Judgment Mr. K.S. Jhaveri, J.—By way of this appeal, the appellant – State has challenged the judgment and order of the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, Camp at Mahuva, Dated : 15.02.2012, rendered in Sessions Case 112 of 2009, whereby, the learned trial Judge acquitted the original Accused No. 1– the opponent, herein, of the charges for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution, as set out before the trial Court, reads as under; 3. A complaint came to be lodged by the father of the prosecutrix with Talaja Police Station, wherein, he stated that he is residing at the address given in the complaint along with his wife and children and out of them, the prosecutrix was the eldest. Then, the complainant went on to narrate the alleged offence stating that on 03.02.2009, at about 03:00 a.m., while the complainant, his wife and children were sleeping near their house, the opponent, herein, came there and allured the prosecutrix and run away with her on his motorcycle. On registration of the offence, police carried out the investigation, and since, prima facie evidence were found against the original accused, a charge-sheet was laid against them. At the time of trial, since, the accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried, they were tried for the alleged offence. On completion of the trial, the trial Court passed the judgment and order, acquitting all the accused including the opponent, herein. Hence, the present appeal. 4. Ms. Shah, learned APP, vehemently submitted that in view of the fact that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age, at the time of commission of offence, the trial Court committed an error in acquitting the accused. She, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. 5. As against this, Mr. Savani, learned Advocate for the opponent, supported the judgment and order of the trial Court submitting that the same was passed after appreciating the evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, and hence, no interference is called for with the same at the hands of this Court. 6. We have heard learned APP for the appellant – State and the learned Advocate for the opponent and perused the material on record with their assistance. 7. 6. We have heard learned APP for the appellant – State and the learned Advocate for the opponent and perused the material on record with their assistance. 7. Before proceeding with the matter, here, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under; “363. Punishment for kidnapping.—Whoever kidnaps any person from 1[India] or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. XXX XXX XXX 366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; 1[and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punished as aforesaid]. XXX XXX XXX 376. Punishment for rape:— (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by Sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (1) Whoever:— (a) Being a police officer commits rape— (i) Within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or (ii) In the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or (iii) On a woman is his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or (b) Being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman is custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or (c) Being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman’s or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (d) allured Being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (e) Commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (f) Commits rape when she is under twelve years of age; or (g) Commits gang rape, Shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years.” 8. A perusal of the material on record shows that the prosecution failed to prove before the trial Court that on the date of the alleged offence, the prosecutrix was of 14 years of age. The father and mother of the survivor were confronted on the aspect of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, however, they failed to give any satisfactory explanation as to on what basis, the date of birth of the survivor was mentioned to be 18.03.1994 in the record of Gram Panchayat. The father and mother of the survivor were confronted on the aspect of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, however, they failed to give any satisfactory explanation as to on what basis, the date of birth of the survivor was mentioned to be 18.03.1994 in the record of Gram Panchayat. Moreover, the School Leaving Certificate of the brother of the prosecutrix issued by Primary School, Raigon, shows that his date of birth is 01.06.1994, and therefore, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the date of birth of the prosecutrix cannot be 15.03.1994. Moreover, from a perusal of the evidence of the prosecutrix, who was examined by the prosecution as P.W.-14 at Exhibit-64, it cannot be said that she was forcefully taken away from the custody of her parents or that she was ever subjected to physical exploitation by the opponent against her wish and will. In fact, there is no material on record to show that on the date of the alleged offence, the prosecutrix was minor and that she was allured from the custody of her parents against her will. In view of the above, we have to look into the matter from the touchstone of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court right from 1991 to 2013. 9. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of “M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani vs. State of Kerala & Anr.”, (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under; “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below.” 10. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below.” 10. Further, in the case of “Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka”, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” 11. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 12. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 12. Even in the case of “State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.”, reported in (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In Para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.” 13. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in cases of “State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors.”, 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by L.R.s vs. State of M.P.”, 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. 14. In the case of “Luna Ram vs. Bhupat Singh and Ors.”, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in Paras 10 and 11 has held as under; “10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence.” 15. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of “Mookkiah and Anr. vs. State, Rep. by The Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu”, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in Para 4 has held as under: “4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]” 16. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of “State of Karnataka vs. Hemareddy”, AIR 1981, SC 1417, wherein it is held as under; “...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi vs. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.” 17. In the recent decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Shivasharanappa & ors. vs. State of Karnataka”, JT 2013 (7) SC 66 has held as under; “That appellate Court is empowered to re-appreciate the entire evidence, though, certain other principles are also to be adhered to and it has to be kept in mind that acquittal results into double presumption of innocence.” 18. In the case of “Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana”, (2011) 7 SCC 130 , the Apex Court set aside the conviction of the original accused, since the prosecutrix, who was alleged to be subjected to physical exploitation by the accused during broad day light, failed to identify the ‘Kothi’, i.e. the premises, wherein, the alleged offence was stated to be committed. The apex Court, hence, set aside the conviction of the original accused observing that the conduct of the alleged rape victim raises suspicion and renders her evidence shaky and untrustworthy. 19. Similar view was taken by this Court, while disposing of an application, bearing Criminal Misc. The apex Court, hence, set aside the conviction of the original accused observing that the conduct of the alleged rape victim raises suspicion and renders her evidence shaky and untrustworthy. 19. Similar view was taken by this Court, while disposing of an application, bearing Criminal Misc. Application No. 12653 of 2009, for grant of leave to appeal, which was preferred by the State against the acquittal of the original accused in Sessions Case No. 153 of 2008 for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC. In Para-3 of the said order, this Court observed as under; “3. It appears to us that there are basic infirmities in the case of the prosecution inasmuch as in the history given before doctor the victim had stated that she herself had gone voluntarily with the accused. Further, the victim had stayed with the accused for about 8 months. She had all opportunities to go away. This shows that there was no compulsion on her part and she voluntarily remained with the accused. The age of the victim is proved above 16 years. Not only that, but, two times the abortion was made and in the Hospital she has declared that she is the wife of the accused. Under these circumstances it is not possible to believe that there was any sexual intercourse under compulsion, more particularly, when there is no medical evidence supporting the case for the offence under Section 376 of I.P. Code. The panchas have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution.” 20. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge committed no error in passing the impugned judgment and order, and hence, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is DISMISSED. The judgment and order of the trial Court, Dated : 15.02.2012, stands confirmed. Bail bonds of the accused, if any, on bail, stands discharged. R & P be sent back to the concerned trial Court, forthwith.