JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.7.2009 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (FT) No. 3 jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No. 161/2004, Baba Madhav Das v. Sunder Das & Ors ., whereby the learned trial Court rejected the secondary evidence produced by the plaintiff-petitioner in the form of some pamphlets and newspaper cuttings in the present dispute whereby the plaintiff-petitioner has sought that the defendant is no longer competent to remain "Mathadhees" of "Avant Shri Sukhram Dham Trust, Ram Chowki, Birai (a public trust, registered under the Public Trust Act). 3. While issuing notices to the respondents relying upon a decision of this Court in the case of Champalal v. Ramesh (S.B.C.W.P. No. 2182/2004 , decided on 8.9.2009), this Court had directed that the defence evidence may not be closed by the learned trial Court. Counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff informed that the trial has proceeded and the defence evidence is likely to be concluded shortly. 4. Mr. H.R. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff submitted that vide previous order dated 6.9.2008, certain copies of pamphlets and newspaper reports, which were taken on record by the trial Court while allowing the application under Order 7, Rule 14 C.P.C., by the plaintiff and at that time, the permission was also sought by the plaintiff that the secondary evidence with regard to some of the documents may be admitted and the such application was allowed by the learned trial Court on 6.9.2008. Therefore, later on, if such secondary evidence was produced by the plaintiff-petitioner is produced, the learned trial Court has seriously erred in refusing to entertain the same and refuse to take such secondary evidence on record by the impugned order dated 27.8.2009. He therefore, prayed that the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Patel, learned counsel for the respondents- defendants submitted that the secondary evidence produced by the petitioner- plaintiff could not satisfy the criteria and the requirement of Section 63(2) of the Indian Evidence Act, as the said newspaper cuttings and pamphlets could not be said to be the copies produced by such mechanical device which itself is not the authenticate reproduction thereof and therefore, such evidence was rightly not entertained as secondary evidence. 6. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the interlocutory order passed by the learned trial Court does not require any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless there is serious miscarriage of justice and the learned trial Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction, no interference with such an interlocutory order, to monitor the process of trial at every stage is called for under writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. 7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 , has held as under: "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles. laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been ,flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo-motu. (1) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 8. In the case of Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 , in para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all error of judgment of a Court or Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 9. Consequently, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner-plaintiff is found to be devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties and the learned trial Court forthwith.Petition Dismissed. *******