division bench of the Mysore High court as set out earlier, which was between the same parties and which decision we have already discussed in some detail earlier (reported in K. Sreenivasa Rao v. K.M. Narasimhiah). In that case, the High court held that the rights of respondent 2 are subject to the rights of the original tenants conferred upon them under S. 27 and 28. This decision has not been challenged by respondent 2 in any proceedings and has now become final as against him. In view of this it is not open to him now to raise any of the contentions which he has sought to raise. It was open to him to make any submission which he wanted to make in that case or to file an appeal against the judgment insofar as it adversely affected him but he has not chosen to do so and it is not now open to him to raise these contentions. We are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be handed over the possession of the shop occupied by respondent 2. 41. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kondeti Suryanarayana and Others Vs. Pinninthi Seshagiri Rao, AIR 2000 SC 70 while interpreting Section 12(1)(b) and 12(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 have held that when landlord requires the building for demolition. He has necessarily to reconstruct such building and then offer building to tenant who delivered possession for purpose of demolition. Their Lordships have further held that object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. Their Lordships have held as under: 5. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions show that where a building is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the said building, the tenant shall have right of re-entry in the premises on its reconstruction. The language of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 is plain and simple and does not suffer from any ambiguity. The language of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 is plain and simple and does not suffer from any ambiguity. Therefore, when a landlord requires a building to be demolished, necessarily he has to reconstruct the building on the same site of the building and on reconstruction of new building the tenant has a right to re-enter in the said premises. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the word "and" occurring in sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 is disjunctive and it has to be read as "or" meaning thereby that after demolition of the building the landlord is not required to reconstruct the building. If such interpretation is given, then it would encourage the unscrupulous landlord to get eviction of the tenants on the ground of demolition of the building which would be repugnant to the object of the Act which aims to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant from the premises. We are, therefore, of the view that where the landlord requires demolition of the building, he has necessarily to reconstruct the same with a right to the tenant to re-enter in the premises. 42. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another Vs. Rawatmal Dugar, AIR 2004 SC 3625 have held that the tenant, when re-enters into possession, does so under the original tenancy which stands statutorily protected under the Act and he has not been evicted nor held liable to be evicted. In spite of the building having been repaired, altered, added to or re-erected, the tenant shall reenter to occupy the premises on the same terms and conditions on which he was occupying the building on the date on which he delivered possession to the landlord, pursuant to the order of the Controller. Their Lordships have further held that the landlord was not justified in offering the premises to the tenants for re-entry by qualifying the offer for payment of a higher rate of rent. Their Lordships have held as under: 9. The leases of immovable property and the relationship between landlord and tenant are governed by Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee are stated in S. 108 of the T.P. Wet which apply subject to the contract or local usage to the contrary. Under Cls. The leases of immovable property and the relationship between landlord and tenant are governed by Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee are stated in S. 108 of the T.P. Wet which apply subject to the contract or local usage to the contrary. Under Cls. (b) and (c) thereof, not only the lessor is bound on the lessee's request to put him in possession of the property but there is also an implied covenant for peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased property by the tenant. So long as the lessee pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the obligations cast on him by the contract of lease, he is entitled to hold and enjoy the property without interruption by anyone including the lessor. Under Cl. (i) the lessee is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premium or rent to the lessor. 10. There has developed what is known as the doctrine of suspension of rent based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. If the lessee is dispossessed by the lessor from the leased property the obligation of the lessee to pay rent to the lessor is suspended. 11. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 the Seven-Judges Bench of this Court examined the impact of Rent Control Legislations on the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in the context of the issue whether for the purpose of seeking an eviction of tenant under the provisions of the rent control law, it was still necessary for the landlord to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice under S. 106 of the T.P. Act. Certain observations made by this Court during the course of its judgment are relevant for our purpose and may be noticed. The State Rent Acts have, to a very large extent, encroached upon the field of freedom of contract. The right of re-entry controlled by S. III of the T.P. Act is further restricted and fettered by the provisions of the Rent Restrictions Act. In spite of the contract of lease having expired or terminated, the tenant lessee continues in possession under the protective wing of the Rent Restriction Act until the lessee loses that protection. The right of re-entry controlled by S. III of the T.P. Act is further restricted and fettered by the provisions of the Rent Restrictions Act. In spite of the contract of lease having expired or terminated, the tenant lessee continues in possession under the protective wing of the Rent Restriction Act until the lessee loses that protection. The lessee is not bound to vacate nor can the lessor-landlord exercises his right of re-entry unless a ground entitling him to do so within the meaning of the Rent Act has been made out and established in a Court of law. The landlord-tenant relationship stands snapped and the tenancy comes to an end only on a decree or order in that regard being passed by a competent Court. Thus, the contractual lease may have come to an end and the landlord-tenant relationship may have ceased to exist under the contract or the T.P. Act, yet the same continues to exist for the purpose of Rent Act. 15. In the present case, Sections 10 and 12 and 13 are placed in close proximity and yet assigned different titles which is suggestive or the legislative intent that the subject-matter dealt with under the two headings, differently named, is different. A comparative reading of Section 10 with Sections 12 and 13 shows that while sub-section (2) of Section 10 contemplates the tenant being directed to put the landlord in possession of the building consequent upon a ground for eviction of tenant having been made out and the landlord having succeeded in making out a case for eviction of his tenant. And so, the delivery of possession by tenant to landlord is in effect eviction of tenant by landlord. The tenancy itself is determined. Under Sections 12 and 13 the Controller orders the tenant to deliver possession of the buildings to the landlord for a specific purpose and according to a calendar of events which binds the landlord and the tenant both. In other words, under Sections 12 and 13 the tenant is not evicted; the tenancy does not come to an end; the lease continues to survive; and yet the tenant ceases to be in actual possession of the building which is placed in possession of the landlord for a specified purpose. In other words, under Sections 12 and 13 the tenant is not evicted; the tenancy does not come to an end; the lease continues to survive; and yet the tenant ceases to be in actual possession of the building which is placed in possession of the landlord for a specified purpose. Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 the purpose is "for carrying out repairs, alterations or additions which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated". Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) the purpose is "the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished." The provision seeks to achieve a multipurpose. The tenant is protected because his tenancy does not come to an end and his right to re-occupy the building-repaired, altered, added or erected-continues to survive. The landlord is benefited because but for the tenant having been directed to deliver possession to him he could not have carried out such repairs, etc. or rebuilding. The public interest is served as the buildings are kept in good state and habitable and new building activity continues to be carried on. 16. u/s 12, as we have already stated, the lease does not come to an end, nor the tenancy is terminated, merely on account of possession of the building having been delivered to the landlord; nor does it come to an end nor extinguished because the old building has been demolished and a new building has been erected. The tenant, when he re-enters into possession, does so under the original tenancy which stands statutorily protected under the Act and he has not been evicted nor held liable to be evicted. In spite of the building having been repaired, altered, added to or re-erected, the tenant shall re-enter to occupy the premises on the same terms and conditions on which he was occupying the building on the date on which he delivered possession to the landlord, pursuant to the order of the Controller. The rent for the period between the date of delivery of possession by tenant to landlord and the date of tenant's re-entry shall remain suspended because during that period it was not the tenant but the landlord who was in possession of the building. The rent for the period between the date of delivery of possession by tenant to landlord and the date of tenant's re-entry shall remain suspended because during that period it was not the tenant but the landlord who was in possession of the building. On the tenant's re-entry into possession of the building his obligation to pay the same rent which he was paying on the date of delivery of possession by him to the landlord, shall stand revived. If the law permits a revision of rent or fixation of standard rent afresh, the landlord would be at liberty to invoke that provision and revise the rent consistently with such provisions. But the revision of rent cannot be insisted on by the landlord as a condition precedent to re-entry by the tenant. 20. An order for recovery of possession u/s 12 cannot be passed unless the landlord gives an undertaking for offering the building back to the tenant on the expiry of such period as may be specified by the Controller in this behalf. If the tenant does not avail the offer still the landlord cannot occupy the building. He has to notify the vacancy in writing to the authorized officer u/s (1) of Section 3. The nature of user after reconstruction must remain the same as it was before, that is to say, a residential building must continue to be a residential building and a non-residential building must continue to be a non-residential building on re-erection unless permitted otherwise by the Controller. Section 12 empowers the Controller to specify time or appoint the dates for three purposes: (i) the date by which the tenant has to deliver possession of the building to the landlord, (ii) the date by which the landlord has to complete the work, and (iii) the date by which the landlord shall offer the building to the tenant. The Controller can also specify the date or time before the expiry of which the tenant must give response to the offer made by the landlord. 'Such period as may be specified by the Controller in this behalf-the expression as employed in sub-section (2) of Section 12 qualifies all the events within the scope of that provision. Once these dates have been specified there will be no difficulty of implementation. 43. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Jameel Abbas and Others Vs. Mohd. 'Such period as may be specified by the Controller in this behalf-the expression as employed in sub-section (2) of Section 12 qualifies all the events within the scope of that provision. Once these dates have been specified there will be no difficulty of implementation. 43. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Jameel Abbas and Others Vs. Mohd. Yamin @ Kallu Khan etc., AIR 2004 SC 3683 have held that the same rent which is being paid by the tenants in the adjoining shops would be a fair measure of rent which the tenant respondents should be directed to pay in the eventuality on reentry. Their Lordships have held as under: 5. During the course of hearing we tried to explore the possibility of settlement between the parties. The landlords have produced a site plan of newly built premises for the perusal of the Court. It appears that a huge shopping complex has come up in place of the old building. There are 18 shops on the ground floor. The landlords offered to the tenants the three shops situated contiguously, each measuring 8' x 8' on the north eastern end of the building. The shops were not acceptable to the tenant-respondents for re-occupation mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the shops were situated on the back part of the building at a distance from the front portion of the building while the shops they had vacated were situated in the front portion of the old building abutting on the main road. Secondly, the area of the shops was much less compared to the area of the shops previously in occupation of the tenants. There were other incidental and ancillary disputes. However, the learned counsel for the respondents has been able to persuade the respondents to occupy the shops offered by the landlords and it is reported that on 2nd April, 2004 three shops measuring 8' x 8' each have been occupied by the three tenant-respondents. This bring to an end one and the major part of the controversy. 7. We do not propose to enter into niceties and perpetuate the litigation. This bring to an end one and the major part of the controversy. 7. We do not propose to enter into niceties and perpetuate the litigation. Inasmuch as the principal and major part of the controversy has come to an end by the landlords having offered three shops to the three tenant-respondents and the shops have also been occupied by them, the remaining other disputes need a summary burial and that can be done by making reasonable directions. We agree with the learned counsel for the landlord appellants that in the absence of any material supporting the finding, the direction for payment of compensation to each of the tenant-respondents at the rate of Rs. 3.000/- per month for the period for which they have been out of occupation cannot be sustained. The learned counsel for the tenant respondents has conveyed the willingness on the part of the tenant-respondents to pay reasonable rent to the landlord-appellants in view of the premises having been newly constructed. 9. All the three appeals are disposed of in terms of the following directions:- (1) The three tenant-respondents who have entered into possession of the three shops on 2nd April, 2004 situated in the north east corner of the building shall be deemed to be holding the shops in their respective possession as tenants with effect from 2nd April, 2004. They will execute such rent notes in favour of landlords as may be approved by the trial Court. If the terms of lease are not settled then the tenancy between the parties shall remain one for non-residential purpose running month by month. (2) The Trial Court shall ascertain the rent which is being paid by the tenants in the adjoining shops preferably the three shops which are of the dimension of 8'-0" x 8', 7'-10" x 8' and 7'-8"x8' and appoint the same rent to be paid by each of the three tenants to the landlords month by month with effect from 2nd April, 2004. (3) The tenant-respondents are entitled "or payment of compensation for the period commencing 13th November, 2001 up to 9th April, 2003, the day of the order of the High Court reserving three shops for occupation at the tenants and which the tenants refused to occupy. (3) The tenant-respondents are entitled "or payment of compensation for the period commencing 13th November, 2001 up to 9th April, 2003, the day of the order of the High Court reserving three shops for occupation at the tenants and which the tenants refused to occupy. The rate of compensation payable by the landlords to the tenants shall be calculated at the same rate at which rent is appointed by the Trial Court for payment by the tenants to the landlords. It shall be in the discretion of the trial Court to direct the compensation being paid by the landlords to the tenants lump sum or to direct the same being adjusted as against payment of rent by the tenants to landlords after the amount of compensation has been quantified. 44. The learned Single Judge in M. Abu Tahir Vs. M. Rahamathulla, (2005) 4 MLJ 628 while interpreting Section 14(1)(b) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has held that landlord seeking eviction of tenant on ground of demolition and reconstruction of building, the landlord has to given an undertaking as provided in Section 14(2)(b) of Rent Act that work of demolition will be commenced within one month and completed before expiry of three months. The learned Single Judge held this to be mandatory. The learned Single Judge has held as under: 13. It is not the case of the landlord, either in the petition or as P.W. 1 that he wants to retain the building, as such, and to carry on the business, shifting the same from the place where he is now carrying on. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act empowers the landlord, to recover possession of the non-residential building, if he is not occupying, for the purpose of business, which he is carrying on, thereby impliedly informing that the building, as such, is required for personal occupation, not any other building to be constructed, after demolition. ON the other hand, Section 14(1)(b) of the Act empowers the landlord, to recover possession of the building, if it is required bona fide, for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and that demolition should be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the site of the building, sought to be demolished. ON the other hand, Section 14(1)(b) of the Act empowers the landlord, to recover possession of the building, if it is required bona fide, for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and that demolition should be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the site of the building, sought to be demolished. If it is to be held that the ingredients u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act are satisfied, then the building has to be demolished as per the undertaking, to be given u/s 14(2)(b) of the Act. In that case, the building may not be available for the landlord, to be occupied for his person occupation as contemplated u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the two grounds, certainly, would nor synchronize and therefore, the landlord has to choose either Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act or Section 14(1)(b) of the Act and not both. If he chooses both and urges even now, then that would indicate the lack of bonafide so as to say, the aim of the landlord is, to evict the tenant and the requirement os not bona fide. When these things were pointed out, to the revision petitioner, as said above, the only ground urged was demolition and reconstruction, as envisaged u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, we have to see, ignoring the other grounds, whether the landlord has complied with the requirements of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act as well as Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. In this context, we have to remember the provisions of Section 14(1)(b) and 14(2)(b) of the Act 45. In the instant case also, the proviso has visualized reentry/re-induction of the tenant after reconstruction of the building. However, the manner in which he has to be re-inducted, has not been provided for in the enactment. If the provision is applied literally as it stands, it would lead to absurdity and unjust result. The tenant shall be at the mercy of the landlord. The landlord can not defeat the right of re-induction of the tenant by delaying the construction of the building and by imposing such harsh conditions which are impossible to be complied with by the tenant in the new terms of tenancy. The intention of the proviso is to make re-entry of the tenant a reality and not mirage. Moreover, it was never intended by the law makers to cause unnecessary hardship to the tenant. The intention of the proviso is to make re-entry of the tenant a reality and not mirage. Moreover, it was never intended by the law makers to cause unnecessary hardship to the tenant. The Court has taken into consideration the leading judgments on the same issue, as discussed hereinabove, in order to make this proviso workable by applying the maxim of casus omissus. 46. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Vs. B.N. Bhattacharjee and Another, AIR 1979 SC 1725 have held that the Court should stick to literal meaning in absence of any alternative meaning but can go beyond the strict grammatical construction when a new ambiguous provision is to be construed. Their Lordships have further held that Actus curie neminem gravabit is a principle of wider import and is a tool of construction too. Their Lordships have held as under: 46. The possible obstacle in adopting this interpretation is that while the assessee's appeal gets revived when the Commission rejects an application, the I.T.O's appeal is not resuscitated u/s 245(7). Even this is more imaginary than real and depends on overemphasis on verbalism. After all, the clause we have to decode is "the assessee shall not be deemed to have withdrawn the appeal from the appellate tribunal". The obvious object to this clause is to restore the parties to status quo ante, and in fairness, must apply to the Department as to the assessee. This non-discriminatory import can be reasonably read into the clause if we construe the expression the "assessee" in a wider way so as to include all parties affected by the subject matter of the assessment. In that case, the clause may mean that no one who is aggrieved by the assessment shall "be deemed to have withdrawn the appeal from the appellate tribunal." An equitable and purpose-oriented construction of the clause means that the assessee will be put back in the same position vis-a-vis his appeals and if, to facilitate his moving the Commission, the I.T.O. has withdrawn the departmental appeals, the Commission's rejection of the application shall not prejudice the Revenue. Actus curiae neminem gravabit is the principle of wider import and is a tool of construction too. This perhaps may be making up for a lacuna by a restructuring of a clause so as to work out justice to the Department. Actus curiae neminem gravabit is the principle of wider import and is a tool of construction too. This perhaps may be making up for a lacuna by a restructuring of a clause so as to work out justice to the Department. The scheme of Section 253(4) contemplates filing of memorandum of cross-objections by the I.T.O. on receipt of notice of an appeal by the assessee. So much so, it is also possible, alternatively, to read into Section 245M(7) the right of the Department to file an appeal do novo on receipt of notice of the revival of the assessee's appeal, within the period specified in Section 253(4). This does not do violence to the language of Section 245M(7) and affords equitable relief to the Department by enabling it to bring its appeal back to life notwithstanding the earlier withdrawal, when the assessee's appeal reincarnates under Sec. 245M(7). 47. We are mindful that a strictly grammatical construction is departed from in this process and a mildly legislative flavour is imparted by this interpretation. The judicial process does not stand helpless with folded hands but engineers its way to discern meaning when a new construction with a view to rationalisation is needed. Lord Denning, in his recent book "The Discipline of Law" [p.12] made a seminal observation on "Ironing out the creases" by outing a passage from Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 KB 481. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that the must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with diving prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with diving prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive take of finding the intention of Parliament and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which give rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon's case, and it is the safest guide today. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by Plowden....put into homely metaphor it is this. A judge should ask himself the question. If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. 47. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 1973 have held that the Courts must always seek to find out the intention of the legislature. This can be done from the language used in the statute. But courts should not always cling to the literalness and should endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. Their Lordships have further held that to make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye 'some' violence to language is permissible. Their Lordships have held as under: 17. The courts must always seek to find out the intention of the legislature. Though the courts must find out the intention of the statute from the language used, but language more often than not is an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought. As Lord Denning said it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. Though the courts must find out the intention of the statute from the language used, but language more often than not is an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought. As Lord Denning said it would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. As judge Learned Hand said, we must not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember that statutes must have some purpose or object, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship. We need not always cling to literalness and should seek to endeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not make a mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye 'some' violence to language is permissible. (See K.P. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1922 and Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1964) 54 ITR 692). 21. We must remember that the provision is a penal provision. It has further to be borne in mind that the expression 'if is hot same as 'as if nor does it contemplate a deeming provision. It has also to be borne in mind that the provision was introduced for the imposition of penalty in lieu of prosecution. The purpose of the Act and the object of a particular section has to be borne in mind. Having regard to the same, we are in agreement with the views expressed by the Orissa High Court in Bisra Limestone Co. Ltd. Vs. Sales Tax Officer and Others, AIR 1971 Ori 122 Jammu & Kashmir High Court, in Assessing Authority v. Jammu Metal Rolling Mills (1971 Tax LR 1861 ) (supra), the High Court of Kottayam Electricals Private Limited Vs. The State of Kerala, (1973) 32 STC 535 the High Court of M. Pais and Sons and Another Vs. The State of Mysore, (1965) 2 MysLJ 620 the High Court of The Gaekwar Mills Ltd. Vs. The State of Gujarat, (1976) 37 STC 129 and with respect we are unable to accept the views of Veeraswami, C.J. in The State of Madras Vs. Prem Industrial Corporation, (1969) 24 STC 507 and the other decision of the Madras High Court in Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes ( 1973 Tax LR. 2029) (supra). 48. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 0.5. O.S. Singh and Another Vs. Prem Industrial Corporation, (1969) 24 STC 507 and the other decision of the Madras High Court in Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes ( 1973 Tax LR. 2029) (supra). 48. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 0.5. O.S. Singh and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (1995) 7 JT 664 have held that one view, which reflects the traditional approach, is that the Court cannot legislate for casus omissus and that if there is a gap or an omission in the statute the lacuna cannot be supplied by the Court by judicial construction and that it is for the law-making authority to remove the defect. This view further postulates that the Court cannot so interpret a statute to produce a casus omissus where there is really none. The other view is that the Court can fill in the gaps in the enactment by finding out the intent of Parliament. Both the views have been approved by the Supreme Court in different cases. Their Lordships have held as under: 8. In service jurisprudence a distinction is made between a "substantive appointment" and an "officiating appointment". While substantive appointment confers on the person so appointed a substantive right to the post, an officiating appointment does not confer any such substantive right. The appointment on officiating basis is usually made when the incumbent substantively holding that post is on leave or when the permanent post is vacant and no substantive appointment has yet been made to that post. Such an officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in the former case or a substantive appointment being made to that permanent post in the latter case. An appointment on officiating basis, is, from the very nature of such employment, itself of a transitory character and, under the ordinary law of master and servant, is terminable at any time. (See: Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India. The expression "officiated continuously in a senior post" in Rule 3(3)(b) of the Seniority Rules must, therefore, be construed to mean holding a senior post on officiating basis prior to substantive appointment on such senior post. (See: Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India. The expression "officiated continuously in a senior post" in Rule 3(3)(b) of the Seniority Rules must, therefore, be construed to mean holding a senior post on officiating basis prior to substantive appointment on such senior post. Since a person cannot be treated as officiating on a post after he has been substantively appointed on that post, the said expression cannot be construed as referring to the period of officiation subsequent to the date of substantive appointment. For ascertaining the period of continuous officiation on a senior post, which is required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of assigning the year of allotment to a promotee officer. Rule 3(3)(b) has to be read with Explanation I wherein it has been prescribed that in respect of an officer appointed to the Service by promotion for the purpose of determination of his seniority the period of his continuous officiation in a senior post shall count only from the date of the inclusion of his name in the Select List, or from the date of his officiating appointment to such senior post whichever is later. Thus two conditions are required to be fulfilled: (i) inclusion of the name in the Select List prepared for the purpose of promotion under the Recruitment Rules and Promotion Regulations: and (ii) continuous officiation on a senior post. Explanation I postulates that both these conditions must coexist for a promotee officer to take the benefit of continuous officiation in a senior post from the date prior to the date of his substantive appointment. 9. But there may be a situation when a person is appointed to the Service by promotion without his having officiated on a senior post prior to his substantive appointment. How is the year of allotment to be assigned to such an officer? A literal interpretation of Rule 3(3)(b) of the Seniority Rules would lead to the result that Rule 3(3)(b), when it talks of continuous officiation in a senior post, only envisages cases where an officer before his substantive appointment to the service has officiated in a senior post and it does not make any provision in respect of a situation where an officer is appointed substantively to the service without his having officiated in a senior post prior to his substantive appointment to the service. In other words, Rule 3(3)(b) suffers from casus omissus. In other words, Rule 3(3)(b) suffers from casus omissus. Before we reach this conclusion it may be pointed out that judicial decisions reveal two trends. One view, which reflects the traditional approach, is that the court cannot legislate for casus omissus and that if there is a gap or an omission in the statute the lacuna cannot be supplied by the court by judicial construction and that it is for the lawmaking authority to remove the defect. [See: Him Devi v. Distt. Board Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halda.] Here also the approach is that the court cannot so interpret a statute to produce a casus omissus where there is really none. [See: Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson Bros (A.C. at p.602; State of Karnataka v. Union of India"] The other view has been thus put forward forcefully by Denning, L.J., as the learned Master of Rolls then was in Seaford court Estates Ltd. v. Asher: (All ER at p.164. ... when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament... and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature..... A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across tins ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the materia] of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. 49. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Rajiv Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 2917 have held that a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. Their Lordships have held as under: 23. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. Their Lordships have held as under: 23. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute/statutory provision as a whole-appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. But, at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, 1966(1) QB 878 " is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC, 1966 AC 557 where at p.577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges". 24. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accident." "But," on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Panton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit protereunt legislators ,the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute-Casus omissus et oblivoni datus dispositions communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws. 50. In Lucy v. W.T. Henleys Telegraph Works Co. Ltd. The All ELR, 1969(3) 456, Lord Denning has held that an act of Parliament should be construed as to effectuate the intention of the makers of it and not to defeat it. If they have by mistake overlooked something, we should do our best to smooth it out. We should construe it so as to avoid absurdities and incongruities, and to produce a consistent and just result. The Lord Denning has held as under: I cannot believe that Parliament intended that the widows should be in a worse position that the living claimants. Seeing that the living claimants have been permitted to join I.C.I. as defendants, I think Mrs. Lucy and Mrs. Wild should likewise be permitted. It comes back once again to the ever-recurring question: How should we construe an Act of Parliament? I have said before, and I repeat it now, that we should do our best to smooth it out. We should construe it so as to avoid absurdities and incongruities, and to produce a consistent and just result. This can be done quite simply here by construing the words "the action" in S. 3(4) as meaning simply "the action which Mrs. Lucy brings in respect of the death of Mr. Lucy". The sub-section does not mean that "the action against I.C.I." or "the action against the new defendant " is to be brought within 12 months of Mr. Lucy's death. The sub-section means simply that the action in respect of his death must be brought within 12 months. This is the only interpretation which does justice to Mrs. Lucy and Mrs. Wild, as compared to the living claimants. Lucy's death. The sub-section means simply that the action in respect of his death must be brought within 12 months. This is the only interpretation which does justice to Mrs. Lucy and Mrs. Wild, as compared to the living claimants. It also fits in with the provision of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, on which S. 3(4) is founded. Section 1 of the act of 1846 gave the widow an action"...whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default.."; and S. 3 said that- 51. In Nothman v. London Borough of Barnet. The All England Law Reports, 1978(1), the Lord Denning has held that the literal method is now completely out-of-date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as the 'purposive' approach. The Court should adopt such a construction as would promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision. The Lord Denning has held as under: I have read that passage at large; because I wish to repudiate it. It sounds to me like a voice from the past. I heard many such words 25 years ago. It is the voice of the strict constructionist. It is the voice of those who go by the letter. It is the voice of those who adopt the strict literal and grammatical construction of the words, heedless of the consequences. Faced with glaring injustice, the judges are, it is said, impotent, incapable and sterile. Not so with us in this Court. The literal method is now completely out-of-date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as the 'purposive' approach. He said so in Kammins Ballarooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd.' and it was recommended by Sir David Renton and his colleagues in their valuable report entitled 'The Preparation of Legislation'. In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will 'promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision'. It is no longer necessary for the judges to wring their hands and say." 'There is nothing we can do about it'. Whenever the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by leading words in, if necessary-so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. 52. Whenever the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by leading words in, if necessary-so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. 52. While permitting/allowing rebuilding, the learned Rent Controller/Appellate Authority shall fix a time within which the construction has to be commenced and completed by the landlord. The tenant must vacate the premises in order to enable the landlord to carryout construction, as ordered by the learned Rent Controller/Appellate Authority. The terms and conditions of tenancy more or less should be on the old terms of tenancy, except increase in rent, which is to be determined as per the law laid by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Jameel Abbas and Others Vs. Mohd. Yamin @ Kallu Khan etc., AIR 2004 SC 3683 The tenancy will be deemed to have been temporarily suspended and not terminated. Since right of tenant of re-entry has been provided now under the proviso. Re-induction of the tenant should be on the same dimensions as per old tenancy and the location and the place should also be same. It is clarified that in case the premises are commercial and are on the main bazaar, the tenant cannot be shifted to first floor or second floor. In the eventuality of the premises not handed over by the landlord to the tenant, the tenant will be held entitled to reasonable compensation to be determined by the learned Rent Controller, which should neither be exorbitant nor on the lower side. 53. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/S Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra K. Tandon, AIR 1998 SC 1639 have held that provisions of Rent Control and Eviction Act should be harmoniously construed so as to balance the rights of landlord and obligations of tenant towards each other. 54. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 1998 SC 602 have held that law should be just to all Sections of the Society. It should not be unjust to one and give disproportionate benefit to the other. Their Lordships have held as under: 15. 54. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 1998 SC 602 have held that law should be just to all Sections of the Society. It should not be unjust to one and give disproportionate benefit to the other. Their Lordships have held as under: 15. The aforesaid decisions clearly recognise and establish that a statute which when enacted was justified may, with the passage of time, become arbitrary and unreasonable. It is, therefore, to be seen whether the aforesaid principle is applicable in the instant case. Can it be said that even though the provisions relating to the fixation of standard rent were valid when the Bombay Rent Act was passed in 1947 the said provision, as amended, can still be regarded as valid now'. 55. The Apex Court in Hari Dass Sharma Vs. Vikas Sood and Others, (2013) 7 AD 129 has permitted the tenant to apply for re-entry into building in accordance with the proviso to Clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2009. 56. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, the revision petition is allowed. The judgment, dated 17.01.2006, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Shimla, is set aside and the order, dated 01.08.2003, passed by the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, is modified as under: The tenant is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord within a period of three months. Thereafter, the landlord shall commence the construction within a period of six months and complete the same within a further period of one year after obtaining the statutory permissions. The tenant shall be re-inducted on the basis of the observations made hereinabove after one month of the construction of the building. The tenant should be re-inducted in the same place, location and area should be equivalent to the area which was in occupation of the tenant before the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller. CMP No. 203 of 2006 In view of the analysis made hereinabove, the present application is rendered infructuous and the same is dismissed as infructuous. No costs.