JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant-plaintiff has preferred this first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'C.P.C.') for assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.4.1995 passed by learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge No. 3, Kota (for short'the learned trial Court'). 2. Stated in succinct, the factual matrix giving rise to this appeal is that the appellant-plaintiff laid a suit before the learned trial Court against the respondents for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,02,155.80. In the plaint, it was inter alia alleged by the appellant that appellant is a private limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Kota and the company is involved in designing, fabrication, supply, erection of radial gates, bridge hoisting and other ancillary items. in the plaint, it was further averred by the appellant that the respondent State of Karnataka invited tenders for providing and fixing 10 spillway crest radial gates together with operation bridge and hoisting arrangements pertaining to Hidkal Dam. Pursuant to the notice inviting tender (for short 'NIT'), the appellant submitted his tender, which was accepted by the respondents and a communication to this effect was conveyed by second respondent to the appellant at Kota vide letter dated 9.12.1975. After negotiations between the parties, the contract was finalized. Agreement was executed between the parties on 5.6.1976 and the same was signed on behalf His Excellency the Governor of State of Karnataka by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, DDRB, Hidkal Dam. As per averment in the plaint, in terms of the agreement, requisite steel material was not supplied by JPC and thereafter the appellant had to purchase the same from open market. Appellant obtained the requisite steel material from the stockyard of Hindustan Steel Limited on the rates which were higher than JPC rates. The appellant has also stated in the plaint that during subsistence of the agreement, JPC changed its policy and an information to this effect the circulated by JPC that it stopped allotment of steel material and therefore those who are aspirants for the requisite material, can obtain the material from other chief producers of steel or from steelyards. For substantiating this assertion, the appellant has also placed on record the letter issued by the JPC dated 3.6.1977. For substantiating this assertion, the appellant has also placed on record the letter issued by the JPC dated 3.6.1977. According to the appellant, there were certain compelling reasons for purchasing the steel material from Hindustan Steel Limited and in these circumstances, it purchased the requisite steel from the stockyard of Hindustan Steel Limited with the concurrence of the second respondent. For carrying out the contract work, the appellant invested additional amount in purchase of steel from Hindustan Steel Limited and for claiming this additional amount, the appellant submitted vouchers before the respondents. However, in terms of the agreement, the respondent agreed to pay only a sum of Rs. 1,92,458.80 to the appellant instead of its total claim of Rs. 2,81,118.60 and the claim to that extent was accepted by the respondents. As per the appellant, the amount which was agreed by the respondents in terms of the agreement ought to have been paid by them but for the reasons best know to the respondents, the said amount too was not paid to appellant for a considerable period despite repeated requests. in these circumstances, the appellant-plaintiff served a notice under Section 80 C.P.C., claiming the outstanding amount of Rs. 1,92,455.80 + interest C' 18% per annum to the tune of Rs. 1,09,700/- only. Cumulatively, the total amount of Rs. 3,02,155.80 was claimed by the appellant in the notice. Even after serving the notice, the amount was not paid and in that situation, the suit was instituted by the appellant before the learned Court below. 3. Before the learned Court below, on behalf of the respondents their lawyer appeared and contested the matter. The respondents also filed a written statement disputing claim of the appellant. Although in the written statement, the claim of the appellant was repudiated but precisely the respondents harped on certain technical objection is about the legality of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. as well as the limitation. In the written statement, the amount of interest claimed by the appellant was seriously disputed by the respondents. 4. on the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned trial Court framed in all five issues for determination. 5. After settling of issues by the learned trial Court, the matter was posted for evidence of the appellant-plaintiff. In the written statement, the amount of interest claimed by the appellant was seriously disputed by the respondents. 4. on the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned trial Court framed in all five issues for determination. 5. After settling of issues by the learned trial Court, the matter was posted for evidence of the appellant-plaintiff. On behalf of the appellant-plaintiff, adjournments were sought form time to time for producing the evidence and in totality the appellant sought 22 adjournments. Considering the laxity on part of the appellant, the learned Court below closed the evidence of the appellant- plaintiff vide its order dated 29.10.1993. After closing of the evidence of the appellant, an application was filed on behalf of the appellant under Order 18, Rule 17 read with Section 151 C.P.C. The application came up for consideration before the learned trial Court on 24.4.1995. The learned trial Court heard the arguments of the rival parties on appellant's application under Order 18, Rule 17 read with Section 151 C.P.C. and vide its impugned order dismissed the suit filed by the appellant. While rejecting the application of the appellant under Order 18, Rule 17 read with Section 151 C.P.C. and dismissing the suit, the learned Court below has taken cognizance of the fact that the order dated 29.10.1993, whereby evidence of the appellant was closed, has been upheld by this Court by way of dismissal of the revision petition preferred by the appellant against the said order. The part, some other reasons have also been incorporated in the impugned order. 6. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned judgment passed by the learned Court below. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that on 29.10.1993, witness of the appellant, Mr. Ravindra Pareek was present but his statement could not be recorded because the lawyer representing the appellant-plaintiff was busy in connection with some public meeting to be addressed by President, AICC (Prime Minister of India). Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that dismissal of the revision petition has not forfeited his right to challenge the closure of evidence and consequential dismissal of suit in this appeal because according to him, while dismissing the revision petition this Court has granted liberty to the appellant to agitate this issue in appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that dismissal of the revision petition has not forfeited his right to challenge the closure of evidence and consequential dismissal of suit in this appeal because according to him, while dismissing the revision petition this Court has granted liberty to the appellant to agitate this issue in appeal. Assailing the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that refusal of adjournment was illegal/improper in view of clauses (d) and (e) of Order 17, Rule 1 C.P.C. According to learned counsel, the Court ought to have either recorded the statement of the witness present in the Court or it should have given time to the litigant to engage another Advocate. The sum and substance of the argument of the learned counsel is that a party cannot suffer on account of any mistake of the counsel. In support of his contention, the learned counsel. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on following legal precedents: (1) Bashir Ahmed v. Mehmood Hussain Shah, AIR 1995 SC 1857 ; (2) Om Prakash & Ors. v. Ram Dutt &Anr., 1999(2) RLW (Raj.) 1254 ; (3) Nathdwara Temple Board v. Raman Lal & Anr., 2000-01 DNJ (Raj-) (Suppl.) 96 ; (4) Parmanand v. Bajrang, 2001(3) RLW (SC) 426 ; (5) Raflq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1400 . 7. The second limb of the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that after dismissal of the revision petition, an application under Order 18, Rule 17A C.P.C. was submitted but the same was rejected simply on the ground that the revision petition filed by the appellant has already been dismissed by this Court. According to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, the facts mentioned in the application were subsequent to the dismissal of the revision petition and therefore, those facts ought to have been taken cognizance by the learned Court below. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that in the impugned order although the learned Court below has referred to issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 and onus of proving these issues was on the respondents but without recording any finding on these issues, the learned trial Court has non-suited the appellant-plaintiff solely on the ground that for proving issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 and onus of proving these issues was on the respondents but without recording any finding on these issues, the learned trial Court has non-suited the appellant-plaintiff solely on the ground that for proving issue Nos. 1 and 2 it has not tendered its evidence. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the findings recorded by the learned Court below on issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not in consonance and conformity with the Order 20, Rule 5 C.P.C., hence the impugned order/judgment cannot be categorized as judgment in the eye of law. For this proposition, the learned counsel for appellant has placed reliance of following judgments: 1) Chhinga Ram &Anr. v. Nihal Singh, AIR 1963 Raj. 100 ; 2) Smt. Lakxhmamma v. Smt. Kamalamma, AIR 2001 Karnataka 120 ; 3) Om Prakash v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2001 Himachal Pradesh 18 . 8. I have considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant and examined the legal provisions referred to by the counsel. with the assistance of the learned counsel for the appellant, I have also perused the legal precedents cited at the Bar. While dealing with Order 17, Rule 1 (2) C.P.C., Hon'ble Apex Court, in case of Bashir Ahmed v. Mehmood Hussain Shah, AIR 1995 SC 1857 (supra), has held in clear and unequivocal terms that due to absence of the counsel, a litigant cannot be allowed to suffer and a litigant is required to be given time to engage another counsel. The Apex Court has observed in Paras 8 and 9 as infra: 8. In this case, it is seen that the counsel for the appellant had to cross- examine the respondent-plaintiff. Unless there is time for the new counsel to be engaged for application for his mind to pleadings, issues framed, the evidence already on record, it would be difficult to proceed with the cross-examination on the spur of moment. It would be seen that the matter was adjourned from 8.8.1994 to 9.8.1994. Obviously, during that night the counsel must have fallen ill. Therefore, the party had no time to make alternative arrangements. Engaging a new counsel to proceed with trial would be fraught with grave risk and be unrealistic. It would be seen that the matter was adjourned from 8.8.1994 to 9.8.1994. Obviously, during that night the counsel must have fallen ill. Therefore, the party had no time to make alternative arrangements. Engaging a new counsel to proceed with trial would be fraught with grave risk and be unrealistic. The Court should have adjourned the case for the next date so as to enable the appellant to have another counsel engaged and given instructions to the new counsel to proceed with the cross-examination in the light of the pleadings and the issue framed in that behalf. 9. Under these circumstances, the Court was not right In refusing to adjourn the matter at least for the next day and It committed grave error of law by its order to forfeit the right of the appellant to cross- examine the respondent. 9. While interpreting Order 17 Rules I and 2 C.P.C., this Court in case of Om Prakash & Ors. v. Ram Dutt & Anr., 1999 (2) RLW (Raj.) 1254 (supra), has reiterated the same principle. In yet another judgment in case of Nathdwara Temple Board v. Raman Lal & Anr., 2000-01 DNJ (Raj.) (Suppl.) 96 (supra), this Court has passed the following order: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. By the impugned order the learned trial Court has closed the plaintiff's evidence. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it was on account of the counsel engaged by the petitioner being busy in marriage of his daughters that despite the witness being present in the Court his statements were not recorded and the evidence has bet I in such circumstances, I think it proper to give one more opportunity to the petitioner to produce all his witnesses. 3. Since in the past also the petitioner has already been given number of opportunities, therefore, this opportunity is required to be given on costs which is assessed at Rs. 1,000/-. 4. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. 3. Since in the past also the petitioner has already been given number of opportunities, therefore, this opportunity is required to be given on costs which is assessed at Rs. 1,000/-. 4. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to lead his evidence provided he produces all such witnesses whom he wants to examine before the learned trial Court on the next date of hearing which is already fixed before the learned trial Court, on this date the learned trial Court shall record the statement of all those witnesses, if for any reason of the Court the statements are not recorded, the Court should bind down those witnesses to appear on the next date of hearing for recording their statements. This opportunity shall be further subject to the condition of the petitioner paying a cost of Rs. 1,000/- to the non-petitioners. It is made clear that the petitioner shall not be entitled to examine any witness who is not produced by him before the learned trial Court on the next date of hearing as ordered above." 10. The Apex Court in almost similar circumstances, examined the rigor of Order 17, Rule 18 C.P.C. In case of Parmanand v. Bajrang, 2001 (3) RLW (SC) 426 (supra), there was a situation that evidence of the defendant was closed after rejecting his prayer for adjournment and the suit was decreed. The Apex Court after examining the matter, remanded the matter back with a direction to the learned trial Court to afford the defendant opportunity to adduce his evidence and for deciding the matter afresh. The Apex Court observed in Paras 5 and 6 as infra: 5. We have heard learned counsel and perused the record. It was for defendant No. 1 to prove that the sale agreement, execution whereof was admitted by him, in fact, was not intended to be a real sale agreement and it was only a security for the loan advanced to him by the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 could not lead any evidence as adjournment to produce the evidence was denied to him. Whether there was any pressure on defendant No. 1 and/or the sale agreement was executed only as a security for loan, it was for him to prove. We do not wish to say anything more lest it may prejudice the case of any of the parties. Whether there was any pressure on defendant No. 1 and/or the sale agreement was executed only as a security for loan, it was for him to prove. We do not wish to say anything more lest it may prejudice the case of any of the parties. As earlier noticed, defendant No. 1 in his appeal before the High Court sought remand of the suit to the trial Court for an opportunity to lead evidence. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the relief that could be given to defendant No. I was to grant an opportunity to him to lead evidence before the trial Court instead of recording a finding as above without any evidence and on that basis dismissing the suit. Counsel for the appellant has no objection if an opportunity is granted to defendant No. 1/respondent to adduce evidence in the suit. 6. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and direct the trial Court to afford opportunity to defendant No. I to adduce evidence in the suit and decide the matter afresh without being influenced by observations made in this order or in the impugned judgment of the High Court. (Emphasis supplied) 11. The next judgment i.e. Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1400 (supra), is on a different issue because that was a case wherein the Supreme Court has observed that a party should not suffer for misdemeanor or inaction of his counsel. Although the issue involved in the matter was different but nonetheless it can render some assistance to the cause of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant has been non-suited in the present case on account of absence of his counsel. 12. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant about the non- recording of finding on issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5, suffice it to say that from a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is amply clear that the order impugned is not in consonance and in conformity with Order 20, Rule 5 C.P.C. 13. 12. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant about the non- recording of finding on issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5, suffice it to say that from a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is amply clear that the order impugned is not in consonance and in conformity with Order 20, Rule 5 C.P.C. 13. On close scrutiny of the legal precedents referred to supra and peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, in my considered opinion, the learned Court below has committed grave and serious error of law and fact in rejecting the application of the appellant under Order 18, Rule 17 C.P.C. and consequently rejecting the suit itself. It is a trite law that normally the Courts are expected to decide the lis involved in the matter bipartite and not to deny justice to a litigant on mere technicalities or on account of some omissions on the part of its counsel. The Courts are meant for imparting substantial justice and as and when technicalities are pitted against substantial justice, the Court must see that substantial justice prevails. One more redeeming fact in the matter is that the respondents have not chosen to contest this appeal, therefore, viewed from any angle in the interest of justice, I feel that some indulgence is required to be granted to the appellant and atleast one opportunity is required to be given to the appellant for adducing its evidence. In this view of the matter, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below cannot be sustained. 14. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 24.4.1994 passed by Addl. District judge No. 3, Kota is reversed and set aside and the file is remitted back to the learned trial Court for deciding it afresh after giving one more opportunity to the appellant for adducing its evidence. The learned trial Court is directed to ensure appearance of the parties by issuing notices to them at the earliest. As the matter is very old one, inasmuch as the suit was filed by the appellant way back in the year 1983, it is expected from the learned trial Court to decide the main suit afresh as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a year from the date of receipt of copy of this order and the requisite record. As the matter is very old one, inasmuch as the suit was filed by the appellant way back in the year 1983, it is expected from the learned trial Court to decide the main suit afresh as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a year from the date of receipt of copy of this order and the requisite record. The record of the case be sent back forthwith. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal Allowed. *******