JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Transfer Application filed by respondent Nos. 3 Rakesh Gupta (T.A. No. 66 of 2013) has already been dismissed by me on 26.2.2013. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are tenants of large property on behalf of the petitioner. The lease deed was executed in the year 1982. According to the terms of the lease deed they were entitled to induct licences. They inducted in part of the leased property respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as licencees. Thereafter, they filed release application against respondent Nos. 3 and 4 under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which was allowed. Now the said release order is being executed by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 against respondent Nos. 3 & 4. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that in 2011 S.C.C. Suit No. 17 of 2011 has been filed by the petitioner for eviction against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The lease deed executed in 1982 was only for 10 years. Landlord petitioner has also filed another suit in the form of O.S. No. 1625 of 2012 for injunction against all the four respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that petitioner is superior landlord hence he can permit the licencee/sub tenant i.e. respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to continue. I do not agree with this argument. If lessee continues in possession even after expiry of lease he does not become trespasser. At least he retains the minimum right as tenant at sufferance. Even during such period (while enjoying only the right of tenant at sufferance) tenants right viz-a-viz sub-tenants or licences who had been inducted by him subsists and continue. The superior landlord or paramount title holder cannot take over the position of tenant in respect of sub tenants and permit them to continue in possession even though the tenant may be having a right to evict them. In such situation superior landlord is entitled to file suit for eviction against tenant either impleading or not impleading the sub tenants and if the suit is decreed then landlord would be entitled to take possession not only from the tenant but also from the sub tenants. In such situation superior landlord is entitled to file suit for eviction against tenant either impleading or not impleading the sub tenants and if the suit is decreed then landlord would be entitled to take possession not only from the tenant but also from the sub tenants. However, he cannot grant immunity from eviction to the sub tenants if tenant has got a decree of eviction against his sub tenants until either through decree of the Court chief tenant is evicted or chief tenant willingly hands over possession to the landlord and surrenders whatever right he has got. 4. This question has thoroughly been examined by the Supreme Court in Vasu Deo v. Bal Kishan, AIR 2002 SC 569 . In the said case the shop in dispute was owned by a trust, the trust had leased out the shop to the tenant who in-turn had subsequently inducated a sub tenant. Tenant filed suit for eviction against sub tenant. Trust also filed a suit for eviction against the chief tenant. Sub tenant pleaded that he had attorned in favour of the paramount title holder the trust and had entered into a direct tenancy with the trust. The Supreme Court held that during the subsistance of sub lease and without vacating the promises the sub tenant could not have attorned to the trust the paramount title holder merely because the trust had filed eviction suit against the tenant. Para-15 of the said authority is quoted below : 15. We may now deal with D. Satyanarayana’s case (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant. A suit for eviction from the demised premises was decreed under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which provides for eviction of a tenant if the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and such denial or claim was not bona fide. The limited question arising for decision before this Court was whether the appellant was estopped from denying the title of the lessor under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 despite the fact that there was threat of eviction by the owner of the demised premises by a person having title paramount so as to examine whether such denial could be said to be bona fide or not. There was no dispute on facts. There was no dispute on facts. The statement of facts as set out in the judgment of this Court shows that the appellant was ‘constrained to attorn in favour of the original lessor’. The High Court had upheld the decree of eviction passed by the Trial Court resting its judgment on the rule of estoppel. This Court stated the rule of estoppel and set out the well-settled exceptions to which the general rule of estoppel between landlord and tenant is subject: firstly, a tenant is not precluded from denying the derivative title of the persons claiming through the landlord; secondly, the estoppel is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy, that is, it is open to the tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the tenancy, the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title holder. That there was threat of eviction and as a result of such threat the tenant attorned to the real owner was opined to be sufficient to constitute eviction by title paramount, however, this Court has emphatically stated that if the tenant gives up possession voluntarily to the title holder, he cannot claim the benefit of this rule. The judgment of this Court in D. Satyanarayana’s case has to be read as laying down that in the facts of that case the plea of the tenant that his landlord’s title had come to an end did not amount to a denial or claim which was not bona fide so as to attract applicability of Clause (iv) of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings Control Act. The common law rule of estoppel, as codified in Section 116 of Evidence Act and its exceptions have been dealt with for determining the core issue - whether the tenant denying title of landlord could be said to have done so bona fide or not. The common law rule of estoppel, as codified in Section 116 of Evidence Act and its exceptions have been dealt with for determining the core issue - whether the tenant denying title of landlord could be said to have done so bona fide or not. In D. Satyanarayana’s case nowhere this Court has examined whether the relationship between the alleged paramount title holder and the landlord was governed by rent control law or not, nor the question of obligation of tenant to hand over possession to his landlord under Section 108(q) of Transfer of Property Act came up for consideration. There are the features which distinguished D. Satyanarayana’s case from the case before us. In the case before us the plea of eviction by paramount title is not available to the appellant for three reasons: firstly, it cannot be said that the Trust is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted by the tenant-respondent or to which he has no defence; secondly, the attornment by the appellant in favour of the Trust is voluntary and not under any compulsion; and thirdly, it cannot be said that the Trust has such good and present title against the tenant-respondent so as to hold the appellant liable to be evicted against his will. As already stated, and even at the risk of repetition, it has to be emphasised that, in view of the tenant-respondent’s relationship with the Trust being one governed by the provisions of the rent control law, his title as tenant (and hence as landlord as against the sub-tenant appellant) will not come to an end unless and until the suit for eviction filed by the Trust against the respondent is decreed and the decree has achieved finality. 5. The said authority was followed in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665 . The facts of the said case were that Development Authority had allotted the premises in dispute to the landlady who had inducted a tenant therein. Landlady filed suit for eviction against the tenant. Meanwhile, Development Authority started proceedings for resumption of the premises in dispute against the landlady. The tenant pleaded that he was not liable to eviction. The Supreme Court negated the contention. 6. Accordingly, the petitioner claiming to be superior landlord/paramount title holder cannot grant any protection to respondent Nos. Landlady filed suit for eviction against the tenant. Meanwhile, Development Authority started proceedings for resumption of the premises in dispute against the landlady. The tenant pleaded that he was not liable to eviction. The Supreme Court negated the contention. 6. Accordingly, the petitioner claiming to be superior landlord/paramount title holder cannot grant any protection to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who are liable to deliver possession to their landlord i.e. respondent Nos. 1 and 2 even though they in turn are tenants of the petitioner. 7. The other argument is that after getting the property vacated respondent Nos. 1 and 2 may let out the same to other person or give it on licence. That question is not relevant at all for deciding the present writ petition. If so advised the petitioner may seek relief by way of temporary injunction application in O.S. No. 1625 of 2012 regarding which direction has already been issued on 27.11.2012 in writ petition No. 2478 of 2012 Annexure 11 to this writ petition. 8. Accordingly I do not find any reason to quash the execution proceedings of U.P.U.B. Execution Case No. 1 of 2005 or to quash order dated 30.8.2011 passed in Misc. Case No. 4 of 2011 arising out of the said execution case passed by J.S.C.C./Prescribed Authority, Aligarh. Writ petition is dismissed. —————