Judgment : A. Hariprasad, J. 1. Revision petitioner is the 1st defendant in a suit for injunction filed before the Wakf Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") by the 1st respondent/plaintiff. 2nd respondent Wakf Board is the 2nd defendant in the suit. Challenge herein is against the temporary injunction order passed by the Tribunal against the petitioner. 2. 1st respondent's case in the injunction petition is as follows: The shop building described in the plaint schedule, situated in Kozhikode City, belongs to a Wakf. 1st respondent/plaintiff is a Wakf Trust represented by the Secretary. Plaintiff is in management of the Wakf properties. Predecessor of the revision petitioner took the shop room on rent from the muthavalli of the Wakf as per an agreement on 15.09.1973. Revision petitioner is running a printing press in the tenanted premises. Another suit was filed against the revision petitioner by the Wakf, seeking eviction from the premises. On 19.06.2012, the 1st respondent/plaintiff noticed the revision petitioner taking hasty steps for materially altering the structure of the tenanted shop room. Revision petitioner removed the windows of the rooms and attempted to change the roofing. They intended to construct a new structure. Hence the suit is filed for permanent prohibitory injunction along with the application for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Revision petitioner/1st defendant filed a counter affidavit raising the following contentions: The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Dispute in the suit is relating to the rights and liabilities arising out of landlord-tenant relationship between the Wakf and the revision petitioner. 1st respondent/plaintiff suppressed the factum of dismissal of eviction suit, O.S.No.13 of 2006 by the court. 1st respondent is not an entity coming under the Trusts Act, 1882 and therefore, it has no legal personality to institute a suit in its own name. It is also contended that if at all a trust was formed, it is incompetent to represent or act on behalf of a Wakf. To the knowledge of the revision petitioner, no scheme has been framed by the Wakf Board in relation to the Wakf in question. The suit should have been filed before a civil court and not before the Tribunal. Revision petitioner has not made or attempted to make any new construction. To the knowledge of the revision petitioner, no scheme has been framed by the Wakf Board in relation to the Wakf in question. The suit should have been filed before a civil court and not before the Tribunal. Revision petitioner has not made or attempted to make any new construction. No material alteration of a permanent nature affecting the stability of the structure was contemplated or carried out. The suit and injunction application are legally and factually not maintainable. 4. We heard the learned counsel Sri.B.G.Bhaskar, appearing for the revision petitioner, Sri.P.A.Abdul Jabbar, for the 1st respondent and Sri.K.Shibili Naha, Standing Counsel for the Wakf Board. 5. Law is trite regarding the issues to be considered in a temporary injunction application. Court will have to consider initially whether the petitioner has established a prima facie case to claim temporary injunction. Secondly, it will have to consider the balance of convenience to determine in whose favour it lies and thirdly, who will suffer irreparable injury or loss, if temporary injunction is either granted or disallowed. It is also axiomatic that the purpose of temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject matter in dispute as it existed on the date of institution of the suit. 6. Fundamental question raised by Sri.B.G.Bhaskar, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, is that the Tribunal erred in holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is specifically contended by the revision petitioner that the Tribunal wrongly relied on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum and another (2010 (4) KLT 765). It is further contended that the Tribunal should have followed the decision of the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram (deceased by Lrs.) v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (AIR 2010 SC 2897). Learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that there is no conflict between the said decisions rendered by Benches of co-equal strength of the Supreme Court. According to him, the decision in Ramesh Gobindram's case(supra) is the one applicable to the facts of this case. 7. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the Tribunal is perfectly right in following the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, which considered and explained the earlier decision on the same subject. Therefore, there is no legal error committed by the Tribunal. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the Tribunal is perfectly right in following the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, which considered and explained the earlier decision on the same subject. Therefore, there is no legal error committed by the Tribunal. 8. Article 141 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: "141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.-The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India." The said Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare law. It is well settled that what is the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it (see United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi - 1998 (1) KLT 951 (FB)). 9. Regarding the binding nature of precedents, we find a large body of case law pronounced by the Apex Court as well as various High Courts. It may be superfluous to narrate all the decisions, for it will only make this judgment obese. A Bench decision of the Supreme Court, consisting of five learned Judges, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2005 SC 752) laid down the law regarding precedents in lucid terms. It has been held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. It has also been held that a Bench of lesser quorum cannot doubt the correctness of the view of law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. 10. Question as to which of the decisions pronounced by Benches of the Supreme Court of co-equal strength is the binding precedent was considered by this Court on many occasions. In Joseph v. Special Tahsildar (2001 (1) KLT 958) Full Bench of this Court considered the above question in extenso. Law laid down therein is the following: "We may now refer to a few High Court decisions on the question where an apparent conflict between an earlier and a later decision of the Apex Court by Benches consisting of equal number of Judges is pointed out. In our view, in such a situation the later decision must prevail over the earlier decision." 11. In our view, in such a situation the later decision must prevail over the earlier decision." 11. Later, a Full Bench of this Court in Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman (2011 (4) KLT 458) answered a reference order relating to the binding nature of decisions, where conflicting views are expressed in the decisions of two Benches of co-equal strength of the Supreme Court. After an elaborate precedential survey, following propositions have been laid down: "The legal position, which therefore emerges on a discussion and analysis of the principles stated in various decisions of the Apex Court and other High Courts including this Court, so as to act as guidance to the High Courts and Subordinate Courts, when faced with a conflicting decisions, are summarised below:- (i) In case of conflicting views taken in the decisions of two Benches of equal strength of the Apex Court, the decision later in point of time, will prevail over the earlier one; (ii) What is binding is the ratio decidendi. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. (iii) A decision which is not expressed and is not found on reasons nor proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Art.141 of the Constitution. Similarly, any declaration made or conclusion arrived at without application of mind or preceded without a reason, cannot be a declaration of law, or authority as a binding precedent. (iv) It is well settled that what is the essence of a decision is the ratio and not every observation, nor what logically follows from various observations made in it. (v) The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Art.141 of the Constitution. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Art.141 of the Constitution. (vi) A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn. p.153). (vii) A Division Bench, in case of conflict between the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges and the decision of a larger Bench and in particular, a Constitution Bench, would be bound by the latter decision. (viii) Per incuriam means a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision such as a decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law. A ruling making specific reference to an earlier binding precedent may. Or may not be correct, but cannot be said to be per incuriam". Hence, it is now indubitable that the decision rendered by the Apex Court later in point of time will prevail over the earlier one. 12. From the above discussion, it is evident that the Tribunal is absolutely right in following the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum's case (supra) as that is the later decision on the point. 13. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that there is no conflict between the decisions rendered by the supreme Court in Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum's case and Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra). According to him, these two decisions operate in different fields. This submission is stoutly denied by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. We shall now examine the decisions closely to appreciate this contention. 14. In Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra) the question posed for determination by the Supreme Court was whether or not the Tribunal can entertain and adjudicate upon a dispute regarding eviction of a tenant holding a Wakf property? Facts therein would show that certain suits were filed for eviction of tenants, occupying the buildings belonging to a Wakf. 14. In Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra) the question posed for determination by the Supreme Court was whether or not the Tribunal can entertain and adjudicate upon a dispute regarding eviction of a tenant holding a Wakf property? Facts therein would show that certain suits were filed for eviction of tenants, occupying the buildings belonging to a Wakf. After considering the relevant provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the Supreme Court stated the law as follows: "From a conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 (supra) it is clear that the jurisdiction to determine whether or not a property is a wakf property or whether a wakf is a Shia wakf or a Sunni wakf rests entirely with the Tribunal and no suit or other proceeding can be instituted or commenced in a Civil Court in relation to any such question after the commencement of the Act. What is noteworthy is that under Section 6 read with Section 7 (supra) the institution of the Civil Court is barred only in regard to questions that are specifically enumerated therein. The bar is not complete so as to extend to other questions they may arise in relation to the wakf property. xxxxxxxxxxxxx A plain reading of the above would show that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the matter in dispute is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The words "which is required by or under this Act to be determined by Tribunal" holds the key to the question whether or not all disputes concerning the wakf or wakf property stand excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Whenever a question arises whether "any dispute, question or other matter" relating to "any wakf or wakf property or other matter" falls within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court the answer would depend upon whether any such dispute, question or other matter is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. If the answer be in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be excluded qua such a question, for in that case the Tribunal alone can entertain and determine any such question. If the answer be in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be excluded qua such a question, for in that case the Tribunal alone can entertain and determine any such question. The bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 85 is in that sense much wider than that contained in Section 6(5) read with Section 7 of the Wakf Act. While the latter bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only in relation of questions specified in Sections 6 (1) and 7(1), the bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 85 would exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts not only in relation to matters that specifically fall in Sections 6 and 7 but also other matters required to be determined by a Tribunal under the Act. There are a host of such matters in which the Tribunal exercises original or appellate jurisdiction. ........... xxxxxxxxxxxx .................... Suffice it to say that there are a host of questions and matters that have to be determined by the Tribunal under the Act, in relation to the wakf or wakf property or other matters. Section 85 of the Act clearly bars jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any suit or proceedings in relation to orders passed by or proceedings that may be commenced before the Tribunal. It follows that although Section 85 is wider than what is contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts even under Section 85 is not absolute. It is limited only to matters that are required by the Act to be determined by a Tribunal. So long as the dispute or question raised before the Civil Court does not fall within four corners of the powers vested in the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the former to entertain a suit or proceedings in relation to any such question cannot be said to be barred." 15. After laying down the principles as aforementioned, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not provide for any proceedings before the Tribunal for determination of a dispute concerning the eviction of a tenant in occupation of Wakf property or the rights and obligations of the lessors and lessees of such property. Hence, it was concluded that a suit seeking eviction of tenants from what is admittedly a Wakf property could, therefore, be filed only before the civil court and not before the Tribunal. 16. Hence, it was concluded that a suit seeking eviction of tenants from what is admittedly a Wakf property could, therefore, be filed only before the civil court and not before the Tribunal. 16. Now, we shall consider the ratio in Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum's case (supra). That is a case wherein the dispute pertained to the Wakf estate created by a registered deed by one late Shahzadi Begum. Certain dispositions were made by the Wakif relating to the Wakf property, so as to create a portion for Wakf-al-al-aulad and remaining for pious and religious purposes. Disputes relating to the administration of Wakf was taken to the original side of the Calcutta High Court. Basic question that arose for consideration of the Supreme Court is whether the suit could be entertained by a civil court or whether it should have been entertained by a Wakf Tribunal. After a detailed survey of the various provisions in the Act and after considering the decision in Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra), it was held thus: "The Wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property. The words "any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property" are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. Any dispute, question or other matters whatsoever and in whatever manner which arises relating to a Wakf or Wakf property can be decided by the Wakf Tribunal. The word 'Wakf' has been defined in S.3(r) of the Wakf Act, 1995 and hence once the property is found to be a Wakf property as defined in S.3(r), then any dispute, question or other matter relating to it should be agitated before the Wakf Tribunal. When there is a special law providing for a special forum, then recourse cannot be taken to the general law." 17. Regarding the scope of decision in Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra), it was held thus: "Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied on the decision of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010 (3) KLT 862 (SC) = (2010) 8 SCALE 698). In the aforesaid decision it was held that eviction proceedings can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the Wakf Tribunal. The dispute in the present case is not an eviction dispute. In the aforesaid decision it was held that eviction proceedings can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the Wakf Tribunal. The dispute in the present case is not an eviction dispute. Hence, the aforesaid decision in Ramesh Gobindram's case is distinguishable." 18. It is, therefore, evident that the Supreme Court, while disposing thecase of Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum (supra), has not only considered the various provisions of the Act, but also considered and distinguished the decision in Ramesh Gobindram's case (supra). In other words, the second decision in point of time has touched upon the very same subject and has discussed all the statutory provisions along with the earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the same subject. The Supreme Court having considered and distinguished its earlier decision on the point, it is the duty of all courts in the Country to follow the second decision as a binding precedent in respect of matters dealt with therein. Submission of the revision petitioner that decisions mentioned above, of the Supreme Court, operate in different fields cannot therefore be accepted. 19. Another contention of the revision petitioner is regarding the competency of the plaintiff to institute a suit on behalf of the Wakf. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the plaintiff Trust is in administration of the Wakf property. Whether the plaintiff Trust is competent to institute a suit for injunction, on behalf of the Wakf, against the defendant is a matter which will have to be independently considered and decided, as it is a vexed question of fact and law. Stated differently, it cannot be decided in a proceedings under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, that contention of the revision petitioner also has to fail. 20. Tribunal considered and found that the 1st respondent made out a prima facie case for claiming temporary injunction. Relief sought is only to prevent the permanent alteration of the tenanted premises. Object of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of dispute as on the date of the suit. Balance of convenience and aspect of injury are favourable to the plaintiff/1st respondent. Therefore, Tribunal's finding that the 1st respondent is entitled to temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit is legally correct and factually justifiable. Balance of convenience and aspect of injury are favourable to the plaintiff/1st respondent. Therefore, Tribunal's finding that the 1st respondent is entitled to temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit is legally correct and factually justifiable. We find no merit in the revision petition. In the result, i. Civil Revision Petition (Wakf) is dismissed. ii. Parties are directed to suffer their costs.