JUDGMENT Justice A.M.Khanwilkar, C.J.: This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the Society, duly registered under the Societies Registration Act to espouse the cause of its members, who, it is asserted, have marginal land holding and are engaged in tea plantation activity thereon. 2. The relief claimed in this petition, essentially, is to declare that the amended provisions introduced by the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1999, in particular, Sections 1(2), 2, 3, 4 and 7 thereof are unconstitutional, arbitrary and void; and, to quash and set aside the same. Incidental relief is also claimed against the respondents to refrain from interfering with the rights of the petitioners to deal with the tea estates, in the manner as they may like. 3. According to the petitioners, the principal Act, being Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, expressly exempts the tea estates from the application of the Act, by virtue of Section 5(g) of that Act. However, the amendment Act attempts to whittle down the said protection given to the tea estates and is repugnant to the exemption provided to tea estates. In that, Section 6A introduced by the amendment Act stipulates that if the tea estate is put to other use than raising or maintenance of tea plantation or a purpose subservient to tea plantation, irrespective of the fact as to whether such land is in excess of the permissible area prescribed under Section 4 of the principal Act or otherwise, it is treated as surplus area and deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for a public purpose on payment of amount determined under Section 14 of the principal Act and also vesting of the title in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Section 7A introduced by the amendment Act seeks to impose a complete ban on transfer of whole or even part of the land under a tea estate by way of contract, agreement, custom or usage. Transfer in respect of land under a tea estate has been declared to be void ab initio, notwithstanding the fact that the transfer is effected in favour of a third party before coming into force of the amendment Act on 29.3.2000. As per section 1(2) of the amendment Act, the amended provisions are made applicable w.e.f. 28.7.1973. Transfer in respect of land under a tea estate has been declared to be void ab initio, notwithstanding the fact that the transfer is effected in favour of a third party before coming into force of the amendment Act on 29.3.2000. As per section 1(2) of the amendment Act, the amended provisions are made applicable w.e.f. 28.7.1973. The amendment Act has also introduced Section 1 7A in the principal Act, which provides for treatment of certain transfers and change of use of lands, exempted under Section 5(g) to be void and vesting of such land in the State Government. In this backdrop, the present petition has been filed by the Society and including the named members of the Society being petitioners No. 2 to 16. 4. In the petition, however, no material facts have been disclosed to show as to how and why the amended provisions have vitiated the fundamental rights of the petitioners and in particular, of the members of the petitioners-Society; or for that matter, as to how and which of the rights enured to the members of the petitioners-Society by virtue of exemption of lands under tea estates from the application of the principal Act, have been impacted. We say so because, in the grounds of petition, general issues are raised to buttress the reliefs claimed by the petitioners. 5. The first ground urged in the writ petition, is that, Section 5(g) expressly excludes the operation of the principal Act in its entirety to tea estates. That exemption cannot be nullified or taken away by introducing Sections 6A and 7A by way of amendment in the year 2000. More so, because the tea gardens/estates cannot be equated with the lands used for other agricultural purposes - being outside the definition of the expression ‘land’ as defined in Section 3(f). Therefore, no legislation in respect of tea estates could be made by the State. Secondly, the principal Act having excluded tea estates from the definition of land, the provisions introduced by amendment Act are nothing short of colourable exercise of power. The amendment Act is not within the scope of legislative competence of the State. Thirdly, the restriction imposed by virtue of Sections 6A and 7A, introduced by way of amendment Act in 2000, is irrational and arbitrary; and would inevitably violate the petitioners’ right to livelihood as also the right to liberty. Further, the amendment is arbitrary. The amendment Act is not within the scope of legislative competence of the State. Thirdly, the restriction imposed by virtue of Sections 6A and 7A, introduced by way of amendment Act in 2000, is irrational and arbitrary; and would inevitably violate the petitioners’ right to livelihood as also the right to liberty. Further, the amendment is arbitrary. For, it imposes blanket restriction for using the land under tea estates for any other purposes, irrespective of the fact that it may not be feasible or practicable to grow any tree in such land. Instead, to optimise the resources, it would be appropriate to use such land for alternate purposes to protect the right of life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens. Fourthly, the transfer of land inter vivos as also by way of succession, is governed by the central Acts. The amending Act seeks to amend and abrogate the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; The Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Succession Act. That is impermissible. Fifthly, the transfer of land by the landholder to his kith and kin by no standards, per se, constitutes change of user of the land. Similarly, transfer inter vivos to a third party may not result in change of user and may continue to be used as a tea estate. Nevertheless, the amendment Act seeks to declare even such transactions as void ab-initio, which is not consistent with the object and intent behind Section 5(g) in the principal Act. Further, the amended provisions completely disregard that the transfer in a given case may be necessitated due to economic compulsions of the land owners. Sixthly, Sections 6A and 7A give un-canalized and unfettered power to the State to withhold or grant permission or to determine the purpose of change of user of land or for transfer thereof. Moreover, the tea gardens/tea estates cannot be singled out. That results in invidious discrimination. More so, when the change occurs while retaining the use of land for permissible activity. Seventhly, the Apex Court has already held that imposing such restriction on the transfer of land is unconstitutional and void. Therefore, the amendment is beyond the competence of State Government to enact such law. Eighthly, Sections 6A, 7A and 17A provide for forfeiture and vesting of the land in the State. Such provisions are irrational and unconstitutional. Seventhly, the Apex Court has already held that imposing such restriction on the transfer of land is unconstitutional and void. Therefore, the amendment is beyond the competence of State Government to enact such law. Eighthly, Sections 6A, 7A and 17A provide for forfeiture and vesting of the land in the State. Such provisions are irrational and unconstitutional. More so, in respect of land owners who are in possession of the tea garden, whose aggregate land holding does not exceed the permissible limits of the total holding of the land. Ninthly, the provisions regarding the forfeiture and vesting introduced by way of amendment and more so making operational with retrospective effect from the date i.e. 28.7.1973 is irrational, unconstitutional and void. It impinges upon the vested rights of the person and would have retrospective effect, which is unconstitutional and void. Lastly, once the tea estates are excluded from the purview of the principal Act, the provisions of Section 4 or 10 cannot be made applicable to the tea estates’ owners/holders. Section 6A, 7A and 17A are in conflict with Section 5(g). Further, in view of exclusion of tea estates from the application of the principal Act, that protection cannot be taken away by way of amendment. 6. At the time of arguments, however, the counsel for thepetitioners moulded the grounds of challenge to the amended provisions. Learned counsel fairly submitted that she will not pursue the challenge regarding the legislative competence of the State to make law on the subject and including the amended provisions. 7. The oral argument is, thus, restricted to the issue of validity of the amended provisions introduced by the amendment Act, namely, Sections 6A, 7A and 17A, being in conflict with Section 5(g) of the principal Act. Further, those provisions could not have been introduced without amending Section 5(g) of the principal Act. The effect of the amended provisions is to take away the unconditional exemption in respect of the lands under tea estates, that too with retrospective effect. It is then contended that no purpose, sought to be achieved by the principal Act, will be fulfilled by introducing the amended provisions. On the other hand, the amended provisions impinge upon the rights of the land owners to hold their property, which right also includes “right not to hold the property”. It is then contended that no purpose, sought to be achieved by the principal Act, will be fulfilled by introducing the amended provisions. On the other hand, the amended provisions impinge upon the rights of the land owners to hold their property, which right also includes “right not to hold the property”. It is then contended that the amended provisions give unbridled and unfettered powers to the Authorities in respect of grant of permission to transfer and change of user of the land. There are no guidelines as to when permission can be granted and in what circumstances the same should be rejected. Similarly, there are no guidelines as to the manner in which, the land, which vests in the State Government, will be used for public purpose. In any case, such law cannot be given retrospective effect to efface and disregard the completed transfers and vesting of title in favour of third party. Further, after vesting of the land, the compensation provided for is not as per the prevailing market value, but under Section 14 of the principal Act. That is not commensurate with the market value. The vesting of the land can be only on account of surplus holding, which is the purpose of enacting the principal Act. In any other situation, the acquisition and vesting of the tea estates due to transfer or change of user, can be and ought to be only on payment of compensation at the prevailing fair market price therefor. It was also contended that the amended provisions of Sections 6A and 7A be read down to mean that the same will not affect the right of tea estates holders to dispose of land to third party, in the event the successor were to continue with the tea estate activity thereon or when the aggregate holding of the tea estate holder including the land under the tea estate does not exceed the permissible limits prescribed under Section 4 of the principal Act. These are the broad points urged before us during the hearing. 8. These are the broad points urged before us during the hearing. 8. In support of these arguments, the counsel for the petitioners has reliedon decisions in Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others versus State of H.P. and others1, para 13; The Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. Versus S.B.Kamble and others2, para 15; Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji versus Union of India and others3, paras 5, 45 to 47, 101 to 103 and 107. 9. Reliance is also placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in M/s Prag Ice & Oil Mills and another etc. etc. vs. Union of India4, (paras 4 to 9 and 17 ) and in Smt. Janabai and etc. etc. versus Laxman Gunaji Wanole and another etc.5, (paras 44 and 48 ). 10.Per contra, the learned Advocate General, to resist the reliefs claimed in the writ petition, would submit that thepetition, as filed, is only an attempt to invite the Court to decide academic issues. For, the petition is bereft of any factual matrix indicative of giving rise to the cause of action qua the petitioners before this Court, including petitioners No. 2 to 13. Therefore, the Court should be loath to entertain such petition. He further argued that the ground urged by the petitioner in the writ petition or for that matter modulated submissions made during the course of hearing through the counsel, are founded on complete misunderstanding and misreading of the provisions. According to him, Section 6A is not a provision of imposing restriction but is only regulatory in nature. It predicates obtaining prior permission of the Authority before the change of user or transfer of the tea estates is effected. These amended provisions are intended not only to preserve the tea estates in the State but also to promote and encourage tea estate activity in the State, which was on the down hill for quite some time. 11.He then submits that the principal Act forms part of the 9th Schedule of the Constitution, for which reason, it is not open to challenge the validity of the provisions contained therein on the grounds urged before this Court, as it has the protection of Article 3 1B of the Constitution. According to him, even the amended provisions must receive the same protection as in the case of the principal Act, if the same have received assent of the President of India. According to him, even the amended provisions must receive the same protection as in the case of the principal Act, if the same have received assent of the President of India. Further, amended provisions must be interpreted in the context of the aims and objects of the principal Act. He submits that it is no concern of the Court to even remotely suggest that the legislation, as passed, is not properly drafted. Further, the argument pressed into service was nothing short of projecting the individual hardship likely to be caused to the tea estate owners. That cannot be the basis to invalidate the legislation. 12.He further submits that the petitioners have not pleaded material facts to demonstrate as to how the amended Act may result in invidious discrimination. Inasmuch as, no facts are pleaded as to in what manner discrimination is likely to be meted out to the land owners holding less than the ceiling or permissible limit. He then submits that the challenge to the amended Act on the ground that it will have retrospective effect is ill advised. According to him, the effect of Section 1(2) of the amended Act is to make the enactment retroactive, which is within the legislative competence. In any case, the Legislature has the authority even to enact retrospective legislation. Further, the grievance of the petitioners is not about the legislative competence, but is one of validity of the provision being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. That plea is not available to challenge the legislation, which has the protection of Article 3 1B of the Constitution; and in any case, the amendment Act having received assent of the President of India and being in the nature of legislation providing for acquisition of the estate must receive protection under Article 3 1A of the Constitution. In other words, non-inclusion of the amended Act in the 9th schedule will be of no avail to the petitioners. He would then submit that the amended Act is enacted in furtherance of the principal Act, which already finds place in the 9th schedule. Thus understood, protection received to the principal Act under Article 31 B must proprio vigore apply to the amendment Act and thus insulating it from the challenge on the ground of being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus understood, protection received to the principal Act under Article 31 B must proprio vigore apply to the amendment Act and thus insulating it from the challenge on the ground of being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 13.Even though the amendment Act is not included in the 9th schedule, the learned Advocate General has emphasized that considering the gamut of the provisions in the amended Act, there is little doubt that the same must receive protection under Article 3 1A of the Constitution - having been assented by the President of India. In support of the submissions, he has relied on the decision of the apex Court in Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami vs. State of Orissa and another6, (para 12), State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rakesh Kohli and another7, (paras 16 to 29), Sriram Narayan Medhi vs. The State of Maharashtra8, (para 11 and 12), Kunjukutty Sahib Etc. Etc. vs. The State of Kerala and another9, (para 19). He submits that the petition be dismissed being devoid of merits. 14. Having considered the rival submissions, the matter in issue is limited to the question of constitutionality of the amended provisions. The counsel for the petitioners has fairly not pressed the question regarding legislative competence to enact the provisions in the Act and including the amendments to the principal Act of 1972. In other words, the challenge is to the validity of the amended provisions introduced by the amending Act of 1999, which received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000 and have come into force from 28th July, 1973, on the ground that the same are arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and unconstitutional. This challenge has been refuted by the State, in the first place, by relying on Article 31B of the Constitution. According to the State, since, indisputably, the principal Act has been included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution, the protection available to the principal Act under Article 31 B will have to be automatically extended to even the amendments effected in the said Act, albeit introduced at a subsequent point of time. It is not in dispute that the amended Act of 1999 has not been included in the 9th Schedule. In our opinion, the legal position on this issue is no more res integra. It is not in dispute that the amended Act of 1999 has not been included in the 9th Schedule. In our opinion, the legal position on this issue is no more res integra. It is well established that unless the amending Act is also included in the 9th Schedule, it will not receive protection of Article 3 1B of the Constitution, merely because the principal Act, to which the said amendments have been effected, is already included in the 9th Schedule. {See The Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra)}. In paragraph 15, the Court noted that 9th Schedule would not, however, extend to the amendments made in the Act or Regulations after the date of inclusion of the principal Act in the 9th Schedule. {Also see M/s Prag Ice & Oil Mills (supra)}. 15.Reliance has been placed on another decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Mahant Sankarshan Ramnuja Das Goswami (supra), which dealt with the argument that the benefit of Article 3 1A might have been available to the original Act, as it was a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes, but not to the amending Act, which was not such a law but only amended a previous law by enlarging the definition of “estate”. This argument has been negatived by the Constitution Bench as untenable, as can be discerned from the opening part of paragraph 12 thereof. The Apex Court then considered the efficacy of the assent given by the President to new categories of properties brought within the operation of the existing law. To that extent, observed the Apex Court, protection of Article 3 1A would be available as a necessary consequence. Relying on the observations in this judgment, an attempt was made by the learned Advocate General to persuade us that the protection of Article 31 B of the Constitution must be extended to the amended provisions on the same analogy. That argument cannot be countenanced in view of the Supreme Court judgments referred to earlier. 16.The learned Advocate General would then contend that since the amending Act has received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000, the same must receive protection of Article 3 1A of the Constitution, as it is a law providing for acquisition of estates. That argument cannot be countenanced in view of the Supreme Court judgments referred to earlier. 16.The learned Advocate General would then contend that since the amending Act has received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000, the same must receive protection of Article 3 1A of the Constitution, as it is a law providing for acquisition of estates. To consider this submission, we deem it apposite to reproduce Article 3 1A of the Constitution, which reads thus: “31A. To consider this submission, we deem it apposite to reproduce Article 3 1A of the Constitution, which reads thus: “31A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for – (a) The acquisition by the Sate of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or (b) The taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property, or (c) The amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, or (d) The extinguishment of modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or (e) The extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, Shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19: Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent: Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the Sate of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. (2) In this article, - (a) the expression “estate” shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include – (i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the Sates of Tamil Nadu and Kerala any janmam right; (ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement; (iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans; (b) the expression “rights”, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under- proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.” 17.On a bare reading of this provision, it is amply clear that, it is a provision for saving of Laws dealing with acquisition of estates. It stipulates that the law on that subject shall not be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. As the amending Act of 1999 provides for vesting of land and acquisition thereof, the same would come within the sweep of Article 3 1A, subject to fulfilment of other requirements. The first proviso mandates that the protection under Article 3 1A would be available to the stated law, which has been reserved for assent of the President and the assent is so accorded. The amending Act of 1999 fulfils the requirement of the first proviso. The second proviso to Article 3 1A further mandates that if the law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, the State cannot acquire any portion of such land, which is within the ceiling limit applicable to that person under any law for the time being in force, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The term “estate” has been explained in sub-article (2) of Article 3 1A. 18.The purport of Article 3 1A has been delineated by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Sriram Narayan Medhi (supra). The Apex Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 of that decision has restated the settled legal position that neither the question of discrimination nor of compensation or its adequacy can be gone into, nor can unreasonableness of the provisions under which the landlord’s title has been extinguished nor the manner in which the price is to be paid can be challenged, once it is held that Article 3 1A of the Constitution applies to that law. 19.Suffice it to observe that even if we have accepted the argument of the learned Advocate General that the amended provisions introduced by the amending Act of 1999 have protection of Article 3 1A of the Constitution, still it is essential to consider the purport of the amending provisions so as to analyse the challenge thereto about its validity. 20. Before we refer to the said provisions, it may be appropriate to refer to the object and intention for enacting the principal Act of 1972. It is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to ceiling on land holdings in the State of Himachal Pradesh. This Act is titled as ‘The Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972". Section 1 of the Act stipulates that the Act will extend to the whole of Himachal Pradesh and will come into force at once. It came into force w.e.f. 28th July, 1973 with the publication of the Act in the official gazette. Section 3 of the Act provides for definition of the expressions referred to therein. Section 4 of the principal Act specifies the permissible area of a land owner or a tenant or mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another of a person or a family consisting of husband, wife and up to 3 minor children. Section 5, which is of some significance, provides for exemptions. It refers to certain categories of lands to which the provisions of the Act would not apply. Clause (g) deals with the lands used as tea estates. Section 6 deals with the ceiling on land. It opens with the non obstante clause. Section 5, which is of some significance, provides for exemptions. It refers to certain categories of lands to which the provisions of the Act would not apply. Clause (g) deals with the lands used as tea estates. Section 6 deals with the ceiling on land. It opens with the non obstante clause. It provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to hold land in its capacity either as land owner or tenant or a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity and partly in another within the State of Himachal Pradesh, exceeding the permissible area, on and after the appointed day. The term “appointed day” has been defined in Section 3(b) to mean as the 24th day of January, 1971. Section 7 deals with certain transfers not to affect the surplus area. Section 8 gives option of selection of permissible area to the person concerned. Section 9 refers to the manner in which declaration is required to be filed to furnish return under Section 8. The submission of statement is to be done under Section 10 of the Act to the Collector, who, in turn, prepares a draft statement in the manner prescribed, showing, among other particulars, the total area of land owned or held, the specific parcels of land which a person may retain by way of permissible area or exemption from ceiling and also the surplus area. Section 11 of the Act provides for vesting of surplus area in the State Government. These are some of the relevant provisions in the principal Act. 21.The amending Act of 1999, which received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000, provides that it shall come into force at once, except Sections 2, 3 and 4 thereof, which shall and shall always be deemed to have come into force w.e.f. 28th day of July, 1973. As the question of legislative competence has not been pressed into service, the question is – Whether Section 1(2) of the amending Act is otherwise unconstitutional? It cannot be gainsaid that the Legislature has power not only to amend the existing law, but introduce amendment thereto with retrospective effect. As the question of legislative competence has not been pressed into service, the question is – Whether Section 1(2) of the amending Act is otherwise unconstitutional? It cannot be gainsaid that the Legislature has power not only to amend the existing law, but introduce amendment thereto with retrospective effect. In the present case, the effect of Section 1(2) of the amending Act is that Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the amending Act - which refer to amended provisions inserted in Section 5 (after clause (d) and clause (g) thereof and omitted clauses (e) & (f) by Section 2 of the amending Act), after Section 6 (inserting Section 6A by Section 3 of the amending Act) and after Section 7 (inserting Section 7A by Section 4 of the amending Act) - those amended provisions shall and shall always be deemed to have come into force w.e.f. 28th day of July, 1973. The intention behind this amending Act is to remove the mischief, which was noticed with the passage of time - of transfers and use of land under tea estates for other purpose, after the appointed date – inevitably defeating the purpose of exemption of tea estates under Section 5(g) of the Act. As a matter of fact, the State had introduced statutory Rules to eradicate that mischief. However, the validity of the said Rules was put in issue before the Apex Court in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail (supra). The Court opined that the State failed to satisfy as to how the prohibition sought to be imposed by the Rules helps in achieving the object of the Act, when Section 5(g) of the Act exempted the tea estates from application of the provisions of the Act. The Court accepted the challenge of the appellant before it that the State Government, in exercise of delegated legislative power of making Rules, could not have made Rules on the subject inspite of the fact that the tea estates were completely excluded from the provisions of the Act. Presumably, in anticipation of that decision, of striking down of the Rules imposing restrictions in respect of tea estates by the Supreme Court, the State Legislature enacted law on the subject, titled as “The Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1999, which received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000. Presumably, in anticipation of that decision, of striking down of the Rules imposing restrictions in respect of tea estates by the Supreme Court, the State Legislature enacted law on the subject, titled as “The Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1999, which received assent of the President on 29th March, 2000. 22.The crucial issue, therefore, to be answered in this petition is about the validity of the amended provisions of Sections 6A and 7A inserted by Sections 3 and 4 of the amending Act of 1999, respectively. We deem it apposite to reproduce the said provisions. Section 6A reads thus: “6-A Change in use of land under tea estates. - Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (g) of section 5 of this Act where whole or any part of the land which is comprised in a tea estate, and irrespective of its being in excess of the permissible area prescribed under section 4 is identified to be exempted by the Collector under section 10 of this Act, is put without the permission of the State Government to any other use than raising or maintenance of tea plantation or a purpose subservient to tea plantation, the provisions contained in this Act shall apply to such land so put to another use and it shall be treated as surplus area and shall be deemed to have been acquired by the State government for a public purpose on payment of amount determined under section 14 and all rights, title and interest (including the contingent interest, if any) recognized by any law, custom or usage for the time being in force of all persons in such area shall stand extinguished and such rights, title and interest shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances.” Section 7A reads thus: “7-A. Bar to transfer of land under tea estates. – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage for the time being in force, and the provisions contained in clause (g) of section 5 of this Act no transfer of whole or part of the land under a tea estate and identified to be exempted under section 10 of this Act, shall be made by sway of sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage with possession or creation of any tenancy or otherwise except with the permission of the State Government. (2) No Registrar or the Sub-Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 shall register any document pertaining to the transfer of land which is in contravention of the provisions of sub-section(1) and such transfer shall be void ab initio and the land involved in such transfer, shall together with structures, buildings or other attachments, if any, vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such land shall be treated as surplus area under the provisions of this Act.” 23. We shall deal with the challenge to Section 7 of the amending Act, whereby Section 17A came to be inserted in the principal Act, a little later. 24. Reverting to Section 6A, it opens with the non­obstante clause. It plainly provides that notwithstanding the exemption of tea estates in Himachal Pradesh from application of the principal Act of 1972, by virtue of Section 5(g); and irrespective of the land being in excess of the permissible area prescribed in Section 4 is identified to be exempted by the Collector under Section 10, the rigours of Section 6A would apply. That provision has come into force w.e.f. 28th July, 1973. Thus, the said provision would apply to a case when the stated tea estate is or has been put to use other than for raising or maintenance of tea plantation or a purpose subservient to tea plantation without the permission of the State Government. If so, such land will have to be treated as surplus land and liable to be acquired by the State Government for a public purpose on payment of amount determined under Section 14 of the principal Act. The sweep of this deeming provision is to withdraw the exemption given to the concerned tea estates under Section 5(g), w.e.f. 28th July, 1973; and as a result, the said land is liable to be reckoned for determining the permissible ceiling area held by the person concerned on the appointed day. If, on computing that land, the holding of the person were to become in excess than the permissible ceiling area, there is nothing wrong if the law treated such area to be surplus and to be proceeded accordingly – though originally the same was exempted under Section 5(g). 25. If, on computing that land, the holding of the person were to become in excess than the permissible ceiling area, there is nothing wrong if the law treated such area to be surplus and to be proceeded accordingly – though originally the same was exempted under Section 5(g). 25. The exemption to tea estates was granted in the principal Act by Section 5(g), with the avowed purpose of not only preserving the tea estates in the State of Himachal Pradesh, but to promote that activity to sub-serve the common good. If any person, who had availed of such exemption, indulged in activity other than tea plantation or a purpose subservient to tea plantation on that land, must stand to lose the exemption so granted qua that land, as if it was never available to it from the inception i.e. the appointed day. Further, if the holding of that person on computing the area of such land were to result in holding in excess of the permissible area, then, as on the appointed day, such surplus area which was earlier exempted will have to be proceeded with on the legal assumption that the same was never exempted under Section 5 (g). 26. The petitioners, on the other hand, relying on the dictum in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail (supra) would contend that just as right to carry on business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, carries with it the right not to carry on business. It logically follows that the right to secure, hold and dispose of property guaranteed to the citizens under Article 19(1) (f) carried with it right not to hold any property. According to the petitioners, user of land for purposes other than tea plantation or subservient to tea plantation, because of compelling necessity and changed situation, after the appointed day, should not visit them with acquisition of their land by the State Government. The argument, though attractive, clearly overlooks that, ordinarily, even the land used as tea estates by the person concerned would fall within the definition of land in Section 3(f) of the Act of 1972, but for the exemption under Section 5(g) of the Act. It was so exempted with a view to further the policy of the State to preserve and promote the tea estates in the State of Himachal Pradesh to subserve the common good. It was so exempted with a view to further the policy of the State to preserve and promote the tea estates in the State of Himachal Pradesh to subserve the common good. In absence of Section 5(g), the holding of that land would have otherwise been reckoned for computing the permissible ceiling area as on 24th day of January, 1971 and if that holding were to be in excess of the ceiling limit, the excess/surplus land would have automatically vested in the State Government. But for that exemption, the land owners continued to remain owners of the tea estates irrespective of its being in excess of the permissible area. Suffice it to note that the observations in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Bhutail (supra) are in the context of the issue about the authority to frame Rules in exercise of the powers of delegated legislation, on a subject expressly exempted in the principal Act. It does not follow that the State Legislature was incompetent to legislate on that subject, so as to limit the sweep of exemption only to genuine landlords who continued to themselves use the land as tea estate and were engaged in the activity of tea plantation and for purposes subservient to tea plantation thereon. 27.On a bare reading of Section 6A, we have no hesitation in taking the view that it would apply only to cases where the land was treated as exempted by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act, irrespective of its being in excess of the permissible ceiling area. This provision, on the face of it, will have no application to the tea estates which were otherwise within the ceiling limits, even if the same were to be computed alongwith the other land holding of that person. 28.The definition of expression “tea estate” is found in Section 3(s). A priori, Section 6A is attracted in cases where the area of land under tea estates, if added to the other land holding of that person, would exceed the permissible ceiling limit of that person as on 24th day of January, 1971 and not otherwise. 28.The definition of expression “tea estate” is found in Section 3(s). A priori, Section 6A is attracted in cases where the area of land under tea estates, if added to the other land holding of that person, would exceed the permissible ceiling limit of that person as on 24th day of January, 1971 and not otherwise. Once it is found that such holding would exceed the permissible area, to the extent it is in excess of the permissible area and on happening of the specified event, the land under the tea estate would be and must be treated as surplus as on the appointed day and, therefore, in law, deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for public purpose on payment of amount to be determined under Section 14 of the Act. 29. The argument of the petitioner that the term ‘public purpose’ has not been defined does not commend to us. Inasmuch as, if the land is treated as surplus area and deemed to have been acquired by the State Government, the land so vested in the State Government will have to be dealt with in the same manner as for disposing the surplus lands provided in the Act of 1972 read with Rules framed thereunder. That is the purport of expression “for public purpose”, occurring in Section 6A of the amended provision. So understood, the argument of the petitioner does not take the matter any further. 30. The other argument of the petitioner that the amount provided under Section 14 is illusory and unrealistic and thus impinges upon the rights of the landowner to get a fair market price also deserves to be stated to be rejected. The challenge to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act has already been tested by the Apex Court and has been negatived. The question regarding reasonableness of amount to be paid to the person is no more res integra. It is not an acquisition of land, which is unconnected with the provisions of Act of 1972. The challenge to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act has already been tested by the Apex Court and has been negatived. The question regarding reasonableness of amount to be paid to the person is no more res integra. It is not an acquisition of land, which is unconnected with the provisions of Act of 1972. Once it is found that the exemption given to the land stood withdrawn due to the acts of commission and omission of the land owner; and that land, if computed to determine the holding of the person, is found to be in excess of the ceiling limit on the appointed day, Section 14 of the Act of 1972 would come into play and the amount to be paid in lieu of vesting of the land in the State Government will have to be determined on that basis, as is the case in respect of any other land which is in excess of permissible ceiling area. 31.If the amended Section 6A is so understood, we fail to comprehend as to how the said provision is unconstitutional. The purport of Section 6A is that the exemption would cease to apply to the concerned tea estate, the moment it is used for purpose other than for tea estate. In that eventuality, the land would be deemed to be surplus if the other land held by the concerned land owner is already upto the permissible ceiling area. In other words, the rigours of Section 6A will not apply to the land owners whose holding including the land originally used as tea estate, is within the permissible ceiling area. We find that Section 6A is a composite provision. It is not only a deeming provision to treat such land as surplus area and of vesting the same in the State Government free from all encumbrances, as also to provide for payment of amount determined under Section 14 in lieu of vesting of the land in the State Government. Hence, challenge to Section 6A, as inserted by the amending Act, is devoid of any merits. 32. That takes us to the challenge to Section 7A of the Act. We have already reproduced the said provision in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence, challenge to Section 6A, as inserted by the amending Act, is devoid of any merits. 32. That takes us to the challenge to Section 7A of the Act. We have already reproduced the said provision in the earlier part of the judgment. On a bare reading of the said provision, it is noticed that it is broadly analogous to Section 6A of the Act in all other respects, except that Section 6A deals with the change in use of land under tea estates; whereas Section 7A pertains to bar on transfer of land under tea estates. The raison d’etre in both these provisions is the same. As a result, the logic for rejecting the challenge to Section 6A will apply proprio vigore even to the challenge to Section 7A. 33.Be that as it may, Section 7A opens with non-obstante clause. It provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, agreement, custom or usage, for the time being in force, and the provisions contained in clause (g) of Section 5 of this Act, no transfer of whole or part of the land under tea estate and identified to be exempted under Section 10 of the Act shall be made by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage, with possession or creation of any tenancy or otherwise except with the permission of the State Government. Even, this provision has come into force w.e.f. 28th day of July, 1973, by virtue of Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act. In law, therefore, it will have to be treated as being part of the principal Act from its inception, having come into force on the same day. The consequence of this amendment is to limit the exemption granted under Section 5(g) to tea estates which did not continue to be owned by the same land owner as was on the appointed day i.e. 24th January, 1971 because of sale, gift, exchange, lease, mortgage. That rigour applies to inter vivos transfers and not to transfer by succession as such. 34.It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature is competent to enact law with retrospective effect. The fact that the original land owner transferred the tea estate after the appointed day and before coming into force of the amendment Act of 1999, does not take away the power of the State Legislature to enact law with retrospective effect. 34.It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature is competent to enact law with retrospective effect. The fact that the original land owner transferred the tea estate after the appointed day and before coming into force of the amendment Act of 1999, does not take away the power of the State Legislature to enact law with retrospective effect. Indisputably, this legislation is a social welfare legislation. It is intended to further the directive principles of the State policy that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; and that the operation of the economic system does not result in concentration of wealth and means of protection to the common detriment. The amended provision purports to nullify and invalidate the transactions executed between the land owner and third party of transferring the tea estate after the appointed day. In other words, Section 7A is a provision to disregard all such transactions as “nonest” in the eyes of law and to declare that the concerned land is surplus land on the appointed day in the hands of the original land owner. As a result thereof, the said land, in law, would vest in the State Government. 35.True it is that both in Sections 6A and 7A, as inserted by amending Act, it is provided that the rigours of the concerned provisions would come into play if the transactions referred to therein were entered without the permission of the State Government. The Act does not spell out the circumstances or guidelines for grant or non-grant of such permission by the State Government. That, in our opinion, does not affect the power of the legislature to make a law for limiting or withdrawing the exemption granted to stated tea estates, which is the intent of the legislature in introducing the amended provisions. 36.The provision recognizes that if the State Government has already granted permission to any transaction, then it would be treated differently, as covered by the exemption clause 5(g). Assuming that the grievance of the petitioners that no guidelines have been framed for grant or non-grant by the State Government that does not mean that the entire provision is un­constitutional. 36.The provision recognizes that if the State Government has already granted permission to any transaction, then it would be treated differently, as covered by the exemption clause 5(g). Assuming that the grievance of the petitioners that no guidelines have been framed for grant or non-grant by the State Government that does not mean that the entire provision is un­constitutional. In that case, the words “without the permission of the State Government” in Section 6A and the words “except with the permission of the State Government” occurring in Section 7A will have to be disregarded being unconstitutional. Even then the remaining provision would be enforceable against the land owners covered within the sweep thereof. We fail to understand as to how this approach will be of any help to the petitioners. Hence, the argument under consideration is negatived. 37.We may now turn to Section 7 of the amended Act, which in turn inserts Section 1 7A in the principal Act. Section 17A, so inserted, reads thus: “1 7-A. treatment of certain transfers and change of use of lands exempted under section 5.- (1) The Collector shall call for, from the revenue officers in his district, the record of transfers of lands made, after the appointed day but before the commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1999 by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise in respect of any land comprised in any tea estate, whether under a tea plantation or held for other purposes subservient to a tea plantation and exempted under clause (g) of section 5 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, and examine such record for satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such transfer. (2) Where either on examination of the record under sub-section (1) or in consequence of definite information which may come into his possession, and after making such enquiry, as he may deem fit, the Collector is satisfied that the transfer of land has been made or land has been put to some other use, as a result of fraud or concealment of facts or is detrimental to the interests of the tea plantation/industry, he shall, at any time within two years following the commencement of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1999, declare such transfer or change of use of land as illegal and void: Provided that no order under this sub-section shall be passed by the Collector without affording an opportunity of being heard, in the case of the transfer of land to the parties to such transfer, and in the case of change of land use to the land owner.\ (3) Where the change of land use has been declared as illegal under sub-section (2), the Collector shall direct the land owner to restore within such period, not exceeding one year, as may be fixed by him, the user of the land for tea plantation or for the purpose subservient to tea plantation i.e. the purpose on account of which it has been exempted from the provisions of the Act under clause (g) of section 5 of the Act, failing which such land shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining the permissible area under section 4 of the Act. (4) Where any transfer of land has been declared void under sub-section (2), all rights, title and interests, including the contingent interests, if any, of the land owner and of any other person/transferee in such transferred land, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, instrument, custom or usage shall stand extinguished and all such rights, title and interests shall vest in and shall stand transferred to the State Government together with structures, buildings or other attachments, if any, free from all encumbrances and the person in possession of such land shall be liable to ejectment under the provisions of Section 163 of the Himchal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, and such a person shall be entitled only to such amount in lieu of such land as would have been determined and payable to him under the Act, as if such land was in excess of the permissible area and had vested in the State Government under section 11: Provided that in exceptional cases of hardship, the Collector, with the prior approval of the State Government and for reasons to be recorded in writing, may, in lieu of the transfer and vestment of any structure, building or other attachments together with the land thereunder, order the transfer and vestment free from all encumbrances of any other land, equivalent to the land covered under the aforesaid structure, building or attachment thereto, out of the permissible area of such a land owner who has transferred the land.” 38.In the first place, Section 17A inserted by Section 7 of the Act has not come into force w.e.f. 28th day of July, 1973, as in the case of Section 6A and 7A, respectively. In other words, this provision would operate prospectively on and from the publication of Amendment Act, 1999, in the official gazette on 11.4.2000. Further, this provision does not open with non­obstante clause unlike in the case of Section 6A and 7A, respectively. Sub-section (1) predicates that the Collector shall call records of transfer of land made after the appointed day but before commencement of the Amendment Act of 1999, in respect of the tea estates from the revenue officers in his district. After examining that record, he may satisfy himself about the legality or propriety of the transfer. Sub-section (1) predicates that the Collector shall call records of transfer of land made after the appointed day but before commencement of the Amendment Act of 1999, in respect of the tea estates from the revenue officers in his district. After examining that record, he may satisfy himself about the legality or propriety of the transfer. If he is satisfied that the transfer of land has been made or land has been put to some other use, as a result of fraud or concealment of facts or is detrimental to the interest of the tea plantation/industry within 2 years from the commencement of the amendment Act of 1999, he is free to declare such transfer or change of use of land as illegal and void, after giving opportunity of being heard to the parties. In case the change of use is declared illegal under sub-section (2) of the same provision, the Collector can direct the land owner to restore the tea estate within a period not exceeding one year and if the land owner fails to comply with that direction, by virtue of the deeming provision, such land is required to be reckoned for the purpose of determining the permissible area held by that person under Section 4 of the Act. The effect of sub-section (3) of Section 17A, therefore, is in the nature of re-opening of the statement prepared by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act and to treat the land in question as land held by the person concerned for determining his holding and if it is found to be in excess of the ceiling area, the same would be treated as surplus and shall vest in the State Government together with structures, buildings or other adjustments, free from all encumbrances and in lieu thereof, the person concerned would be entitled for payment of amount determined under the Act, as if it was a surplus land vested in the State Government. This is the purport of Section 1 7A of the Act. We fail to understand as to how this provision can be said to be unreasonable keeping in mind the avowed object of exempting the land under the tea estates from the application of Ceiling Act. This is the purport of Section 1 7A of the Act. We fail to understand as to how this provision can be said to be unreasonable keeping in mind the avowed object of exempting the land under the tea estates from the application of Ceiling Act. We find substance in the stand taken by the State that this provision is in the nature of providing procedural and including regulatory measures so as to compel the land owners to use the land which was otherwise exempted and not reckoned for computing the ceiling area as on the appointed day. The land owner who has taken benefit of Section 5(g) cannot be heard to complain that he is being forced to use the land under tea estate for tea plantation only. Right to hold property is not an absolute right. Section 1 7A, appears to us, to be a reasonable restriction. For, it envisages that the land so exempted must be continually used as a tea estate failing which it should be computed for determining the total holding of the person concerned, as on the appointed day, disregarding the exemption granted to the person qua that land while finalization of the statement under Section 10 of the Act. The provision is in public interest and intended to further the State policy of equal distribution of wealth; and of preservation of tea estates and promotion thereof in the State of Himachal Pradesh. 39.That takes us to the argument of the petitioners, that if, the land has been transferred to third party before commencement of the Amendment Act of 1999 and if the transferee was still using the land under tea estate for tea plantation or for purpose subservient to the tea plantation, the objective of exempting the land under Section 5(g) was fulfilled and there was no reason to disregard the concluded transaction. This argument clearly overlooks the sweep of the Land Ceiling Act. One of the avowed purposes of the Ceiling Act was to redress the issue of concentration of wealth and property in the hands of some persons. It is a social welfare legislation. The citizen certainly has a right to hold property, but that right is limited to the permissible ceiling area, by virtue of Act of 1972. The holding of the person concerned must be reckoned as on the appointed day i.e. 24th day of January, 1971. It is a social welfare legislation. The citizen certainly has a right to hold property, but that right is limited to the permissible ceiling area, by virtue of Act of 1972. The holding of the person concerned must be reckoned as on the appointed day i.e. 24th day of January, 1971. If the person has availed exemption because the whole or part of the land held by him was used as a tea estate, which land otherwise could have been included for determining his total land holding, as on the appointed day; and if lateron he uses that land for some other purpose or transfers it to third person after the appointed day, by virtue of the deeming provision in the Amended Act, in particular, Section 6A and 7A, in law, the exemption granted to that person would stand withdrawn. Further, if his total holding were to exceed the permissible ceiling limit, the surplus holding would stand vested in the State Government. Thus, the purport of the provision is not only of withdrawal of exemption given to the land used as tea estate as such, but also withdrawal of concession given to the land owner at the relevant time by excluding it from his total holding for determining the permissible ceiling area. That benefit would stand withdrawn because of his acts of commission and omission, as provided in Sections 6A and 7A. That being a reasonable restriction; and the legal effect being of all acts and transactions effected by that person after the appointed day to be treated as nonest in the eyes of law, it is not a case of taking away exemption retrospectively - but it would be a matter of re-determination of the total holding of the person concerned as on the appointed day. 40. The grievance of the petitioners that the purport of Section 6A and 7A would also impact the land owners whose land holding would be within the permissible ceiling area even if land under tea estate was to be taken into account, in our opinion, is founded on complete mis-understanding of Section 6A and 7A of the Act. 40. The grievance of the petitioners that the purport of Section 6A and 7A would also impact the land owners whose land holding would be within the permissible ceiling area even if land under tea estate was to be taken into account, in our opinion, is founded on complete mis-understanding of Section 6A and 7A of the Act. We have held that Section 6A and 7A of the Act will be attracted only if the total holding of the person concerned were to be in excess of the permissible ceiling area after adding the land under tea estate which was otherwise exempted in the statement under Section 10 prepared by the Collector. 41. We may now turn to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji versus Union of India and others10. The Apex Court in no uncertain terms has noticed that the Ceiling Act is a measure for inhibiting concentration for urban lands in the hands of few persons and for equitable distribution of such land to subserve the common good and for which Article 39(b) & (c) of the Constitution of India comes into play. The Court has held that the restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with the building or portion of building which is within the ceiling area will be invalid. In the present case, however, we have held that the rigours of Sections 6A, 7A and 17A would apply “only” to the person whose total holding of land on the appointed day after reckoning the land under the tea estate affected by the amended provision would exceed the permissible ceiling area. Hence, it is unnecessary to dilate any further on the reported decision under consideration. 42.The petitioners had placed reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Janabai (supra), which dealt with the question of validity of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975, in the context of Article 3 1A of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed on observations from paragraphs 4 to 9. The Court noted that if the acquisition of land of any person below the ceiling area is to be resorted to, the State is obliged to pay compensation not less than the market rate. Reliance was placed on observations from paragraphs 4 to 9. The Court noted that if the acquisition of land of any person below the ceiling area is to be resorted to, the State is obliged to pay compensation not less than the market rate. In the present case, we are concerned with the provisions which expressly deal with the situation where the land above the ceiling limit will be treated as surplus and, therefore, vest in the State Government within the meaning of the Act of 1972. In other words, the fact situation in which the amended provisions would come into play, the question of paying compensation, as if it was acquisition of land for purpose other than the surplus ceiling area, does not arise. By the very nature of Sections 6A and 7A or for that matter Section 17A, inserted by the Amended Act of 1999, the same will be attracted only to lands which are not within the ceiling area, but surplus land after reckoning the land affected by the said provision(s), which was otherwise known to be used for tea estate on the appointed day. 43.That takes us to the recent judgment of the Apex Court relied by the learned Advocate General in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh versus Rakesh Kohli and another. He placed reliance on paragraphs 16 to 29, which in turn deal with the proposition that the Court should observe circumspection before declaring the Statute to be un­constitutional. The Court must be doubly sure that there can be no manner of doubt that the provision in question violates a provision of the Constitution. Considering the view already taken, nothing would turn on this decision. 44.Taking over all view of the matter, therefore, we find no merits in the challenge to the validity of the amended provisions. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any.