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2013 DIGILAW 666 (AP)

Behra Bhaskara Rao v. Kameswari Enterprises

2013-08-19

P.NAVEEN RAO

body2013
ORDER P. Naveen Rao, J. 1. O.S. No. 88 of 1997 was instituted by M/s. Kameswari Enterprises for recovery of an amount of 4,50,000/- from Behara Bhaskara Rao (first defendant) and Behara Rama Lakshmi (second defendant) with subsequent interest at the rate of 18% p.a.; for compensation and for injunction restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2 their men from interfering with the quite enjoyment of the suit schedule premises. O.S. No. 2 of 1998 was instituted by Behara Bhaskara Rao and Behara Rama Lakshmi against M/s. Kameswari Enterprises (first defendant) for recovery of an amount of ` 1,38,003.75 towards damages for use and occupation of the plaint schedule property with subsequent interest at the rate of 12% p.a. O.S. No. 33 of 1999 was instituted by Behara Bhaskara Rao and Behara Rama Lakshmi against M/s. Kameswari Enterprises (first defendant) for recovery of an amount of ` 3,31,209/- towards damages for use and occupation of the plaint schedule property with subsequent interest at the rate of 12% p.a. O.S. No. 95 of 1999 was instituted by Behara Bhaskara Rao and Behara Rama Lakshmi for recovery and possession of the plaint schedule property by evicting M/s. Kameswari Enterprises (first defendant) and for future damages for use and occupation of the plaint schedule property. Additional Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam by common judgment dated 13-10-2003 dismissed O.S. No. 88 of 1997; O.S. No. 2 of 1998 is decreed in part; O.S. No. 33 of 1999 is decreed in part and O.S. No. 95 of 1999 is decreed with interest directing the first defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the demised premises by vacating the same within three months from the date of judgment. Thus, Behara Bhaskara Rao succeeded in all the four original suits against M/s. Kameswari Enterprises. 2. Aggrieved by the common judgment and decree dated 13-10-2003, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, three Appeal Suits are instituted in this Court. A.S. No. 3702 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 88 of 1997. A.S. No. 3747 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 2 of 1998. A.S. No. 3746 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 33 of 1999. 3. The property in dispute is the premises containing Sri Lakshmi Talkies Cinema Theatre. On 01-08-1982. A.S. No. 3702 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 88 of 1997. A.S. No. 3747 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 2 of 1998. A.S. No. 3746 of 2003 is directed against O.S. No. 33 of 1999. 3. The property in dispute is the premises containing Sri Lakshmi Talkies Cinema Theatre. On 01-08-1982. Behara Bhaskara Rao granted lease in favour of M/s. Kameswari Enterprises for a period of 15 years to run Sri Lakshmi Cinema theatre (suit schedule property). This lease expired on 31-07-1997 and thereafter no further lease was granted. In Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 27522 of 2003 filed in A.S. No. 3702 of 2003 by the petitioner/appellant, this Court by an order dated 27-11-2003, granted interim injunction on condition of petitioner/appellant depositing the suit costs within four weeks from that date. It is represented that the petitioner/appellant is in possession of the suit schedule property. Late Behara Bhaskara Rao was arrayed as first respondent in all the three Appeal Suits pending before this Court. Since decrees were passed against M/s. Kameswari Enterprises and there was no valid possession, the competent authority has not granted renewal of license to operate the cinema theatre and therefore no cinema theatre is running. Aggrieved by not renewing the license to run the cinema theatre, M/s. Kameswari Enterprises instituted a writ petition before this Court but the same was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby. Writ Appeal is filed but later it was withdrawn. However, in view of the injunction order granted by this Court on 27-11-2003. M/s. Kameswari Enterprises continues to be in possession of the suit schedule property. 4. During the pendency of these three Appeal Suits, late Behara Bhaskara Rao died on 30-8-2011. Three Miscellaneous Petitions are filed in three Appeal Suits seeking to bring on record legal representatives of late Behara Bhaskara Rao. A.S.M.P. No. 2513 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3747 of 2003. A.S.M.P. No. 2530 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3702 of 2003 A.S.M.P. No. 2505 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3746 of 2003. While so three more Miscellaneous Petitions are filed in three Appeal Suits seeking to come on record as respondents in the three Appeal Suits. A.S.M.P. No. 2504 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3747 of 2003 A.S.M.P. No. 2512 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3702 of 2003. While so three more Miscellaneous Petitions are filed in three Appeal Suits seeking to come on record as respondents in the three Appeal Suits. A.S.M.P. No. 2504 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3747 of 2003 A.S.M.P. No. 2512 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3702 of 2003. A.S.M.P. No. 2506 of 2011 is filed in A.S. No. 3746 of 2003. 5. Petitioners' plea in A.S.M.P. Nos. 2504, 2512 and 2506 of 2011 seeking to come on record as respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the three Appeal Suits are opposed by the plaintiffs. Three Miscellaneous Petitions (A.S.M.P. Nos. 2513, 2530 and 2505 of 2011) filed by the appellant seeking to implead the Legal Representatives of the deceased respondent No. 1 are opposed by the Legal Representatives. 6. In response to notice issued by this Court, the legal representatives of late Behara Bhaskara Rao/proposed respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the three Miscellaneous Petitions filed counter-affidavits opposing the prayer of the appellant to implead them as respondents. They have stated that their father has executed a Sale Deed on 10-5-2011 and sold the property and in view of the same, they have no interest in prosecuting the litigation and therefore they do not want to come on record and contest the Appeal Suits filed by the appellant. 7. Elaborate arguments are advanced by the counsel appearing for the appellant and counsel appearing for the proposed respondents as well as legal heirs of defendant No. 1. 8. Learned counsel for the proposed respondents contends that in view of reluctance of legal heirs of defendant No. 1, to prosecute the Appeal Suits, in order to protect their interests, the petitioners in A.S.M.P. Nos. 2504, 2512 and 2506 of 2011 filed these three miscellaneous petitions seeking to come on record as respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the respective Appeal Suits. It is their contention that the suit schedule property was purchased by them from late Behara Bhaskara Rao and since his legal heirs are not interested in prosecuting the litigation, to protect their interests in the suit schedule property, they seek to come on record in three Appeal Suits and contest the appeals. They contend that they acquired right, title and interest over the suit schedule property in view of purchasing of the suit schedule property by virtue of Sale Deed dated 10-05-2011. 9. They contend that they acquired right, title and interest over the suit schedule property in view of purchasing of the suit schedule property by virtue of Sale Deed dated 10-05-2011. 9. It is further contended that the appellant cannot compel the legal representatives to come on record as respondents and to contest the matter. It is their discretion to contest or not to contest the litigation and appellant cannot compel them. In view of the fact that the legal representatives of the deceased are not interested in prosecuting the litigation, it is all the more necessary for the proposed respondents to come on record and prosecute the litigation or otherwise their rights and interests in the property would be adversely affected as there would be no other person to oppose the claim made by the appellant in the Appeals. Furthermore, referring to the terms of the sale deed, the counsel submits that the terms of the sale deed vests right in them to prosecute the litigation. He further contends that the right of the appellant in terms of the declaration sought by him and injunction granted by this Court is with reference to possession of the suit schedule property. The proposed respondents are not interfering with the possession vested in the appellant in view of injunction order granted by this Court. He further submits, reiterating the legal position that the proposed respondents are not claiming better right than what was vested in late Behara Bhaskara Rao, they are only stepping into his shoes to protect their interests on account of acquiring title to the property through the sale transaction dated 10-5-2011. The sale transaction being validly made, the proposed respondents have the authority and competence to prosecute the litigation. 10. Learned counsel for the proposed respondents submits that the injunction order granted by this Court was only with reference to possession of suit schedule property by Kameswari Enterprises during the pendency of the Appeal Suits. There was no restraint on the defendant owner of the property from disposing of the property. Therefore, the disposal of the property by the owner was validly done and it is not in violation of the injunction granted by this Court. He, therefore, submits that the sale transaction dated 10-5-2011 is not hit by injunction. There was no restraint on the defendant owner of the property from disposing of the property. Therefore, the disposal of the property by the owner was validly done and it is not in violation of the injunction granted by this Court. He, therefore, submits that the sale transaction dated 10-5-2011 is not hit by injunction. He further submits that appellant has no claim of title to the property; he cannot stop Behara Bhaskara Rao from alienating the property. 11. Defending the decision of the proposed respondents in filing petition under Order 22 Rule 10, learned counsel submits that in a petition filed under this provision, there is no abatement and no substitution of parties and coming on record as respondents is only for the purpose of protecting their vested rights on account of purchasing of the property during the pendency of the appeals. 12. Learned counsel for the proposed respondents relied on the following decisions: Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Harjug Dass v. Som Dass (deceased) through his Chela Shiama Dass AIR 1975 SC 2159 , Hukum Chand v. Om Chand and others (2001) 10 SCC 715 , Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and others 2013 (2) SCJ 689 : 2013 (3) ALD 111 (SC) : 2013 (3) ALT 35.1 (DN SC) and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and others (4) (2001) 6 SCC 534 . 13. Learned counsel highlighted the hypothetical situation where in the event of the appellant failing in the Appeals, filed by him, no one can take execution proceedings if they are not permitted to come on record and they cannot initiate execution proceedings even though the title is validly transferred to them and they will have to undergo rigmarole of the litigation to acquire possession. He therefore contends that the opposition of appellant to their petition to come on record is not bona fide and the primary objective of the appellant is to prolong the litigation and to continue to occupy the property illegally and deprive the owners of the property from its enjoyment. 14. These petitions are opposed by the appellant contending that as they are not legal heirs they cannot be impleaded as party respondents in place of the deceased first respondent and therefore said petitions are not maintainable. 14. These petitions are opposed by the appellant contending that as they are not legal heirs they cannot be impleaded as party respondents in place of the deceased first respondent and therefore said petitions are not maintainable. It is his contention that the dispute is between the appellant and the first respondent and the proposed respondents are third parties and, therefore, they cannot prosecute the litigation. It is further contended that these respondents were not parties before the lower Court and therefore they cannot now come and implead as party respondents to prosecute the litigation. It is further contended that during the pendency of the Appeals there was an injunction granted by this Court and in view of the injunction granted by this Court, the defendant No. 1 could not have sold the property and selling the property is ex-facie illegal and such transaction being void transaction as it offends the injunction order granted by this Court and not being a valid transaction in the eye of law, such persons have no right to come on record and prosecute the litigation. It is further contended that the deceased did not seek permission of this Court under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and therefore the sale undertaken by respondent No. 1 is not a valid sale consideration. Further, the petitioners seeking to implead as respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have no locus-standi to prosecute the litigation. 15. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following decisions: Pannala Renuka and another v. Kavali Venkataiah and others 2007 (1) ALT 259 : AIR 2007 A.P. 46 , Kuna Ramulu v. Kuna Annapurnamma and others 2002 (2) An.W.R. 491 (A.P.) : 2003 (3) ALD 146 , Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh and others (1996) 5 SCC 539 : 1996 (4) ALT 25 (D.N.), Surjit Singh and others v. Harbans Singh and others (8) (1995) 6 SCC 50 , Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 2010 (1) SCJ 863 : (2010) 2 SCC 114 : 2011 (1) ALT 4.5 (DN SC), Kanta Rani alias Kanti Devi and another v. Rama Rani (1988) 2 SCC 109 , Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others (2006) 13 SCC 608 and Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nab Hassan Saheb and another AIR 2004 SC 173 : 2004 (1) ALT 24.1 (DN SC). The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for appellant and their relevance: 16. In the decision cited 5th supra, suit was instituted for declaration of the title and delivery of possession of the suit schedule property. In the said suit, petitioners filed I.A. No. 938 of 2005 under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. seeking to implead them as defendants Nos. 4 and 5. The trial Court dismissed the said I.A. The contention of the petitioners in that I.A. was that they purchased the property during the pendency of the Original Suit. This was opposed contending that there is violation of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act in purchasing the property when the suit is pending. This Court held that purchaser lis pendens is bound by the decree passed against his vendor and he cannot as of right be impleaded in the suit. In the decision cited 6th supra, similar view is taken by this Court. 17. In the decision cited 7th supra, the issue that fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the respondents, who purchased the property during the pendency of the suit, are necessary or proper parties and can they be brought on record? Suit was instituted for declaration. The plaintiff is the owner of the property on the basis of the registered will executed by his mother and a declaration was already given by a Civil Court in another decree. Interim injunction was granted on 14-6-1991, which was subsequently vacated on 2-12-1991. The defendant alienated the suit schedule lands on 2-12-1991 and 12-12-1991 in favour of the respondents. In view of the same, the said respondents sought to come on record as defendants under Order 1 Rule 10 of C.P.C. The said application was dismissed by the trial Court holding them as neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. On Revision, the High Court passed orders dated 13-5-1993 directing to implead them as defendants to the suit. Challenging the same, appeal was filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court is pleased to hold as under: It would, therefore be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit. 18. In the decision cited 8th supra, it was held as under: The Court in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, the assignor and his assignees, respondents, herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. 19. In support of his contention that the transaction is not a fair transaction in view of the pendency of the Appeals and injunction granted by this Court, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 9th supra, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme held as under: 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. The learned counsel submits that the said observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are also applicable to the case on hand. 20. On the application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and transfer of title without leave of the Court, pendente lite he relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 11th supra, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the property is transferred without leave of the Court as mandated by Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, pending litigation, purchaser of such property cannot seek to be a party as of right in the pending suit. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: 12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject matter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court. 21. In the said case, when the trial Court did not agree for impleadment of the persons, who purchased the property during the pendency of the litigation, on filing a Writ Petition before the High Court, High Court granted relief holding that the respondents' vendors are required to be added as parties in the suit as there was nobody to represent and safeguard their interests. This order of the High Court is set-aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 22. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 10th supra in support of his contention that consequent to death of first defendant, it is mandatory for the legal heirs to come on record and contest the matter. It was a case where pre-emption suit was filed by the defendants on the basis of right of pre-emption acquired under customary law; it is held that subsequent to his death his legal representatives are entitled to be brought on record and to continue the suit holding that the right of pre-emption being heritable. The facts in issue are the same as in the Appeals. 23. Same is the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision cited 8th supra. The facts in issue are the same as in the Appeals. 23. Same is the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision cited 8th supra. Relying on the decision cited 12th supra, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the injunction granted by this Court and in view of the pendency of the litigation, the sale transaction undertaken by the first respondent on 10-5-2011 being ex-facie illegal and void exercise, the purchasers of such property cannot seek as a matter of right to implead them as respondents and contest the appeals. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the proposed respondents and their relevance: 24. In support of his contention that Order 22 Rule 10(1) alone would apply to the situation of this nature and not Rule 3 or 4of Order 22, he has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 1st supra, wherein it was held as under: When a suit is brought by or against a person in a representative capacity and there is a devolution of the interest of the representative, the rule that has to be applied is Order 22, Rule 10 and not Rule 3or 4, whether the devolution takes place as a consequence of death or for any other reason. Order 22, Rule 10, is not confined to devolution of interest of a party by death. 25. In support of his contention, he has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 4th supra, wherein it was held as under: The legislature while enacting Rules 3, 4 and 10 has made a clear-cut distinction. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing the legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing the legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rule 10, the legislature has not prescribed any such procedure in the event of failure to apply for leave of the court to continue the proceeding by or against the person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of a suit which shows that the legislature was conscious of this eventuality and yet has not prescribed that failure would entail dismissal of the suit as it was intended that the proceeding would continue by or against the original party although he ceased to have any interest in the subject of dispute in the event of failure to apply for leave to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved for bringing him on the record. 7. Under Rule 10 Order 22 of the Code, when there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against persons upon whom such interest has devolved and this entitles the person who has acquired an interest in the subject-matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person interested, to apply to the court for leave to continue the suit. But it does not follow that it is obligatory upon them to do so. If a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, and yet as pointed out by Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moti Lal v. Karrbuldin ILR (1898) 25 Cal 179 : 24 IA 170 : 1 CWN 639 (PC)) he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary. It is also plain that if the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, obtains leave to carry on the suit, the suit in his hands is not a new suit, for as Lord Kingsdown of the Judicial Committee said in Prannath Roy Chowdry v. Rookea Begum (1857-60) 7 MIA 323), a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of the title. It is the old suit carried on at his instances and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings. 26. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble supreme Court cited 2nd supra, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Order 22 Rule 10 of C.P.C. takes care of the situation of this nature. It was held as under: In case of any assignment or creation of any interest during the pendency of a suit, under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, the suit may, by leave of the Court be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. The rule is an enabling one and permissive in nature. It was further held as under: In our opinion, the only exception is when the transfer of property forming the subject matter of the suit, pendente lite, results in wiping out the cause of action itself or deprives the transferee of the right to decree, such as where the cause of action was personal to the original plaintiff. Otherwise, the only result is that such transferee steps into the shoes of his predecessor-in-interest and remains bound by the result of the suit and would not, at a later stage, be permitted to raise the plea that he was not bound by the result of the litigation because he was not brought on record of the suit and impleaded as a party. 27. The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 3rd supra, wherein it was held that violation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, does not amount to annulling the conveyance or the transfer but it would be subservient to the rights of parties to a litigation. 27. The learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited 3rd supra, wherein it was held that violation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, does not amount to annulling the conveyance or the transfer but it would be subservient to the rights of parties to a litigation. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens is a doctrine based on the ground that it is necessary for the administration of justice that the decision of a Court in a suit should be binding not only on the litigating parties but on those who derive title pendente lite. The provision of this Section does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to a litigation. 28. He therefore contends that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments, the application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 is maintainable and the leave sought by the proposed respondents is valid and unless the leave is granted, their interest would be adversely affected, as there is no one to protect their interests, reiterating his contention that the injunction granted by this Court is not a bar for undertaking sale transaction. 29. Prima facie, there is no dispute to the title of suit schedule premises vested in late Behara Bhaskara Rao when he sold the property to proposed respondents. The contest in these three appeals is possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property as a lease holder and incidental issues thereon. The injunction granted by this Court is with reference to possession of suit schedule property. There was no restraint on the part of the respondent No. 1 on sale of property as owner of the suit schedule property. Furthermore, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision cited 11th supra, sale transaction pendente lite does not vitiate. Such sale is subservient to the pending litigation. 30. On account of purchase of suit schedule property, interest in the said property is devolved on the proposed respondents and it is permissible for them to apply to this Court to seek to come on record of the three Appeal Suits as respondents under Order 22 Rule 10 of C.P.C., as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions cited 1st, 3rd and 4th supra. As rightly contended by learned counsel for proposed respondents, in the event of appellant fails in the suit, there would be no one seeking enforcement of decrees passed by trial Court and they would have to suffer severe hardship. Having given my anxious consideration to rival contentions of learned counsels for appellant and proposed respondents and in view of the principles of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the proposed respondents, I am of the considered opinion that the proposed respondents are entitled to come on record as respondents in the three Appeal Suits pending before this Court and to contest the Appeals. Hence, A.S.M.P. Nos. 2504, 2512 and 2506 of 2001 filed by the proposed respondents seeking to come on record as respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the three Appeal Suits are allowed. After the institution of three Appeals, respondent Behara Bhaskara Rao died. Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in A.S.M.P. No. 2513, 2530 and 2505 of 2011 are legal representatives of Late Behara Bhaskara Rao. This fact is also admitted by them in the counter affidavit filed by them in the three Miscellaneous Petitions. It is mandatory for the appellant to bring the legal representatives of a deceased respondent as soon as it comes to his knowledge the death of a respondent Thus, these three Miscellaneous Petitions are validly filed. The legal representatives have to be brought on record of the three Appeal Suits pending in this Court. On being made parties, it is for the legal representatives of deceased Behara Bhaskara Rao to contest the Appeal Suits. But, merely because they claim that since suit schedule property was sold by their father, they have no interest in the suit schedule property is not a ground to reject the Miscellaneous Petitions. A.S.M.P. Nos. 2513, 2530 and 2505 of 2011 filed by the appellant seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased first respondent are ordered. It is made clear that I have not expressed anything on merits of either parties and it is for them to plead and establish their respective case.