JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. By means of this petition the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 17-11-1998, passed by Labour Court in Case No. 49 of 1997, whereby the application filed by the work-man-respondent No.1 U/S 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been allowed. 2. Briefly stated that facts of the case giving rise to this writ petition, according to the petitioners, are that the workman-respondent No.1 filed an application before the Labour Court U/S 33-C(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’), which was registered as Misc. Case No. 41 of 1997, on the ground that the opposite- parties have not paid over-time allowance to him from 16.3.1988 to 15.7.1992. The overtime allowance has been claimed to be Rs. 50,000/-, which was illegally retained by the petitioners. 3. The application was contested before the Labour Court by the opposite-parties/petitioners by filing the W.S./objection and denied the claim of the workman-respondent No.1. The opportunity to lead the evidence was given to the parties and the parties led their evidence before the Labour Court. Thereafter the Labour Court allowed the claim for Rs. 46,015/-. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by Labour Court, the petitioners have preferred this writ petition. In the writ petition the petitioners denied the claim of the workman-respondent No.1 and it is pleaded that the Labour Court was not having jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter U/S 33-C(2) of the Act as it was entertained directly without making any reference by the Central Government for adjudication, and the application ought to have been rejected on this ground alone. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed by the workman and contents of the writ petition have been denied. It was alleged in the counter affidavit that the Labour Court is having jurisdiction to decide the claim regarding pre-existing rights and benefits and the claim was maintainable before the labour court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. It was alleged in the counter affidavit that the Labour Court is having jurisdiction to decide the claim regarding pre-existing rights and benefits and the claim was maintainable before the labour court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The issue to be decided in this case is – ‘Whether U/S 33C-(2) of the Act the claim of the workman- respondent No.1 can be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court by making incidental inquiry or whether the labour court can only exercise the power in respect of the claim which was pre-agitated by way of settlement, award of claim mentioned in Chapter V-A.’ 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the application U/S 33-C(2) of the Act can be moved only with regard to pre-existing benefits or one flowing from a pre-existing right. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Union of India and another versus Kankuben (Dead) by LRS. And others, reported in (2006) 9 Supreme Court Cases 292. 9. In the above cited case the Hon’ble Apex Court considering the ratio of the case of State Bank of India Vs. Ram Chandra Dubey, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 73 , has referred para-8 of that case wherein it has been held that – ‘Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and it denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit.’ 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India (supra) has also considered the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. V. P.S. Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 wherein it was held that the Labour Court is competent to interpret the award on which the workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 11. In the above cited cases of Kankuben it is held that the application claiming overtime allowance and employer disputing the claim and raising preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the application, the application U/S 33-C-(2) of the Act is not maintainable before the Labour Court. 11. In the above cited cases of Kankuben it is held that the application claiming overtime allowance and employer disputing the claim and raising preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the application, the application U/S 33-C-(2) of the Act is not maintainable before the Labour Court. In the another cited case of State Bank of India (supra), it has been held that where in a reference of the question of validity of termination of service and consequential reliefs the Industrial Tribunal found the workmen concerned to be entitled to reinstatement from the date of termination but gave no finding in regard to payment of back wages, application filed U/S 33-C(2) of the Act for computation of back wages on the basis of such award, is not maintainable. 12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the workman-respondent No.1 drew attention of this court towards para-16 of the judgment of Constitution Bench rendered in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc. reported in AIR 1964 Supreme Court 743, which reads as under:- “16. Let us then revert to the words used in s. 33C(2) in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction. When sub-s. (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, does it mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer? According to the appellant, the scope of subs. (2) is similar to that of sub-s. (1) and it is pointed out that just as under sub-s. (1) any disputed question about the workmen’s right to receive the money due under an award cannot be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under sub-s.(2) if a dispute is raised about the workmen’s right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by the Labour Court. The only point which the Labour Court can determine is one in relation to the computation of the benefit in terms of money. We arc not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2)it is clear that if a workman’s right’ to receive the benefit is disputed. that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. We arc not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2)it is clear that if a workman’s right’ to receive the benefit is disputed. that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of subs. (2)does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The Clause “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit” does’ not mean “where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit.” The appellant’s construction would necessarily introduce the addition of’ the words “admittedly, or admitted to be” in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellants contention is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on ‘the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman’s application. The claim under s. 33 C (9,) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s. (2). As Maxwell has observed “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution(1). We must accordingly hold that s. 33C (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-s. (3), the Labour Court should have been authorized to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. 3 becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub- s. (2).” 13. He further drew attention towards para-19 in which it has been observed that- there is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33C(1) fall under Section 33C(2) and in that sense, Section 33C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding, but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter VA, may also be competent under Section 33C(2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. 14. From the above observation made by the Apex Court, it is thus quite clear that the claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter VA may also be adjudicated under Section 33C(2) of the Act and task can be assigned to Labour Court. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 further contended that in the case of Ram Chandra Dubey (supra) although the judgment of Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan was cited but ratio of para-16 of this case has not been considered, wherein application was filed U/S 33C(2) and computation of back wages on the basis of award was involved. He further contended that in the case of Kankuben (supra) relied on behalf of petitioners, the ratio of para-16 P.S. Rajagopalan case has not been considered. 16. P.S. Rajagopalan was cited but ratio of para-16 of this case has not been considered, wherein application was filed U/S 33C(2) and computation of back wages on the basis of award was involved. He further contended that in the case of Kankuben (supra) relied on behalf of petitioners, the ratio of para-16 P.S. Rajagopalan case has not been considered. 16. Learned counsel for the workman-respondent No.1 also relied on the case of Pradip Chandra Parija and others versus Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others reported in (2002) 1 SCC and contended that judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. It has been held in para-6- ‘In the present case the Bench of two learned Judges has, in terms, doubted the correctness of a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. They have, therefore, referred the matter directly to a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done here, the reason why it could not agree with the earlier judgment. If, then, the Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, reference to a Bench of five learned Judges is justified.’ 17. Learned counsel for the workman-respondent No.1 also contended that the matters which are to be adjudicated by the Labour Court under Industrial Disputes Act are necessarily to be mentioned in the Schedule of the Act but there is no mention in the Schedule the dispute of over-time therefore the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the over-time dues or allowance, hence the matter of over time dues would be covered under Section 33C(2) of the Act. 18. It is to be mentioned here that the judgment rendered in The Central Bank of India (supra) is a judgment of three learned Judges and the judgments of Kankuben and Ram Chandra Dubey are rendered by two learned judges. 18. It is to be mentioned here that the judgment rendered in The Central Bank of India (supra) is a judgment of three learned Judges and the judgments of Kankuben and Ram Chandra Dubey are rendered by two learned judges. Hence the ratio laid down by three learned Judges would prevail and it is held that it is a workman’s right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. In the case at hand the dispute was relating to payment of over-time dues. Although the employer denied the same but the workman has produced the documentary evidence in support of his claim that he had done overtime work with the employer. Thus the objection raised by the petitioners that the Labour Court was not competent to adjudicate the application of workman U/S 33C-(2) of the Act has no substance and it is held that the Labour court was competent to adjudicate the matter of over time dues of the workman by making incidental inquiry, but in the case at hand no such evidence was adduced before the Labour Court to prove entitlement of the overtime dues and a pre-existing right for the same. No Government Order or other evidence has been adduced to the effect that the workman was entitled to the overtime dues as has been granted by the Labour Court. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that over time dues have been denied by the petitioner before the Labour Court and in that situation the Labour Court has to adjudicate whether the amount is due or not and the finding of Labour Court on this issue is not based on evidence and the Labour Court has committed manifest error of law simply relying on photocopies of bills produced by the workman which were not admissible in evidence. 20. 20. In reply learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has contended that the workman has filed the application for over time dues before the Labour Court and the workman has also filed photo copies of over time bills and made statement before the court that originals of these bills are with the employer and the learned Labour court has summoned the originals from the employer but the employer did not produce the same before the court and did not discharge its burden and hence the photo copies of the bills are admissible in evidence as secondary evidence. He also contended that the labour court was obliged to adjudicate whether on weighing the probabilities, the materials placed before it by the workman was acceptable or rendered probable. The learned counsel has relied on the case of Kuldip Singh and K.S. Paripoornan reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2412. 21. In the above cited case of Kuldip Singh it has been observed that the only question before the tribunal was whether on weighing the probabilities, the materials placed by the petitioner was acceptable or rendered probable. In the case at hand as mentioned in the judgment of Labour Court, the workman produced photo copies of bills of over time and also made statement that the original are with the employer, but the employer did not come forward to file the originals and if the photocopies produced by workman before the Labour Court were not genuine, in that situation the employer had ample opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal, but it has not been done. Thus the Labour Court was fully justified in relying on the photo copies of the bills. The bills so submitted by the workman are not themselves an evidence of entitlement. Firstly, it is the burden of the workman to prove the fact of entitlement and pre-existing right and it is only after such proof that the said relief can be granted by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has committed manifest error of law in allowing the applications only on the basis of the bills, so submitted, by the workman. In view of the Constitutional Bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Central Bank of India (supra), the Labour Court ought to have decided the workman’s right to receive the overtime dues at the very first instance. In view of the Constitutional Bench decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Central Bank of India (supra), the Labour Court ought to have decided the workman’s right to receive the overtime dues at the very first instance. It is only after such right of the workman being established, then the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit so proved, in terms of money. 22. In view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, the judgment of the Labour Court suffers from manifest error of law and the same is liable to be set aside. 23. The writ petition is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Labour Court, firstly to decide the entitlement of the workman for the overtime dues under Section 9 33-C(2) of the Act and thereafter if the Labour Court finds such entitlement in favour of the workman, to decide the amount payable to him in accordance with law.