JUDGMENT Gangele J.1. These two writ appeals have been filed against the common order dt.31.7.2009 passed in W.P.No.1103/2003 and W.P.No.4978/2009. 2. The respondent No.1 is a company incorporated under the provisions of Indian Companies Act. Initially the name of the company was “Texmaco (Gwalior) Limited”. Subsequently, it was changed as “Cimmco Birla Ltd.” An agreement was entered on 7th April 1947 between Govt. of Gwalior State through its Minister for Industries, Commerce and Communication and M/s Birla Brothers Ltd. Gwalior State granted permission to establish certain industries. It also granted sufficient and adequate land or lands for the purpose of establishment of factory and also granted other benefits including exemption from payment of tax. In pursuance to the aforesaid agreement, Secretary, Industries Commerce and Communication Gwalior Govt. ordered that a plot “A” was handed over to the Director of the Cimmco company and possession of a triangular plot No. “A” was given to the company on 24th May 1947. The area of the plot is mentioned in a map attached with the order. The plot area of the plot was 32 Bigha 9 Biswa consisting of 15 khasra nos. The details are as under :- Khasras No. Area Bighas Biswas 465 2 19 1358 - 8 1359 3 1 1360 2 - 1361 4 4 1363 2 1 1364 2 3 1365 5 4 1366 2 6 1367 1 15 1368 - 16 1369 2 4 1370 1 17 1371 1 4 1372 - 5 Total 32 9 3. Govt. of M.P. also granted a lease to the company named as Central India Machinery Manufacturing Company Ltd. for a period of 99 years vide lease deed dated. 8th November 1963 of total area 18.75 ekars situate at village Ghospura of Tahsil Gwalior khasra numbers 438, 439, 440, 441, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 459, 460, 461, 1377, 1478, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1384, 1392, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1402, 1403 total 31. The company established factory over the aforesaid portion of the land. It also constructed residential accommodation for its workers over some portion of the land. After near about 40 years,3 the company became sick and it was referred to BIFR under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to SICA). The reference was made to this effect on 14.11.2000 and a case was registered as case No.372/2000. 4. After near about 40 years,3 the company became sick and it was referred to BIFR under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to SICA). The reference was made to this effect on 14.11.2000 and a case was registered as case No.372/2000. 4. The Nazul Officer vide letter dt. 2nd November 2002 informed the Director, MITS to deposit 10% of the total amount of Rs.60,81,00,000/- as value of the land, which was sought for allotment of land of survey Nos.1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 455, 1392 and 1394 situate at village Gospura by the Institute. It is also mentioned in the letter that in accordance with the order of the State of M.P. Revenue Department dt.20th Sept. 2002, the Institute was required to deposit 10% amount. The respondent No.1 came to know about the aforesaid fact when a news was published in the local newspaper, then it challenged the aforesaid letter dt.2nd November 2002 in W.P.No. No. 1103/2003. The petitioner pleaded in the petition that the land in question was allotted to the petitioner company on lease for a period of 99 years. The petitioner company had been paying the rent and there was no violation of terms and conditions of the lease deed. The petitioner company was not issued any show cause notice in regard to termination of lease neither the lease was terminated, hence, the order of allotment of the land to MITS (appellant in W.A.No.374/2009) is arbitrary and illegal. 5. Petitioner/respondent No.1 also filed a petition W.P.No.4978/2007 and prayed a relief that the respondents be directed not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the land of survey No.1371 and possession of the petitioner be protected. 6. Learned Single Judge heard both the petitions simultaneously and allowed both the writ petitions. The order date 2.11.2002 (Annexure P/1) communication issued by the Nazul Officer was quashed and a writ of mandamus was issued against the respondents not to interfere and disturb possession of the company over the lands in question. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, these appeals have been filed. W.A.No.374/2009 has been filed by the MITS and W.A.No.610/2010 has been filed by the State of M.P. 8. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, these appeals have been filed. W.A.No.374/2009 has been filed by the MITS and W.A.No.610/2010 has been filed by the State of M.P. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the MITS (Appellant in W.A.No.374/2009) has contended that due to violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed, the lease granted earlier to the respondent No.1 was cancelled and thereafter the possession of the land was taken over by the Government. The land was recorded in the khasra entries as Government land and subsequently, it has been allotted to the appellant, hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to law. He further submitted that the respondent company breached the terms and conditions of the lease. He further submitted that the respondent No.1 company did not come with clean hands before the writ Court, hence, the learned Single Judge committed an error in granting relief. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel relied on the following judgments : (i) M/s Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India – 2007 AIR SCW 5350; (ii) Jiyaji Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction 2007 (2) MPLJ 519 (iii) Morgan Securities and Credit (P) Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd. 2006 (12) SCC 642 (iv) State of M.P. v. Krishnarao Shinde - 1991 RN 53 9. Learned Dy.Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State adopted the arguments of the learned senior counsel for MITS. He further submitted that the lease of the land leased out to the petitioner was cancelled due to non compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease deed and it was allotted to the MITS for educational purpose. The institute also deposited 10% of the amount. The company was a defaulter and it breached the terms and conditions of the lease, hence, the order of allotment is in accordance with law. Learned Dy.Advocate General further contended that the company was a Government lessee and in accordance with the provisions of section 182 of M.P.Land Revenue Code, the Govt. has right to eject a lessee from its land by order of a revenue officer and the name of the government was recorded in the khasra entries. 10. Learned Dy.Advocate General further contended that the company was a Government lessee and in accordance with the provisions of section 182 of M.P.Land Revenue Code, the Govt. has right to eject a lessee from its land by order of a revenue officer and the name of the government was recorded in the khasra entries. 10. Contrary to this, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 contended that a valid lease was granted to the respondent No.1 company of two blocks one is absolute grant granted by the State and another is lease granted by the State Government. The lease was never cancelled. No such order has been communicated to the company by Government. He further submitted that the company was referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to BIFR) and in accordance with the provisions of SICA, the State Government had no power and authority to allot the land to MITS. The learned senior counsel further pleaded that there is no order of competent authority in regard to allotment of land to MITS. Hence, the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the petitions and there is no merit in both the appeals, they are liable to be dismissed with costs. In support of his contentions learned senior counsel relied on the following judgments :- (i) Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. CANRA Bank – (1998) 5 SCC 554 . (ii) Morgan Securities and Credit (P) Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd. - (2006) 12 SCC 642 (iii) Jiyaji Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction – 2007 (2) MPLJ 519 (iv) M.P.Housing Board v. Shiv Shankar Mandil and Ors. - 2009 RN 1 = AIR 2009 SC 863 . 11. As mentioned earlier in this order, two blocks of lands were granted to the petitioner company (respondent No.16 herein); one by way of grant by Gwalior State and another vide lease deed executed between the erstwhile Company and State Government. In the agreement, which was executed between the Company and the Gwalior State through its Minister, Industries and Commerce Department. There is no mention to the effect that the grant can be cancelled subsequently, hence, it is an absolute grant. There are terms and conditions mentioned in the lease deed executed between the petitioner company and the State of M.P. in the year 1961. There is no mention to the effect that the grant can be cancelled subsequently, hence, it is an absolute grant. There are terms and conditions mentioned in the lease deed executed between the petitioner company and the State of M.P. in the year 1961. There is no averment in the return filed by the State that what terms and conditions were breached by the petitioner company and due to which the lease was cancelled. There is no order of the Government filed by the State in regard to the cancellation of lease deed. It is pleaded that the land which is subsequently allotted to MITS was recoded in the khasra entries as Government land. Order dt. 15.9.1998 passed by the Upper Tahsildar is filed by the State in the reply as Annexure R-4/1. It is mentioned in the order that the land area 94.436 hectare was allotted earlier to the Industries Department and around the aforesaid area of the land, residential colonies have been developed, hence, the aforesaid land be recorded in the name of Revenue Department. 12. Additional return was also filed before the writ Court. In the additional return, it is pleaded that the Industries Department surrendered the land to the State Government except Khasra Sl.No.1373. However, the fact remains that there is no order placed by the State on record before the writ Court by which the lease granted to respondent No.1 was cancelled. There is no order placed by the State Government or MITS on record before the writ Court, by which the land was allotted to the MITS. Only an order of Nazul Officer was field by the petitioner before the writ Court as Annexure P-1. 13. Industries Department also filed return before the writ Court and pleaded that the land mentioned in para 5.2 of the petition except survey No.1373 was allotted to M/s Cimmco Birla Ltd. Textile Division and the land mentioned in para 5.4 of the petition was leased out to Central India Manufacturing Company for a period of 99 years vide lease deed date 8.11.1963. It is further pleaded that the Industries Department had not surrendered the land in question except survey No. 1337 to the Revenue Department. It is further pleaded that the Industries Department had not surrendered the land in question except survey No. 1337 to the Revenue Department. It is further pleaded that the Industries Department wrote a letter to the Collector in regard to correction in the revenue entries of area 264 Bigha 5 Biswa allotted to different industries and thereafter the entries were corrected. 14. From the aforesaid pleadings of the Industries Department, it is clear that the Industries Department never surrendered the land to the Revenue Department, hence, Revenue Authorities had no right to record the land in question as Government land in khasra entries. 15. There is no pleading in the return by the State Government that the petitioner/respondent No.1 company breached any terms and conditions of the leased deed. Hence, the submissions of the State Government that the land is of the Revenue Department is baseless and devoid of any substance. It is also clear from the letter return by the General Manager of Commerce Industries dt. 8.12.1997 filed before the writ Court. The land was of the ownership of the respondent No.1 company. 16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Azim Ahmad Kazmi and others v. State of U.P. reported in (2012) 7 SCC 278 has held that the Government grant of lease of land shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of Government Grants Act, 1895. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as under :- “29. However, if the Government proceeds under the terms of the Government Grants Act, 1895 then what procedure is to be followed. section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, stipulates that the lease made by or on behalf of the Government is to take effect according to their tenor – All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor; any decree or direction of a Court of law or any rule of law, statute or enactments of the legislature, to the contrary.” 17. From the aforesaid law laid down by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Azim Ahmad Kazmi (supra), it is clear that the grant made by the Government is to take effect grant to the tenor - all provisions, restrictions conditions and limitations contained in the grant. From the aforesaid law laid down by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Azim Ahmad Kazmi (supra), it is clear that the grant made by the Government is to take effect grant to the tenor - all provisions, restrictions conditions and limitations contained in the grant. In 1947 grant of land was made by the Govt. of Gwalior to the petitioner company and it would govern in accordance with the provisions of agreement entered into between the respondent company and Gwalior State and in the agreement, there is no provision in regard to automatic cancellation of grant. 18. Counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Krishnarao Shinde reported in 1991 RN 53. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when the lease granted by the Gwalior State to company, then the company is a Government lessee and not a pakka tenant. In this case, the lease was initially granted for a period of one year and subsequently it was extended for a period of 10 years and then the proceedings were initiated to eject the company then the company filed a civil suit. However, in the present case, the lease was granted to the petitioner/respondent No.1 company for an unlimited period. 19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ITC Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 7 SCC 493 has held as under in regard to cancellation of lease :- “30. A lease governed exclusively by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the TP Act”, for short) could be cancelled only by filing a civil suit for its cancellation or for a declaration that it is illegal, null and void and for the consequential relief of delivery back of possession. Unless and until a Court of competent jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law. Unless and until a Court of competent jurisdiction grants such a decree, the lease will continue to be effective and binding. Unilateral cancellation of a registered lease deed by the lessor will neither terminate the lease nor entitle a lessor to seek possession. This is the position under private law. But where the grant of lease is governed by a statute or statutory regulations, and if such statute expressly reserves the power of cancellation or revocation to the lessor, it will be permissible for an authority, as the lessor, to cancel a duly executed and registered lease deed, even if possession has been delivered, on the specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute.” 20. From the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the lease under private law could only be cancelled by filing a civil suit and once the grant of lease is covered by the statute or statutory regulations, the lease could be cancelled on the specific grounds of cancellation provided in the statute. In the present case, in the year 1963, Industries Department granted the lease to the petitioner/respondent No.1 company. A copy of the lease has been filed as Annexure P/4 before the writ Court and the aforesaid lease could only be cancelled if there was violation of any term and condition of the lease after giving opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.1 company. Respondent State or MITS failed to place any order on record in regard to cancellation of lease, hence, the lease granted to the respondent No.1 company was never cancelled. Consequently, the order passed by the Nazul Officer (Annexure P/1) directing the MITS (appellant in W.A.No.374/2009) to deposit the rent in regard to allotment of land is contrary to law. Apart from this, the State did not place any specific order by which the land was allotted to MITS. It is only mentioned that MITS made an application for allotment of the land and thereafter the then Chief Minister directed the department to find out the value and premium of the land, it could not be termed as order of allotment of land. 21. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the MITS has contended that the petitioner/respondent No.1 violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed because it had using the land for the purpose of marriage gardens. 21. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the MITS has contended that the petitioner/respondent No.1 violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed because it had using the land for the purpose of marriage gardens. An application was also filed before the writ Court in this regard. On the aforesaid ground, no order of termination of lease has been passed. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the lease granted earlier came to an end. 22. One fact which is also taken care of is that respondent No.1 company was referred to BIFR and the proceedings were pending before the Board. 23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Morgan Securities and Credit (P) Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd. reported in (2006) 12 SCC 642 held that when the reference is made before the BFIR in regard to winding up of a company no action could be taken against the company without permission of the Board in accordance with the provisions of SICA. 24. Section 22 of the SICA also prescribes suspension of legal proceedings in regard to an industry, in which reference has been made under the provisions of SICA. Respondent Company was referred to BIFR and reference was made. In this view of the matter, no land of respondent No.1- Company could be allotted by any authority to any other institution or person. 25. Consequently, in our opinion, there is no merit in both these appeals. They are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.