Judgment Challenging the order of penalty dated 24.11.2000 and the appellate order dated 06.08.2004, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed as an Electrical Operative, Grade – III on 13.03.1970. A charge-memo was served upon the petitioner on 29.11.1999 and the petitioner submitted his reply however, a departmental proceeding was initiated for imposition of major penalty upon the petitioner. On conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry report was submitted on 25.09.2000 whereunder the charge levelled against the petitioner was found proved. A copy of the enquiry report was served upon the petitioner and the petitioner submitted his reply to the second show-cause notice. The disciplinary authority agreed with the enquiry report whereunder it has been found that the petitioner had contracted the second marriage while his first wife was alive and therefore, he imposed a penalty of dismissal from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal however, it was dismissed by order dated 06.08.2004. In the aforesaid facts the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed stating that the petitioner admittedly contracted a second marriage without seeking permission of the department and therefore, in view of Clause 37 (xxiii) of standing order, the petitioner is liable to be proceeded for committing the said misconduct. After the enquiry, it was found that the petitioner contracted the second marriage while his first wife was alive and therefore, the charge against the petitioner was found proved. In these facts, the order of penalty dated 24.11.2000 was passed whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. On consideration of the materials on record, the appellate authority also rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner by order dated 06.08.2004 and therefore, this is not a matter which requires interference by this Court exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that even if it is admitted that the petitioner without seeking prior approval, contracted the second marriage while his first wife was alive, the order of dismissal from service is definitely excessive and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and found proved against the petitioner. 5. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that even if it is admitted that the petitioner without seeking prior approval, contracted the second marriage while his first wife was alive, the order of dismissal from service is definitely excessive and disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and found proved against the petitioner. He has further submitted that the date on which charge-memo was served upon the petitioner and the date on which the petitioner was dismissed from service, the petitioner had already divorced his first wife and thereafter, he had contracted the second marriage and therefore, the fact that his first wife was alive is of no consequence. It has not been found by the department during the enquiry that the petitioner's marriage with his first wife was subsisting when the charge-memo was served upon the petitioner. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Ananda Sen, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that admittedly the petitioner did not obtain permission of the department before contracting the second marriage and therefore, in terms of Clause 37 (xxiii) of the Certified standing order, he has committed a misconduct and therefore, he was proceeded in a departmental proceeding. It is further submitted that it has come on record that the petitioner was living with another lady, with whom he contracted the second marriage, since 10.02.1988 itself. The misconduct alleged and found proved against the petitioner is for the act of not seeking permission from the department before contracting the second marriage. It has been pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the petitioner has been punished in another departmental proceeding and his appeal is pending for consideration. 7. Clause 37 (xxiii) of the Certified standing order of Steel Authority of India Limited is reproduced below:- Clause 37 (xxiii): Contracting another marriage while wife is still alive, or marrying a person who has a wife without first obtaining the permission of the management. 8. A perusal of the documents on record would disclose that the petitioner though contracted the second marriage, he had already divorced his wife on 29.05.1998. Charge framed against the petitioner is for the misconduct of not seeking permission of the department before contracting the second marriage and the charge no-where mentions the fact that he was living with another lady since 10.02.1988. 9. Charge framed against the petitioner is for the misconduct of not seeking permission of the department before contracting the second marriage and the charge no-where mentions the fact that he was living with another lady since 10.02.1988. 9. This may be an error or a mistake on the part of the employee in not seeking permission of the department before contracting second marriage but by no stretch of imagination, this can be said that such a misconduct would warrant an order of dismissal from service. Besides the above, on a plain reading of the provision contained in Clause 37 (xxiii) of the Certified standing order, I am of the view that this would not be applicable to a person who is a Muslim because the important expression appearing in the said Clause is 'when the first wife is still alive' and there cannot be any dispute that a Muslim can marry a second time after divorcing his wife and therefore, whether the first wife was alive or not, is of no consequence for a Muslim for contracting the second marriage. I am of the opinion that, the punishment of dismissal from service is excessive and definitely disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and found proved against the petitioner. Ordinarily, the Writ Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not substitute its own decision over the decision of the authorities and the authorities alone are competent to take a decision with respect to the quantum of punishment, however, in certain situations the High Court can interfere with the order of penalty. 10. In “Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel” reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “20. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of true of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence.” 11. In “Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union of India”, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed:- “The quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to decide and the jurisdiction of the High courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as Wednesbury principles.” 12. In “Dev Singh Vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Another”, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 9 , a case where an official file was misplaced and for that the employee was proceeded in departmental enquiry and he was dismissed from service for the said misconduct, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus, “6. In “Dev Singh Vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Another”, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 9 , a case where an official file was misplaced and for that the employee was proceeded in departmental enquiry and he was dismissed from service for the said misconduct, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus, “6. A perusal of the above judgments clearly shows that a court sitting in appeal against a punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty, however, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the above noted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case.” 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders are quashed. Since the petitioner would have superannuated from service on 31.03.2010, the matter is remanded for fresh consideration by the authorities within 8 weeks, in so far as quantum of punishment is concerned. 14. The Writ Petition is disposed of with the aforesaid direction.