Judgment : 1. Astounding, incredible and extraordinary allegations in a complaint, unique in nature and character, probably first of its kind in judicial history of the Nation, and may also be the last, resulted in registration of Crime No.2141 of 2013 of Aluva East Police Station, for the offence punishable under Section 376 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.). The petitioner herein is the first accused in the said case and his son is the second accused. The first accused is a sitting MLA and a prominent person enjoying wide popularity among the people of his constituency. 2. The short case put forward by the petitioner is that even assuming that all the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, they do not constitute the ingredients necessary to attract Section 376 of I.P.C. and if that be so, no offence is made out and the complaint and the FIR produced as Annexures A1 and A2 are only to be quashed. In other words, the petitioner wishes to abort the proceedings at the threshold. 3. In the light of the said fact, it becomes necessary before going into the various aspects to refer to the allegations in the complaint in detail. 4. The complaint is produced as Annexure A1. It is in vernacular language. It is addressed to the Superintendent of Police (Rural), Aluva. It is undated. According to the complainant, she has studied upto MCA. She says that her father owns a business in timber and runs a mill under the name and style St.Augustine Packing Industries and Saw Mill in Manjapra Village. The business commenced from 1.1.2007. Shri. Jose Thettayil, MLA from Angamaly, the petitioner herein, was invited for the inauguration of the Mill. The complainant too had attended the function. According to the complainant, accepting the invitation, the MLA had come to attend the function. Likewise, many other persons, including the Panchayat President, also attended the function. At the function, the complainant was introduced to the petitioner for the first time. The residential house, where the complainant resides, and the Saw Mill are situate in the same compound. The complainant used to go to the business concern to help her father. On the next day of the inauguration, the MLA had made a call to the Saw Mill office. The residential house, where the complainant resides, and the Saw Mill are situate in the same compound. The complainant used to go to the business concern to help her father. On the next day of the inauguration, the MLA had made a call to the Saw Mill office. On hearing the sound of the complainant, he asked whether it was Noby, the daughter of Augustine. The complainant replied in the affirmative and she says that her mobile number was sought for. She replied that currently she did not have a mobile connection. Later on, she, for business purposes, took a mobile connection with Idea. About four months thereafter, the MLA came to the office and stated that he was on his way for inauguration at some other place. The complainant had her mobile phone with her and when the number was sought for by the MLA, it was given to him. According to the complainant, thereafter, the MLA used to phone her occasionally. From the beginning of 2010, the MLA began to call her frequently. Whenever he called, he enquired about the welfare of the complainant and about the affairs of the business that is being carried on by her father. One day, it is claimed that, she asked the MLA why he was calling her so often. He then said to have told her that his son was studying for MBA in Ireland and he desired that his son marries the complainant when he returns from Ireland. The MLA indicated that he was planning to meet her father and talk about the marriage. Thereafter, he called the complainant frequently. While so, in the beginning of 2012, the son of the petitioner returned to his native place and for the next few days she was called over phone by the MLA and she was informed that his son had returned home and asked the complainant to come over to Anns India Exim Private Limited at Cheriyavappilaserry. The complainant went there. There apart from him, his eldest son Adarsh, two Directors, Cheriyan and Smiley, and other staff were present. Then the petitioner introduced his son to the complainant and it is stated that for the next five months Adarsh, the eldest son of the MLA used to attend his office. The concern was engaged in sale of vessels. There apart from him, his eldest son Adarsh, two Directors, Cheriyan and Smiley, and other staff were present. Then the petitioner introduced his son to the complainant and it is stated that for the next five months Adarsh, the eldest son of the MLA used to attend his office. The concern was engaged in sale of vessels. As per the complainant, before that, in 2010, with the help of her father, the complainant had purchased a flat in Periyar Residency, Chembakassery Road, Aluva. The number of the apartment is 11-C. A few interior decorations were done. After the purchase, the MLA had come to see the flat. He is said to have opined that the existing interior decorations were of old style and so also the furniture and advised her to modernize the furniture and interior decorations. With the help of her father, the complainant carried out interior decorations worth Rs.40 Lakhs. During that period, while the work was in progress, the MLA used to visit the flat and give directions and suggestion. The complainant says that after meeting Adarsh, she went to the business concern of the petitioner to purchase household articles for the flat. After the purchase, Adarsh offered to accompany her to deliver the articles. She agreed. Since there was a marriage proposal between the complainant and Adarsh, she did not feel anything unusual in the conduct. She and Adarsh reached the flat with the articles purchased by her. After keeping the articles in the flat, they returned. Thereafter, on several occasions, Adarsh used to call the complainant and on many occasions they went to the complainant's flat. On some occasions, the conduct of Adarsh crossed the limits, but since the complainant thought that as she has to marry him, she did not raise any resistance or objection to the said conduct. The complainant admits that she had sexual intercourse 4 or 5 times with Adarsh. While things stood so, the complainant came to know from her friends that there was a marriage proposal for Adarsh with some other girl. The complainant came to know the same in August, 2012. After she came to know about the same, when Adarsh came to meet her, he was asked about the same and he said that there was no substance in that rumour. Doubts and suspicion remained in the mind of the complainant. The complainant came to know the same in August, 2012. After she came to know about the same, when Adarsh came to meet her, he was asked about the same and he said that there was no substance in that rumour. Doubts and suspicion remained in the mind of the complainant. She felt that clear evidence of the real relationship between her and Adarsh was absolutely necessary. Therefore, she purchased a web camera and installed it in her bed room. The complainant says that thereafter when Adarsh came to her flat they had indulged in sexual intercourse which was caught in the web camera. Subsequently, without much delay, Adarsh went to Bombay. He had gone to Bombay promising that he will return from Bombay after about four months and then the marriage can be conducted. During August, the complainant says that she came to know that other marriage proposals were being mooted for Adarsh. Thereafter, the MLA is said to have contacted her and asked her to meet him with the key of the flat. The complainant went in her car near to CSA Auditorium and picked up the petitioner and they went together to the flat. On that day, the MLA is said to have behaved indecently to the complainant. That conduct of the petitioner was quite contrary to the conduct of a father whose son was going to marry the complainant. His conduct was with ill-motive. The complainant says that she was surprised and pained by the conduct of the MLA which made her to suspect that he was not interested in the marriage. She felt that she was being betrayed after promising to conduct the marriage and sexually exploiting her, which she could not bear and tolerate. The complainant felt extremely disappointed. She then felt that if she ever got an opportunity, she would teach the MLA a lesson. During that period, MLA used to very frequently call her over phone and kept on promising that his son would marry her. While so, in the first week of October, 2012, the MLA called her and said that they had to go to the flat urgently. The complainant went in her car and picked up the MLA from near CSA Auditorium and they together went to the flat. As soon as they got down from the car, MLA started talking to someone over phone. The complainant went in her car and picked up the MLA from near CSA Auditorium and they together went to the flat. As soon as they got down from the car, MLA started talking to someone over phone. According to the complainant, seizing the opportunity, she went to the flat using the elevator and as soon as she opened the door, she switched on the web camera. Soon thereafter the MLA came inside and caught hold of the complainant. As per the complaint, though the complainant felt annoyed, since she had to realize her aim, she submitted without offering any sort of resistance and they indulged in sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they returned from the flat. When she later verified the web camera, she found that the camera had not caught the scenes with the MLA. Even after that episode, the MLA continued to phone her. While so, on 21.10.2012 again he asked her to come to take him to the flat. The complainant went in her car and picked up the MLA from near CSA Auditorium and went to her flat. The complainant says that she reached the flat earlier than the MLA and switched on the web camera. Later, as soon as the MLA entered into the flat, he caught hold of the complainant and they had sexual intercourse and they returned from the flat. The intercourse that took place on 21.10.2012 was clearly available in the web camera. Thereafter, though the MLA insisted to go to the flat, she did not agree or heed. Ever since then, the complainant says that she met the MLA on several occasions and demanded that her marriage with his son be conducted, otherwise, she would make the contents of the CD with her public and that would cause considerable humiliation and embarrassment to his family. A person by name Martin related to the MLA came and told her family that the marriage will be conducted in May, 2013. But nothing transpired thereafter. The complainant says that she began to believe that she was being cheated. According to the complainant, she felt that it was with the said object in mind that the MLA on the first occasion had telephoned her. It is stated that the sexual intercourses were not with her proper consent. But nothing transpired thereafter. The complainant says that she began to believe that she was being cheated. According to the complainant, she felt that it was with the said object in mind that the MLA on the first occasion had telephoned her. It is stated that the sexual intercourses were not with her proper consent. She also says that she was afraid that if she did not heed to the desire of the MLA, he would not conduct the marriage with his son. The complainant winds up the complaint by requesting the authorities concerned to resort to legal steps to have her grievances redressed. It is also stated that the opposite party, being a sitting MLA and former Minister, if she gives the complaint to the local police, he would wield his influence and stall any further action on the complaint, and so, she did not file the complaint in the local police station. The complaint is signed by her and her mobile number is given in the complaint. 5. Shri. M.K.Damodaran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, after referring to the complaint in detail, contended that even if the entire allegations in the complaint are taken on its face value and as proved, it is clear that the ingredients of offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. are not made out. Even assuming, without admitting, that there was sexual intercourse between the complainant and the petitioner, it is evident from the averments in the complaint that they were consensual acts. Learned counsel contended that it is rather unusual for a woman to have her sexual exploits extracted in a web camera and then contend that she had been raped. It is very evident from a reading of the complaint that at no point of time, she had offered any resistance or diffidence, even assuming that there was sexual intercourse at the instance of the petitioner. It is rather inconceivable that a woman would believe that after having had sex with his son, in order to pressurize the father to have the marriage of his son conducted with the complainant, she thought it necessary to have sexual intercourse with the father. There is no averment in the complaint, according to the learned Senior Counsel, that there was any intimidation, threat, coercion or any such vitiating factor which induced the complainant to yield to the desire of the petitioner. There is no averment in the complaint, according to the learned Senior Counsel, that there was any intimidation, threat, coercion or any such vitiating factor which induced the complainant to yield to the desire of the petitioner. In support of the contentions, learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Uday v. State of Karnataka (( 2003 (4) SCC 46 ) and Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar ((2005) 1 SCC 188). 6. Learned Senior Counsel went on to contend that this is a typical instance where there is obvious abuse of process of court and is a glaring example of the legal machinery being misused for personal gains. This is a fit case, according to the learned Senior Counsel, where the FIR and the complaint should be quashed in order to render justice to the petitioner and also in the interests of justice. For the above proposition, learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy ( AIR 1977 SC 1489 ), Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1972 SC 545 ) and Madhavrao J. Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre ( (1988) 1 SCC 692 ). 7. Per contra, learned Director General of Prosecution appearing on behalf of the State, pointed out that the court has no power to stifle the investigation and the police are bound under law to register a crime when a complaint is filed disclosing a cognizable offence. The court shall not interfere denying the law enforcing authorities from performing their mandatory statutory duty. On the basis of the averments in the complaint, it is yet to be determined what exactly are the offences made out. True, the FIR as now stands mentioned only the offence under Section 376 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. Even if during investigation, it is found that the said offence is not made out, but other offences are made out, the investigating agency is free to file reports to that effect. 8. The learned DGP contended that traditional Indian women, in the social and cultural background in which they live, will be extremely shy to come forward with a false allegation of rape, since it brings her no credit and had only the effect of attracting humiliation and threat of ostracism from the society. She by doing so, endangers her future itself. The learned DGP contended that traditional Indian women, in the social and cultural background in which they live, will be extremely shy to come forward with a false allegation of rape, since it brings her no credit and had only the effect of attracting humiliation and threat of ostracism from the society. She by doing so, endangers her future itself. It is also not proper for the court to make comments about the conduct of the victim or about the victim. For the above proposition, learned DGP relied on the decisions reported in State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ) and Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa ( AIR 2008 SC 572 ). 9. Learned DGP then contended that this is a typical case where by making a false promise of marriage, the petitioner had sexually exploited the lady and the so-called consent, therefore, is vitiated by misconception of fact. For the said proposition, learned DGP relied on the decision reported in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mange Ram ( AIR 2000 SC 2798 ). Relying on the decisions reported in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P. (1989 Crl.L.J. 1013), Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi (AIR 2007 SC 899) and State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2011 Crl.L.J. 89), the learned DGP contended that it is quite inappropriate for this court to probe into the veracity of the allegations in the complaint at this point of time nor is it proper for the court to quash the proceedings at the threshold stifling the investigating agency from finding out the truth. The power to investigate is within the domain of the police and it is for the investigating agency to decide how and in what manner the investigation should be conducted. While the court may have power to supervise the investigation, it certainly does not possess the power to direct that the investigation should be conducted in a particular manner. At any rate, according to the learned DGP, it will be a travesty of justice if this court at the threshold, quashes the proceedings and prevents the investigating agency from enquiring into the veracity of the allegations. 10. The defacto complainant has also entered appearance. The contentions of the third respondent are substantially the same as the ones advanced by the learned DGP. 10. The defacto complainant has also entered appearance. The contentions of the third respondent are substantially the same as the ones advanced by the learned DGP. Referring to the complaint, learned counsel for the third respondent contended that the complaint has to be read as a whole and if so done, it would be clear that the sexual intercourse which the petitioner had with the victim, is without consent. Emphasis was laid on the sentence that it was without proper consent that the sexual intercourse was done on the first occasion. That, according to the learned counsel, shows that there was no consent on the part of the victim. Apart from the said fact, learned counsel pointed out that there are innumerable instances where the Apex Court had occasion to hold that when sexual intercourse is entered into by a person with a lady as a result of a promise to marry her and making her believe that he would do so, and then later retracts, sexual intercourse so had, clearly amounts to rape. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions reported in Gurmeet Singh v. State of H.P.(2011 KHC 6499), Laddoo Singh v. State of Punjab (2008 KHC 5822), Bipul Medhi v. State of Assam (2008 KHC 5464) and Peter K.C. v. State of Kerala (2011 KHC 249). The third respondent has also produced two unreported judgments of this court in support of the above contention. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent also pointed out that it will be quite unjust for this court to quash the complaint at the threshold preventing a fair and just investigation being conducted by the investigating agency. The law does not permit the court to meddle with the investigation and it is the exclusive privilege of the investigating agency to decide as to the course of investigation, and nature of evidence that is to be collected. May be that the court may evaluate the investigation periodically. But the power of the court ends there. It does not extend to giving directions to the police as to in what manner the investigation should be done. At any rate, according to the learned counsel, it could not be said that the allegations in the complaint do not contain the ingredients of the offence of rape. But the power of the court ends there. It does not extend to giving directions to the police as to in what manner the investigation should be done. At any rate, according to the learned counsel, it could not be said that the allegations in the complaint do not contain the ingredients of the offence of rape. Further, it is contended that the question as to whether there was consent or not is to be determined after evidence and if that be so, question of interference at this stage does not arise. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent further pointed out that it is quite unbecoming of a person like the petitioner to indulge in activities complained of. It is a clear case where he, wielding his power, had sexually exploited a helpless lady by giving her the hope of marriage with his son. If this court interferes at this stage and quashes the proceedings, it will be sending a wrong signal to the society indicating that persons in power can escape from the clutches of law. According to the learned counsel, such a course may not be adopted. If after investigation, it is found that no offence is made out, the investigating agency will file the necessary report. If on the other hand, there are materials to show that offence is made out, the petitioner has still opportunity to establish his innocence at the time of trial. 13. The reason agitated by the petitioner for quashing the complaint is that even if the entire allegations in the complaint are taken as true and correct, still they do not disclose the ingredients necessary to attract Section 376 of I.P.C. It may at once be mentioned here that the crime is currently being investigated by the CBCID. According to the petitioner, the power to investigate by the police is dependent upon the disclosure of a cognizable offence. If on a reading of the complaint, no cognizable offence is made out or the ingredients necessary to attract the offence made mention of in the FIR are not available, then certainly and surely this court has the power to quash the proceedings and give relief to the petitioner. If on a reading of the complaint, no cognizable offence is made out or the ingredients necessary to attract the offence made mention of in the FIR are not available, then certainly and surely this court has the power to quash the proceedings and give relief to the petitioner. Referring to the complaint, the contention is that there is no averment in the complaint that at any point of time when the sexual intercourse was entered into between the son of the petitioner and the complainant or the petitioner and the complainant, there was any resistance or disinclination offered by the complainant, but she was a willing and consenting partner on all occasions. A stray sentence in the complaint that there was no proper consent cannot be given undue importance when the rest of the allegations in the complaint would clearly show that the sexual intercourse cannot but be as a result of consent on the part of the victim. The contention of the petitioner appears to be that the victim has voluntarily chosen the path of having sexual intercourse with both the father and son and is now trying to blackmail the petitioner by making use of those situations. 14. True, normally, it is very unusual for a woman to come forward with an allegation of rape. Rape is not merely a crime. It leaves the victim as a total wreck both physically and mentally. Considering the social and cultural set up of the Indian society, the rigid caste system followed, conservative and orthodox methods that are being followed, usually improbabilises a false accusation of rape. There can be no manner of doubt that a victim of rape is shunned by the society and that leaves a permanent scar and stigma on her. Normally, the courts will be very slow to distrust the victim. It is often said that a victim of rape is not an accomplice, but an injured witness. These aspects were considered in the decisions reported in State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ), State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain ( AIR 1990 SC 658 ), and Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa ( AIR 2008 SC 572 ). 15. However, of late, the Indian society seems to have shed its orthodox nature and appear to have become more progressive and adventurous. 15. However, of late, the Indian society seems to have shed its orthodox nature and appear to have become more progressive and adventurous. In the fast moving and developing world, naturally changes have to occur and that must happen in the social and cultural fields also. Traditional moral and ethical values are on the decline. Suffice is to say that living in relationship and such other activities have received both statutory and legal recognition. So as of now, it may not be possible to apply the standards which were once applicable to the conservative and orthodox Indian society. 16. Coming to the core of the issue, the question is whether it is legal, plausible and proper for the court to quash the FIR and the complaint at the threshold thereby stifling the investigation and aborting the same. It is well settled by now that inherent power of the court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or powers that are conferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked in exceptional circumstances when warranted by the facts of the case to give necessary reliefs. Before embarking on a study to ascertain the principles and the law laid down in various decisions regarding the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it is felt that it is first useful to ascertain the nature of the acts that arise for consideration. 17. Going by the averments in the complaint, there are two sets of incidents. One with the son and the other with the father. The sexual exploits of both the father and son have been caught in the web camera, according to the complainant. As per the complaint, the petitioner had proposed that his eldest son Adarsh would marry the complainant and, according to the complainant, she bona fide believed the said fact. It is true that in the complaint it is stated that on the first occasion when certain advances were made by Adarsh, that was not to the liking of the complainant. But the complainant herself says that her annoyance wilted away in the light of the fact that she thereafter began to believe that Adarsh would marry her. There is no case for the complainant that she had offered any resistance or objection to the physical contacts which Adarsh had with her. But the complainant herself says that her annoyance wilted away in the light of the fact that she thereafter began to believe that Adarsh would marry her. There is no case for the complainant that she had offered any resistance or objection to the physical contacts which Adarsh had with her. In fact, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, it would appear that the complainant was a willing and consenting partner. However, one could still say that the sexual exploits with the son was under the bona fide belief that he would marry her. But one fails to understand the sexual exploits of the complainant with the petitioner. No where it is stated that the petitioner had threatened, intimidated or forced the victim to yield to his desire. 18. According to the petitioner, as already stated, the so-called physical contacts were consensual acts and were volitionally and voluntarily entered into by the complainant and extracted in the web camera by the complainant with the oblique motive of blackmailing him. 19. The learned DGP contended that the petitioner is a very clever man who had laid a trap into which the gullible complainant walked in. The complainant was made to believe by the petitioner that his son would marry her and according to the learned DGP, it is clear from the conduct of the petitioner that from the very inception itself he had no intention to have his son married to the complainant. 20. It will be appropriate at this stage to refer to Section 375 of I.P.C. The said Section so far as relevant for the present case reads as follows: ""375.Rape.- A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:-First.-Against her will. Secondly.-Without her consent." 21. An act of sexual intercourse against will or without the consent of the victim amounts to rape. Against the will implies mental opposition to an act which is anticipated before it takes place. It is the state of mind in favour of a man doing an act what he intended and decided to do. 22. Consent is defined in Section 90 of I.P.C. It reads as follows: "90. Against the will implies mental opposition to an act which is anticipated before it takes place. It is the state of mind in favour of a man doing an act what he intended and decided to do. 22. Consent is defined in Section 90 of I.P.C. It reads as follows: "90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.- A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception." The provision is couched in negative form. It will at once be noticed that the consent given is vitiated if it is under fear of injury or on misconception of fact and the person doing the act knows or had reason to believe that the consent obtained was on the basis of the above factors. What is intended by the Section is that consent should be free. It is well settled that consent obtained by any of the vitiating circumstances is also invalid. 23. It is said that consent is the qua animo of the act. Consent is an operation of the mind implying positive mental action. Mere absence of dissent or submission may not amount to consent. In Story's Equity Jurisprudence consent is defined as "consent is an act of reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a balance the good and evil on each side." It is also well settled that consent obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, concealment of fact, mistake and fraud are also vitiated. However, misconception of fact envisaged under the Section must be of an existing fact and not of something which is to take place in future. If it is shown that the person, who promised to marry the victim and compelled her to sexual intercourse, had at the very inception itself no idea of marrying the victim, but made her to believe it to be so, and knowing fully well that the consent so obtained is on misrepresentation and the person concerned later retracts from the promise, he cannot be heard to say that sexual intercourse was with consent. 24. Consent contemplated under Section 375 of I.P.C. is usually termed as informed consent. 24. Consent contemplated under Section 375 of I.P.C. is usually termed as informed consent. It means exercise of the discretion by a person after considering the pros and cons of the act consented to. Consent operates as an exception to criminal liability and if consent is established, it kills the offence of rape. 25. The approach that the courts need to adopt in cases of rape has been indicated in several decisions. It is stated that the courts have to be sensitive, pragmatic and sympathetic and not to treat the victim as an accomplice. The court cannot start with the assumption that the allegation of rape is a false one. These aspects were considered in the decisions reported in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain ( AIR 1990 SC 658 ), State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh ( AIR 1996 SC 1393 ), and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mange Ram (AIR 2000 SC 2799) and Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa ( AIR 2008 SC 572 ). 26. In the context of the case, one is called upon to answer the question as to whether there was consent solely on the basis of the averments in the complaint. According to the learned DGP and also the counsel appearing for the third respondent, even if there was any consent on the part of the victim, or the complainant, it was on a misconception of fact. Consent obtained was on the promise that the son of the petitioner would marry the complainant. 27. Here, one needs to notice the decisions relied on by the parties regarding consent said to have been given by the complainant. In Bipul Mewdhi v. State of Assam (2008 KHC 5464) relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent, Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act was applied to the facts of the case. It is unnecessary to refer to the case in detail for the simple reason that Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act can have no application in the present case. 28. In the decision reported in Laddoo Singh v. State of Punjab (2008 KHC 5822) relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent, it was held that consent obtained by intimidation, force meditated imposition, circumvention, surprise, or undue influence is to be treated as a delusion. 28. In the decision reported in Laddoo Singh v. State of Punjab (2008 KHC 5822) relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent, it was held that consent obtained by intimidation, force meditated imposition, circumvention, surprise, or undue influence is to be treated as a delusion. It was also held in the said decision that consent made in a mistaken belief also amounts to without consent. The decision highlights a situation where promise to marry may or may not amount to consent. 29. In the decision reported in Gurmeet Singh v. State of H.P. (2011 KHC 6499) relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent, it was held that submission of the body by the victim under a misconception of fact cannot be construed as consent for sexual act so as to absolve the accused. The facts of the case show that concealing the fact that the accused was married, he made the victim to believe that he would marry her and kept on promising for several years and had sexual intercourse with her on that basis. The prosecutrix fully believed the accused and hoped that he would marry her. Under those circumstances, when later it turned out that the accused was married and he could not marry the victim, it was held that the sexual acts could not have been said to be with the consent of the victim, but was based on misconception of fact. 30. The decision reported in Pradyumna S. Harish v. State (2011 Crl.L.J. 558) relied on by the learned counsel for the third respondent shows that the complaint contained a specific allegation that the complainant was not willing to have sex with the accused. In such circumstances, it was held that the matter needed investigation and interference at the threshold may not be justified. 31. In the decision reported in State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan ( (1999) 2 SCC 651 ) on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the third respondent, the facts show that the High Court had quashed the FIR on the basis that the victim was more than 16 years of age and she was a willing partner to the sexual intercourse. While accepting the proposition that if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose the ingredients of offence, it should be quashed or set aside, on the facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the said principle cannot be applied to the case and held that the High Court was in error in quashing the proceedings. 32. In the decision relied on by the learned DGP, namely, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mange Ram ( AIR 2000 SC 2798 ), it was held as follows: "12....... The accused was examined on 20-4- 1993. As the incident occurred on 17-4-1993, even if there were any marks of violence on the body of accused, the same would have been obliterated and were not so prominent so as to be noticed by the medical officer who examined him. Therefore, the absence of nail marks or minor injuries on the body of the accused is of not much significance. From the oral evidence of the prosecutrix (PW 5), it is proved that the accused caught her from behind and he lifted her and pushed her down and despite her attempt to cover herself with the salwar, the accused pull it down. She also stated that the accused gagged her mouth when she attempted to cry a loud. The subsequent conduct of the prosecutrix also shows that she was very much resistant to the sexual onslaught on her. She came to her father immediately and told the entire incident as to how she was ravished by the accused. The evidence as a whole indicates that there was resistance by the prosecutrix and there was no voluntary participation by her for the sexual act. Submission of the body under the fear of terror cannot be construed as a consented sexual act. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between the resistance and assent. whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. From the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix had given consent and thereafter she turned round and acted against the interest of the accused. whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. From the evidence on record, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix had given consent and thereafter she turned round and acted against the interest of the accused. There is a clear credible evidence that she resisted the onslaught and made all possible efforts to prevent the accused from committing rape on her. Therefore, the finding entered by the learned sessions Judge that there was consent on the part of the prosecutrix is without any basis." 33. It may be noticed here that in the objections filed by the third respondent as well as the State, they make mention of several decisions where question of consent was considered. Both the respondents pointed out that in a series of decisions, it has been held that sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and later on retracting from the same has been treated to be one without consent. Reference is also made to cases where allegation of rape was upheld even after delivery bythe victim. 34. It is true that in a number of cases brought before court, the allegation is that the person concerned promises to marry the victim and makes her believe that he will do so and under that impression the victim is forced to have sexual intercourse. There may be isolated case of sexual intercourse or there may be series of intercourse thereafter. Ultimately when the person concerned retracts or withdraws from his promise, the question has often been considered whether sexual intercourse undergone by the person can be treated to be one with consent. 35. In the decision reported in Zindar Ali Sheikh v. State of West Bengal ( (2009) 3 SCC 761 ) it was held as follows: "26........The evidence about the cheating is of slip-shod nature and not believable. It is also self- effacing. After all, the first act of the sexual intercourse was without the consent and the accused had thereby, committed rape, however, the version that he gave a marriage promise, would really go against the prosecution, whereby, it would mean that the subsequent acts were done with the consent of the girl on account of the promise of marriage. We do not think that such could be the approach. We do not think that such could be the approach. After all, if the promise of marriage was given and the girl had succumbed on that account, by itself, may not amount to cheating. Besides this, the girl has very specifically stated that even subsequently, she was ravished against her wishes. Therefore, the theory of promise of marriage and the consent for sexual intercourse will wither away. We, therefore, acquit the accused of the offence under Section 417 of IPC." 36. In the decision reported in Uday v. State of Karnataka ( (2003) 4 SCC 46 ) it was held as follows: "21. It, therefore, appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the Courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the Court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them." 37. In the decision reported in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar ( (2005) 1 SCC 88 ), it was held as follows: "14. The last question which calls for consideration is whether the accused is guilty of having sexual intercourse with PW12 'without her consent' (vide Clause secondly of Section 375, IPC). In the decision reported in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar ( (2005) 1 SCC 88 ), it was held as follows: "14. The last question which calls for consideration is whether the accused is guilty of having sexual intercourse with PW12 'without her consent' (vide Clause secondly of Section 375, IPC). Though will and consent often interlace and an act done against the will of a person can be said to be an act done without consent, the Indian Penal Code categorizes these two expressions under separate heads in order to be as comprehensive as possible. 15. What then is the meaning and content of the expression 'without her consent'? Whether the consent given by a woman believing the man's promise to marry her is a consent which excludes the offence of rape? These are the questions which have come up for debate directly or incidentally. 16. The concept and dimensions of 'consent' in the context of Section 375, IPC has been viewed from different angles. The decided cases on the issue reveal different approaches which may not necessarily be dichotomous. Of course, the ultimate conclusion depends on the facts of each case. 17. Indian Penal Code does not define 'consent' in positive terms, but what cannot be regarded as 'consent' under the Code is explained by Section 90. Section 90 reads as follows : "90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception......." 18. Consent given firstly under fear of injury and secondly under a misconception of fact is not 'consent' at all. That is what is enjoined by the first part of Section 90. These two grounds specified in Section 90 are analogous to coercion and mistake of fact which are the familiar grounds that can vitiate a transaction under the jurisprudence of our country as well as other countries. 19. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. These two grounds specified in Section 90 are analogous to coercion and mistake of fact which are the familiar grounds that can vitiate a transaction under the jurisprudence of our country as well as other countries. 19. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. The second part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused. It envisages that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that the consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the Court has to see whether the person giving the consent had given it under fear of injury or misconception of fact and the Court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act i.e. the alleged offender, is conscious of the fact or should have reason to think that but for the fear or misconception, the consent would not have been given. This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology. 20. Section 90 cannot, however, be construed as an exhaustive definition of consent for the purposes of the Indian Penal Code. The normal connotation and concept of 'consent' is not intended to be excluded. Various decisions of the High Court and of this Court have not merely gone by the language of Section 90, but travelled a wider field, guided by the etymology of the word 'consent'.38. In the decision reported in Babu v. State of Kerala ( 2013(2) K.L.T. 574 ) it was held as follows:"It was held that "while we reiterate that a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to "misconception of fact" within the meaning of S.90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying hear and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of S.375 clause secondly." The principles deducible from the above, are summarised below: a) Consent, on the part of a woman as a defence to an allegation of rape, requires voluntary participation; b) The same, not only be after the exercise of intelligence, based on the knowledge, of the significance and moral quality of the act, but after having freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent; c) Consent is an act of reason accompanied by deliberation, a mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, non-resistance and passive giving in cannot be deemed to be 'consent'; (d) Consent means active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of the act of and knowledge of what is to be done, or of the nature of the act that is being done is essential to a consent to an act; e) Consent supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting and a serious and determined and free use of these powers; f) Failure to keep the promise of a future uncertain date does not always amount to 'misconception of fact' at the inception of the act itself ; g) In order to come within the meaning of 'misconception of fact' the fact must have an immediate relevance; h) Consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a 'misconception of fact'; i) Consent given pursuant to a false representation that the accused intends to marry could be regarded as consent given under 'misconception of fact'. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code; j) A misrepresentation as regards the intention of the person seeking consent, i.e. The accused could give rise to the 'misconception of fact'; k) A promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to 'misconception of fact' within the meaning of S.90 I.P.C.; l) the factors set out in the first part of S.90 are from the point of view of the victim; m) The second part of S.90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused; and n) The requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. Therefore, to attract S.415, necessarily it has to be shown at the time of making the promise that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention to induce the person so deceived to do something which he would not otherwise do,. It was also held that in para 25 that a failure to keep the promise subsequently cannot lead to an inference that there was a fraudulent or dishonest intention. These principles were relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in the context of the submission that if at all there was dishonest intention to attract the offence under S.4154 I.P.C. Leading to a conviction under S.417 I.P.C.. Herein we have already found that the story regarding promise to marry cannot survive, automatically the same will have impact on the offence alleged to have been committed under S.415 in the light of the alleged promise to marry alone. We are of the view therefore that there is no evidence to show that the accused had entertained a dishonest intention by extending such a promise and to deceive the victim....." 39. In the decision reported in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013(2) K.L.T 762 (SC)), it was held as follows: "In the event that the accused's promise is not false and has not been made with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would not amount to rape. Thus, the same would only hold that where the prosecutrix, under a misconception of fact to the extent that the accused is likely to marry her, submits to the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act cannot be said to be consensual, o far as the offence of the accused is concerned. Thus, the same would only hold that where the prosecutrix, under a misconception of fact to the extent that the accused is likely to marry her, submits to the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act cannot be said to be consensual, o far as the offence of the accused is concerned. The court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. It is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e., at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, or keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, he fact must have an immediate relevance." S.90 I.P.C. Cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her." 40. This court had occasion to consider the matter in detail while disposing of Crl. Appeal No. 614 of 2006 by judgment dated 22.5.2013. This court had occasion to consider the matter in detail while disposing of Crl. Appeal No. 614 of 2006 by judgment dated 22.5.2013. After considering the literature on the subject and also the various decisions of this Court as well the Apex Court, this Court found that there is no straight jacket formula in ascertaining whether there is consent in a particular case. It depends upon the facts of each case. In several of the decisions, it has been held that the mere promise to marry itself is not a ground to lead to the conclusion that there is misconception of fact. The test appears to be that if the person concerned at the very inception itself had no idea to marry the victim and makes false promise of marriage forcing or compelling the victim to have sexual intercourse with him knowing fully well that consent so given by the victim was under the belief that he would marry her and later if the person concerned retracts from his promise or withdraws from his promise, it has been held that the consent so obtained is as a result of misconception of fact falling with the ambit of Section 90 of I.P.C. 41. If the conduct of the victim towards the person concerned at the relevant time is such a nature so as to create an impression in his mind and belief that she has consented by free will for the commission of the act, then later on it could not be said that there was misconception of fact. It has been held that voluntary submission by the woman while she has the power to resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts to consent and that removes an essential element from the crime of rape. Generally it is stated that the claim of rape has to be considered in the circumstances presented by the case. It is well settled that passiveness or submission by themselves are not evidence of consent. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance, passive giving in when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress cannot be deemed to be consent as understood in law. It is well settled that passiveness or submission by themselves are not evidence of consent. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance, passive giving in when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress cannot be deemed to be consent as understood in law. Consent, in order to constitute as a defence of allegation of rape, should require a voluntary participation after having weighed the pros and cons of the act consented to and victim has made a conscious choice between resistance and assent. 42. Bearing the above principles in mind, one may now have a look at the allegations in the complaint to find out whether the acts of intercourse could be said to be with consent or without consent. 43. One may assume, for arguments sake in this case, that there was sexual intercourse between the petitioner and the third respondent. The contention of the petitioner is that even if there were such physical contacts, they were with the volition and consent of the victim and there was no resistance or objection offered by her at any point of time. However, the learned DGP on behalf of the State would contend that the petitioner had schemed it so well that he made the victim believe that his son would marry her and taking advantage of that belief, he had sexually exploited her. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent invited the attention of this court to the statement in the complaint to the effect ""( intercourse entered into with me was not with my proper consent). It is contended that there is allegation to the effect that there was no free consent and the acts complained of are not voluntary acts on the part of the victim and she was compelled under the circumstances made mention of to yield to the desire of the person concerned. 44. When the sequence of events as disclosed in the complaint are recapitulated, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that there was force, coercion or compulsion on the part of the petitioner to make the victim succumb to the pressure or the existence of misconception of fact. 45. True, the allegation seems to be that the petitioner had proposed that his son would marry the third respondent. 45. True, the allegation seems to be that the petitioner had proposed that his son would marry the third respondent. After the son arrived, he was introduced to the third respondent, who thereafter became closely associated with the son of the petitioner, namely, Adarsh. Even in the complaint filed, it is conceded that there was sexual intercourse between the third respondent and the said Adarsh. It is significant to notice that there is nothing in the complaint to show that it was at the instance of the petitioner or that it was under his instigation that the sexual exploits between the son of the petitioner and the third respondent had occurred. In fact, a reading of the complaint would show that the third respondent did not object to the conduct of the son of the petitioner as she honestly believed that he would marry her. One need not labour much regarding the physical relationship between the son of the petitioner and the third respondent for the simple reason that it is not a subject matter of issue in this proceedings. 46. However, one fact needs to be noticed. The third respondent, feeling suspicious about the possibility of the son of the petitioner marrying another lady, had installed a web camera in her bed room and had physical relationship between the son of the petitioner and the third respondent caught in the web camera. 47. The allegation against the petitioner is that after the son had left for Bombay, the petitioner made advances towards the third respondent. The complaint speaks about the indecent behaviour at the initial stage on the part of the petitioner, which according to the third respondent, caused considerable annoyance and embarrassment to her. However, it is surprising to note that even after the petitioner had made his intentions clear, and even after the third respondent felt that his conduct was unbecoming of a father-in-law and a gentleman, the third respondent does not take objections to his subsequent conducts. If as a matter of fact, the third respondent was annoyed and had disapproved the conduct of the petitioner, normally, one would have expected her not to encourage the petitioner further. It is evident from the conduct expressed in the complaint that the motive of the petitioner was not good and nor were his intentions commendable. 48. If as a matter of fact, the third respondent was annoyed and had disapproved the conduct of the petitioner, normally, one would have expected her not to encourage the petitioner further. It is evident from the conduct expressed in the complaint that the motive of the petitioner was not good and nor were his intentions commendable. 48. Instead of keeping the petitioner at bay even after such conduct from his side, what the complaint says is that the victim wanted to teach the MLA a lesson and she was waiting for an opportunity to do so. 49. This statement in the complaint goes a long way in indicating the mental set up of the third respondent. It would appear that when the complainant entertained the idea of teaching the MLA a lesson, an opportunity was provided to her to accomplish her dream. It is no doubt true that in the complaint, it is alleged that the MLA continued to phone the third respondent and kept on promising that the marriage between his son and respondent No.3 would be conducted. It was thereafter that the MLA, according to the complainant, had called her and expressed his desire to go over to the flat. Normally, when such a desire was expressed by the MLA, being aware of his intentions and after having a bitter experience with him, one would expect the third respondent to repel his advances. But on the other hand, the third respondent goes in her car, fetches the MLA and takes him to the flat. It is significant to remember here that even as per the complaint, the complainant would say that she walked into the flat first and switched on the web camera. What transpired thereafter has already been referred to. Having failed in the first attempt to gather pictures on the web camera, she allows the petitioner to have physical conduct with her on the second occasion also. 50. It is significant to notice that on neither of the occasions, there is any resistance or objection offered by the third respondent. On the other hand, one gets the impression that she encouraged him to have physical contact with her. The third respondent seems to be more concerned about catching the incidents on the web camera with the intention of threatening the petitioner to have his son marry her. On the other hand, one gets the impression that she encouraged him to have physical contact with her. The third respondent seems to be more concerned about catching the incidents on the web camera with the intention of threatening the petitioner to have his son marry her. There is nothing to indicate in the complaint that the petitioner had threatened the third respondent that unless she yielded to his desire, the marriage with his son would not be conducted. There is also nothing in the complaint which suggest that there was threat, coercion or intimidation from the side of the petitioner which made the third respondent to yield as if she had no other option. 51. The tenure of the complaint is that she entered into physical relationship with the petitioner to ensure that the promise of the petitioner to have his son marry her is given effect to. No where in the complaint, one gets allegation to the effect that the petitioner created such a situation by his conduct or otherwise which left the third respondent with no other option but to dance to his tunes. 52. Even otherwise, it is difficult to believe that a father would stoop to the level of compelling a woman to have sexual intercourse with him on the promise that he would ensure that his son marries her. One must remember here that in the case on hand even prior to having sex with the petitioner, the third respondent had already shared her bed with the son of the petitioner. It does not stand to reason or logic and it is not rational to believe that either the son or the father in such circumstance would go in for an alliance with such a lady. Of course, it is claimed that the father and the son were kept in the dark regarding the relationship of the third respondent with each one of them. But it is difficult to believe that the said acts could have been kept a secret for long. Certainly the son and the father would have come to know about the relationship of the third respondent with each one of them. 53. The contention of the learned DGP that the petitioner had created such a situation the victim was left with no choice does not appear to be acceptable. Certainly the son and the father would have come to know about the relationship of the third respondent with each one of them. 53. The contention of the learned DGP that the petitioner had created such a situation the victim was left with no choice does not appear to be acceptable. At the risk of repetition, one may notice that there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner had compelled or insisted that the third respondent should share the bed with him if his son is to marry the third respondent. If the third respondent believed it to be so, it is her voluntary choice. 54. This court had repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the third respondent whether there was anything in the complaint which would indicate that any threat, coercion or compulsion was exercised by the petitioner which made the third respondent to yield to his desire. Learned counsel for the third respondent was unable to point out any such statement. He was unable to point out any conduct on the part of either the petitioner or the third respondent which would indicate that there was compulsion from the side of the petitioner and there was resistance or objection from the side of the third respondent which went unheeded. 55. On the other hand, the impression that one gathers from a reading of the complaint is that the third respondent was collecting materials to ensure that the son of the petitioner marries her. If for that end, she shared bed with both the son and the father, it escapes ones understanding how it could be said that the acts committed by the petitioner were without her consent. Even assuming that the third respondent laboured under the impression that if she did not share bed with the petitioner, the marriage would not take place, that cannot also be taken as a misconception of fact. In order to constitute misconception of fact, the facts should emanate from the person concerned and lead to a situation where the victim is made to believe in the promise and thereby succumbs to the insistence on the part of the person concerned for sexual intercourse. In order to constitute misconception of fact, the facts should emanate from the person concerned and lead to a situation where the victim is made to believe in the promise and thereby succumbs to the insistence on the part of the person concerned for sexual intercourse. Only under such circumstance, it could be said that the consent falls within the ambit of Section 90 of I.P.C. The essential ingredient is that the person concerned knows at the very inception itself that the representation made by him is false and he also knows that the victim yielded believing that representation to be true. If as a matter of fact, the third respondent in the case on hand believed that it would be handy and useful to have web camera draw the sexual exploits with both the father and son for her safety and security, it could not be said that rape was committed by the petitioner. 56. Learned DGP and the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent contended that it is too early to come to the conclusion regarding the question of consent. It is a matter for investigation and a conclusion can be drawn only after evaluation of the evidence. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent highlighted the statement in the complaint that there was no proper consent from the side of the victim. 57. It is difficult to understand what one means by proper consent. It has already been noticed that no semblance of resistance or objection was offered by the third respondent when the petitioner went ahead with his acts. There is no allegation in the complaint in this case to show that the third respondent was subjected to sexual intercourse inspite of the objection and resistance offered by her. 58. The Apex Court had occasion to hold that a lady who has attained majority and who is capable of knowing the pros and cons of her act, if freely indulges in sexual activity believing on a promise of marriage, the act does not amount to rape nor can the conduct be treated as one under a misconception of fact. Misconception of fact can occur only in the circumstances already made mention of. 59. Misconception of fact can occur only in the circumstances already made mention of. 59. On a reading of the complaint as a whole in the case on hand, except for the vague assertion that there was no 'proper consent', which lacks meaning in the context of the other statements in the complaint, there is nothing even to remotely suggest that the ingredients of the offence of rape are made out. It would appear, on the other hand, that the third respondent with the object to ensure that son of the petitioner marries her had consented to the acts so as to collect materials to pressurize the petitioner's son to marry her. There is nothing to show that the physical contacts if at all any between the petitioner and the third respondent were not voluntary and were against her will and consent. The act of sharing the bed with the father and son and capturing the same on the web camera shows that the third respondent had willingly and knowingly participated in the acts complained of. 60. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned DGP and the learned counsel for the third respondent that consent if at all any of the third respondent is under a misconception of fact is difficult to accept. 61. It will not be out of place here to refer to certain incidental facts. Both the State as well as the third respondents have filed counter affidavits to the petition. It is interesting to note that the counter affidavit or the statement as they call it, filed by the State would show that consent if at all any was given under fear, force and misconception, while the third respondent's counter affidavit would show that the third respondent would like to bring it under misconception of fact and undue influence exerted by the petitioner. It is significant to notice that in paragraphs 7, 9, 11 and 22 of the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, what is stated is that the third respondent believed the promise of marriage made by both the accused persons and had sexual intercourse with them. There is no whisper of any threat, force, intimidation or coercion in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent. There is no whisper of any threat, force, intimidation or coercion in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent. On going through the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, the impression that is gained is that she believed a mere promise of marriage made by the second accused and that resulted in physical contact with him. She attributed the same reason for having sex with the petitioner also. Nowhere in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, there is any mention of any resistance or defiance offered by the third respondent when the petitioner made sexual advances towards her. It must be remembered that the words fraud, force, intimidation, coercion, threat, undue influence etc. have definite connotation in law. It has already been found that the claim based on misconception of fact cannot be accepted atleast as against the petitioner. While the State would attribute certain factors as vitiating the consent alleged to have been given by the third respondent, the third respondent would depend upon some other factors. Whatever that be, none of the vitiating factors now taken aid of either by the State or respondent No.3 are seen taken in by the allegations in the complaint. 62. It is contended on behalf of the third respondent that it is a layman's complaint and therefore, literal interpretation should not be given to the allegations in the complaint. It is also pointed out that it is not necessary that the complaint should mention the offences alleged to have been committed by the person concerned. The consequence of the acts made mention of in the complaint is to be determined by the investigating agency and that shall not be stifled. 63. Though there is some basis for the above contention, it may not have much application to the facts of the present case. Even assuming that no offence is stated in the complainant Annexure I produced by the petitioner along with this petition, the Police Officer who received the complaint and who registered the crime formed the opinion that only offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is made out. Prima facie, the said opinion so formed by the police officer concerned cannot be ignored. Prima facie, the said opinion so formed by the police officer concerned cannot be ignored. Attempt is now being made to give a colour to the complaint which would enable a contention to be raised that the consent even if any, was tainted and therefore, the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is made out and thus it enables the police to launch investigation into the matter. 64. The effort so made has necessarily to fail. Apart from the fact that there is no consistency between the stand taken by the State and the third respondent, the common factor that is claimed by both the parties is that consent was given under misconception of fact which has already been found against. 65. This court is not unaware of the necessity to be sensitive, pragmatic and sympathetic towards such issues. But at the same time, it cannot ignore the law also. At no point of time during the physical contacts, the complainant has a case that there was any resistance or diffidence offered by her which went unheeded and she was over powered. She in fact installed a web camera to picturize the incidents and it must be remembered that she is a mature lady who knows the consequences of entering into physical relationship with persons. Even assuming that there was a promise of marriage by the second accused and the petitioner herein, that by itself is not sufficient to lead to misconception of fact and the apex court had occasion to consider such an issue and has held that if believing a mere promise of marriage, the victim concerned enters into sexual contact with the person, it can only be termed as promiscuity on the part of the woman. 66. Even though the learned DGP has a contention that it was a trap laid by the petitioner to gain access to the lady and that he from the very inception had no intention to have his son married to the victim, the complainant does not seem to have such a case. Even in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent before this court, there is no assertion that by giving the promise of marriage the complainant was compelled to have physical contact with either of the accused. Even in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent before this court, there is no assertion that by giving the promise of marriage the complainant was compelled to have physical contact with either of the accused. On the other hand, the sequence of events and the conduct of the victim would lead to the conclusion that she had voluntarily entered into physical contacts with the two accused persons. May be that she has her own reasons for doing so. But having done so, to turn round and say that it is rape, may not be capable of acceptance. 67. Even assuming that there was physical relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent, and that the same is with the consent of the third respondent, the question still remains whether that by itself is sufficient to quash the FIR and the complaint. The power can certainly be traced to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or to Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 68. It is well settled by now that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. does confer any new power on the court. It only declares the power which already existed in the Code. The declaration was necessary to dispel any doubt that apart from the powers enumerated in the Code the courts enjoyed no other power. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in fact only recognizes inherent power in every court to exercise its powers to do justice. Section 482 reads as follows: "482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." The exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is contemplated under three circumstances. They are, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of process of court, (iii) to secure the ends of justice.Among the above three, (ii) and (iii) work in both ways. Those powers are exercised either to prevent injustice being done to a party as well as ensuring that a just cause is not thrown out unjustly and that grievance of a person does not go unredressed. 69. Those powers are exercised either to prevent injustice being done to a party as well as ensuring that a just cause is not thrown out unjustly and that grievance of a person does not go unredressed. 69. One has to necessarily consider the nature and scope of power available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Normally, the power to quash a proceedings which is considered to be an extension of the power conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is very sparingly used. More so, in a case when the remedy of quashing of proceedings is sought for at the threshold. It is well settled by now that if a complaint is laid which discloses a cognizable offence, or information is received by a police officer about the commission of a cognizable offence, he is bound to register a crime and thereafter he is statutorily empowered to commence investigation. This power conferred by the provisions of Cr.P.C. is absolute in its terms and the courts are not supposed to interfere with that power of the police. Even otherwise, it is often said that it is not proper to stifle the investigation which is intended to ascertain the truth and collect evidence regarding the allegations made in the complaint. The power of investigation is in the domain of the police and the courts should not try to usurp that power though the courts may keep watch over the investigation. At any rate, it is accepted principle that the court had no power to interfere with the investigation which is going on and especially to regulate the manner and method to be adopted in investigation of a case. 70. But the above power is circumscribed by one significant fact. That is, the allegation made in the complaint or the information received by the police officer concerned must give rise to a cognizable offence. In other words, the offence made mention of must get support from the averments in the complaint. Once it is so, the power of the police is absolute. 71. One exception to the above power recognized is when the allegations in the complaint taken as a whole does not disclose any cognizable offence, or the offence stated in the FIR, the court is well within its powers in interfering with the matter and quashing the proceedings. 72. Once it is so, the power of the police is absolute. 71. One exception to the above power recognized is when the allegations in the complaint taken as a whole does not disclose any cognizable offence, or the offence stated in the FIR, the court is well within its powers in interfering with the matter and quashing the proceedings. 72. In the case on hand, the stand taken by the petitioner is that even assuming all the allegations in the complaint to be true, no offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is made out. The definite contention is that even assuming that there was physical contact between the petitioner and the third respondent, on a consideration of the allegations in the complaint itself, it is clear that it was with consent and if that be so, offence of rape cannot be attracted. It is further contended that the only offence shown in the FIR is under Section 376 of I.P.C., and if that is not made out from the allegations in the complaint, necessarily, the proceedings have to be put an end to. 73. Learned DGP on the other hand would point out that it is too premature at this stage to come to the conclusion that no offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is made out. Whether the acts were with consent etc., are matters to be determined later for which evidence will have to be collected. The learned DGP contended that the FIS or the complaint is not supposed to be an encyclopedia of facts and it is only intended to set the law in motion. It is for the investigating agency to find out as to what exactly are the offences committed on the basis of the allegations in the complaint or the information received by them and also on the basis of the materials collected during investigation. It may be, according to the learned DGP, that a close scrutiny of the complaint would reveal other offences also. At any rate, according to the learned DGP, it will not be appropriate to quash the proceedings at this juncture stifling the investigation and thereby preventing gathering of materials to ascertain the truth of the matter. It may be, according to the learned DGP, that a close scrutiny of the complaint would reveal other offences also. At any rate, according to the learned DGP, it will not be appropriate to quash the proceedings at this juncture stifling the investigation and thereby preventing gathering of materials to ascertain the truth of the matter. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent also supported the learned DGP in his submissions and further pointed out that the issue as to whether there is consent or not, is a matter to be determined after the evidence is adduced and on appreciation of evidence and not merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. The third respondent has a definite case that it was without proper consent that the physical contacts were made by the petitioner herein and that needs to be probed into. According to the learned counsel, it is a matter for investigation and to quash the proceedings now would mean that a just cause is being thrown out unjustly. 74. Before considering the above contentions, it will be useful to refer to the decisions cited by both sides on this aspect. 75. In the decision reported in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad (AIR 1945 PC 18), the object and scope of the earlier provision, namely, Section 561, which corresponds to Section 482 of the present Code was considered. It was held as follows: "In their Lordship's opinion, however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a clue observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under S. 491 of the Criminal P. C. to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that S.561A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam J. may well have decided rightly in AIR 1938 Mad. 129. But that is not this case." 76. The learned DGP relied on the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2011 Crl.L.J. 89) wherein it was held as follows: "12. 129. But that is not this case." 76. The learned DGP relied on the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2011 Crl.L.J. 89) wherein it was held as follows: "12. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the F.I.R./Complaint, unless the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor it can 'soft-pedal the course of justice' at a crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. The provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as 'Cr. P.C.') are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that esteem of administration of justice remains clean and pure. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers." 77. In the decision relied on by the learned DGP reported in State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ) it was held as follows: "6. At the outset there cannot be any dispute with the proposition that when allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose prima facie commission of a cognizable offence, then the High Court would be justified in interfering with the investigation and quashing the same as has been held by this Court in Sanchaita Investment's case, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : ( AIR 1982 SC 949 ). In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : (1992 AIR SCW 237), this Court considered the question as to when the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and had indicated some instances by way of illustrations, though on facts it was held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the first information report. This Court held that such powers could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. But as an illustration several circumstances were enumerated. Having said so, the Court gave a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases, that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. It is too well settled that the first information report is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into a cognizable offence and, therefore, while exercising the power and deciding whether the investigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should be taken by the Court and at that stage it is not possible for the Court to shift the materials or to weigh the materials and then come to the conclusion one way or the other. In the case of State of U. P. v. O. P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 : (1996 AIR SCW 1229), a three-Judge Bench of this Court indicated that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482 or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be and allow the law to take its own course. The same view was reiterated by yet another three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397 , where this Court sounded a word of caution and stated that such power should be sparingly and cautiously exercised only when the Court is of the opinion that otherwise there will be gross miscarriage of justice. The Court had also observed that social stability and order is required to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. Bearing in mind the parameters laid down in the aforesaid judgments and on a thorough scrutiny of the statement of Seena dated 23rd of July, 1986, which was treated as an F.I.R. and on the basis of which criminal case was registered and her subsequent statements dated 24-8-96 and 25-8-96, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed gross error in embarking upon an inquiry by shifting of evidence and coming to a conclusion with regard to the age of the lady on the date of alleged sexual intercourse, she had with the accused persons and also in recording a finding that no offence of rape can be said to have been committed on the allegations made as she was never forced to have sex but on the other hand she willingly had sex with those who paid money. We do not think it appropriate to express any opinion on the materials on record as that would embarrass the investigation as well as the accused persons, but suffice it to say that this cannot be held to be a case where the Court should have scuttled investigation by quashing the F.I.R., particularly when the criminal case had been registered under several provisions of the Penal Code as well as under Immoral Traffic Act. We also do not approve of the uncharitable comments made by the High Court in paragraph (12) of the Judgment against the woman who had given the F.I.R. It is not possible and it was not necessary to make any comment on the character of the lady at this stage. We also have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction to record a finding that the lady exercised her discretion to have sex with those whom she liked or got money and she willingly submitted herself to most of them who came to her for sex. We refrain from making any further observations in the case as that may affect the investigation or the accused persons but we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion after going through the statements of the victim lady that the High Court certainly exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the F.I.R. and the investigations to be made pursuant to the same so far as respondents are concerned. We, accordingly set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. These appeals are accordingly allowed." 78. Relying on the decision reported in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P. (1989 Crl.L.J. 1013), the learned DGP contended that even if no offence is made out or no offence is mentioned in the FIS, that by itself is not a ground to quash the proceedings. In the said decision, it was held as follows: "7. It is thus settled law that the power of the police to investigate into a report which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence is unfettered and cannot be interfered with by this court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C........................ 22. In the said decision, it was held as follows: "7. It is thus settled law that the power of the police to investigate into a report which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence is unfettered and cannot be interfered with by this court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C........................ 22. In our opinion the High Court has no inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the arrest of a person by a police officer even in violation of S,41(1)(a) C.P.C. Either when no offence is disclosed in the first information report or when the investigation is mala fide as the inherent powers of the court to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice come into play only after the charge sheet has been filed in court and not during investigation which may even be illegal and unathorised. If the High Court is convinced that the power of arrest by a police officer will be exercised wrongly or mala fide in violation of Section 41(1)(a) Cr.P.C. the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution restraining the police officer from misusing his legal power." 79. Relying on the decision reported in Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi (AIR 2007 SC 899), the learned DGP contended that principles of quashing made mention thereof applies to the facts of this case. In the said decision it was held as follows: "9.....As noted herein earlier, a bare perusal of the judgment of the High Court would also show that the High Court had relied on the investigation report in quashing the FIR. Now, the question is whether the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code was justified in relying on the investigation report which was neither filed before the Magistrate nor a copy of the same supplied to the appellant. In our view, the High Court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction by relying on the investigation report and the High Court was also wrong in directing the report to be submitted before it. It is now well settled that it is for the investigating agency to submit the report to the Magistrate........... In our view, the High Court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction by relying on the investigation report and the High Court was also wrong in directing the report to be submitted before it. It is now well settled that it is for the investigating agency to submit the report to the Magistrate........... Therefore, in view of our discussions made herein above, while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, it is not open to the High Court to rely on the report of the investigating agency nor can it direct the report to be submitted before it as the law is very clear that the report of the investigating agency may be accepted by the Magistrate or the Magistrate may reject the same on consideration of the material on record. Such being the position, the report of the investigating agency cannot be relied on by the High Court while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code. Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court has erred in quashing the FIR on consideration of the investigation report submitted before it even before the same could be submitted before the Magistrate. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court and hold that the High Court in quashing the FIR in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code by relying on the investigation report and the findings made therein has acted beyond its jurisdiction. For the purpose of finding out the commission of a cognizable offence, the High Court was only required to look into the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR and to conclude whether a prima facie offence had been made out by the complainant in the FIR or the complaint or not. 10. "Before parting with this judgment, we may also remind ourselves that the power under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases. In our view, the present case did not warrant such exercise by the High Court. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to sustain the order of the High Court and the impugned order is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law." 80. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to sustain the order of the High Court and the impugned order is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law." 80. The learned DGP also relied on the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain ( AIR 1990 SC 658 ), wherein it was held as follows: "19. It is time to recall the observations of this Court made not so far back in Bharwada Bhognibhari Hirjibhai ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) (supra) (Para 9): "In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. We must analyse the argument in support of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the Western world which has its own social milieu, its own social mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the Western world. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turn-key basis and to transplate it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian Society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical." Proceeding further this Court said (para 10): "Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault........ The identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical." Proceeding further this Court said (para 10): "Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault........ The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because : (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive Society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the Society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman would also more often than not want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman would also more often than not want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the Court, to face the cross-examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, act as deterrent." 81. In the decision reported in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) the scope and ambit of inherent power under Section 561A was considered in detail. It was held as follows: "6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under S. 561- A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under S. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cased it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point." 82. In the decision reported in Hari Prasad v. Bishun Kumar ( AIR 1974 SC 300 ), it was held as follows: "4.....Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35,000. There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs. 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating." 83. In the decision reported in P.V. Reddy v. State ( AIR 1978 SC 1590 ), it was held as follows: "2. It is now well settled that the High Court does not ordinarily interfere at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceedings pending in a Subordinate Court. Bearing in mind the well recognised principles of law governing the matter and taking into consideration the nature of the impugned order, we think the High Court was right in declining to grant relief to the appellants. It is also not a matter in which we may legitimately interfere in exercise of our extraordinary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution specially when the case is at its threshold and evidence has still to be adduced as to whether the minerals extracted could or could not be used as a major mineral for certain purposes. It must be realised that it is not possible to determine difficult question of the kind involved in the instant case purely in abstract without relevant evidence bearing on the matter in issue. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Our order will not, however, be interpreted as barring the appellants from raising any defence or contention that may be open to them before the trial court which will dispose of the same in accordance with law uninhibited by any observations made by it earlier or by the High Court in the course of its order dismissing the application under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." 84. In the decision reported in Drugs Inspector, Bangalore v. B.K. Krishnaiah ( AIR 1981 SC 1164 ), it was held as follows: "5. In the decision reported in Drugs Inspector, Bangalore v. B.K. Krishnaiah ( AIR 1981 SC 1164 ), it was held as follows: "5. In a quashing proceeding, the High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition. if proved, make out a prima facie offence and that the accused has prima facie committed the offence." 85. In the decision reported in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy ( AIR 1977 SC 1489 ), it was held as follows: "7. The second limb of Mr. Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that:- "If, upon consideration of the record of the case, and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." This Section is contained in Chap. XVIII called "Trial before a Court of Sessions." It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the new Code, which corresponds to S. 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which thestructure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has not to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. ..................... 11. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. ..................... 11. We are therefore in agreement with the view of the High Court that the material on which the prosecution processes to rely against the respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that they are in any manner connected with the assault on the complainant. We would, however, like to observe that nothing in our judgment or in the judgment of the High Court should be taken as detracting from the case of the prosecution, to which we have not applied our mind, as against accused Nos. 1 to 9. The case against those accused must take its due and lawful course." 86. In the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar ( AIR 1982 SC 949 ), the Apex Court after referring to the decision reported in S. N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari ( AIR 1970 SC 786 ), Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1974 SC 1146 ) and King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (AIR 1945 PC 18), it was held as follows: "The question before the Privy Council was not whether the fresh F.I.R. disclosed any offence at all. In fact, immediately after the passage which I have extracted above, the Privy Council qualified its statement by saying : "No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation." If anything, therefore, the judgment shows that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F.I.R. It shall also have been noticed, which is sometimes overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to qualify, its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. 21. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. 21. The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A. N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S. 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under S. 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission, of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima facie discloses the commission of offence. If that condition is satisfied, the. investigation must go on and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received." 87. In the decision reported in Madhavrao J. Scindiav. Sambhajirao C. Angre ( (1988) 1 SCC 692 ), it was held as follows: "7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 88. In the decision reported in State of U.P. v. R.K. Srivastava ( AIR 1989 SC 2222 ) it was held as follows: "3. It is a well settled principle of law that if the allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute an offence, the criminal proceedings instituted on the basis of such FIR should be quashed." 89. In the decision reported in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) where the issue was considered elaborately and in considerable detail, it was held as follows: "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 90. In the decision reported in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( (1997) 2 SCC 397 ) it was held as follows: "The High Court should sparingly and cautiously exercise the power under Section 482 of the Code to prevent miscarriage of justice. The High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court would consider whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would tantamount to abuse of process of the court. Social stability and order require to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon the exercise of the inherent power vested in the court." 91. In the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Subhash Kumar ( (2004) 13 SCC 437 ), it was held as follows: "2. By the impugned order, the High Court has quashed FIR No.55 dated 27.4.2001. The FIR was registered against four respondents for having committed theft of cheel logs from the forest of Kukanet. In sum and substance the allegation is of illegal felling of trees and theft of the same from the forest. Curiously, the High Court by entering into the factual arena has passed the impugned order quashing the FIR. Such a course is wholly impermissible. The High Court acted more as an investigating agency at a stage when the FIR was under investigation. At this stage, we wish to say no more lest it may prejudice the parties." 92. In the decision reported in K.L.E. Society v. Siddaklingesh ( (2008) 4 SCC 541 ), after referring to the decision reported in R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) it was held as follows: "7. One thing is clear on reading of High Court's reasoning that the High Court came to the conclusion that deductions were made without any rhyme and reason and without any basis. That was not the case of the complainant. On the other hand, it tried to make out a case that the deduction was made with an object. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405 and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2). "6. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405 and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2). "6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirely do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 8. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. 8. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. "93. In the decision reported in Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan ( (2009) 4 SCC 439 ), it was held as follows: "11. The principle providing for exercise of the power by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of of Criminal Procedure to quash a criminal proceeding is well known. The Court shall ordinarily exercise the said jurisdiction, inter alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint petition even if on the value are taken to be correct in their entirety does not disclose commission of an offence." 94. The Court shall ordinarily exercise the said jurisdiction, inter alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint petition even if on the value are taken to be correct in their entirety does not disclose commission of an offence." 94. In the decision reported in Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2009) 1 SCC (Cri.) 446) the Apex Court after referring to the decisions reported in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ), State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 ), Chandrapal Singh and Others v. Maharaj Singh a (1982) 1 SCC 466 ), Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 ), State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ((1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335), Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 ), G. Sagar Suri v. State of UP (2000) 2 SCC 636 ), Roy V. D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC 590 ), Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122 ), Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 it was held as follows: "12. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex - debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised : (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) tootherwise secure the ends of justice. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. Discussion of decided cases 13. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. Discussion of decided cases 13. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved................... 15. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.................... 25. The question before us is - whether the case of the appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra)? Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.................... 25. The question before us is - whether the case of the appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra)? Is it a case where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467 and 120B IPC? For determination of the question it becomes relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made in the FIR/complaint. 26. A three Judge Bench of this court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal and Others, AIR 2008 SC 251 has examined scope and ambit of section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court in the said case observed that inherent powers under section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court. "95. In the decision reported in Sathish Mehra v. State of N.C.T. Of Delhi ( AIR 2013 SC 506 ) after referring to the decision reported in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ), it was held as follows: "14. Though a criminal complaint lodged before the court under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an FIR lodged in the police station under Chapter XII of the Code has to be brought to its logical conclusion in accordance with the procedure prescribed, power has been conferred under Section 482 of the Code to interdict such a proceeding in the event the institution/continuance of the criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of court.......... 15. 15. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognized to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extra-ordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfies the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually comes on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in its entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused. 16. The above nature and extent of the power finds an exhaustive enumeration in a judgment of this court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others which may be usefully extracted below : "7. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. The second limb of Mr Mookerjee's argument is that in any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused with the crime, says the learned counsel, the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides that: This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called "Trial Before a Court of Session". It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that: In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." It would also be worthwhile to recapitulate an earlier decision of this court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra3noticed in L. Muniswamy's case (supra) holding that the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the materials warrant the framing of the charge. It was also held that the court ought not to blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. 17. While dealing with contours of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal proceeding, another decision of this court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy alias Ramu v. Kovvuri Satyanaryana Reddy and others, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 437 : (2011 AIR SCW 4504) to which one of us (Justice P.Sathasivam) was a party may be usefully noticed. In the said decision after an exhaustive consideration of the principles governing the exercise of the said power as laid down in several earlier decisions this court held that: "31. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal4. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 are very wide and at the same time the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution." 96. In the decision reported in GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd. ( (2013) 4 SCC 505 ), the Apex Court, after referring to the decisions reported in Madhavarao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre ( (1988) 1 SCC 692 ), Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha ( AIR 1992 SC 1815 ), and Muksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat ( (2008) 5 SCC 668 ) it was held as follows: "18. From a bare reading of the order passed by the Magistrate, it reveals that two witnesses including one of the trustees were examined by the complainant but none of them specifically stated as to which of the accused committed breach of trust or cheated the complainant except general and bald allegations made therein. While ordering issuance of summons, the learned Magistrate concluded as under: "The complainant has submitted that Accused 2 to 6 are the Directors of the Company and accused 7 is the Secretary of the Company and were looking after the day-to-day affairs of the Company and were also responsible for conduct and business of accused 1 and sometime or the other have interacted with the complainant. I have heard arguments on behalf of the complainant and perused the record. From he allegations raised, documents placed on record and the evidence led by the witnesses, prima facie an offence under Section 415, 409/34/120B is made out. I have heard arguments on behalf of the complainant and perused the record. From he allegations raised, documents placed on record and the evidence led by the witnesses, prima facie an offence under Section 415, 409/34/120B is made out. Let all the accused hence be summoned to face trial under the aforesaid sections on PFRC/Speed Post/courier for 2- 12-2008." 97. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court, the decisions relied on by the DGP reported in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P. (1989 Cri.L.J. 1013) and State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab (2011 Cri.L.J. 89) cannot be taken as imposing absolute prohibition on exercising powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. at the threshold. The decisions show that the various stages at which the power can be exercised and the circumstances under which it can be so done. The above decisions indicate that there is no prohibition in exercising the power to quash the proceedings at the threshold provided the conditions mentioned in those decisions are satisfied. One such recognized principle is that if the allegations in the complaint on the very face of it or even prima facie do not make out the offence alleged or any offence, then the High Court will be certainly within its power in quashing the proceedings. It is no doubt true that power is to be exercised sparingly in rarest of the rare cases especially when interference is sought for at the threshold. 98. It necessarily follows that the power to commence investigation is dependent upon the fact that the complaint or the information received by the police officer discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. When a complaint is laid making certain allegations and a crime is registered for cognizable offence, it cannot be said that the court is not within its power to examine whether the allegations contained in the complaint gave rise to the offence mentioned in the FIR. Of course, quoting of a wrong provision by itself is not a ground to interfere. Again, the contention of the learned DGP that whatever may be the crime that may be registered initially has no significance and it is the offence that is found out later during investigation that matters cannot be accepted. 99. Of course, quoting of a wrong provision by itself is not a ground to interfere. Again, the contention of the learned DGP that whatever may be the crime that may be registered initially has no significance and it is the offence that is found out later during investigation that matters cannot be accepted. 99. It is true that if prima facie an offence is made out on the basis of the allegations, it will not be proper for the court to interfere at the threshold. But it is not possible to accept the contention raised by the learned DGP and the third respondent that as soon as a complaint is received, if a crime is registered and the investigation commenced, the hands of the court are fettered and the investigation must go on. The complaint need not mention the offence as such. It may be for the investigating agency or the court which takes cognizance has to determine the actual offence. But when once the offence is made mention of in the record concerned, then certainly the court is empowered to determine whether the allegations in the complaint give rise to such an offence. If the ingredients of the offence mentioned are not discernible from the allegations in the complaint, then going by the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above, the court is certainly empowered to put an end to the proceedings as it will be treated as an abuse of the process of court. 100. In the case on hand, it has been found that the allegations of rape cannot prima facie stand. The question is whether that by itself is sufficient to quash the FIR and the complaint. 101. Shri.M.K.Damodaran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, pointed out that this court is called upon only to look into the FIR as it stands and whether the allegations in the complaint supports the offence stated in the FIR. This court is not called upon to consider whether any other offence is made out. If as a matter of fact the allegations in the complaint which form the basis for the FIR does not disclose the offence made mention of, then necessarily the court will have to interfere. 102. This court is not called upon to consider whether any other offence is made out. If as a matter of fact the allegations in the complaint which form the basis for the FIR does not disclose the offence made mention of, then necessarily the court will have to interfere. 102. Per contra, learned DGP contended that apart from the fact that offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is made out because the so-called consent is a consent given under misconception of fact, the allegations contained in the complaint gave rise to other offences, namely, Sections 354 and 511 of Section 376 of IPC. Learned DGP referred to pages to 15 of the complaint. The learned DGP highlighted that the indecent behaviour on the part of the petitioner and so also the frequent phone calls made by him may give rise to offence under the Information Technology Act also and other provisions of the I.P.C. If that be so, according to the learned DGP, it will be inappropriate and infact illegal to quash the FIR. 103. One aspect has to be noticed here. It is true that in the portions referred to by the learned DGP in the complaint, it is seen stated that the petitioner has misbehaved with the victim. 104. However, one cannot shut his eyes to the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent before this court. In the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, except for the sexual assaults said to have been committed on her, which she states were under misconception of fact, she has no complaint regarding any other act done by the petitioner. Even assuming that a complaint was laid by a layman, at least at the time of filing the counter affidavit before court, the third respondent could have indicated that she had other grievances also. In fact a reading of the complaint and the counter affidavit of the third respondent would clearly show that she had no grievance regarding the various other acts committed by the petitioner. It is significant to notice that even in the complaint when indecent behavior emanated from the petitioner, no objection or resistance was offered by the third respondent. She does not state that she has any grievance regarding those conducts of the petitioner. 105. It is significant to notice that even in the complaint when indecent behavior emanated from the petitioner, no objection or resistance was offered by the third respondent. She does not state that she has any grievance regarding those conducts of the petitioner. 105. It would therefore appear that the State is desperate to take aid of any material to book the petitioner even though the complainant herself has no grievance regarding the aspects now highlighted by the learned DGP. It will not be out of place here to refer to one significant aspect. The petitioner became acquainted with the third respondent from 2007 onwards. His frequent calls and visits began then. The FIR makes mention of only acts done between early 2012 till 21.10.2012. Therefore, acts done previous to that period have no bearing on the issue involved in this case. 106. The learned DGP had filed a petition to let the Investigating Officer produce the CD for perusal of this court. 107. This court feels that it will not be proper at this point of time to do so since the issue involved has to be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. Materials collected during investigation my not be of much relevance now. 108. From the above observation, the conclusions that follow are : i) The allegations in the complaint, namely, Annexure AI produced along with the petition, read as a whole, do not contain the necessary ingredients even prima facie to attract the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. ii) The physical contacts which the petitioner is alleged to have had with the third respondent, going by the sequence of events contained in the complaint, would show that it was with consent and the claim that it was under misconception of fact cannot be accepted. iii) Even though several other circumstances are raised by the State and the third respondent vitiating the consent, they have no foundation in the complaint. iv) Except for the grievance that the promise of marriage extended by the accused persons was not fulfilled, the third respondent does not seem to have any other grievance. iii) Even though several other circumstances are raised by the State and the third respondent vitiating the consent, they have no foundation in the complaint. iv) Except for the grievance that the promise of marriage extended by the accused persons was not fulfilled, the third respondent does not seem to have any other grievance. v) Even though the complainant/third respondent has stated that physical contacts with the petitioner were not with proper consent, it is not discernible as to what the complainant meant by 'proper consent' and viewed in the light of the conduct of the complainant as could be discerned from the complaint, there is nothing to show that there was want of consent as understood in law. vi) Even accepting the argument of the learned DGP that assuming that offence under Section 376 of I.P.C. is not made out, there are other offences made out from the complaint and so the FIR cannot be quashed, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the third respondent has not voiced any grievance regarding the other conducts of the petitioner narrated by her in her complaint. vii) Even in the counter affidavit filed before this court, the complainant has no grievance that there was attempt to outrage her modesty or she was pestered over phone with necessary accusation so as to attract offences under the Information Technology Act. viii) Going by the principles laid down by the decisions referred to with regard to the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it follows that if the allegations in the complaint do not disclose offence mentioned in the FIR, the court is well within its power to quash the FIR and the complaint. 109. Before parting with this matter, a very disturbing trend that has emerged in criminal jurisprudence needs to be mentioned. Of late, the investigation of any case does not seem to end and it goes on endlessly adding provisions of I.P.C. and more and more accused, some of them based solely on the confession of an accused. In some other cases any number of additional statements are taken from the complainant and then more and more offences get added and so also number of the accused. A stage has reached where anybody could be booked for any offence eroding the sanctity attached to investigation. In some other cases any number of additional statements are taken from the complainant and then more and more offences get added and so also number of the accused. A stage has reached where anybody could be booked for any offence eroding the sanctity attached to investigation. It is even more curious to note that any number of final reports are also being filed in cases labelling them as split charges. It is time that authorities concerned bestow their attention to this matter so that the system can retain its credibility and acceptability. For the above reasons, this Crl.M.C. has to succeed. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the complaint Annexure A1 and the FIR Annexure A2 shall stand quashed asfar as the petitioner is concerned and the further proceedings against the petitioner shall stand dropped.