JUDGMENT : - Tapan Kumar Dutt, J : The learned Advocate for the respondent has completed his submissions today and thereafter the learned Advocate for the appellant has made his submissions in reply. 2. The hearing is concluded. 3. The Court now proceeds to deliver the following judgment. 4. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and having considered the materials on record it appears to this Court that the following are the facts of the case. 5. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for ejectment against the defendant/appellant being Title Suit No. 189 of 2005 and it appears that the said suit was filed on 12.12.2005 and it was placed before the Court of the learned Second Civil Judge (Junior Division), Burdwan. The said suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondent, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff/respondent requires a suit premises for own use and occupation. It further appears that before filing of the suit the plaintiff/respondent had given a notice dated 11.07.2005 through his learned Advocate to the defendant/appellant asking the defendant/appellant to quit and vacate the suit premises. The defendant/appellant contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint. The said ejectment suit came up for final hearing before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 20th December, 2007 decreed the said suit and passed a decree for ejectment against the defendant/appellant. The learned Trial Court after considering the materials on record came to the findings that the plaintiff/respondent is the owner of the suit premises and there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff/respondent and the plaintiff/appellant and that the plaintiff had served a notice of eviction which contained threat of suit in case the defendant did not vacate, upon the defendant. The learned Trial Court has also found that a letter of attornment was also served by the plaintiff/respondent upon the defendant/appellant. It appears from the learned Trial Court’s judgment that the learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff’s family consists of the plaintiff himself, his wife and his school going daughter and also the plaintiff’s old parents. The learned Trial Court has also found that a letter of attornment was also served by the plaintiff/respondent upon the defendant/appellant. It appears from the learned Trial Court’s judgment that the learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff’s family consists of the plaintiff himself, his wife and his school going daughter and also the plaintiff’s old parents. The learned Trial Court further found that the plaintiff is in possession of only one room on the ground floor of the suit holding and the rest of the ground floor is in possession of the defendant and the plaintiff is living with his family in one room on the ground floor and also in one room on the first floor of the suit holding with the permission of his brother as the plaintiff’s brother is the owner of the first floor of the suit holding. Thus it appears that the plaintiff is occupying only one room on the ground floor by his own right and the plaintiff is also occupying one room on the first floor and his brother has given him permission for occupying such room. The learned Trial Court further found that the plaintiff’s father had some property at Chayanbag but such property was sold by the plaintiff’s father in the year 2003 and the plaintiff had purchased the suit property in the year 2000. It further appears from the Trial Court’s judgment that the defendant has two plots for raising a building construction within the Burdwan Municipality and that the defendant’s children are married and the defendant’s two sons are in their respective work-places in Delhi. 6. Challenging the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court the defendant/appellant filed Title Appeal No. 10 of 2008 before the learned District Judge, Burdwan and the learned lower Appellate Court by judgment and decree dated 29th August, 2008 dismissed the said appeal after a contested hearing. The learned Lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and the plaintiff has properly served an appropriate notice of ejectment upon the defendant/appellant. The learned lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff is occupying only one room on the ground floor of the suit holding and another room on the first floor of the suit holding with the permission of his brother. The learned lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff is occupying only one room on the ground floor of the suit holding and another room on the first floor of the suit holding with the permission of his brother. The learned lower Appellate Court also found that the plaintiff does not have any alternative suitable accommodation and the notice of suit has been properly served upon the defendant/appellant. The learned lower Appellate Court has concurred with the findings made by the learned Trial Court. 7. Challenging the said judgment and decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court the defendant/appellant has filed the instant appeal in this Court and an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court by Order dated 21st November, 2008 was pleased to admit the appeal on certain substantial questions of law. It appears that such question as to whether or not the learned Courts below had jurisdiction to entertain the eviction suit and/or the appeal and also the question as to whether or not the notice under Section 6(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 was proved to have been served upon the defendant/appellant by the plaintiff/respondent, involve substantial questions of law. 8. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant/appellant submitted that on 12th December, 2005 the eviction suit was filed and on 20th December, 2007 the said suit was decreed and the title appeal was dismissed on 29th August, 2008. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 43 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short Premises Tenancy Act) and submitted that the appeal, which was filed by the defendant/appellant challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, should have been filed before the Tribunal concerned as the provision for appeal is given in Section 43 of the Premises Tenancy Act. He also referred to Section 43A of the Premises Tenancy Act and submitted that such provision of law came by way of amendment of the Act and was given effect to from 1st November, 2010 i.e. after the title appeal had been disposed of. It appears from the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (amendment) Act, 2010 that the gazette notification, as has been stated in Section 1(2) of the said amendment Act of 2010, is dated 5th October, 2010 and as such it came into force on and from such date. 9. It appears from the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (amendment) Act, 2010 that the gazette notification, as has been stated in Section 1(2) of the said amendment Act of 2010, is dated 5th October, 2010 and as such it came into force on and from such date. 9. The said learned Advocate submitted that such amendment has to be given effect to prospectively and not retrospectively. He thus submitted that the aforesaid appeal could not have been entertained by the learned lower Appellate Court since the amendment came into effect after the disposal of the appeal. According to the said learned Advocate since the appeal was filed in the year 2008 the learned lower Appellate Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain that appeal at that point of time. The said learned Advocate submitted that if the amendment Act had come into force either in October or November, 2010 then some of the provisions of the said Act could not have been given effect from 10th July, 2001. According to the said learned Advocate, Section 4 of the said amendment Act of 2010 by which it has been stated that the amendments made in the principal Act by Sections 2 and 3 shall be deemed to have been made with effect from 10th July, 2001 is redundant and it is of no use. It appears from Section 2 of the said amendment Act of 2010 that it deals with the provisions of Section 39 of the Premises Tenancy Act whereby it was made clear that proceedings referred to Section 39 means certain kind of proceedings as mentioned in the said amendment Act. By Section 3 of the said Amendment Act of 2010, Section 43A was introduced wherein it was stated that the procedure for filing an appeal against a decree or final order of Civil Judge, and the powers to be exercised and the procedure to be followed in admitting and dealing with such appeal, shall be the same as in case of appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It has further been stipulated that in case of revision and review against any decree or final order of civil judge, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply mutatis mutandis. It has further been stipulated that in case of revision and review against any decree or final order of civil judge, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Section 4 of the said amendment Act of 2010 stipulates that the amendments made in the principal Act by Sections 2 and 3 (as indicated above) shall be deemed to have been made with effect from 10th day of July, 2001 and accordingly anything done or any action taken or purported to have been taken or done under the principal Act on or after the said date and before commencement of the said Act shall, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other Authority be, deemed to be, and to have always been for all purposes, as validly and effectively taken or done as if the said amendments had been in force at all material time. The said learned Advocate submitted that since the notification was made on 5th October, 2010 the validation could not have been given effect from 10th July, 2001. 10. The learned Advocate for the appellant referred to the provisions of Section 2(r) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 (for short, Tribunal Act) wherein the expressions “specified Act” has been stated to include the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (only against the final order of the controller). He also referred to the provisions of Section 2(u) of the Tribunal Act, which defines the word Tribunal. He has also referred to the preamble of the Tribunal Act and to the provisions of the Article 323B of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the said Premises Tenancy Act is a specified Act and, therefore, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate an eviction proceeding. He referred to Section 3 of the Tribunal Act which says that the provisions of the Tribunal Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any contract, express or implied. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 6(a) of the said Tribunal Act and submitted that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction, power and the authority in relation to any order made by an Authority under a specified Act. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 6(a) of the said Tribunal Act and submitted that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction, power and the authority in relation to any order made by an Authority under a specified Act. He submitted that the learned Civil Judge was acting as an Authority under the Tribunal Act and not as a regular Civil Court. He submitted that in other words the learned Civil Judge had discharged the functions of a Controller while passing a decree for eviction. The said learned Advocate for the appellant also referred to Section 8 of the Tribunal Act in support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded in respect of the decision of any matter under any of the provision of specified Act and since the Premises Tenancy Act is a specified Act under the Tribunal Act the learned lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 11. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 9 of the Tribunal Act which provides for transfer of case records from High Court to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The said learned Advocate also referred to Section 44 of the Premises Tenancy Act which provides that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to fixation of fair rent in relation to any premises to which the said Act applies or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered by the said Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Controller under the said Act shall be granted by any Civil Court unless it is otherwise provided in the said Act. The said learned Advocate submitted that Section 43A of the Premises Tenancy Act deals with only procedure and not the Forum to which an appeal lies. He further submitted that it is a constitutional mandate to give power to the Tribunal and as such the question of adjudication by any Civil Court does not arise and, therefore, the learned District Judge did not have the power to entertain the title appeal. He further submitted that it is a constitutional mandate to give power to the Tribunal and as such the question of adjudication by any Civil Court does not arise and, therefore, the learned District Judge did not have the power to entertain the title appeal. He submitted that the learned District Judge could have returned the memorandum of appeal to the appellant for filing the same before the Tribunal concerned but the learned District Judge concerned acted illegally in not doing so. 12. The next point urged by the learned Advocate for the appellant is that the plaintiff/respondent failed to prove that the ejectment notice was duly served upon the defendant/appellant. In support of such contention the said learned Advocate submitted that the plaintiff being the P.W. 1 no where stated in his evidence that the ejectment notice was sent to the defendant/appellant at the correct address and, therefore, the question of presumption of service of notice does not arise. The learned Advocate for the appellant further submitted in this regard that the ejectment notice was written on behalf of the plaintiff by the plaintiff’s learned Advocate who was a public prosecutor and, therefore, the said learned Advocate did not have any authority to write such letter but later on when it was found that the said learned Advocate was a former public prosecutor the learned Advocate for the appellant did not press this point any further. The other point which the learned Advocate for the appellant urged was that both the learned Courts below did not discuss the extent of need of the plaintiff and yet granted a decree on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for own use and occupation. 13. The said learned Advocate submitted that it is true that the Special Bench of this Court in a decision reported at 2011(2) CLJ (Calcutta) 641 (Smt. Arati Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Sri Satya Narayan Tripathi & Ors) had considered the subsequent amendments of the aforesaid Acts but the facts and circumstances out of which the said case arose were quite different. He submitted that in the said reported case the matter arose out of execution proceedings and not an appeal and the question that was involved in the said reported case was as to whether the execution of the decree could be permitted or not. He submitted that in the said reported case the matter arose out of execution proceedings and not an appeal and the question that was involved in the said reported case was as to whether the execution of the decree could be permitted or not. The said learned Advocate submitted that in the instant case the appellant is not disputing that the learned Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the eviction suit and the learned Civil Judge had decided only as an authority under the Premises Tenancy Act but the learned District Judge concerned had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2007(1) WBLR (Calcutta) 333 in support of his contention that the learned District Judge concerned should have returned the memorandum of appeal to the learned lawyer of the defendant/appellant for filing the same before the appropriate Forum. He submitted that the suit was filed on 12.12.2005 when the word “proceeding” was still appearing in Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act instead of the word “suit”. The said learned Advocate submitted that in accordance with law the plaintiff/respondent was duty bound to serve the ejectment notice upon the defendant/appellant and since such service has not been proved the suit was bad in the eye of law. The said learned Advocate also submitted that the plaintiff has not pleaded his exact requirement in the pleadings nor proved his requirement of the suit premises and, therefore, no decree should have been granted in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. 14. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff submitted that under Section 21 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (for short, Civil Courts Act) an appeal from the decree made by the learned Civil Judge lay before the learned District Judge as would appear from the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in the facts and circumstances of the instant case the said Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act applies. The said learned Advocate submitted that the substantial questions of law in the instant case were formulated before the Amendment Acts of 2010 in respect of the said Premises Tenancy Act and the Tribunal Act came into force and as such the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court while formulating the said substantial questions of law did not have the occasion to consider the effect of such Amendment Acts of 2010. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act and submitted that the expression “Civil Judge having jurisdiction” was introduced in the said Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act by way of amendment of the said Section with effect from 19.3.2005 i.e. before the filing of the suit and, therefore, the suit was filed before the learned Civil Judge concerned. The said learned Advocate submitted that the expression introduced in the said Section, as aforesaid, would indicate that the learned Civil Judge who was already having jurisdiction in respect of such eviction suits could decide the matter. He submitted that it is true that the word “suit” was introduced in the said Section instead of the word “proceeding” by way of an amendment which took effect in June 2006 but nonetheless in December, 2005 when the suit was filed the suit was filed before the learned Civil Judge who was having jurisdiction to decide such eviction proceeding. His submission was that the word “suit” was introduced to make things more clear i.e. the Civil Judge concerned had jurisdiction to decide an eviction suit. According to the said learned Advocate, Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887 makes it abundantly clear that the appeal could lie from a decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) to the learned District Judge concerned in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The said learned Advocate referred to various Sections of the Premises Tenancy Act like Sections 17, 26, 27, 35 and 36 etc. to show that such Sections in the said Act provide that the Controller shall have power to deal with certain matters and/or disputes but Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act gives the power to the learned Civil Judge concerned to deal with an eviction Suit. to show that such Sections in the said Act provide that the Controller shall have power to deal with certain matters and/or disputes but Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act gives the power to the learned Civil Judge concerned to deal with an eviction Suit. The said learned Advocate, thus, submitted that the forum contemplated under the Premises Tenancy Act in so far as the eviction suit is concerned is the Court of the learned Civil Judge but in respect of some matters power has been given to the Controller to decide such matters. 15. The said learned Advocate submitted that Section 43 of the Premises Tenancy Act stipulates that an appeal shall lie from the final order of the Controller to the Tribunal but since the eviction decree in the instant case has been passed by a learned Civil Judge the question of filing of any appeal before the learned Tribunal does not arise. According to the said learned Advocate, the said Section 43 of the Premises Tenancy Act provides for filing of appeal against a final order of the Controller and not of a Civil Judge as contemplated under the Civil Courts Act, 1887. Section 43A of the Premises Tenancy Act which came into force on 5th October, 2010 prescribes the procedure that should be followed for filing an appeal against a decree or final order of the learned Civil Judge and in the instant case the said Section 43A of the Premises Tenancy Act is applicable and the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure have to be followed. The said learned Advocate submitted with regard to the forum for filing such appeal that Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887 has to be taken into consideration. The said learned Advocate submitted that in any event the Section 4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (Amendment) Act, 2010 (West Bengal Act XXIX of 2010) which was published in the gazette notification dated 5th October, 2010 provides that the amendment introduced by Sections 2 and 3 of the said Amendment Act shall be deemed to have been made with effect from 10th July, 2001 and it has validated the acts done during the period 10th July, 2001 till the time of such notification. The said learned Advocate, however, submitted that it is not necessary to go into such discussion in details in view of the fact that the relevant amendments of the Premises Tenancy Act and the Tribunal Act came up for consideration before the Special Bench of this Court in the said Arati Ghose’s case and the Special Bench had considered the said amendments and delivered its judgment as contained in the said reports (Arati Ghose’s case) (supra). It will appear from Paragraph 3 of the said reports (Arati Ghose’s case) (supra) that the Special Bench had found that in view of the said amending Acts which were given retrospective operation, the learned Courts below had been invested with jurisdiction with retrospective effect and as such the executing court concerned in that case should be entitled to proceed with the execution case by virtue of such amended provision of law. In Paragraph – 4 of the said reports the Special Bench has been pleased to observe that by the amending provisions the jurisdiction has been conferred upon the concerned Civil Court with retrospective effect and there is no bar in setting aside the order that was passed by the learned executing court concerned in the said case and directing the executing court to proceed with the execution case in accordance with law. 16. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2012(1) ICC 321 (Seema Begum & Anr. -vs- Marium Bibi & Ors.). It will appear that the said case was decided after the aforesaid amendments of the said West Bengal Acts came into force. The said learned Advocate referred to Paragraphs – 11 and 12 of the said reports in support of his submission that a Civil Judge or the District Judge or the Munsif cannot be termed as an officer or authority or functionary under the specified Act. The said learned Advocate referred to Paragraph – 21 of the said reports in support of his contention that the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge concerned in the instant case was susceptible to be challenged before the learned District Judge concerned as in the case of a regular Civil Suit. In this regard the said learned Advocate also referred to Paragraph – 25 of the said reports. In this regard the said learned Advocate also referred to Paragraph – 25 of the said reports. It will appear from the said reports that the said Tribunal Act and the Premises Tenancy Act was the subject matter of the consideration before the Hon’ble Court. In Paragraph – 29 of the said reports the Hon’ble Court was pleased to observe that the legislature consciously conferred jurisdiction upon the court and did not intend to confer the power of appeal upon the Tenancy Tribunal treating such court as an “authority’ under the specified Act. In Paragraph – 33 of the said reports the Hon’ble Court was pleased to observe that the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain an application against any order, judgment and a decree passed by a court as envisaged under Section 12A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the Schedule IV appended thereto in respect of a proceeding initiated under Sections 6 and 7 of the said Act. In Paragraph 45 of the said reports the Hon’ble Court was pleased to consider the provisions for validation of the Amendment Act, 2010 and in Paragraph – 46 of the said reports the Hon’ble Court was pleased to hold that the order passed by the learned Tribunal in the said case whereby the learned Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction of an appellate authority over the certain order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) concerned in a certain ejectment suit should be set aside as it was not legally sustainable. 17. The said learned Advocate further submitted that the Court has to consider the law as it stands when the matter comes up for final disposal and the Court has to take into consideration the subsequent changes in law. In support of such contention the said learned Advocate referred to AIR 2006 Supreme Court 351 in this regard. 18. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) could not have been considered to be an authority under Tribunal Act and as such the order was passed by such Civil Judge could not have been challenged before the Tribunal established under the said Tribunal Act. 18. The said learned Advocate submitted that the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) could not have been considered to be an authority under Tribunal Act and as such the order was passed by such Civil Judge could not have been challenged before the Tribunal established under the said Tribunal Act. The said learned Advocate submitted that the Civil Judge (Junior Division) has not been appointed under the specified Act and it functions as provided under the Civil Courts Act, 1887 and, therefore, the said Civil Judge is not an authority under the said Tribunal Act. 19. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the plaintiff has duly complied with Section 6(4) of the Premises Tenancy Act and both the learned Courts below have found that the ejectment notice was duly served upon the defendant-appellant and this Court should not disturb such concurrent finding of fact in a second appeal. The said learned Advocate further submitted that it will appear from the records that no objection was raised by the defendant-appellant when the relevant notice, A/D Card etc. were marked as Exhibit and admitted in evidence. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1655 in support of his contention that once such documents have been admitted in evidence without any objection, it will not be proper for this Court to discard such evidence on the basis of an allegation that such documents have not been proved in accordance with law. The said learned Advocate also cited a decision reported at AIR 1989 SC 630 in support of his contention that once the eviction notice was properly addressed and sent by registered post to the defendant-appellant it has to be presumed that the service has been duly effected upon the defendant-appellant. Of course, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that the fact of the instant case differs with the facts of the said reported case inasmuch as in the said reported case the postman concerned came forward to give evidence but in the instant case no such evidence is available. 20. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and in support of his contention he has referred to a decision reported at 1996(5) Supreme Court Cases 353. 21. 20. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and in support of his contention he has referred to a decision reported at 1996(5) Supreme Court Cases 353. 21. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and having considered the materials on record, it appears to this Court that the suit was filed on 12.12.2005 but before the date of filing of such suit Section 6 of the said Premises Tenancy Act was amended to introduce the expression “by the Civil Judge having jurisdiction” for the words “by the Controller”. Such amendment was with effect from 19.3.2005. Therefore when the ejectment suit was filed, it had to be filed before the learned Civil Judge concerned. It may be that the word “proceeding” was still contained in the said Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act when the suit was filed but it cannot make much difference because such proceeding was essentially a proceeding for eviction of a tenant. The legislature subsequently by further amending the said Section 6 introduced the words “except on a suit being instituted by such landlord” for the words “except on an application made to him by the landlord in the prescribed manner” and such amendment was with effect from 1.6.2006 i.e. before the suit could be disposed of. Thus when the time came from disposal of the suit both the words “Civil Judge” and the word “suit” was provided for in Section 6 of the Premises Tenancy Act. Reading Section 43 of the said Premises Tenancy Act would make it clear that the said Section has provided for filing of an appeal from a final order of a Controller to the Tribunal. Thus, the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only when final order of a Controller is challenged before such Tribunal but in the instant case the final decree which was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) was sought to be challenged by the defendant-appellant and the defendant-appellant himself filed an appeal before the learned District Judge concerned. Thus, the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only when final order of a Controller is challenged before such Tribunal but in the instant case the final decree which was passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) was sought to be challenged by the defendant-appellant and the defendant-appellant himself filed an appeal before the learned District Judge concerned. Thus, Section 43 cannot be said to be a provision which could have been resorted to by the defendant-appellant and the defendant-appellant had rightly filed the appeal before the learned District Judge concerned because such appeal could be filed in terms of the provisions of Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887. Section 43A deals with the procedure for filing such appeal. In the present case Section 43A is applicable as the provisions of Civil Procedure Code in this regard are applicable and the appeal contemplated under the said Section 43A is an appeal against a decree and final order of Civil Judge. That apart, considering the said Seema Begum’s case (supra) and the judgment delivered by the Special Bench, as aforesaid, it is now clear that the Amendment Acts, as already discussed above, have been validly given the retrospective effect and the judgment reported in the said reports i.e. the said Seema Begum’s case and also the Special Bench judgment have already considered this aspect of the matter. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that since the amendments were with effect from the date of notification or 1.11.2010 as the case may be, Section 4 of the said Amendment Acts could not have given the retrospective effect as it would result in a contradictory situation. This Court is unable to accept such contention as the legislature has the power to make an express provision for giving effect to certain provisions of law retrospectively provided such enactment is in accordance with law. This Court does not find any illegality in giving a retrospective effect as contemplated in Section 4 of the said Amendment Act of 2010 and particularly since such matter has already been considered in the Special Bench Judgment and also in the Seema Begum’s case (judgment delivered by a Division Bench). This Court does not find any illegality in giving a retrospective effect as contemplated in Section 4 of the said Amendment Act of 2010 and particularly since such matter has already been considered in the Special Bench Judgment and also in the Seema Begum’s case (judgment delivered by a Division Bench). It has to be noted that the substantial questions of law, as already indicated above, were formulated before the Amendment Acts of 2010 and in view of such Amendment Acts and the validation clause which gives retrospective effect, as aforesaid, and the judgments, reported cases discussed above, this Court does not find any substance in the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant that the learned Lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 22. With regard to the point raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the plaintiff could not prove service of ejectment notice upon the defendant-appellant as the plaintiff did not state in his evidence that the notice was sent to the correct address of the defendant-appellant, this Court is of the view that such point is also without substance. The learned Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiff has been able to prove service of ejectment notice upon the defendant-appellant. The relevant documents in this regard have been marked as Exhibits in the case. It does not appear that any objection was ever raised at the time of admission of such documents into evidence. It will appear from the records that the notice was sent to the correct address of the defendant. The learned Advocate for the defendant-appellant could not show from the records that the ejectment notice was sent to any address other than the correct address of the defendant. It does not make much difference as to whether or not the plaintiff-respondent has stated in evidence that the notice was sent to the correct address because the materials on record would speak for itself as to whether or not the ejectment notice was sent to the correct address. The plaintiff-landlord has come forward to give evidence and he has stated in evidence that his Advocate had sent a letter of ejectment notice by registered post with A/D to the defendant-appellant and he knows his lawyer’s signature and the defendant-appellant has also received such ejectment notice by putting his signature on the A/D Card. The plaintiff-landlord has come forward to give evidence and he has stated in evidence that his Advocate had sent a letter of ejectment notice by registered post with A/D to the defendant-appellant and he knows his lawyer’s signature and the defendant-appellant has also received such ejectment notice by putting his signature on the A/D Card. This Court is of the view that the plaintiff-respondent has sufficiently discharged his duty of proving the service of a valid notice. 23. With regard to the last point on the question of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff-landlord, this Court is also of the view that the point raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant is without any substance. It will appear from the evidence on record that the plaintiff-respondent has stated in evidence that he is residing in one room on the ground floor of the suit building of his own right and also in another room on the first floor of the suit building as a licensee under his brother that is by way of permissive occupation. There is no dispute that the plaintiff’s family consists of himself, his wife, his daughter who was a school-going daughter when the plaintiff gave evidence and has grown up by now, and his old parents. The plaintiff has stated in evidence that he purchased the suit property for residential purpose. He has stated that he wants possession of the suit premises urgently for his own residence as well as for his family members which includes his parents, wife and a school going daughter. 24. Considering the size of the plaintiff’s family and the number of members of such family and also considering the fact that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for residential purpose, it is quite evident that the plaintiff does reasonably require the suit premises for his own use and occupation. The occupation of the plaintiff in one room on the first floor of the suit premises is only a permissive occupation and it depends upon the wishes and whims of his brother to allow the plaintiff to stay in such room. It cannot be stated that the plaintiff has any right in respect of such room on the first floor of the suit building. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant submitted that the old parents of the plaintiff cannot be considered to be of the plaintiff’s family. It cannot be stated that the plaintiff has any right in respect of such room on the first floor of the suit building. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant-appellant submitted that the old parents of the plaintiff cannot be considered to be of the plaintiff’s family. Such argument is unacceptable to this Court. The old father and old mother of the plaintiff cannot be considered to be the members outside the plaintiff’s family particularly when such parents of the plaintiff have a desire to live with the plaintiff. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff’s father had some property at Chayan Bag but the same was sold in or about 2003 and, therefore, the plaintiff’s need is not a genuine need. This Court is also unable to accept such contention. Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff’s father had sold some property in the year 2003 and intended to live with the plaintiff, such selling of the property of the plaintiff's father in the year 2003 cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff claiming the suit premises for own use and occupation by filing a suit in the year 2005. The Court cannot compel the plaintiff to live without company of his parents if the parents of the plaintiff and the plaintiff himself both decide to live together. It is not proper to compel the plaintiff to live separately from his parents. This Court is unable to accept such extreme submissions made on behalf of the defendant-appellant. 25. Both the learned Courts below have come to the concurrent finding that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation. This Court is not inclined to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact while deciding a second appeal. It has also been found by the learned Courts below that the plaintiff does not have any other suitable alternative accommodation. 26. In view of the discussions made above, this Court does not find any merit in the instant second appeal which is dismissed. The judgment and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are affirmed. 27. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible on compliance of all necessary formalities.