JUDGMENT : 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure by the State of Madhya Pradesh being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 11.3.2005 passed in Civil Appeal No.18-A/2004. 2. The facts of the case reveal that the sole respondent (plaintiff) was appointed on the post of Lecturer in the year 1987 and from 1987 to 1991 and from 22.12.2001 to August, 2002 was posted at Sardarpur District Dhar. The facts of the case further reveal that the plaintiff was granted maternity leave in the year 1998 and thereafter extraordinary leave as well as leave without pay in the year 1998 itself and continued on leave without there being any application. The record further reveals that the plaintiff reported back on duty on 28.9.91, however as per her statement she was not permitted to join. Record of the case further reveals that being aggrieved by her non-joining, an Original Application was preferred before the M.P. State administrative Tribunal in the year 1998 and the same was registered as OA No.526/98. The respondent (plaintiff) was permitted to join on account of an interim order dated 21.12.2001 and since then she is continuing in service. The Original Application i.e. OA No.526/98 was disposed of by the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal in light of the fact that the plaintiff was permitted to join, however a liberty was granted to the plaintiff to submit a representation claiming salary and as the salary was not paid to her, she preferred a Civil Suit and the same was registered as C.S. No.14-A/2004 and the trial Court has decreed the suit on 2.8.2004. The state of Madhya Pradesh has been directed to pay salary w.e.f. 2.7.91 to 21.12.2001 to the respondent-plaintiff. An appeal was also preferred by the State Government and the same has already been dismissed on 11.3.2005 and the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the State Government against the judgment and decree dated 11.3.2005. 3. Learned G.A. has vehemently argued before this Court that the plaintiff did not work for the period in question and the back wages have been granted to her. He has further argued that as the principle of no work no pay is applicable in the present case, hence the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below deserves to be set aside. He has further argued that as the principle of no work no pay is applicable in the present case, hence the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below deserves to be set aside. He has also argued before this Court that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff to approach the trial Court and therefore, the judgment and decree deserves to be set aside. 4. Shri Patne learned counsel arguing the matter has vehemently argued before this Court that the appellant will be satisfied in case some reasonable amount of back wages is granted to her, meaning thereby 1/4th back wages be granted to her. 5. This Court while admitting the Second Appeal on 10.11.2006 has framed the following substantial questions of law :- “(a) Whether courts below were justified in decreeing plaintiff's claim and in consequence granted all consequential benefits arising therefrom ? (b) When admittedly plaintiff did not work for the period in question whether a decree with regard to payment of back-wages could be awarded in her favour by directing the defendants to grant all consequential benefits ? (c) Whether impugned judgment and decree though of affirmance is legally and factually sustainable on facts pleaded and found proved ?” 6. The record of the case reveals that after availing the leave, the plaintiff did submit joining and she was not permitted to join. The record further reveals that she was permitted to join only on 21.12.2001 that too on account of the interim order passed by the MP State Administrative Tribunal, however the fact remains that employee in question as stated by her was not permitted to join in the year 1991 and for the first time she woke up from slumber in the year 1998, requesting the MP State Administrative Tribunal to grant relief by directing the State Government to permit her to join, meaning thereby she did not do anything for almost 8 years and therefore, full back wages could not have been granted in the manner it has been done by the trial Court, as affirmed by the first appellate Court. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff did not work for the period in question and therefore, a decree with regard to full payment of back wages could not have been awarded in her favour of the plaintiff directing the defendants to grant all consequential benefits. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff did not work for the period in question and therefore, a decree with regard to full payment of back wages could not have been awarded in her favour of the plaintiff directing the defendants to grant all consequential benefits. In light of the categoric statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff as she was restrained from joining is certainly entitled for some back wages and as stated by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff 1/4th back wages are being granted to her. However, she will be entitled for all other consequential benefits including revision of pay scale and also arrears of salary (confined to 1/4th back wages only). 7. With the aforesaid, the second appeal is disposed of. 12. No order as to costs.