JUDGMENT : The Judgment of the Court was as follows : The writ petitioner in this proceeding, who was serving as Deputy Registrar (Court & Judicial) of this Court had applied for the post of Registrar in the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) on 24th March, 2010, which post he intended to serve on deputation basis. He had submitted his application before the Registrar, Original Side on 25th March, 2010, for the purpose of forwarding the same to the concerned officer of the Central Government. This was done, according to the petitioner, in terms of clause 6(ii) of the High Court Service (Duties, Rights and Obligations of Employees) Rules, 1983 (the 1983 Rules) which requires an existing employee of the Court to apply for any other post through his appointing authority. The advertisement for the post, the text of which has made Annexure "P2" to the writ petition also stipulated that the public institutions specified therein including the High Court could forward the applications of the willing officers whose services could be spared. There is controversy in this proceeding as to whether the Registrar, Original Side of this Court was empowered to forward the petitioners application in the capacity of his appointing authority or not. I shall deal with that aspect of the controversy later in this judgment. The advertisement for the subject post in this case was issued in a publication entitled Employment News of 20-26th March, 2010. On 3rd May, 2010, a "no objection certificate" was issued by the Registrar Original Side of this Court. This was issued in response to a request by the petitioner made on 25th March, 2010, to the Registrar, Original Side. In that request letter, it was indicated that the post for which he was applying was that of Registrar, Debts Recovery Tribunal and "No objection" was given for that post only. The application of the petitioner was forwarded on 3rd May, 2010, by the Deputy Registrar (Administration) of this Court. The petitioner was granted permission to leave station and appear in the interview for the post by the Registrar, Original Side. 2. The application of the petitioner was forwarded on 3rd May, 2010, by the Deputy Registrar (Administration) of this Court. The petitioner was granted permission to leave station and appear in the interview for the post by the Registrar, Original Side. 2. Thereafter, the Deputy Registrar Administration and Registrar Original Side were informed by the Undersecretary (DRT) Department of Financial Services, Government of India that the petitioner was selected for appointment of in the of post Registrar, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal on deputation basis for a period of three years from the date he assumes charge of the post or until further order whichever was earlier. The petitioner was asked to send his acceptance and the said officer of this Court was asked to relieve the petitioner by 4th October, 2010, for reporting to the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (DRAT). The petitioner submitted his application dated 10th September, 2010, before the Registrar, Original Side for relieving him and for granting lien on his parent post for two years. The reason why his posting was in the DRAT and not in DRT has not been explained to this Court, but this issue is not of much significance for effective adjudication of this proceeding. 3. The said application was placed before His Lordship the Hon’ble Chief Justice and the Hon’ble Chief Justice, observed that "the officer, had not taken permission of the Chief Justice as such the proposal cannot be approved. The officer might join at his risk". This observation of the Hon’ble Chief Justice appears from the endorsement made on a note sheet laid before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, dated 17th September, 2010, which was produced before me at the time of hearing by the learned Counsel for the High Court administration. Thereafter, on 20th September, 2010, the petitioner made a representation before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, tendering his apology, and he also indicated therein that he was not aware of the requirement of obtaining permission of the Hon’ble Chief Justice as his appointing authority. The petitioner joined the post of Registrar, DRAT Kolkata on 5th October, 2010, on deputation and the petitioner submitted his representation on 5th October, 2010, for reserving his right in respect of his service. The petitioner joined the post of Registrar, DRAT Kolkata on 5th October, 2010, on deputation and the petitioner submitted his representation on 5th October, 2010, for reserving his right in respect of his service. The petitioner claims to have received a subsequent order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice on 2nd November, 2010, under the cover of a letter dated 2nd November, 2010, written by the Undersecretary Government of India (DRT). In the said letter of 2nd November, 2010, the petitioner was directed to clarify the position and provide reasons/justification as to why his candidature ought not to be cancelled in view of the order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The order of the Hon’ble Chief Justice was passed on 5th October, 2010, to the following effect:- "The employee having joined service with D.R.A.T. without seeking permission of the Chief Justice and without submitting his resignation deserves to be dealt seriously for the misconduct. Inform his employer accordingly." 4. The petitioner was, thereafter, served with another notice issued by the Registrar, Original Side of this Court dated 12th November, 2010, which was also in the nature of a show cause notice. This notice recorded the said observation of the Hon’ble Chief Justice made on 5th October, 2010. The petitioner was required to submit explanation in writing as to why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him in accordance with law for, inter alia, violation of the High Court Services (Duties, Rights and Obligations of Employees) Rules, 1983, misconduct, acts unbecoming of a Government servant and disrespect to high officials. The petitioner replied to the said two notices taking a uniform stand that he had obtained sanction of the Registrar, Original Side, High Court, and the relevant Rules did not cast any obligation to seek permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice or for submitting resignation for undertaking employment. It was pointed out by him that he had obtained prior permission from the Registrar, Original Side, whom he referred to as his appointing authority. 5. In this writ petition, multiple reliefs have been prayed for by the petitioner. One of the reliefs prayed for is for direction upon the High Court administration for sending his last pay certificate as also service book and other documents for fixing his pay and allowance in the Tribunal. His pay and allowance was, however, fixed subsequent to filing of this writ petition. One of the reliefs prayed for is for direction upon the High Court administration for sending his last pay certificate as also service book and other documents for fixing his pay and allowance in the Tribunal. His pay and allowance was, however, fixed subsequent to filing of this writ petition. This has been recorded in the order passed in this matter on 16th December, 2010. His main prayer on which arguments have been advanced before me is for cancellation of the two notices, which were in the nature of notices to show cause issued by the Undersecretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services on 2nd November, 2010 and the Registrar Original Side of this Court on 12th November, 2010. He has also applied for expunction of the remarks and order made by the Hon’ble Chief Justice on 17th September, 2010 and 5th October, 2010 with regard to his action in joining the DRAT. Prayer has also been made for a declaration to the effect that he has not violated the provisions of the 1983 Rules by joining the post of Registrar of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. In substance he seeks sanction of this Court for his migration to the Tribunal in the capacity of Registrar and wants his lien to be retained. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is entitled to be repatriated to his parent department on expiry of his period of deputation and he seeks promotion in his parent department during the period of his deputation which might have had been granted to him had he remained in service with his parent department. On the point of maintaining lien as also for getting promotional benefits, reliance has been placed on the following authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:- (i) T.R. Sharma v. Prithvi Singh & another reported in AIR 1976 SC 367 (ii) Ramlal Khurana (dead) by L.R.S. v. State of Punjab & Others reported in AIR 1989 SC 1985 (iii) State of Punjab and others v. Inder Singh and others reported in (1997) Volume 8 S.C.C. 372. (iv) State of Mysore v. M. H. Bellary reported in AIR 1965 S.C. 868 (v) R.L. Gupta v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 968 (vi) Balkrishna Pandy v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1996 SC 888 6. (iv) State of Mysore v. M. H. Bellary reported in AIR 1965 S.C. 868 (v) R.L. Gupta v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 968 (vi) Balkrishna Pandy v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1996 SC 888 6. The petitioners main case, as argued by Mr. Sanyal, is that the petitioner had applied to the authority who had appointed him, and it was not possible for him to know that it was the Hon’ble Chief Justice who was his real appointing authority. The Registrar, Original Side had accorded him permission and no deficiency in such permission seeking process was pointed out to him. 7. Stand of the High Court administration in this matter is that the petitioner had actually obtained permission from the Registrar Original Side for applying to the post of Registrar Debts Recovery Tribunal whereas he had applied for and joined the post of Registrar Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. On that count, it has been argued that there has been suppression of material fact at the time of obtaining permission to apply for the said post. Secondly, it has been submitted that the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Hon’ble Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution of India as also in terms of the High Court Services (Duties, Rights and Obligation of Employees) Rules 1983. Rule 2(c) of the said rules defines appointing authority as:- "(c) "appointing authority", in relation to an employee, means the Chief Justice or any other authority empowered by the Chief Justice to make appointment to the service or post held by him for the time being;" Clause 5 of the High Court Services Rules 1960 is also relevant for adjudication of the subject-dispute, and this Rule stipulates:- "Rule (5) - The Registrar on the Appellate Side or the Original Side, as the case may be, shall have authority under Article 229(I) of the Constitution to make appointments on behalf of the Chief Justice to posts in the High Court Services, Class-I (except those of Registrars) and the High Court Service, Classes-II, III and IV and promotions to the said posts shall also be made by the said Registrars on the respective sides in their charge. Provided that such appointments and promotions, except in the High Court Service, Class IV, shall be made by the Registrars with the approval of the Chief Justices. Provided that such appointments and promotions, except in the High Court Service, Class IV, shall be made by the Registrars with the approval of the Chief Justices. Provided further that notwithstanding anything contained in this or any other of these rules, the Chief Justices shall have Power, subject to the provisions of the proviso to clause (I) of Article 229 of the Constitution, to make any appointment to any post in the High Court Service, Classes I, II and III and also power to cancel any appointment made in Class IV and make any appointment in its stead." 8. The writ petitioner in this proceeding has come at the stage when he was asked to explain his conduct by the authority who he is serving now, as well as by his original employer, being the High Court administration. No affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Union of India or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The High Court administration, however, has contested this proceeding by filling affidavit. In this matter I am primarily to examine as to whether the notices to show cause suffered from any ex facie illegality or not. On the question as to whether the Hon’ble Chief Justice is the appointing authority of the petitioner or not, I do not think there is any doubt that the Hon’ble Chief Justice is his appointing authority. Under the aforesaid clause of the 1960 Rules, the Registrar is to make appointment on behalf of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The power to make appointment is also not exclusively vested in the Registrar. Under Rule 5, the Registrar is to make appointment with the approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. Thus, the ultimate authority for appointment to the post of Registrar as also the Deputy Registrar would be the Hon’ble Chief Justice. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued by Mr. Sanyal that it is not possible for an employee to know who exactly is his appointing authority, as in the case of the petitioner, the Registrar, who is admittedly his superior authority, had given the clearance. 9. On behalf of the High Court administration, it has been submitted that permission, if any, was given to him for joining the post of Registrar, Debts Recovery Tribunal whereas the petitioner got himself engaged in the Appellate Tribunal. 9. On behalf of the High Court administration, it has been submitted that permission, if any, was given to him for joining the post of Registrar, Debts Recovery Tribunal whereas the petitioner got himself engaged in the Appellate Tribunal. If the petitioners remissness was confined to this sole factor, I might have had considered this to be an error of technical nature. But in this case the petitioner was alerted twice for not having obtained permission of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, once on 17th September and next on 5th October, 2010, and the main charge against him is that he did not obtain permission from is appointing authority. This charge remains irrespective of the fact as to whether he had joined the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. Having been pointed out specifically that his shifting to the Appellate Tribunal was without permission of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, I do not think the proceeding against him can be nipped at the threshold on this count. 10. There is, however, another factor, though not specifically contained in the pleading, has been brought to my notice by Mr. Sanyal in course of hearing. The term of the petitioner in the Appellate Tribunal is ending on 30th September, 2013. This aspect of the controversy has an impact on the directions I shall issue in this matter, and I shall examine this aspect in the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment. Case made out by the High Court administration in this matter is that the petitioner was not given permission from proper authority to join the DRAT. This being the stand of the High Court administration, and considering the fact that no step has been taken against him by the authorities, after the initial notice calling for his explanation was issued, he continues to remain an employee of this Court. On the point of not initiating any formal departmental proceeding against the petitioner, Mr. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel submitted that this restraint was shown by the High Court administration in deference to this proceeding which was pending adjudication. If that is the case, then also there is no alteration to the fundamental position that the petitioner continues to be an employee of this Court. 11. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel submitted that this restraint was shown by the High Court administration in deference to this proceeding which was pending adjudication. If that is the case, then also there is no alteration to the fundamental position that the petitioner continues to be an employee of this Court. 11. In these circumstances, in my opinion, so far as the notice issued by the Undersecretary to the Government of India Department of Financial Services is concerned, no further step ought to be taken against the petitioner as the petitioners terms of service is almost over. In this notice, issued on 2nd November, 2010, no independent grievance of the DRAT against the petitioner has been made out. The foundation of this notice is the complaint of the High Court administration that he had joined the DRAT without the permission of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, and the petitioner has been asked to provide reasons/justification as to why his candidature ought not to be cancelled. No step has been taken thereafter for about three years and the petitioners term is ending within a month. The DRAT has obtained service of the petitioner all through, and he has been released his pay. Now no purpose, in my opinion, would be served if the petitioner has to justify the same action before the two authorities. For this reason, I restrain the respondent nos. 5, 6 and 7 from taking any further action on the basis on the said notice dated 2nd November, 2010, and the said notice shall remain permanently stayed. 12. I am, however, not inclined to quash the notice issued by the Registrar, Original Side of this Court, dated 12th November, 2010. The petitioner remains an employee of this Court and allegations against him relate to breach of service regulations guiding the employees of this Court. Since the matter is pending for a long time, it was specifically argued by Mr. Sanyal that failure to take any step subsequent to filing of the reply of the petitioner constituted acceptance of the reply. I am not making any comment on that issue. The petitioner is still an employee of the High Court, and his migration to the DRAT was not sanctioned by the appropriate authority. His continuance as an employee of the High Court not having been extinguished in any manner, he remains under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. I am not making any comment on that issue. The petitioner is still an employee of the High Court, and his migration to the DRAT was not sanctioned by the appropriate authority. His continuance as an employee of the High Court not having been extinguished in any manner, he remains under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The petitioner accordingly shall be permitted to revert back to this Court in whatever capacity the High Court administration may think it proper. It shall be open to the High Court administration to proceed further with the notice of 12th November, 2010. In the event it is asserted on behalf of the petitioner that the notice to show cause has lapsed or there has been deemed acceptance of his reply to the notice to show cause, it shall be open to the petitioner to take such stand before the appropriate authority. It shall be up to the High Court administration to bring the notice to show cause to its logical conclusion by taking appropriate steps in accordance with law. 13. Mr. Sanyal had also argued that the petitioner should be entitled to all promotional benefits on his reversion, relying on the authorities referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. I am refraining from making any comment or issuing any direction in that regard also considering the fact that there are allegations against the petitioner for breach of Service Regulations, and I have left it to the High Court administration to take final decision on that issue. The petitioner shall be at liberty to raise this issue before the High Court administration, if so advised. 14. The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. 15. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order be given to the parties expeditiously, if applied for. Writ petition is partly allowed.