Judgment In this writ petition, challenge to the order of removal from service is on the ground that the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the Authorities in the departmental proceeding, is based on no evidence and the findings are wholly perverse and therefore, not tenable in law. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed as a constable on 23.04.1992. At the relevant time the petitioner was deployed to guard the post between 21.00 hrs. and 05.00 hrs. at Camp-II store. A charge memo was served upon the petitioner on 04.08.2001 in which two charges namely, (i) he failed to prevent the theft of 1.040 MT brass scrap from Camp-II store and, (ii) he failed to inform the incident to the competent authority which demonstrates gross negligence, misconduct and indiscipline on his part, were framed against the petitioner. 3. The petitioner submitted his reply on 13.08.2001 pleading not guilty. On 30.08.2001 the enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the charges leveled against the petitioner. On conclusion of the enquiry, the report was submitted on 29.09.2001 holding the charges proved. On 29.09.2001 itself a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner and he was directed to submit his representation within 15 days, which he submitted on 15.10.2001. The order of removal from service was passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 18.10.2001. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 24.10.2001 which was dismissed by order dated 26.12.2001. Challenging the orders dated 18.10.2001 and 26.12.2001, the petitioner has moved this Court by filing the present writ petition. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating that under Rule-34 of CISF Rules, 1969 (as amended by CISF Rules, 2001), specific and definite charges of gross misconduct, negligence in performing duty etc. were framed against the petitioner. It is further averred that the petitioner, a member of armed force of the Union deployed on duty with arms and ammunition, failed to discharge his duty properly and honestly and as a result criminals were able to steal government property worth Rs 78,000/-by removing asbestos sheets of the roof of Camp-II store. The petitioner willfully and deliberately suppressed the fact and did not inform the incident of theft to his senior officers. The petitioner willfully and deliberately suppressed the fact and did not inform the incident of theft to his senior officers. The above act on the part of the petitioner amounts to misconduct, violation of standing order and sheer negligence in discharging his duty and therefore, considering the gross misconduct on the part of the petitioner an order of removal from service was passed. It is also stated that before the regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated, a preliminary enquiry was conducted and a copy of the preliminary enquiry report was also provided to the petitioner which he acknowledged on 14.08.2001. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the department failed to produce any legally sustainable evidence in support of the charges framed against the petitioner and therefore, the conclusion holding the charges proved against the petitioner, are perverse and therefore, liable to be interfered with by this Court. He has further submitted that the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner for the negligence attributed to him in preventing the theft from Camp-II store, is grossly excessive and disproportionate to the charges found proved against the petitioner and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 7. Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents reiterated the stand taken in the counter-affidavit and submitted that in absence of any allegation of violation of principles of natural justice and/or non-adherence of the procedure prescribed under the rules, the challenge made by the petitioner to the order of penalty in the present writ petition, must fail. 8. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been punished only on suspicion and no motive has been imputed to the petitioner for his alleged failure to inform the superior officers about the incident of theft. The petitioner served for more than 20 years without any complaint against him and the order of removal from service would deprive him of his livelihood as well as pensionary benefits. 9. As noticed above, the specific charges framed against the petitioner were that, while on duty on 22/23.07.2001, he failed to prevent theft of 01.040 MT brass scrap and after the police came during investigation and recovered the theft article, he failed to inform the incident to the superior officers. 9. As noticed above, the specific charges framed against the petitioner were that, while on duty on 22/23.07.2001, he failed to prevent theft of 01.040 MT brass scrap and after the police came during investigation and recovered the theft article, he failed to inform the incident to the superior officers. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated ; “16................In fact, petitioner was detailed for patrolling duty in Camp-II store with Arms & Ammunition from 2100 hrs on 22.07.2001 to 0500 hrs on 23.07.2001 with another Constable B.D. Singh. On the intervening night of 22/23.07.2001 B. S. City police recovered 01.040 MT brass quides near Airstrip boundary wall which is just outside of Camp-II store area and arrested one criminal at about 0415 hrs on 23.07.2001. Three B.S. City police personnel went to told him about recovery of brass quides and choked the lock and seal of Camp-II store and its surroundings and also meet the petitioner. On enquiry / investigation, it was found that above brass quides belonged to BSL Bokaro and was stored in Camp-II store. Further, it was observed that criminals entered inside the store by removing asbestos sheet of roof of the store and stolen brass quides weighing 01.040 MT approximately cost of which was Rs.78,000/-. Petitioner being a duty sentry deployed with Arms & Ammunition at Camp-II store failed to provide proper security to Govt. property. The petitioner also did not inform his senior officers regarding this fact and kept silent, which on the other hand depicts his ill intention. This act on the part of petitioner amount to gross misconduct, sheer negligence towards discharge of his bonafide duty and highly prejudicial to good order and discipline of an Armed Force of the union, for which petitioner is liable for stringent punishments. Accordingly petitioner was rightly been punished by disciplinary authority ...............” 10. During the departmental proceeding five witnesses were examined by the department. All the witnesses were examined to prove the factum of theft. The prosecution witness no. 2 namely, Rakesh Kapoor stated that the asbestos sheet of the shed was removed and inside the shed brass liner (brass quides) were found scattered. The prosecution witness nos. 2 and 5 deposed that they came to know about the incident on 24.07.2001 through the newspaper. The prosecution witness no. 2 namely, Rakesh Kapoor stated that the asbestos sheet of the shed was removed and inside the shed brass liner (brass quides) were found scattered. The prosecution witness nos. 2 and 5 deposed that they came to know about the incident on 24.07.2001 through the newspaper. The petitioner examined himself and stated that on 22.07.2001 he alongwith duty guard B.D. Singh were guarding Camp-II store between 21.00 hrs. and 05.00 hrs. and at about 23.40 hrs. S.N. Roy, Post Commander inspected the area and found everything all right and entered a report in the GD entry at the main gate. At about 4.15 hrs. police came there and spoke to S.N. Roy, Post Commander and conducted search in all the stores. The petitioner in his reply submitted that none of the witnesses has spoken or gave evidence that the theft was committed in the night of 22/23.07.2001. When the incident of the theft came into light, since the Post Commander was there, it was his duty to inform the superior officers. Before the Appellate Authority also, the petitioner raised a plea that during the departmental enquiry the prosecution witnesses could not bring any evidence in support of the charges framed against the petitioner. No evidence could be brought on record about the exact date and time of the theft from Camp-II Store. On 22.07.2001, HC/GD Mahendra Singh was deployed on duty at Camp-II store in 'B' shift and he was found absent when checked by Deputy Commandant and an entry was made in Checking Register, however, this aspect was not looked into by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority. He further submitted that he wanted to examine the Camp Commander and HC /GD, J.L. Rajak as the defence witness but the enquiry officer did not permit them to be examined on the ground that they were also under suspension. He further submitted that he was found on duty and always alert whenever checked by Post Commander. On these grounds, he submitted that the enquiry officer recorded the findings that the charges against the petitioner are found proved, only on suspicion and the Disciplinary Authority has also overlooked these aspects of the matter and therefore, the penalty order dated 18.10.2001 was liable to be set-aside. 11. On these grounds, he submitted that the enquiry officer recorded the findings that the charges against the petitioner are found proved, only on suspicion and the Disciplinary Authority has also overlooked these aspects of the matter and therefore, the penalty order dated 18.10.2001 was liable to be set-aside. 11. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the charge of negligence against the petitioner was found proved only on the ground that theft had taken place at Camp-II stores. It is also true that it could not be established in the departmental proceeding that the incident had occurred in the night of 22/23.07.2001. The specific plea taken by the petitioner has not been considered by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. It also appears that the permission denied to the petitioner for examining the defence witness on the ground that they were under suspension was not justified and the petitioner has been denied an opportunity to defend himself effectively in the departmental proceeding. Moreover, it is not the charge against the petitioner that he colluded with the accused persons who were apprehended by the local police. No motive has been alleged against the petitioner. Merely, because the theft had occurred, negligence on the part of the petitioner cannot be held to be proved. It also appears that since the Post Commander had reached along with the local police at the place of occurrence and inspected the Camp-II store, the petitioner did not consider it necessary to inform other superior officers. It may be a mistake on the part of the petitioner, however, as no charge of collusion with the criminals or intentionally suppressing the information, had been framed against the petitioner, the penalty of removal from service and the further order that the period of suspension would be considered as absence without leave, are definitely excessive and disproportionate to the charges found proved against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry. 12. In “Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others”, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 442 , one 'K', whose private land fell within the area covered by the beat of the delinquent employee, who was forest guard, cut and felled 21 trees and after an enquiry, it was found that out of 21 trees, 17 were in forest land. In “Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others”, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 442 , one 'K', whose private land fell within the area covered by the beat of the delinquent employee, who was forest guard, cut and felled 21 trees and after an enquiry, it was found that out of 21 trees, 17 were in forest land. Although 'K' paid compensation for the illegal felling of trees stating that he felled the trees, bonafide believing that the trees were standing on his private land, the appellant was proceeded against departmentally and penalty of removal from service was imposed upon the delinquent employee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that dismissal from service on a trivial charge of negligence which resulted in no loss to the department was disproportionate and excessive. 13. In “S.K. Giri Vs. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others”, reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 519, when the delinquent employee was supposed to be on duty, a large number of persons entered inside the Steel Plant and removed coal from the area which was the duty point of the delinquent employee. It was alleged that at that point of time the delinquent employee was found absent from duty and therefore, he was charge-sheet for misconduct and gross-negligence on duty and an enquiry against him was held. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held the punishment of removal from service severe and disproportionate. 14. In “Dev Singh Vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Another”, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 9 , in the disciplinary enquiry, the delinquent employee was held responsible for the misplacement of the file which was entrusted to him, however, no motive was attached for such misplacement of file. Taking note of the fact that the employee had served the respondent-corporation for nearly 20 years with unblemished service, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held : “7. Applying the said principles laid down by this Court in the cases noted hereinabove, we see that in this case the appellant has been serving the respondent Corporation for nearly 20 years with unblemished service, before the present charge of misconduct was levelled against him. The charge itself shows that what was alleged against the appellant was misplacement of a file and there is no allegation whatsoever that this file was either misplaced by the appellant deliberately or for any collateral consideration. The charge itself shows that what was alleged against the appellant was misplacement of a file and there is no allegation whatsoever that this file was either misplaced by the appellant deliberately or for any collateral consideration. A reading of the charge-sheet shows that the misplacement alleged was not motivated by any ulterior consideration and at the most could be an act of negligence, consequent to which the appellant was unable to trace the file again. The disciplinary authority while considering the quantum of punishment came to the conclusion that the misconduct of the nature alleged against the appellant should be viewed very seriously to prevent such actions in future, whereby important and sensitive records could be lost or removed or destroyed by the employee under whose custody the records are kept. Therefore, he was of the opinion that a deterrent punishment was called for, forgetting for a moment that no such allegation of misplacing of important or sensitive record was made in the instant case against the appellant and what he was charged of was misplacement of a file, importance or sensitiveness of which was not mentioned in the charge-sheet. Therefore, in our opinion, the disciplinary authority was guided by certain facts which were not on record, even otherwise, we are of the opinion that when the Service Bye-laws applicable to the Corporation under Service Byelaw 17 provide various minor punishments, we fail to appreciate why only maximum punishment available under the said Bye-laws should be awarded on the facts of the present case. We think the punishment of dismissal for mere misplacement of a file without any ulterior motive is too harsh a punishment which is totally disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and the same certainly shocks our judicial conscience. 15. In “U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. and Others Vs. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Others”, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 450 and “Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar”, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 192 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court took similar view and interfered with the quantum of punishment on the ground of its being shockingly disproportionate to the charges framed and proved against the delinquent employee. 16. In “Ranjit Thakur Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar”, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 192 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court took similar view and interfered with the quantum of punishment on the ground of its being shockingly disproportionate to the charges framed and proved against the delinquent employee. 16. In “Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, “25.............The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review...........” 17. In “Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra”, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed, “16............Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. ................Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty...........” 18. In “B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India”, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Court will not interfere with the order of punishment unless the punishment awarded is one which shocks the conscience of the Court. A similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma”, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 401 and several other cases. 19. In several cases, in view of the long pendency of the case or in view of the fact that the employee was on the verge of retirement or had already retired, the Hon'ble Supreme Court instead of remanding the matter back to the department for taking a fresh decision with respect to quantum of punishment, itself substituted a lesser punishment. Similar were the cases in “Dev Singh Vs. Similar were the cases in “Dev Singh Vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Another” (supra) and Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others” (supra). 20. In “Harjit Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.”, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 582, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the order of dismissal from service and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement observing as under, 15. “In the aforementioned situation, ordinarily, we would have asked the disciplinary authority to consider the matter afresh, but the occurrence had taken place in the year 1984. The appellants and the said Parminder Singh had worked only for a few years, one of them is dead. In the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that we would be justified to fix the quantum of punishment. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case and in particular having regard to the passage of time, punishment of compulsory retirement will meet the ends of justice. If otherwise eligible, the delinquents would be entitled to retiral benefits. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.” 21. In “Surendra Prasad Shukla Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.”, reported in (2011) 8 SCC 536 , it was found that the delinquent, a Head Constable in State Police, who had served for 34 years, was dismissed from service as a stolen car was recovered from the government quarter occupied by the delinquent employee. However, no charge of abetting or aiding the offence under Section 392 I.P.C., for which his son was charged, was framed against him, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the punishment of dismissal from service, which would deprive the employee of his pension also, was shockingly disproportionate to negligence proved against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and modified the punishment of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement. 22. In “State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya”, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1931 , a case in which the delinquent employee without verification, instructed his colleague to transfer a dormant account into operative category, at the request of an unknown person visiting the bank and claiming to be account holder, which turned out to be false, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under, “11. However having regard to the fact that the proven charge did not involve either misappropriation or fraudulent conduct and the other circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the punishment of dismissal should be substituted by compulsory retirement, which does not involve reinstatement. 12. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. We uphold the finding of guilt recorded by the disciplinary authority, but modify the punishment from 'dismissal' to 'compulsory retirement'. There is therefore no question of grant of any back-wages.” 23. In “Hussaini Vs. Hon. Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors.”, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 120 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has converted the order of punishment of dismissal from service into an order of compulsory retirement on compassionate ground. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned orders dated 18.10.2001 and 26.12.2001 are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. However, since it is about 12 years since the petitioner was removed from service, it would not be proper to remand the matter back to the authorities to decided the question of punishment to be imposed upon the petitioner. Since the petitioner served for more than 10 years and no specific charge of collusion or intentionally suppressing the information from the superiors, has been levelled against the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefit of his past services and therefore, I think it would serve the ends of justice, if the petitioner is compulsorily retired from service. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petitioner is ordered to be compulsorily retired from service. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.