JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devendra Kumar Arora, J.—By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 31.12.2011, by which the representations of the petitioner dated 4.2.2011 and 25.2.2011 were rejected. 2. The specific query was made from the learned counsel for the petitioner that since when the petitioner is not working with the opposite parties, but learned counsel for the petitioner failed to give any specific reply. From the pleadings of writ petition, it comes out that petitioner was working as daily wage helper with the opposite parties and he is not in service since 1992. Almost similar facts have been mentioned in the order dated 31.12.2011. The perusal of same reveals that as per record of opposite parties, the petitioner was engaged on 23.2.1987 and in the month of November, 1991 after working for 12 days, he absented from duties. 3. Admittedly, the petitioner is not in engagement of opposite parties since 1992 and it appears that he approached this Court by means of writ petition No. 3410 (S/S) of 2011 and the same was disposed of by means of order dated 1.9.2011 with a direction to opposite parties to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner dated 4.2.2011 and representation submitted by the petitioner’s wife dated 25.2.2011 within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified of order. In compliance of order, the said representations were considered and rejected by means of order dated 31.12.2011. 4. Shri Shishir Jain, learned counsel for opposite parties while opposing the writ petition submitted that no claim can be raised on the basis of rejection of the representation, when the original claim is highly belated and the writ petition is to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches done. 5. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 6. The perusal of record shows that admittedly the petitioner is not working with the opposite parties since 1992, and the present writ petition has been filed on the ground of rejection of petitioner’s representation vide order dated 31.12.2011 that is on the direction of this Court in writ petition No. 3410 (S/S) of 2011, but the fact remains that cause of action accrued to the petitioner in the year 1992. 7. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case in S.S. Balu and another v. State of Kerala and others, 2009 (2) SCC 479 , pleased to observe as under: “It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15.1.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage.” 8. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 , held: “16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322). 17. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322). 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 ). 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass v. Union of India held: ((2007) 9 SCC 277, paras 9-10) ”9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray, making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition has been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579 ). 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.” 10. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.” 10. In the case of Union of India and others v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, in which it has been held that when a belated representation in regard to a ‘stale’ and ‘dead’ issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the ‘dead’ issue or time-barred dispute. The relevant paragraph Nos. 14,15 and 16 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to necessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining (SCC pp. 122-23, para 9) : [ (2008) 10 SCC 115 ]. “9. The Courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve and ‘decision’ on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to ‘consider’. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.” 15. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.” 15. When a belated representation in regard to a ‘stale’ and ‘dead’ issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the ‘dead’ issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a Court’s direction. Neither a Court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. 16. A Court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “state” issue. If it is with reference to a “dead or “state” issue or dispute, the Court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the Court or tribunal deciding to direct “consideration” without itself examining the merits, it would make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the Court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect. 11. In view of the above, this Court does not find any good reason to interfere with the matter. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. ——————