Judgment Ravi R. Tripathi, J.—Letters Patent Appeals No. 1974 of 2004, 1975 of 2004, 1973 of 2004, 2000 of 2004 and 2001 of 2004 arise from the judgement and order dated 1st April 2004, passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Applications No. 9492 of 1998, 8587 of 1998, 9461 of 1996, 3326 of 1998 and 1548 of 1998 respectively. By the said judgment the learned Single was pleased to allow the aforesaid petitions. The learned Single Judge considered the question of validity of Regulation 113 of Service Regulations of the erstwhile Gujarat Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “the said Regulations”), who in exercise of powers conferred by Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 framed the said regulations. The learned Single Judge was pleased to examine Regulation 113 of the said Regulations in depth and undertook exercise of threadbare analysis for testing the legality and validity of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations. The learned Single Judge examined the validity of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations by having reference to other similar regulations, viz. Regulations 148, 236, 237; last but not the least Regulation 238 of the said Regulations. The learned Single Judge did refer to Schedule-A and Schedule-B to the said Regulations. The learned Single Judge examined the legality and validity in light of various aspects which are enumerated in Para 3.7 of the judgment and order. The aspects which are taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge are as under: (i) Whether the impugned provision is arbitrary, discriminatory and unguided? (ii) Whether it violates principles of natural justice? (iii) Whether it is unreasonable? (iv) Whether it is against public policy and public interest? (v) Whether it is unfair and/or unconscionable? The learned Single Judge considered the aspect whether the Regulation is discriminatory, in Paras 4, 4.1 and 4.2 of the judgment. The learned Single Judge considered the aspect of arbitrariness in Paras 4.3, and 4.4. The learned Single Judge considered the aspect of regulation being unguided in Paras 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. In Para 5, the learned Single Judge considered the aspect whether the Regulation violates the principles of natural justice and went on to examine the same in Paras 5.1 to 5.9. The learned Single Judge was pleased to examine these aspects in light of the decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court cited before him. In Para 5, the learned Single Judge considered the aspect whether the Regulation violates the principles of natural justice and went on to examine the same in Paras 5.1 to 5.9. The learned Single Judge was pleased to examine these aspects in light of the decision of the Hon’ble the Apex Court cited before him. The learned Single Judge then proceeded to examine the aspect whether the Regulation can be said to be unreasonable in Paras 6, 6.1 and 6.2. The learned Single Judge then proceeded to examine the aspect, viz. whether the Regulation is against the public policy and public interest in Para 7. So far as Regulation being unfair and unconscionable is examined in Para 8 and finally recorded his findings in Paras 9, 10 and 11 as under: “9. The aforesaid discussion will, therefore, in my opinion, render Regulation 113 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. Regulation 113 is not only against the provisions of Article 14 for the reasons stated above, but also it is against Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 16(1) provides for equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Undisputedly the Board is covered under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that words ‘matters relating to employment’ must include all matters in relation to employment, both prior and subsequent including the terms and conditions of service and such matters e.g. age of superannuation, termination of service, etc. 11. Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India the right to live has been provided. By now it is well settled principle of law that life is good, decent life to the citizen together with all the basic amenities and facilities such as livelihood, food, shelter, etc. When by virtue of draconic provision like Regulation 113, a person is rendered jobless and is deprived of his means of livelihood. Such provision would create sense of insecurity in the employees. Certainly such provision would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India also. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the challenge to validity of Regulation 113 is required to be upheld by holding the said Regulation ultra-vires Articles 14, 16(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India and hence null and void.” (emphasis supplied) 2. Certainly such provision would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India also. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the challenge to validity of Regulation 113 is required to be upheld by holding the said Regulation ultra-vires Articles 14, 16(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India and hence null and void.” (emphasis supplied) 2. It is thereafter the learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the action of the erstwhile Board (GEB) in each individual case. The facts of Special Civil Application No. 8587 of 1998 are considered in Paras 13, 13.1, 13.2, 14, 14.1, 14.2 and 14.3. So far as the facts of Special Civil Application No. 3326 of 1998 are concerned they are considered in Paras 15 and 15.1. So far as the facts of Special Civil Application No. 1548 of 1998 are concerned they are considered in Paras 16 and 16.1. So far as the facts of Special Civil Application No. 9492 of 1996 are concerned the learned Single Judge examined the facts of the case in Para 17. So far as the facts of Special Civil Application No. 9461 of 1996 are concerned they are considered in Paras 18 and 18.1. Finally the learned Single Judge was pleased to hold in Para 19 as under: “19. In the result, for the reasons stated above, all the petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners in all cases are quashed and set aside, with direction that they are required to be placed on their original posts with continuity of service within three months from the date of receipt of the writ of this judgment. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.” The learned Single Judge was pleased to further observe as under: “So far as the back-wages are concerned, in this petition there is no material before me to decide that question. However, it will be open for the petitioners to agitate that question before the appropriate forum and the other side will also have a chance to contest the said claim. It is also made clear that before such forum, both the parties will be entitled to lead appropriate evidence.” 3. However, it will be open for the petitioners to agitate that question before the appropriate forum and the other side will also have a chance to contest the said claim. It is also made clear that before such forum, both the parties will be entitled to lead appropriate evidence.” 3. The learned advocates for the parties invited attention of the Court to order dated 02.11.2004 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1973 of 2004 and other appeals with Civil Application No. 8733 of 2004 and other Civil Applications by this Court [Coram: A.R. Dave, J. (as he then was) & K.A. Puj, J. (as he then was)]. The order reads as under: “Admit. Civil Application Nos. 8733, 8735, 8737, 8963, 8966 of 2004. Rule returnable on 08.12.2004. By way of ad interim relief, it is directed that (1) The applicant shall pay one month’s salary, last drawn, to the opponents within 1 week from today. And (2) Within four weeks from today, either the opponents shall be reinstated in service without back wages or shall be paid salary, last drawn, for the period commencing from 01.04.2004 to 30.11.2004. Further orders with regard to interim relief shall be passed after hearing the concerned parties on 08.12.2004. (emphasis supplied) Any amount paid by the appellant/ applicant to the opponents would be subject to final result of the appeals and this order is passed without prejudice to all the rights and contentions of the parties.” 4. The learned senior advocate along with other advocates appearing for the workmen – opponents in the Letters Patent Appeals submitted that they are getting meagre amount of Rs. 5000/- per month which is not increased since 02.11.2004, almost a decade by now. The learned advocates for the opponents submitted that though the learned Single Judge had observed in the last Para to the effect that, “So far as the back wages are concerned, in this petition there is no material before me to decide that question. . . . . . . .” the learned Single permitted the workmen to agitate that question before appropriate forum, with a liberty to the other side to contest the said claim. . . . . . . .” the learned Single permitted the workmen to agitate that question before appropriate forum, with a liberty to the other side to contest the said claim. It is requested that taking into consideration the time taken in this litigation and the time lag after which these Letters Patent Appeals have come up for consideration before this Court the workmen may not now be relegated to agitate that question (question of back wages) before appropriate forum and this Court itself may pass appropriate orders with regard to back wages. 5. Learned senior advocate Mr. S.N. Shelat appearing with Ms. Lilu K. Bhaya for the appellants- the erstwhile GEB, now Gujarat Electricity Transmission Company Limited made his submissions and to start with he invited attention of the Court to Regulation 113 of the said Regulations. Regulation 113 is reproduced in Para 1.2 of the Judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The same is reproduced hereunder for ready perusal: “Regulation-113 : Continued absence from duty or overstay, in spite of warning, to return to duty, shall render the employee liable to summarily discharged from service without the necessity of proceedings under the Gujarat Electricity Board Conduct, Discipline and appeal procedure.” 6. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is erroneously held to be invalid by the learned Single Judge because, in fact, it provides for specific factors to be taken into consideration like ‘continued absence from duty’ and ‘overstay’ for being resorted to. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that these two terms have specific meaning and it is not possible for anybody to allege ‘continued absence’ in absence of specific facts. Similarly, he submitted that ‘overstay’ also conveys a definite meaning and that being so it will not be possible for anybody to resort to Regulation 113 of the said Regulations in arbitrary manner unless the facts justify that it is a case of ‘continued absence from duty’ or ‘overstay’. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that actually the authority while framing these regulations did take care and did not implant a specific period for either continued absence from duty or overstay. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that actually the authority while framing these regulations did take care and did not implant a specific period for either continued absence from duty or overstay. Otherwise, in other similar cases ‘regulations’ do provide for continued absence for more than a particular period, for instance, 1, 2 or 3 months; similarly for the ‘overstay’ beyond a particular period. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is wrongly branded to be violative of principles of natural justice by the learned Single Judge, because in the said Regulation itself it is provided that action will be taken under Regulation 113 of the said Regulations only if an employee (workman) does not return to duty ‘in spite of warning’. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that ‘in spite of warning’ is a mechanism provided for giving notice to the employee (workman). Once there is a provision for giving notice to an employee (workman) it cannot be said that Regulation is violative of principles of natural justice. (emphasis supplied) 7. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge has missed a very important aspect of this regulation and that aspect is what is provided under this regulation, viz. an employee continues to be absent from duty or overstays and does not return in spite of warning is rendered liable under this regulation to be ‘summarily discharged’. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that it ought to have been appreciated by the learned Single Judge that the very fact that this regulation renders an employee ‘liable to be summarily discharged’ is suggestive of the fact that it is an enabling provision. It is only in appropriate cases that the authority will be resorting to Regulation 113 and in each and every case of ‘continued absence’ or ‘overstay’ the authority is not duty bound to resort to Regulation 113 and ‘discharge summarily’ an employee from service. 8. It is only in appropriate cases that the authority will be resorting to Regulation 113 and in each and every case of ‘continued absence’ or ‘overstay’ the authority is not duty bound to resort to Regulation 113 and ‘discharge summarily’ an employee from service. 8. The submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants though sound to be prima facie convincing are belied by the facts and circumstances of all the cases which are before this Court and the facts of each case which are pointed out to this Court by the learned advocate on record for the appellants in great detail which indicate that the authority (then GEB) has resorted to Regulation 113 as ‘Brahmastra’. This Court will not be wrong in observing that in every case which is before this Court, the Court has felt that Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is utilised with one and the only one object of creating terror in the minds of the employees that if they do not succumb to pressure of the higher officers they will be falling prey to this ‘Brahmsastra’ of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations. This became possible because Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is so worded. It is always open and it is so done by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that only because Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is resorted to by the officers concerned of the then GEB, it must not render Regulation 113 of the said Regulations as invalid or illegal. This Court is of the opinion that if Regulation 113 of the said Regulations was on the same lines as is the provision – Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations which fell for consideration of the Hon’ble the Apex Court, in the matter of Indian Airlines Ltd. vs. Prabha D. Kanan, reported in AIR 2007 SC 548, then for the reasons recorded by the Hon’ble the Apex Court, it could have been held to be valid. The Hon’ble the Apex Court is pleased to quote Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations, which reads as under: “13. The Hon’ble the Apex Court is pleased to quote Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations, which reads as under: “13. The services of an employee may be terminated without assigning any reasons to him/ her and without any prior notice but only on the following grounds not amounting to misconduct under the Standing Orders, namely: (a) If he/ she is, in the opinion of the Company (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) incompetent and unsuitable for continued employment with the Company and such incompetence and unsuitability is such as to make his/ her continuance in employment detrimental to the interest of the Company; OR if his/ her continuance in employment constitutes, in the opinion of the Company (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines), a grave security risk making his/ her continuance in service detrimental to the interests of the Company: (emphasis supplied) OR if in the opinion of the Company (the Board of Directors of Indian Airlines) there is such a justifiable lack of confidence which, having regard to the nature of duties performed, would make it necessary in the interest of the Company, to immediately terminate his/ her services.” The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants placed heavy reliance on the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble the Apex Court and submitted that as validity of Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations was upheld by the Hon’ble the Apex Court, validity of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is also required to be upheld and the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is required to be quashed and set aside, which has held Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations to be unjust and arbitrary for the reasons set out herein above. What falls for consideration of this Court is whether Regulation 13 can at all be compared with the aforementioned Regulation 13 with which we are concerned. This Court, despite all possible efforts, is not able to agree that Regulation 113 can be equated with Regulation 13. Reasons are so obvious that we need not detain ourselves on spelling out those reasons. Still to illustrate, in the aforementioned Regulation 13 the subject matter of Regulation 13 is excluded or kept outside the purview of the definition of ‘misconduct’ under Standing Orders. Reasons are so obvious that we need not detain ourselves on spelling out those reasons. Still to illustrate, in the aforementioned Regulation 13 the subject matter of Regulation 13 is excluded or kept outside the purview of the definition of ‘misconduct’ under Standing Orders. In the case on hand Regulations 148, 236 and 237 of the said Regulations deal with similar conduct of employees – workmen and to that there is no explanation from the appellants. Not only that the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is not able to point out as to in which specific case the Board (the erstwhile GEB) will resort to Regulation 148, 236 or 237, and in which case it will resort to Regulation 113. Once that is not clear, Regulation 113 cannot be allowed to stand on Statute Book, more particularly, when this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in holding Regulation 113 of the said Regulations to be unjust, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. In fact, when a question comes to pronounce on legality and validity of a provision that provision is required to be tested with reference to all possible circumstances in which it is going to be applied and it must not result into either in arbitrariness or in violation of principles of natural justice. In fact, the task of this Court is made easier by learned advocate Ms. Lilu K. Bhaya for the appellants by citing the facts of each case in detail and making it more than clear that in every case the Board (erstwhile GEB) has resorted to Regulation 113 of the said Regulations with only and the only object of victimisation of concerned employees. In fact, it will not be inappropriate or incorrect to say that in every single case when the authority found that they are not able to handle the employee/ workman, by resorting to Regulation 148, 236 or 237 of the said Regulations, they have resorted to Regulation 113. In such a situation, to argue that as Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations was held to be valid by the Hon’ble the Apex Court, Regulation 113 of the said Regulations in the present case should also be held to be valid, is far fetched claim. In such a situation, to argue that as Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations was held to be valid by the Hon’ble the Apex Court, Regulation 113 of the said Regulations in the present case should also be held to be valid, is far fetched claim. In Regulation 13 (one which was before the Hon’ble the Apex Court), there was an additional factor in the form of safeguard and that was ‘in the opinion of the company (Board of Directors of the Indian Airlines) the person adjudged to be incompetent and unsuitable for continued employment with the Company’, Regulation 13 could be resorted to. In the present case, on employee being transferred outside the circle, though policy of the then GEB was that Class-III and Class-IV employees should not be transferred outside circle, in all these cases, the employees were transferred outside their circle as immediate superior or authority higher than that has resorted to Regulation 113 of the said Regulations and sacked the employee. Imposing the penalty which is nothing else than Economic Death. It is easy for the authority to resort to shortcut and impose penalty of Economic Death on an employee, because immediate higher officer or an officer higher than that found the employee/ workman to be inconvenient to him. In one of the cases it has come on record that, ‘the employee/ workman had pointed out the involvement of the higher officers in theft of electricity’. Not only that it is also on record that once an employee was brought back to his original place, he was again thrown out of the circle, as it was felt that his continued presence at the same station is likely to disturb the higher officers. It is a matter of record that when an employee did not resume duty at the transferred place and resorted to remedy like making representation, by serving warning (under regulation 113) he was thrown out of service. Whether such conduct under Regulation 113 of the said Regulations, which gives room to play arbitrarily be allowed to stand on the Statute Book even after decades of independence of the country. Gone are the days wherein after industrial revolution, the policy known to industrial world was ‘hire and fire’, the workmen was treated to be nothing more than slave. Whether such conduct under Regulation 113 of the said Regulations, which gives room to play arbitrarily be allowed to stand on the Statute Book even after decades of independence of the country. Gone are the days wherein after industrial revolution, the policy known to industrial world was ‘hire and fire’, the workmen was treated to be nothing more than slave. He was not supposed to question any action of his immediate superior or officer higher than that. But we are living in a society which is governed by law and law does not permit any arbitrariness or any unguided or uncanalised power being vested in any authority. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants invited attention of the Court to Paras 12 to 25 of the aforesaid judgement in the matter of Indian Airlines Ltd. (Supra) and also to paras 29 and 30 wherein the Hon’ble the Apex Court was pleased to set out the contentions raised and submitted that for the same set of reasons this Court needs to uphold validity of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations and quash and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. On a careful consideration of the contents of Pars 12 to 25 and also Paras 29 and 30, this Court is of the opinion that the said judgment is of no help to the appellants herein and Regulation 113 which does not have enough safeguards like those existing in Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations, cannot be allowed to stand on the Statute Book. 9. Various other decisions were cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, which are referred to by the Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Indian Airlines Ltd (Supra). The same are not required to be discussed separately. 10. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, the facts which are set out and to which attention is drawn by learned advocate Ms. L.K. Bhaya for the appellants, it is clear that in every single case it was at the most a case of indiscipline and was required to be dealt with by the authority in accordance with the regulations which are specifically provided to deal with such ‘indiscipline’. L.K. Bhaya for the appellants, it is clear that in every single case it was at the most a case of indiscipline and was required to be dealt with by the authority in accordance with the regulations which are specifically provided to deal with such ‘indiscipline’. At one stage, the learned advocate emphatically submitted that if such an indiscipline is tolerated, then it will directly affect public cause, because the erstwhile GEB was entrusted with the pious duty of supplying electricity to the people at large. True it is that the erstwhile GEB was entrusted with the pious duty of supplying electricity to the public at large, but that does not and that cannot justify grant of any uncanalised power in favour of the officers, who are human beings having human weaknesses. It is not unknown that human mind is not able to digest disobedience, but then law has to take care of such weaknesses by providing sufficient safeguards so that human weaknesses do not take control of the situation which in turn, result into disturbing the industrial peace. In view of that this Court is of the opinion that these appeals are without any merit and the same are dismissed. 11. Coming to the question of individual cases, learned senior advocate Mr.Bhaskar P. Tanna appearing for petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 8587 of 1998 submitted that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in holding Regulation 113 of the said Regulations to be unjust, arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice and that the only additional request is that so far as back wages is concerned taking into consideration the time lag the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 8587 of 1998 be not directed to go to the appropriate forum and appropriate orders be passed with regard to back wages. In this regard, learned senior advocate Mr. Tanna invited attention of the Court to an order passed by this Court [Coram: G.S. Singhvi, J. (as he then was) & A.S. Dave, J.] dated 21.07.2005. It will be appropriate to reproduce the order, which reads as under: “Shri S.B. Vakil, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants requests for an adjournment on the ground that he is busy in a part-heard matter before another Bench. It will be appropriate to reproduce the order, which reads as under: “Shri S.B. Vakil, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants requests for an adjournment on the ground that he is busy in a part-heard matter before another Bench. Shri B.P. Tanna, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent says that he does not have any objection but makes a grievance that his client has not been paid wages for the last four months. (emphasis supplied) In view of the above, we adjourn the case to 24.8.2005 with the direction that interim order dated 2.11.2004 passed by this Court shall operate till final disposal of the appeal. This would necessarily mean that the appellants shall either take the respondent back in service or pay him last drawn wage. (emphasis supplied) In case the appellants decided not to take the respondent in service, then the amount due to him till date shall be paid within next seven days. For the month of August 2005, the amount shall be paid on or before 6.8.2005.” 12. What is important about this order is that the mighty Board (the erstwhile GEB) was sitting tight over the order of this Court dated 02.11.2004. That is the reason why grievance was required to be made before this Court that the opponent (petitioner of’ Special Civil Application No. 8587 of 1998) was not paid wages for the last four months. What is this, if it is not the case of victimization, which became permissible, because Regulation 113 of the said Regulations is so worded that it is lacking the required safeguards, which render it to be unjust, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. It is really painful that despite two orders of this Court, viz. order dated 02.11.2004 and order dated 21.07.2005, the Board which has ceased to exist and is succeeded by the present appellants, viz. Gujarat Electricity Transmission Company Limited did not find time to review the case and to think about taking back in service the workman/ employee, who was thrown out of service by resorting to Regulation 113 of the said Regulations, though it was observed by this Court by saying that, “ . . . . . . . . This would necessarily mean that the appellants shall either take the respondent back in service or pay him last drawn wage.” 13. . . . . . . . This would necessarily mean that the appellants shall either take the respondent back in service or pay him last drawn wage.” 13. All this has become possible because there is power which is to be exercised by human beings and those human beings are not immune to human weaknesses. In such circumstances, the Court has to think before stamping Regulation 113 to be valid, because if that is done without taking care that the said Regulation is not abused in the present form in which it exists, it will result in perpetuating the injustice. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove this Court is of the opinion that Regulation 113 of the said Regulations cannot be allowed to exist as it stood at the relevant time. Regulation 113 of the said Regulations which is declared to be unjust, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice by the learned Single Judge is upheld. 14. In the result, the appellants are directed to treat the impugned orders in the Special Civil Applications as non-est in the eye of law and give all the consequential benefits including back wages to the concerned employees/ workmen. The appellants shall complete necessary formalities and shall see to it that the order is complied with at the earliest, but not later than four weeks from today. 15. At this juncture, there is prayer from the learned advocate for the appellants to stay this order, and the same is objected by the learned advocates including learned senior advocate Mr. Bhaskar Tanna appearing for the opponent in Special Civil Application No. 1975 of 2004. This Court finds no reason to stay this order, more particularly when time which has gone by and for which these workmen are hanging on a thin string of a meager amount which is paid by the appellants as if they are doing mercy to these workmen. Hence this request is rejected. This Court restrains itself from awarding cost to the opponents only because legality of Regulation 113 of the said Regulations, was under challenge, but for that fact, the Court would have certainly awarded exemplary cost in favour of the opponents-workmen.