JUDGMENT 1. - By the impugned order dated 17.10.2012 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bhilwara in Rent Appeal No. 129/2009 - Jagdish Chandra & Ors. v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi & Ors ., rejected the application filed by the petitioners-tenants under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. rejecting the prayer for amendment of the written statement at the appellate stage, on the purported ground that during the pendency of the appeal, since an alternative shop had become available the landlord (respondents), therefore the written statement deserves to be amended. The application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. filed by the petitioners however was rejected by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal by the impugned order. 2. Earlier also, when the petitioners-tenants against the order dated 1.2.2012 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal rejecting petitioners' appeal had approached this Court by filing SBCWP No. 4438/2012 - Jagdish Chandra & Ors. v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi & Ors ., a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 1.8.2012 remanded the matter back to the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal to first decide the application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. and thereafter pass appropriate orders thereon. The copy of the order dated 1.8.2012 is also placed on record as Annex.3 in the present writ petition. The operative portion of the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court is quoted hereunder for ready reference : "8. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 1.2.2012 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal in Appeal No. 129/2009 and certificate of recovery of possession issued pursuant thereto are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Rent Tribunal for decision afresh after considering and disposing of the applications preferred by the petitioners-tenants as aforesaid appropriately. The appeal along with applications shall be decided by the Appellate Rent Tribunal expeditiously in any case within a period of six months from the date of this order. No order as to costs." 3. The appeal along with applications shall be decided by the Appellate Rent Tribunal expeditiously in any case within a period of six months from the date of this order. No order as to costs." 3. After such remand, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has now again rejected the application of the petitioners-tenants under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. by the detailed impugned order dated 17.10.2012 by observing as under : " 6- mHk; i{kh; rdksZa ij euu fd;kA izkFkh@vihykFkhZ us eSllZ Hkaoj yky Kkupan ds jgu'kqnk nqdku ekpZ] 2010 esa jgueqDr gksdj izkIr gksus ls vthZnkjku dh vko';drk ds vk/kkj dks lekIr dj nsrh gS ,oa bl vihy dks lkjoku :i ls izHkkfor djrk gS ,oa bl vk/kkj ij tokc ds iSjk la0 5 esa vkxs 5,] 5ch] o 5 lh tksMs+ tkus dk fuosnu fd;k ,oa bl la'kks/ku dh btktr pkgh xbZ gSA ;g nqdku nkSjkus vthZoknk fjDr gksdj izkIr gksuk crk;k x;k gS vr% izpfyr okn ij i'pkrorhZ ?kVuk dk dksbZ izHkko ugha gS ln~Hkkfod vko';drk vthZnkok is'k djus dh fnukad dks mRiUu gksuk U;k;laxr gSA vf/koDrk izR;FkhZ@Hkw&Lokeh dh vksj ls izLrqr mDr U;kf;d fofu'p;ksa ls iw.kZ ekxZ n'kZu izkIr gksrk gS tks bl ekeys ij iwjh rjg pLik gksrs gSA U;kf;d n'"VkUr 2008 ( 3 ) vkj0,y0MCY;w0 2671 esa vihy yafcr jgus ds nkSjku oknh ds iq= dks jkstxkj fey x;k& fyf[kr dFku esa la'kks/ku pkgk fd vc ln~Hkkoh vko';drk dk vk/kkj lekIr gks x;k gS& [kkfjt gqvk & ekuuh; U;k;ky; us ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k gS fd la'kksf/kr fl0iz0la0 ds vkns'k 6 fu;e 17 esa tksM+s x;s ijUrqd dh n'f"V ls la'kks/ku dh vuqefr ugha nh tk ldrh vkSj bldh vuqefr dsoy fopkj.k dh voLFkk esa gh nh tk ldrh gS& og vk/kkj tks csn[kyh gsrq okn nk;j djus dh frfFk dks vkSj ;gka rd fd fdjk;k vf/kdj.k }kjk vafre U;k; fu.kZ;u dh frfFk dks Hkh fo|eku ugha Fkk ml vk/kkj dks vyx djus dh vuqefr ugha nh tk ldrh gSA vU; U;kf;d n'"VkUrksa esa Hkh bl izdkj ds er izfrikfnr fd, x, gSA vr% jgu'kqnk nqdku ds izkIr gks tkus ls vthZnkj dh vko';drk lekIr ugha gks tkrh gS ,oa bl vk/kkj ij la'kks/ku dh vuqefr fn;k tkuk fof/k leer izdV ugha gksrk gSA 7- vr% izkFkhZ@vihykFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr vkosnu vUrxZr /kkjk 22 jsUV dUV~ksy ,DV lifBr vkns'k 6 fu;e 17 fl0iz0la0 fnukad 15-2-2011 [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA " 4. Mr. Mr. M.C. Bhoot, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Surendra Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-tenants submitted that in the absence of relevant pleadings in this regard, the appeal of the petitioners would be rendered ineffective, and the petitioners-tenants would not be able to contend that in view of alternative shop becoming available to the respondents-landlord, the bona fide need of the landlord could be satisfied with the same therefore, that application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. deserves to be allowed, otherwise the appeal would be rendered ineffective. 5. On the other hand, Dr. Sachin Acharya, learned counsel for the. respondents-landlord relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna & Ors. v. Kishan Lal &Anr. reported in 2012(4) WLN 66 (Raj.) in which, the similar amendment was sought by the tenants at the stage of second appeal before this Court, came to be rejected by this Court on 31.8.2012 rejecting application of the tenant under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. and the said order was reproduced while dismissing the second appeal itself later by the judgment and decree dated 25.9.2012. He, therefore, submitted that at the appellate stage, no such amendment could be allowed and need as it existed on the date of filing of eviction application, deserves to be seen. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order dated 17.10.2012 passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bhilwara does not require any interference by this Court in the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 has held as under : "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) in any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) in any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. in this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been, flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. it has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) it may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter- productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 8. In the case of jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 in Para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a Court or Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 9. This Court in the case of Gopal Krishna (supra), held as under : "20. There is no dispute on the proposition of law as such that amendment in the pleadings can be allowed even at the appellate stage but the question is as to whether it is just and proper or just and fair to allow such amendment as claimed. The answer has to necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no dispute on the proposition of law as such that amendment in the pleadings can be allowed even at the appellate stage but the question is as to whether it is just and proper or just and fair to allow such amendment as claimed. The answer has to necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, this Court is satisfied that such amendment in the written statement cannot be allowed and it would seriously prejudice the plaintiffs' case if such amendment of repetitive nature giving rise to a defence, which has already been taken/availed by the defendant-appellant and he has failed before the Court below was to be allowed. The defendant-tenant cannot be allowed to re-write his defence by keep on amending his written statement endlessly throughout the appellate forums. if this was to be permitted, the trial of eviction suit will never end and lawyer's acumen and ingenuity like that of learned counsel for appellant-defendant will keep on putting the clock back on square one. Therefore, it is not just and proper to allow such amendment at highly belated stage of 34 years since filing of the eviction suit in 1978." 10. So far as the apprehension of the petitioners that the observations made in the impugned order dated 17.10.2012 rejecting application under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. filed by the petitioners-tenants are likely to affect the decision of the Appellate Rent Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court, the same is misconceived. Suffice it to state that any observations made while passing interlocutory orders deciding the application tinder Order 6. Rule 17 C.P.C. will not affect the final decision of the appeal itself on its merits. The petitioners-tenants are free to raise the grounds available to them under the law in the pending appeal before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, which is expected to decide the same uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order, which is interlocutory in nature. 11. In view of above discussion, the writ petition filed by the petitioners- tenants is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs. A copy of this order be sent A the concerned parties and the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bhilwara forthwith.Petition Dismissed. *******