U. Santha Rao v. Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Andhra Pradesh
2013-08-19
K.G.SHANKAR
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. The petitioner seeks for a Writ of mandamus declaring the proceedings dated 21-5-2008 issued by the 1st respondent on the basis of G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006, as illegal, to hold that G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006 does not apply to the petitioner and for consequential relief of grant of full pay and other attendant benefits during the suspended period. The petitioner was appointed by the 3rd respondent as a Lecturer in Physical Education into aided vacancy. The petitioner was appointed on 03-11-1980 after due selection process. On 28-12-2004, a complaint was lodged against the petitioner under Sections 376, 420, 354 and 506 IPC, which was registered as Crime No. 123 of 2004. It was subsequently converted as Sessions Case No. 99 of 2005 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry. On account of the complaint dated 28-12-2004, the petitioner was arrested on 29-12-2004. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from the date of arrest through proceedings dated 07-01-2005. After full-fledged trial, the petitioner was acquitted on 31-8-2005. No appeal was preferred from the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of the learned Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry, became final. 2. The petitioner consequently requested the 2nd respondent for his reinstatement into service. The 2nd respondent issued proceedings dated 30-9-2005 directing the 3rd respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service. The 3rd respondent accordingly reinstated the petitioner into service on 03-10-2005. Proceedings were issued on 06-9-2007 by the 2nd respondent regularizing the period of suspension, treating the period of absence partly as Earned Leave and partly as Half Pay Leave. The petitioner submitted a representation on 16-11-2007 to the 1st respondent claiming that he is entitled to full pay and allowances under F.R. 54-B(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules (the Fundamental Rules, for short) on the ground that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court. The representation of the petitioner was rejected by the 1st respondent-Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad through proceedings dated 21-5-2008 on the basis of G.O.Ms. No. 3, Finance (FR. II) Department, dated 04-01-2006. Questioning the same, the present writ petition is laid. 3.
The representation of the petitioner was rejected by the 1st respondent-Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad through proceedings dated 21-5-2008 on the basis of G.O.Ms. No. 3, Finance (FR. II) Department, dated 04-01-2006. Questioning the same, the present writ petition is laid. 3. Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that F.R. 54-B(1)(a) of the Fundamental Rules envisages that the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the employee for the period of suspension ending with the reinstatement. 4. Learned Counsel for Petitioner Sri. N. Ashwani Kumar further contended that F.R. 54-B(2) of the Fundamental Rules deals with the cases of Government servants under suspension that the during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings or Court proceedings. F.R. 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules deals with cases where the competent authority considers that the suspension was wholly unjustified. F.R. 54-B(5) of the Fundamental Rules deals with residuary cases. No departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and he continued to be in service even after the disposal of the criminal proceedings against him. He therefore does not fall within F.R. 54-B(2) of the Fundamental Rules. It is not the case of anybody that it was considered that the suspension of the petitioner was patently unjustified. The petitioner consequently does not fall under F.R. 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules also. Consequently, the petitioner falls within F.R. 54-B(5) of the Fundamental Rules. Under F.R. 54-B(7) of the Fundamental Rules, in respect of cases falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as period spent on duty. However, F.R. 54-B(7) of the Fundamental Rules, prior to amendment through G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006, read that the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. Applying the amended provision, the representation of the petitioner was rejected. 5. Learned Counsel for Petitioner Sri. N. Ashwani Kumar pointedly drew attention to the amendment to F.R. 54-B(7) of the Fundamental Rules which came into force on 04-01-2006. Not only the First Information Report was registered against the petitioner prior to that on 28-12-2004, the petitioner was acquitted (on 31-8-2005) and was reinstated into service (on 03-10-2005) prior to G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006. Consequently. G.O.Ms.
N. Ashwani Kumar pointedly drew attention to the amendment to F.R. 54-B(7) of the Fundamental Rules which came into force on 04-01-2006. Not only the First Information Report was registered against the petitioner prior to that on 28-12-2004, the petitioner was acquitted (on 31-8-2005) and was reinstated into service (on 03-10-2005) prior to G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006. Consequently. G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006, has no application to the case of the petitioner. 6. Once G.O.Ms. No. 3, dated 04-01-2006, does not apply to the petitioner, the question is whether the period of suspension shall be treated as 'on duty' and whether it is open for the competent authority to decide the same on the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. In the present case, the petitioner was suspended purely on account of initiation of criminal action against him. The criminal case against the petitioner ended in acquittal. The petitioner was not at fault for the suspension against him. I therefore consider that the period of suspension of the petitioner is liable to be treated as 'on duty' for all purposes as he was ultimately acquitted and as no departmental enquiry was initiated at any point of time against him. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to the writ sought for by him. This writ petition, accordingly, is allowed setting aside the proceedings dated 21-5-2008 issued by the 1st respondent and directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for granting of benefits to the petitioner like full salary and other attendant benefits during the period of suspension. No costs. Petition allowed.