Pratapmal Dharewa Dadabari Trust, Sujangarh v. Ganpat Das
2013-04-04
VINEET KOTHARI
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Hon'ble Dr. KOTHARI, J.—The present writ petition has been filed by the plaintiff – Shri Pratapmal Dharewa Dadabari Trust, Sujangarh and its three trustees against the defendant-respondents Ganpat Das s/o Kaludas & other legal representatives of late Kaludas, who was working as Poojari in the temple managed by the registered Public Trust, the petitioner no.1. The petitioner plaintiffs are aggrieved by the order Annex.7 dated 16/12/2011,whereby, the learned trial court in a suit for mandatory injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from encroaching the land of temple of deity, which was managed by the petitioner Public Trust and forcibly performing Pooja therein and not to interfere in the day-to-day management of the petitioner Public Trust along with damages for unauthorised occupation by them on the part of the property of petitioner Trust, which was duly registered as Public Trust with the Devasthan Department. By the impugned order the petitioner Trust sought to prove the photocopy of the original Patta of Samvat Year 1898, more than 100 years old document, as a secondary evidence, since the original Patta was given to their advocate Shri Har Gopal Mohta of Bikaner, who died during the pendency of said trial in the year 2008 and the photocopy of the said Patta was already on the record of the trial court and other corroborative evidence in the form of registration of petitioner Trust with the Devasthan Department including the description of the property vide order No.12/87/Churu of the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Bikaner dated 25/6/1987 (Annex.8) in the case file No. 68/85 passed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 and Annex.2 giving the details of the immovable property of the said petitioner Trust including the land of 10000 sq. yds, which is approximately the land of 9 bighas disclosed in the Patta, a copy whereof is produced as Annex.5 on record, which Patta is in favour of petitioner Trust/Trustees. 2. The legal representatives of deceased Poojari Kalu Das are contesting the said suit filed by the plaintiff Trust. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.
yds, which is approximately the land of 9 bighas disclosed in the Patta, a copy whereof is produced as Annex.5 on record, which Patta is in favour of petitioner Trust/Trustees. 2. The legal representatives of deceased Poojari Kalu Das are contesting the said suit filed by the plaintiff Trust. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Abhinav Jain submitted that the learned trial court has erred in rejecting the application of the petitioner Trust under Section 65 of the Evidence Act in not allowing the plaintiffs to lead secondary evidence in the form of Patta, a 100 years old document, which itself is entitled to a presumption of it being valid as per Section 90 of the Evidence Act and the original of which, in the circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner Trust, namely death of their advocate Shri Har Gopal Mohta in 2008, a photocopy of which is duly produced at the time of filing the suit itself and since the respondent-defendants, legal representatives of deceased Poojari Kalu Das, who had no right to remain in possession of the part of the property known as Hanuman Temple within the premises of Jain Temple belonging to the petitioner Trust and in fact the respondent-defendants were illegally occupying the said portion of the property and were illegally trying to encroach upon the other part of the land also. Learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, submitted that not only the suit against them deserves to be decreed but in the absence of title being allowed to be proved by the plaintiffs under the garb of impugned order, a serious miscarriage of justice would result in the present case. 4. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his case. (i) M.Chandra vs. M.Thangmuthu & anr.- 2010 AIR SCW 6362 (ii) Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (D) & ors. - 2007 AIR SCW 4583 5. On the other hand, Mr. N.L.Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-defendants submitted that the impugned order of the learned trial court is justified and such interlocutory order does not require interference by this Court in the present writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions.
On the other hand, Mr. N.L.Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-defendants submitted that the impugned order of the learned trial court is justified and such interlocutory order does not require interference by this Court in the present writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions. (i) Rajendra Pal vs. Smt. Anjali Singh – 1996(1) RLR 439 ; (ii) Smt. J. Yashoda vs. Smt. K.Shobha Rani – 2007 AIR SCW 2713; (iii) Dr. Gurmukh Ram Madan vs. Bhagwan Das Madan – 1999(1) RLW 103. 6. I have heard the learned counsels at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and gone through the case laws cited at the bar. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Chandra vs. M. Thangmuthu & anr.- 2010 AIR SCW 6362 emphasizing the need of secondary evidence to be allowed where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party held in para 30 of the judgment as under:- “It is true that a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of a document must adduce primary evidence of the contents, and only in the exceptional cases will secondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence is admissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available, whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidence of the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. It should be emphasized that the exceptions to the rule requiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where a party is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of that party. In the instant case, the appellant, a returned candidate, had produced duplicate copy of conversion certificate issued by Arya Samaj to prove herself to be Hindu belonging to Scheduled Caste in election petition filed against her. It was her specific case that much before the Assembly Elections 2006, she had undergone all the rituals in Arya Samaj only for the purpose of reaffirmation of Hindu faith and the conversion certificate issued by Arya Samaj was received and acknoledged by her uncle, who had accompanied her.
It was her specific case that much before the Assembly Elections 2006, she had undergone all the rituals in Arya Samaj only for the purpose of reaffirmation of Hindu faith and the conversion certificate issued by Arya Samaj was received and acknoledged by her uncle, who had accompanied her. It was also her specific case that she did not take back the certificate from her uncle, since she was of the view that the same may not be required for her purpose. It is only when the election petition was filed, it order to prove her case of reaffirmation of her faith in Hinduism, she came to know that her uncle has lost the certificate, which necessitated her to obtain a duplicate copy of conversion certificate from Arya Samaj. The contents of the duplicate certificate clearly established that it was issued for the second time on the request made by the appellant, after she was told by her uncle that the original certificate received by him is lost. Held, it was improper to refuse the secondary evidence on the ground that the appellant failed to produce the original certificate issued by Arya Samaj, has not examined her uncle, who was supposed to have received and retained the original certificate and the original records have not been summoned from Arya Samaj and no steps have been taken to summon the responsible person from Arya Samaj to prove that the appellant underwent conversion. Moreover, the certificate amply demonstrate that the appellant has successfully proved her case of reaffirmation of Hindu faith by undergoing rituals of conversion in the Arya Samaj.” 8. Similarly, in Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (D) & ors.
Moreover, the certificate amply demonstrate that the appellant has successfully proved her case of reaffirmation of Hindu faith by undergoing rituals of conversion in the Arya Samaj.” 8. Similarly, in Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (D) & ors. - 2007 AIR SCW 4583, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where the amendment of the plaint is sought even though belatedly by the plaintiff to make his claim more precise to enable the Court to adjudicate more satisfactorily, refusal by the trial court and appellate court to allow such amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was not proper and at the same time the Hon'ble Apex Court said that an ancient lease document of 1975 relied upon by the plaintiff in support of his claim and to prove the same in secondary evidence was permissible under Section 65 of the Evidence Act and refusal by the courts below to look into the same on the ground that no foundation was laid for adducing secondary evidence was not proper. Relevant para 12 of the judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- “12. Similarly, when there is an ancient document of 1875 that is being relied upon in support of the claim of the plaintiff, the appellate Court ought to have granted an opportunity to the plaintiff to prove that document or to lay the foundation for adducing secondary evidence for its acceptance in evidence by production of a certified copy of the lease deed. By refusing to look into the document of title relied upon by the plaintiff on the ground that no foundation has been laid for adducing secondary evidence by production of a certified copy of the lease deed, the trial Court and the appellate Court have adopted a course that has resulted in injustice to the parties. The trial Court ought to have, in the circumstances, called for evidence regarding the availability of the original of the 1875 lease deed and given the plaintiff an opportunity to lay the foundation for accepting in evidence a certified copy of that document. After all, the whole case depends upon whether the suit property is included in the 1875 lease deed and if it is included, whether the plaintiff could get a decree for recovery of possession of the portion in the possession of defendants 1 to 9.” 9.
After all, the whole case depends upon whether the suit property is included in the 1875 lease deed and if it is included, whether the plaintiff could get a decree for recovery of possession of the portion in the possession of defendants 1 to 9.” 9. As against the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Abhinav Jain, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. N.L.Joshi, are distinguishable on facts. 10. In Dr. Gurmukh Ram Madan vs. Bhagwan Das Madan – 1999(1) RLW 103 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the original document is not produced and no explanation for such non furnishing is given and such document in not a public document then in such secondary evidence is not permissible. In the present case, sufficient explanation was given by the plaintiff that the original Patta was handed over to their Advocate Shri Har Gopal Mohta, who unfortunately died while conducting the trial and record from him could not be traced back by the plaintiff after his death, but the photocopy of the said Patta of Samvat Year 1898 was already there on record of the learned trial court and there was no allegation against the petitioner that the said document was forged by him. 11. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Smt. J. Yashoda vs. Smt. K.Shobha Rani – 2007 AIR SCW 2713, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. N.L.Joshi is distinguishable. In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that admittedly the documents sought to be proved as secondary evidence were only photocopies and there was no possibility of said documents being compared with the originals and, therefore, the High Court was justified in holding that the photocopies cannot be accepted as secondary evidence. The said judgment on interpretation of Section 63 of the Evidence Act is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. Likewise, in Rajendra Pal vs. Smt. Anjali Singh (supra) in a criminal case u/Sec. 125 Cr.P.C., this Court held that photocopies of the documents, which were neither true copies nor certified copies, were not admissible in evidence. The photocopy of the visiting card and plaint alleged to have been filed by the non-petitioners in the Court cannot be admitted in evidence. 13.
The photocopy of the visiting card and plaint alleged to have been filed by the non-petitioners in the Court cannot be admitted in evidence. 13. This Court is, therefore, of the clear opinion that the learned trial court in the present case was not justified in refusing to allow the secondary evidence in the form of photocopy of the Patta, a 100 years old document, which was already filed but the original of which was lost on account of death of advocate of plaintiff, Mr. Har Gopal Mohta but the said Patta was duly supported by contemporary evidence in the form of registration with the Devasthan Department with description of the property. 14. This Court is also constrained to note that the present suit is being contested by the legal representatives of deceased Poojari Kalu Das. The Poojari of the temple has admittedly no inheritable right of worship and his appointment as Poojari and duties to perform 'seva pooja' is governed by the terms of his appointment by the Trust or the Trustees managing the affairs of the deity. The Poojari cannot claim any independent right over the property of the Deity in any case. They are neither the owners nor the managers of the property of the Deity, therefore, right to sue cannot be said to have devolved to their legal representatives of deceased Poojari with the death of Poojari appointed by the Trust. Assuming that his appointment continued through his life time, but with his death the same comes to an end and his legal representatives cannot claim any inheritable right even of 'seva puja', much less any right in the property of the Deity, which is managed by the registered Public Trust or the Trustees managing the affairs of the said temple and they are duly registered with the Devasthan Department. Therefore, this aspect of the matter that the respondent-defendants being legal representatives of the deceased Poojari Kalu Das were not even entitled to contest the suit of the plaintiffs deserves to be taken note of by the learned trial court. They were simply unauthorized occupants of the property of the Deity or even a portion thereof. 15. This Court in Ram Gopal & Ors. vs. Idol of Shri Radha Krishna Mandir & Anr.
They were simply unauthorized occupants of the property of the Deity or even a portion thereof. 15. This Court in Ram Gopal & Ors. vs. Idol of Shri Radha Krishna Mandir & Anr. - (SB Civil First Appeal No. 46/1988) decided on 10/1/2007 [AIR 2007 (NOC) 900 (Raj.)] held that the Poojari of a temple has no right to live in the property belonging to the temple and the licence or the permission of the Trust of the temple exists only so long as he continues to discharge his duties as Poojari and once his services as Poojari is dispensed with, no further right remains with the Poojari and he has to vacate the property of the temple with out any demur or objection. Para 13 of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- “Though learned counsel for the appellants rightly submitted that plea of adverse possession can be raised even against the property belonging to idol, relying on AIR 1926 Allahabad 392, AIR 1929 Allahabad 315 and AIR 1935 Madras, 483, but in the opinion of this Court, the defendants have not only pleaded specifically and clearly about their possession becoming adverse to the owner of the property and as to on which date it so happened and thereafter it happened to be continuous and peaceful possession thereby giving them right to remain in possession on account of plea of adverse possession, but he has also failed to prove any such thing before the learned trial court. As against this, the case of the plaintiffs in plaint as well as evidence is clear that the father of the defendants Bhanwar Lal and thereafter one of the defendants Mishri Lal were acting as Poojaries in the said temple and were therefore, given permission to live in the disputed suit property, but with the removal of those persons from the said position of Poojaries, their license or permission to live in the said property automatically stood terminated and it is well settled that the permission under a leave and license by the owner of the property can be revoked at any time.
The Poojari of a temple does not have any right to live in the property belonging to the temple and he can use the property only under the permission from the management of the temple only so long as he continues to discharge his duty as Poojari and once his services as poojari are dispensed with, no further right remains with poojari and he has to vacate the property of the temple without any demur or objection. In the present case though the burden of this issue No.7 was on the defendants, the defendants have not pleaded anything much less established as to how they continued to have peaceful and undisturbed possession of the said suit property in the form of a hostile possession or adverse possession. In the absence of any such pleadings or proof, the learned trial court, in the opinion of this Court, rightly held that the defendants were not entitled to any relief on this ground.” 16. Thus, in the present case, not only the respondent-defendants have no right to contest the suit against the plaintiff-Public Trust but at the same time, the learned trial court has grossly erred in not allowing the plaintiff Trust to establish its title with a 100 years old Patta, when the original of the same was misplaced or lost by the advocate concerned, who represented them in trial, but unfortunately died during the pendency of the trial in the year 2008 and, therefore, the secondary evidence in the form of photocopy of the said Patta, which was already on the record of the trial court deserves to be allowed and since not allowing the same to be accepted as secondary evidence would amount to miscarriage of justice, this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution considers it appropriate & in the interest of justice to allow the said secondary evidence to be led by the petitioner in view of the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of M.Chandra vs. M.Thangmuthu & anr (supra) and Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (D) & ors. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 17. In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 16/12/2011 (Annex.7) passed by the learned Addl.
(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 17. In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 16/12/2011 (Annex.7) passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Sujangarh (Churu) is quashed and set aside and the application filed by the petitioner-plaintiffs under Section 65 of the Evidence Act stands allowed and the learned trial court is requested to expedite the trial of the said suit and decide the same preferably within six months from today. Copy of this order be sent to the court below forthwith.