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2013 DIGILAW 682 (RAJ)

Laxman Lal Yadav v. State of Rajasthan

2013-04-04

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2013
Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—The petitioner, Laxman Lal Yadav is aggrieved by the fact that the investigation has been kept pending against him by the police. Therefore, he has prayed that FIR No.61/11-12, registered by Abkari Nirodhak Dal, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur City, dated 30.01.2012, should be quashed and set aside. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 30.01.2012, an FIR was registered by Gajanand Sharma, S.I., at Police Station Excise, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur, wherein he had claimed that he had received a secret information that one Toyota, bearing Registration No.RJ-14/U-2788 would be transporting illicit liquor. Upon the basis of this information, the police decided to patrol the Delhi road near the Transport Nagar. They saw the said vehicle coming. However, when the driver and the co-passenger saw the police party standing, they suddenly turned the vehicle and evaded the police. Both the persons managed to run away. Therefore, the police contacted the informer, who told them that the persons who have escaped, are Ramjilal and Mahesh. When the vehicle was searched, a large number of illicit liquor was discovered. During the course of investigation, it was discovered that the registered owner of the said vehicle is the petitioner. Although, a charge-sheet has been filed against others, but the police has continued to keep the investigation pending against the present petitioner. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. R.B. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently raised the following contentions before this Court:- Firstly, the petitioner is neither named, nor any overt act has been assigned to the petitioner in the FIR. Secondly, even prior to the alleged occurrence, on 14.10.2008 the petitioner had sold the vehicle, in question, to one Keshav Kumar Goyal. Mr. Goyal, too, had sold the vehicle to others. Thus, the vehicle in question had exchanged hands many a times. Therefore, the petitioner is not connected with the vehicle as he had sold it as far back as in the year 2008. Thirdly, even amongst the subsequent purchasers, criminal cases have been registered against each other; the investigation in those FIRs' is still pending. Therefore, the petitioner happens to be an innocent person, who is being falsely implicated in the present case. Thirdly, even amongst the subsequent purchasers, criminal cases have been registered against each other; the investigation in those FIRs' is still pending. Therefore, the petitioner happens to be an innocent person, who is being falsely implicated in the present case. Fourthly, the word 'owner', contained in Section 54-A of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950(for short ' the Act of 1950'), would have to include the person to whom the vehicle has been sold. The said word cannot be restricted only to “the registered owner”. Since the vehicle in question was sold by the petitioner in 2008, obviously he does not continue to be “the owner” on the date of the incident. Hence, he is not covered by Section 54-A of the Act of 1950. 4. Heard the learned counsel and perused the FIR. 5. The first contention raised by the learned counsel is unacceptable. For, the FIR deals with the incident when the vehicle was intercepted and when the driver and the co- passenger sitting in the car managed to flee the police. Thus, at the time of registration of the FIR, obviously the police did not know the name of the registered owner of the vehicle. Therefore, even if the petitioner has not been named, or an overt act has not been assigned to him in the FIR, the said fact is irrelevant to the controversy involved. 6. The issue before this Court is whether a registered owner falls within the ambit of Section 54-A of the Act of 1950 or not? 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner frankly conceded that despite sale of the vehicle in 2008 to Mr. Keshav Kumar Goyal, and inspite of subsequent sale to others, the petitioner does continue to be “the registered owner” in the records maintained by the Regional Transport Office. 8. The word “owner” in relation to a motor vehicle, has been defined in sub-clause (30) of Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(for short 'the Act of 1988'), which reads as under:- “2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (1) ........ ........... 8. The word “owner” in relation to a motor vehicle, has been defined in sub-clause (30) of Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(for short 'the Act of 1988'), which reads as under:- “2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.- (1) ........ ........... (30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.” 9. According to the said definition, the word “owner” means a person, in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered. Obviously, the vehicle, even today, stands registered in the name of the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner would fall within the first category specified in the definition of the word “owner”. 10. The word “owner” has also been used in Sec. 54-A of the Act of 1950. Section 54-A reads thus:- “Section 54-A. Owner of animal, cart, vessel, raft, motor vehicle or any other means of conveyance deemed to be guilty in certain cases.- Where any animal, cart, vessel, raft, motor vehicle or any other means of conveyance is used in the commission of an offence under this Act, and is liable to confiscation, the owner thereof, except in case of a motor vehicle or other means of conveyance being owned by the Central Government or any State Government or any of their undertaking, shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence and such owner shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly unless he satisfies the Court that he had no reason to believe that such offence was being or likely to be committed and he had exercised due care in the prevention of the commission of such an offence.” 11. obviously, the word “owner” in Section 54-A of the Act of 1950 would have to be interpreted in light of the definition of the word “owner”, given in the Act of 1988. A bare perusal of Sec. 2(30) of the Act of 1988, clearly reveals that the word “owner” does not relate to subsequent purchasers, but merely restricts itself to certain class of persons, first of whom is “the registered owner”. A bare perusal of Sec. 2(30) of the Act of 1988, clearly reveals that the word “owner” does not relate to subsequent purchasers, but merely restricts itself to certain class of persons, first of whom is “the registered owner”. It is not the case of the petitioner that the vehicle was either taken on higher purchase agreement, or was leased out, or was under hypothecation. Therefore, he would not fall within the other three categories, as mentioned in Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988. Since he is “the registered owner” of the vehicle, obviously he would fall within Section 54-A of the Act of 1950. 12. The issue whether the petitioner is an innocent person or not, and the issue whether others who have subsequently bought the vehicle, are equally liable for the alleged offence or not, these issues cannot be decided by this Court at this initial stage. After all, such issues are subject to assessment and appreciation by the learned trial Court. 13. It is, indeed, trite to state that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for interfering with the F.I.R. is extremely limited one. In catena of cases, the Apex Court has held that the Court should take the F.I.R. as the truth for the time being. In case, the ingredients of the alleged offence are prima-facie made out, then the Court should not interfere with the F.I.R. For, investigation is arena of the Police; the veracity of the FIR can be investigated only by the Police. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the High Court should refrain from entering into the said arena. Further-more, while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., at the initial stage of investigation, the High Court is not permitted to consider the evidence, which may be produced by the defense during the course of the trial. At the initial stage, when the investigation is in progress, to enter into defense evidence would be a premature step. Therefore, the High Court should be weary of interfering with the investigation and in quashing the F.I.R. at the out set. 14. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in the present petition, it is hereby dismissed. The stay application also stands dismissed.