JUDGMENT Mr. A.N. Jindal, J.:- This appeal has arisen out of the order dated 10.8.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal, whereby the review petition against the judgment dated 1.12.2006 was accepted and the award was set aside. 2. The factual background of the case is that as per agreement No.6 dated 10.10.1997, work of replacing head regulator/bridge at RD No.144895 and MLL was allotted to the appellants- M/s Chandi Construction Company. The work was to be completed within one year after excluding the period of rainy reason from July to September. However, the appellants were asked by the respondent vide letter No.13559/60/3A dated 13.10.1997 to proceed with the work. On 16.10.1997, the work was commenced by the appellants. However, on 22.5.1998, on account of differences between the parties over the measurement of the work, the work was stopped, consequently, the committee of three Executive Engineers was constituted by the Engineer-in- Chief to take final measurements of the work done. On 8.7.1998, the respondents terminated the agreement vide letter No.5-9/Spl/Camp. Dated 8.7.1991. The Committee submitted the report vide No.732-35/Steno dated 26.5.1998. However, the appellants, aggrieved by the acts of the respondents for not making payment, filed civil writ petition No.7270 of 1998, which was disposed of by this Court on 9.7.1998 with the direction to make payment within a month. The relevant portion of the observations made by this Court are reproduced as under : “We are not at all satisfied with the averments made in paragraph 15, reference whereof has been given above. The word “shorague. No definite time has been spelled out. In totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct respondents to make over to the petitioner the payments due to him for the work that has since already been done, within a month from today.” 3. Pursuant to the said order, on 19.8.1998, the respondents released the payment vide No.11 dated 19.8.1998 of Rs.6,76,054/- and the next payment of Rs.5,00,275/- vide draft No.363589 to the appellants. 4. Here it may be observed that up to that date, neither the respondents raised any objection about the qualification and competency of the appellants to apply for tenders, nor any such objection was raised by any of the respondents including any outsider regarding their competency to apply for the contract and allotment of work. 4. Here it may be observed that up to that date, neither the respondents raised any objection about the qualification and competency of the appellants to apply for tenders, nor any such objection was raised by any of the respondents including any outsider regarding their competency to apply for the contract and allotment of work. No objection was raised at the time of making part payments as aforesaid regarding any dis-qualification of the appellants to receive the same. 5. On 27.10.1998, the appellants applied for appointment of the Arbitrator vide its letter No.149/CCPLKR and also moved an application on 2.2.1999 before the civil court at Karnal for appointment of the sole arbitrator. The civil court appointed Mr. B.S. Sandhu, Retired Chief Engineer, Punjab Irrigation Department as the sole arbitrator. The arbitration proceedings commenced and an award was passed by Mr. B.S.Sandhu, Arbitrator on 5.12.2003, which was amended vide award dated 19.12.2003 and 23.2.2004. 6. At the time of appointment of the Arbitrator or during the pendency of the proceedings before the Arbitrator, no such objection was raised that the company was not authorised to apply for the contract. The dispute was only with regard to the measurements. The original award dated 5.12.2003 and 1912.2003 and 23.2.2004 (both amended awards) were challenged before the District Judge on 21.5.2004, whereas the limitation for challenging the original award dated 5.12.2003 was at the most, only up to 4.3.2004. The respondents while challenging the award took the following objections :- 1. No full opportunity of hearing was given to the objectors- respondents. 2. The matter dealt with by the arbitrator was not within the scope of the arbitration. 3. Civil Court at Kurukshetra had no territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 4. The contractor firm had not approached the adjudicator as per Clause 24.1 of GCC within 14 day of the notification of the Engineer’s decision. 5. The arbitrator misconducted himself while flouting the provisions of the arbitration agreement. 6. The amount awarded under the claims No.1, 3, 4, 10 and 11 are totally wrong and unjustified as the arbitrator did not consider the claims. 7. The arbitrator has wrongly awarded interest against the provisions of the agreement. 7. These objections were duly considered by the Additional District Judge, Karnal and were dismissed on 1.12.2006. 8. 6. The amount awarded under the claims No.1, 3, 4, 10 and 11 are totally wrong and unjustified as the arbitrator did not consider the claims. 7. The arbitrator has wrongly awarded interest against the provisions of the agreement. 7. These objections were duly considered by the Additional District Judge, Karnal and were dismissed on 1.12.2006. 8. The Additional District Judge, Karnal, held that the civil court at Kurukshetra as well as Karnal had the territorial jurisdiction to try the petition. The operative part of the order is reproduced as under :- “As per my discussion above, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned award dated 5.12.2003 and also the amended awards dated 19.12.2003 and 23.2.2004 passed by the Arbitrator. Consequently, the same stand upheld thereby dismissing the present objection petition. There shall be no orders as to costs. Memo of costs be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to the record room.” 9. Then, four months thereafter, on the basis of anonymous complaint received in the office of the Superintending Engineer, Construction Circle, Karnal, vide letter No.9700/65A/17 dated 14.11.2006, the matter was investigated by the Executive Engineer, Construction Division No.17, Karnal. The enquiry was held against the appellants that the contract was taken by the appellants while tendering fake and forged documents. The enquiry was completed and thereafter the present review petition was filed on 27.2.2007 along with an application for condonation of delay for review of the award. The respondents sought to review on the following grounds :- 1. The tenders for replacing Head Regulator-cum-Bridge at RD-144895 MLL were called by the then Executive Engineer, Water Services Division, Dadupur vide his letter No.1732043 dated 8.4.1997 amounting to Rs.410 lacs and the period of completion of work was 12 months excluding the rainy season. As per bid condition No.4.5 (a), to qualify the award of contract, each bidder in its name should have in the last five years 1992-93 to 1996- 97, achieved minimum annual turn over (in all classes of Civil Engineer Const. Works only) for Rs.410 lacs in any one year and satisfactory completed as a prime contractor of at least one similar work,but the appellants did not qualify this condition. 2. There were discrepancies in the calculations regarding the work at Sr. .No.6 for less execution and the difference was Rs.43,514/-. 3. Works only) for Rs.410 lacs in any one year and satisfactory completed as a prime contractor of at least one similar work,but the appellants did not qualify this condition. 2. There were discrepancies in the calculations regarding the work at Sr. .No.6 for less execution and the difference was Rs.43,514/-. 3. The Punjab Agro Industries Corporation, through whom the turn over certificate was issued, has informed that no such certificate was issued by the Corporation. 10. M/s Chandi Construction Company Limited, through Mukesh Kumar Goel, having been authorised, vide resolution dated 14.7.2004 to pursue the petition, filed the reply denying all the allegations stating that since the contract was duly checked, verified and accepted by the respondents, no such objection was made, therefore, now they cannot raise such objection. It was also submitted that the contract was awarded by the officials of the respondents after due verification of the documents and information supplied by the contractor. It was also denied that if the appellants had manipulated or fabricated any documents to secure the contract and the contract was awarded on 10.10.1997 and they now after 10 years of the issuance of the contract could not raise such objection. It was also submitted that the review application was not maintainable. It may here be mentioned that Gian Chand and Amit Kumar, who are said to be not supporting the claim of the company, had retired much earlier and had ceased to have any interest in the company. 11. From the pleadings of the parties, the Additional District Judge, Karnal, framed the following issues :- 1. Whether there are sufficient grounds to review the judgment dated 1.12.2006?OPA 2. Relief. 12. In order to substantiate the issue, the State of Haryana examined Chander Shekhar SDO, Office of Executive Engineer Construction Division, Kurukshetra (PW-1), S.P. Thukral, Executive Engineer, Construction Division, Karnal (PW-2), Raghubir Singh, Executive-I, Punjab Agro Industry Corporation Limited Chandigarh (PW3), Kimti Lal, Junior Engineer Eastern Division, Canal Colony, Ferozepur (PW4), Rakesh Kumar, Junior Engineer Office of Executive Engineer, Ludhiana, Drainage Division, Ludhiana (PW5). 13. 13. The learned Additional District Judge, Karnal, without referring to any of the statements of the witnesses qua the plea of fraud as raised by the respondents while relying upon two affidavits tendered by Gian Chand and Amit Kumar, the alleged Directors of the Company held that there was sufficient evidence of fraud committed by the appellant company in obtaining the contract in question and then its execution and consequential litigation. As such, the award was bound to be set aside. 14. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 15. The prime argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the contract was offered and accepted on 10.10.1997 and work was commenced with the corporation. The respondents, after due verification of all the documents, had accepted the tender and issued the work orders and some work was done and the amount was claimed and part payment was made. However, after 10 years of the contract, this plea of fraud, set up by the respondents, was nothing but a sheer excuse to avoid payment. The counsel for the respondents has urged that on enquiry it was found that the contract was obtained by the appellants by showing wrong turnover, therefore, it being the result of fraud, no award could be passed. 16. Having pondered over the rival contentions, I find merit in the argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. After having lost on merits before the Additional District Judge on 1.12.2006, the respondents on the basis of the anonymous complaint, after holding enquiry, this application for review was filed on 27.2.2007 on the ground that some wrong certificates were obtained in order to show their eligibility to seek the contract which, on enquiry, were found to be not correct, therefore, the fraud was committed. Such plea was not tenable in the eyes of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. It was the department who had given the contract to the appellants and it was their duty to enquire about all certificates at the time when the tender was issued. Now after ten years of the issuance of the contract, it does not lie in their mouth to say, in this review petition filed after one year of the passing of the award that the tender was obtained by way of fraud. Now after ten years of the issuance of the contract, it does not lie in their mouth to say, in this review petition filed after one year of the passing of the award that the tender was obtained by way of fraud. In any case, the alleged certificates have nothing to do with the actual competency of the appellants to do the work, but it was the quality of the work or the scope of the arbitration or any other objection falling within the purview of Section 34 of the Act, which could be challenged in order to discard the claim of the appellant, but no such objection was raised by the respondents. The arbitrator had passed the detailed award which was never challenged by way of appeal. Now the respondents cannot come to contend that the contract was obtained on the basis of some forged certificates relating to the eligibility of the contractor regarding his turnover. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the contract was obtained on the basis of the misdeeds, then also there was no case that the work suffered due to the same. As such, there was no occasion for the respondents to plead fraud. The respondents cannot justify the plea of fraud since the said plea has not been taken by them either in the principal objections towards the claim petition nor in the objections for setting aside the award. It is also not the case of the respondents that they had stopped work on account of some defect in the contract. No such evidence has been brought on record for proving the alleged fraud. Neither the complainant, who had lodged the complaint regarding fraud, was also examined, nor such witness was examined to prove that the appellants had misrepresented something containing fraud before them. No witness before whom they placed any forged documents was examined. The documents were with the respondents which could only be examined before allowing the tender. Now after 10 years, it does not lie in their mouth to say that the certificates were not issued by the office concerned. The original documents having changed hands cannot be said to have been produced by the appellants. The officers whose signatures were appended on the allegedly forged documents were examined, who could only say that those were not their signatures. 17. The original documents having changed hands cannot be said to have been produced by the appellants. The officers whose signatures were appended on the allegedly forged documents were examined, who could only say that those were not their signatures. 17. As regards the contention that Gian Chand and Amit Kumar (who were once the directors of the company) filed the affidavits for acceptance of the review petition, therefore, the review petition is bouind to be accepted, it may be observed that Gian Chand and Amit Kumar were never tendered for their cross examination. Mere tendering of the affidavits by the respondents would not dispense with the mode of proof and would hardly be used as evidence in the case against the appellants. Even otherwise, these two directors had already resigned much earlier therefore, they having lost interest in the award could be expected to say anything against the appellant company. Actually, vide separate resolution, as referred to above, Mukesh Kumar was pursuing the review petition and not Gian Chand and Amit Kumar. They appear to have deposed against the interests of the present contractor i.e. M/s Chandi Construction Company Limited, being inimical to Mukesh Kumar and fear of threatened prosecution. The court appears to have been moved by these two affidavits, which are of no value in the eyes of law. The court has not gone into the depth of the actual situation and passed the judgment on conjunctions. 18. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Act of 1996, only provides for correction and interpretation of award by the Arbitral Tribunal and not by the appellate court. The Arbitration Act being complete Code, not providing any remedy of review, the review petition is not maintainable. 19. Having heard the contention, I find merit in it. The Arbitration Act being complete Code, not providing any remedy of review, the review petition is not maintainable. 19. Having heard the contention, I find merit in it. Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is reproduced as under :- “33.Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.- (1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties — (a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award; (b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. (2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award. (3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the arbitral award. (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with notice to the other party, may request, within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as so claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award. (5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from the receipt of such request. (6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional arbitral award under subsection (2) or sub-section (5). (7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional arbitral award made under this section.” 20. (6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional arbitral award under subsection (2) or sub-section (5). (7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional arbitral award made under this section.” 20. A perusal of Section 33 of the 1996 Act would show that only a Arbitral Tribunal or the Arbitrator, as the case may be, can within 30 days from the receipt of the arbitral award, correct any computation, clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of similar nature, but the section does not enable any judicial review of the judgment. The Arbitral Tribunal has specific and limited jurisdiction of review which cannot be beyond the scope of Section 33 of the 1996 Act. Even filing of such application beyond the period of 30 days was also discouraged by treating the same without limitation but in the present case, the award was passed on 5.12.2003, the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the objection petition on 1.12.2006. No appeal against the said award was filed by the respondents. However, the review petition was filed on 27.2.2007. Thus, after the Additional District Judge passed the order, then he becomes functus officio after passing the judgment, therefore, he could not exercise any power under Section 33 of the Act after expiry of the period of thirty days. In any case, he could correct the award only within the scope as provided under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, but there is no provision as such for review of the order passed by the Additional District Judge so as to set aside the same altogether. Similar observations were made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Arunachal Pradesh vs. Damni Construction Co. (2007) 10 SCC 742 . 21. Again, the Apex Court dealt with the issue with regard to maintainability of review petition before the Arbitral Tribunal in the case of Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Ors., [2011(3) Law Herald (SC) 2138] : JT 2010 (9) SC 382 wherein it was observed as under :- “12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit,the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit,the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed is ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (vide: Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar & Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1457 ; and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 641 ). 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 ; Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1814 ; Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2186 ; State of Orissa & Ors. v. Commissioner of Land Records and Settlement, Cuttack & Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 162 ; and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain & Ors., [2008(2) Law Herald (SC) 850] : (2008) 2 SCC 705 , this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in absence of any statutory provision for the same is nullity being without jurisdiction. 14. Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/ modification/correction is not permissible.” 22. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of K.Narayana Raju vs. Union of India, Rep. By General Manager, S.C. Railway and Ors. 2006 (suppl.) 272 (AP) observed as under :- “4. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied upon para 4 of a judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , wherein it was held that power of review is not an inherent power and that unless specifically provided under the statute the authority has no power of review. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied upon para 4 of a judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , wherein it was held that power of review is not an inherent power and that unless specifically provided under the statute the authority has no power of review. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court (supra 2), unless the power of review is conferred under the statute, the court has no power to review, and hence, the present application is not maintainable. 5. Though the learned counsel for the review petitioner placed a copy of the order of this court passed in a review petition earlier, the aspect as to the maintainability was not considered in the said order, as no objection was raised at that point of time. However, now a specific objection has been raised by the office as well as by the respondents. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of this court to examine the said objection. The learned counsel for the review petitioner has fairly conceded that there is no provision under the Act. However, by referring to Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the learned counsel sought to contend that where an appeal has not been filed, a review application is maintainable. 6. However, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (supra) a review petition is not maintainable, since there is no specific provision under the Act empowering this court to review the orders already passed.” 23. As such, the crux of the matter is that after the award was passed by the competent court and having attained finality, the same could not be upset by way of review application because of lack of its maintainability. 24. Now examining the case from another angle. The respondents have challenged the award on the ground of fraud played upon them at the time when the contract tender was accepted. In this regard, it is observed that fraud is of two types: one is played upon the party and the other upon the court. 24. Now examining the case from another angle. The respondents have challenged the award on the ground of fraud played upon them at the time when the contract tender was accepted. In this regard, it is observed that fraud is of two types: one is played upon the party and the other upon the court. Where there is a fraud played upon the party, then the award could be challenged only by way of suit and when it is played upon the court, then the petition under Section 151 of CPC to set aside the order (passed by the civil court) could be filed. It is no denying a fact that no fraud was played upon the court. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that at the time of accepting the contract, the appellants had no adequate turnover and the tender was received on the basis of the fake documents. It is again noticed that since the date of inception of the arbitration proceedings, till its finalization, such objection was never raised by the respondents and the dispute did not arise on account of any such disqualification as alleged by the respondents. In any case, when the fraud is alleged by the party to have been played upon the opponent, the remedy of the party is to file civil suit. Similar observations were made made by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Bank v. M/s Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 2592 wherein it was observed that in case of fraud upon a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. 25. 25. This judgment was followed by the Apex Court in the recent judgment delivered in the case Hari Parkash Aggarwal and another vs. Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs) and others 2013 (3) RAJ 275, wherein, in para 32 of the judgment the court made the following observations :- “In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, can be summarised as under:- (i) An application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings; (ii) Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by the Court to redress only such a grievance, for which no remedy is provided for under the CPC; (iii) In the event that an order has been obtained from the Court by playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the Court to recall the said order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can also be exercised by the appellate court; (iv) Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing an independent suit. (v) A person aggrieved may maintain an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, but cannot make an application for impleadment or apportionment before the Reference Court. 26. I also find myself in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant that the application for review was not within time inasmuch as, the application for setting aside the award could be filed only within three months from the date of passing of the award and not from the of the amended award, therefore, if very filing of the objection petition becomes time barred, then the objection petition having lost its entity, the review petition is of no consequence. In the instant case, the award was passed on 5.12.2003 and the objection petition was filed on 21.5.2004, passing of the amended award would not make a way to hold that the limitation began to run from the date of passing of the amended award. In the instant case, the award was passed on 5.12.2003 and the objection petition was filed on 21.5.2004, passing of the amended award would not make a way to hold that the limitation began to run from the date of passing of the amended award. Similar observations were made in Damanni Construction Co.’s case (supra), wherein it was observed as under :- “A perusal of the interim award dated 12.10.2003 passed by the arbitrator clearly shows that it was final to the extent of the claim decided therein. This interim award did not mince any words and determined the amount after discussing the claim in detail and finally calculated the amount under each of the claims. Therefore, there was no confusion in this award. It was absolute thoughtlessness on the part of the appellant to have written a letter after six months i.e. on 2.4.2004 seeking review of the interim award.” 27. It was further observed in para No.8 and 9 of the judgment as under :- “The reply given by the arbitrator dated 10.4.2004 was to the effect that as per the scheme of the Act of 1996, the issues/claims that have been adjudicated by the interim award dated 12.10.2003 are final and the same issues cannot be gone into once again at the time of passing the final award. Hence, the same does not give any fresh cause of action to the appellant so as to move an application under Section 34 (3) of the Act. In fact, when the award dated 12.10.2003 was passed the only option with the appellant was either to have moved an application under Section 34 within three months as required under Section 34 (3) or within the extended period of another 30 days. But instead of that a review and with regard to mode of payment, neither of which falls under the purview of Section 33. Therefore, in this background, the application was totally misconceived and the reply sent by the arbitrator does not entitle the appellant a fresh cause of action so as to file an application under section 34 (3) of the Act, taking it as the starting point of limitation from the date of reply given by the arbitrator i.e. 10.4.2004.” 28. As such, when the objection petition itself was time barred then the question of entertaining the review petition did not arise. 29. As such, when the objection petition itself was time barred then the question of entertaining the review petition did not arise. 29. Again, at the cost of repetition, it appears that after the Executive Engineer lost on merits, in order to avoid the liability, after receiving an anonymous complaint and on the basis of the alleged enquiry tried to pass the buck, after 10 years of the commencement of the contract, may be for his own reasons with a malice to snatch the valuable rights which stood already vested way back in the year 2003 by way of valid award passed by the Arbitrator. Apparently, no fraud appears to have been committed by the appellant. 30. In the wake of the aforesaid discussions, this appeal is accepted, impugned judgment is set aside and the review petition is dismissed. Since the Arbitrator had awarded interest @ 12% per annum, but had not made it clear as to up to which date it was awarded, therefore, necessity to clarify the ambiguity has arisen. Thus, while exercising the powers under Section 31 (7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it is ordered that the appellant would be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum up to the date of award and at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of award till realization of the award amount. ---------0.B.S.0------------