Judgment : Joymalya Bagchi, J. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.05.2011 in W.P. No. 14690 (W) of 2005 whereby the learned Single Judge directed the appellant company to grant compassionate appointment to the writ petitioner. The father of the writ petitioner was an employee of Durgapur Steel Plant (hereinafter referred to as “DSP”) and admittedly he died in harness on 06.04.1994 due to natural causes. The mother of the writ petitioner, Sova Sen, was also an employee of DSP at that material point of time. The writ petitioner was named as dependant in the service records of his mother. In May, 1994, Sova Sen on behalf of the writ petitioner made an application for his compassionate appointment on the premise that his father had died in harness on 06.04.1994. In such application that fact the she was in employment of DSP was also no disclosed. It is pertinent to mention that in or about 1995 a policy was adopted by DSP not to extend privilege of compassionate appointment to the dependants of a deceased employee in the event of his/her spouse was also employed with DSP at the time of death. Thereafter, on 23.10.1999 the mother of the writ petitioner took voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and received all benefits arising therefrom i.e. 105% Basic Pay + Dearness Allowance payable till 2004. On 09.07.2002 the writ petitioner was instructed to collect bio data form provided he fulfilled necessary eligibility criteria for compassionate appointment. On 08.11.2012 the appellant company rejected the prayer of the writ petitioner for compassionate appointment on the ground that his mother was in employment at the time of the death of his father. It is relevant to note that all terminal benefits relating to the deceased father of the writ petitioner as well as substantial voluntary retirement benefits around rupees 9 lakhs were paid to the mother of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner challenged the order dated 08.11.2002 before this Court in W.P. No. 14690 (W) of 2005. The said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court and the appellant company was directed to give compassionate appointment to the writ petitioner on the ground that one Prasenjit Ghatak and Ripa Roy Choudhury had been given similar appointment on compassionate ground. The said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court and the appellant company was directed to give compassionate appointment to the writ petitioner on the ground that one Prasenjit Ghatak and Ripa Roy Choudhury had been given similar appointment on compassionate ground. In appeal, the Appellate Court by order dated 08.02.2005 directed the respondent authorities to consider the prayer for compassionate appointment of the writ petitioner afresh without being influenced by any observation made by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid order. Thereafter, the appellant no. 3 by order dated 08.06.2005 again declined the prayer for compassionate appointment of the writ petitioner on the ground that he was not dependent on his father but was dependent on his mother who had obtained benefits of voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in 1999 and as per the prevalent policy he was not entitled to compassionate appointment as his mother was in employment with DSP at the time of the death of his father. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 08.06.2005 the instant writ petition was filed. Learned Single Judge set aside the impugned order passed by the appellant no. 3 and directed compassionate appointment to be given to the writ petitioner. Hence, the present appeal on behalf of the appellant company. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant company submitted that the company adopted a policy in 1995 wherein it was decided that in respect of old cases for compassionate appointment no such appointment would be offered in case the spouse of the deceased employee was in employment at the time of his/her death. It was further submitted that the writ petitioner was shown as dependant in service records of his mother who was admittedly an employee of DSP at the time of death of his father and hence he was not entitled to employment as per the aforesaid policy adopted in 1995. It was further submitted that the mother of the writ petitioner took voluntary retirement under Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the company and all benefits under the said scheme around rupees 9 lakhs was received by his mother in addition to the terminal benefits payable to his father on death. Hence, the family of the deceased cannot be said to be in penurious condition so as to justify the claim for compassionate appointment. Hence, the family of the deceased cannot be said to be in penurious condition so as to justify the claim for compassionate appointment. It was argued that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that the cases of Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak were different from that of the petitioner. In fact, disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against Prasenjit Ghatak for procuring employment by suppressing material facts and no negative equality can be claimed from such appointment. It was also argued that under the prevalent policy, compassionate appointment could be extended only to cases of death of employee occurring due to accident arising out of or in the course of employment and not otherwise. Learned counsel relied on S. Mohan Vs. Government of T.N. & Anr., (1998) 9 SCC 485 and Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Dilip Singh, 2013?III?LLJ?312(Cal) in support of his contentions. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/respondent no. 1 submitted that the 1995 policy could neither alter the tripartite agreements nor take away any right or privilege to which the employee is entitled by way of practice or usage. In this regard, he referred to Clause 8.14.2 of 1989 NJCS tripartite agreement which, inter alia, provided that any facilities, privileges, amenities, benefits, monetary or otherwise or concession to which an employee might be entitled by way of practice or usage would not be withdrawn, reduced or curtailed except to the extent and manner as provided in this agreement. He further submitted that compassionate appointments are not restricted only to the case of accidental deaths arising out of or in course of employment but also to deaths occur due to other causes also. He submitted such plea to oppose that his prayer has been argued for the first time before this Court and was neither raised before the First Court or in the memoranda of appeal. He further argued that there was no suppression in his application. His name was empanelled and he was given bio?data to fill up for processing his prayer for compassionate appointment wherein no misstatement was made. According to him, as his mother had obtained voluntary retirement in 1999 he ought not to have been denied the privilege of compassionate appointment in 2005 when similar privilege had been given to other candidates like Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak. He relied on Balbir Kaur & Anr. Vs. According to him, as his mother had obtained voluntary retirement in 1999 he ought not to have been denied the privilege of compassionate appointment in 2005 when similar privilege had been given to other candidates like Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak. He relied on Balbir Kaur & Anr. Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 493 , Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 244 and Nirmal Jeet Singh Hoon Vs. Irtiza Hussain & Ors., (2010) 14 SCC 564 in support of his contentions. He prayed for dismissal of the appeal. Let us first examine the schemes prevalent in the appellant company in the matter of compassionate appointment. In 1983, a NJCS agreement was entered by and between the appellant company and its employees’ union which provided for compassionate appointment as follows : “7.16. Employment.” Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers disabled permanently and those who meet with death. One dependant of the retiring employee would be provided employment, but in case of TISCO, the same would be subject to their Certified Standing Orders.” In 5th July, 1989 another NJCS agreement was executed which, inter alia, modified the eligibility criteria for compassionate appointment in the following manner : “8.10.4. In case of death due to accident arising out of and in course of employment, employment to one of his/her direct dependents will be provided.” In May 1995, another tripartite agreement was executed by and between the appellant company and its employees’ union, inter alia, providing for compassionate appointment in the following manner : “3.4.5.1. (f) In case of death or permanent total disablement due to accident arising out of and in course of employment, employment to one of his/her direct dependents will be provided.” Lastly, NJCS agreement dated 23rd July, 2001 was executed providing for compassionate appointment as follows : “3.4.5.1. (f) In case of death or permanent total disablement due to accident arising out of and in course of employment, employment to one of his/her direct dependents will be provided. However, instead of employment, the dependent may opt for benefits under Employees’ Family Benefit Scheme (EFBS)”. It is also pertinent to note that in the aforesaid 1989 NJCS agreement the following Clause was incorporated : “8.12.1. However, instead of employment, the dependent may opt for benefits under Employees’ Family Benefit Scheme (EFBS)”. It is also pertinent to note that in the aforesaid 1989 NJCS agreement the following Clause was incorporated : “8.12.1. Merely as a consequence of the implementation of this Agreement any facility, privilege, amenity, benefit, monetary or otherwise, or concession to which an employee might be entitled by way of practice or usage, shall not be withdrawn, reduced or curtained except to the extent and manner as provided for in this Agreement. 8.12.2. Benefits provided under this committees’ previous agreements will continue, unless otherwise specified in this agreement.” Similar provision was incorporated in clause 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 in the 1995 and 2001 NJCS agreements respectively. In March 1995, a decision was taken by the competent authority to constitute a committee to examine the claims of old compassionate appointment cases in the light of the provisions in the aforesaid NJCS agreement, the practices in DSP and manpower requirements in categories in which the compassionate appointment are generally made. The committee submitted its following recommendation report in September, 1995 : “a. No compassionate employment should be provided against cases of superannuation/VR/resignation and termination on disciplinary grounds. b. No second dependent should be considered for compassionate employment. c. In cases where husband and wife are both employees and one spouse dies in harness no compassionate employment should be considered. In such cases compassionate employment may be considered only on death in harness of both the spouses.” Such recommendations were duly accepted by the competent authority. The appellant no. 3 rejected the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment on the score that he was shown as dependant of his mother and not of his father who died in harness and that his mother was in employment with DSP when his father died and application for compassionate appointment was made. She took voluntary retirement in 1999 and received all benefits on such account. Hence, his claim could not have been considered in the light of Clause (a) and (c) of the aforesaid 1995 policy decision as his mother was in employment when his father died in harness and she had taken voluntary retirement thereafter and received all her benefits under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the company. Hence, his claim could not have been considered in the light of Clause (a) and (c) of the aforesaid 1995 policy decision as his mother was in employment when his father died in harness and she had taken voluntary retirement thereafter and received all her benefits under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the company. The authority further held that the cases of Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak were not similar to that of the petitioner as Ripa was appointed prior to the 1995 policy decision whereas disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against Prasenjit for suppression of material fact that his brother was in employment with DSP at the time of his compassionate appointment and there cannot be any negative equality in the matter of equal treatment under law. Learned Single Judge has set aside the order of the appellate no. 3 by holding that the 1995 policy decision could not override the provisions of NJCS agreements and that in view of Gobinda Prokash Verma Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 289 , retiral benefits given to mother on voluntary retirement could not be taken into consideration for assessing eligibility for compassionate appointment of the petitioner. Learned Single Judge reversed the finding of the authority and held that cases of Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak were similar to the petitioner and the latter be given compassionate appointment on the score of parity. Compassionate appointment is not a right but a privilege extended to the family of a deceased employee in the event of sudden demise of a bread earner. As compassionate appointment is in the nature of privilege, no person can claim subsisting right to compassionate appointment and the same is subject to alterations and/or modifications thereto owing to factual exigencies or otherwise. Such appointments are an exception to the rule of appointment to public posts through open competition. It has to be offered bearing in mind the prevalent schemes at the time of consideration of such prayer for compassionate appointment and the financial status of the concerned family. In V. Sivamurthy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 730 , the Apex Court enumerated the principels relating to compassionate appointment as follows : “The principles relating to compassionate appointments may be summarized thus: (a) Compassionate appointment based only on descent is impermissible. In V. Sivamurthy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 730 , the Apex Court enumerated the principels relating to compassionate appointment as follows : “The principles relating to compassionate appointments may be summarized thus: (a) Compassionate appointment based only on descent is impermissible. Appointments in public service should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and comparative merit, having regard to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though no other mode of appointment is permissible, appointments on compassionate grounds are well recognised exception to the said general rule, carved out in the interest of justice to meet certain contingencies. (b) Two well recognized contingencies which are carved out as exceptions to the general rule are : (i) appointment on compassionate grounds to meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family on account of the death of the bread?winner while in service. (ii) appointment on compassionate ground to meet the crisis in a family on account of medical invalidation of the bread winner. Another contingency, though less recognized, is where land holders lose their entire land for a public project, the scheme provides for compassionate appointment to members of the families of project affected persons. (Particularly where the law under which the acquisition is made does provide for market value and solatium, as compensation). (c) Compassionate appointment can neither be claimed, nor be granted, unless the rules governing the service permit such appointments. Such appointments shall be strictly in accordance with the scheme governing such appointments and against existing vacancies. (d) Compassionate appointments are permissible only in the case of a dependant member of family of the employee concerned, that is spouse, son or daughter and not other relatives. Such appointments should be only to posts in the lower category, that is, class III and IV posts and the crises cannot be permitted to be converted into a boon by seeking employment in Class I or II posts.” In Union Bank of India & Ors. Vs. M.T. Latheesh (supra) the Apex Court succinctively laid down that no dependant has a right to employment under compassionate appointment scheme but is only entitled to fair and proper consideration of his application. The Apex Court held as follows: “17. Vs. M.T. Latheesh (supra) the Apex Court succinctively laid down that no dependant has a right to employment under compassionate appointment scheme but is only entitled to fair and proper consideration of his application. The Apex Court held as follows: “17. When an employee dies and any one of the dependent mentioned in clause 2 (c) of the appointment on compassionate ground scheme formulated by the Bank can forward an application as per the said scheme. Consequently the dependent does not automatically become entitled to get employment. The right that accrues on the applicant is a right to get preferential treatment against the general principle of appointment, subject to the discretion of the Bank. Further the possession of relevant qualification does not create any vested right on the applicant to get appointed to a post specified by the scheme. 18. It is submitted that the dependent of a deceased employee will not get any vested or hereditary right to succeed the deceased in the matter of employment. What he is entitled to is a preferential treatment for appointment as against the general principle of appointment. The employer is not under obligation to grant appointment to the dependents. The duty of the employer is only to properly consider the application.” In State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Raj Kumar, (2010) 11 SCC 661 , the Apex Court held that compassionate appointment is not a right but is traceable only to specific schemes framed by the employer which is applicable at the time when the application for compassionate appointment is considered. In the said case, the Apex Court held as follows: “8. It is now well settled that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the Rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the Rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme.” We have examined the various NJCS agreements providing for compassionate appointment in the appellant company. We are of the view that there is no provision in the said agreements which provides that compassionate appointment to a dependant of an employee who died in harness is a matter of right irrespective of the financial status of the family. Compassionate appointment is not a heritable right of the heirs of the deceased employee but a concession given to the family to tide over financial exigencies due to untimely demise of the bread earner. Any case of compassionate appointment under the aforesaid agreements are to be considered on the anvil of financial exigencies and not as a matter of course by the appellant company. In this backdrop, a committee was constituted to consider old cases of compassionate appointments in the light of provisions of NJCS agreements, practices in DSP and requirement of manpower in the categories where such appointments are ordinarily made. Such committee recommended that no compassionate appointment be given in the even :? (a) in case of superannuation/VR/resignation and termination on disciplinary grounds; (b) in case of a second dependant; (c) in case one of the spouses is in employment when the other dies in harness. Such recommendations were duly accepted by the competent authority. Learned Judge held such recommendations could not have overridden the terms of the NJCS agreements. As discussed earlier, the aforesaid agreements do not give a right to a dependant to be appointed on the death of an employee in the course of employment. It only gives them a right to be considered for such privilege only if the financial status of the family of the deceased so necessitates. As discussed earlier, the aforesaid agreements do not give a right to a dependant to be appointed on the death of an employee in the course of employment. It only gives them a right to be considered for such privilege only if the financial status of the family of the deceased so necessitates. The 1995 policy decision merely rationalises such assessment of immediate financial needs of the family of the deceased employee by laying down objective parameters for determining cases where due to employment of any family member e.g. spouse/another dependant of the deceased employee, compassionate appointment may not be a crying need for the family to survive. Laying down such objective parameter for assessing a relevant consideration in the matter of compassionate appointment, namely, financial buoyancy of the bereaved family, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or unreasonable. Such parameters are to be read as administrative instructions in aid of the statutory agreements as the provisions of the said agreements are silent as to the manner of assessing financial status of the concerned family. The said policy decision, therefore, can neither be said to have been formulated beyond the competence of the employer or that the same overrides the terms of the industrial agreements. The parameters laid down in the policy decision are to be read harmoniously with the provisions of the aforesaid agreements as they provide objective guidelines in sieving the more deserving cases of compassionate appointment from the less deserving ones, e.g. where is there another family member in employment at the time of death in harness of an employee to buttress the financial needs of the concerned family. In the instant case, the appellant no. 3 denied compassionate appointment on the score that the writ petitioner was not shown as a dependant of his mother and not of his father who died in harness. His mother, in fact, was in employment at the time of his father’s death and also when prayer for compassionate appointment is made – a fact suppressed in such application. Thereafter, his mother took voluntary retirement and received around rupees 9 lakhs as compensation under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. These factors disentitled the writ petitioner from claiming for compassionate appointment in terms of clause (a) and (c) of 1995 policy decision. Thereafter, his mother took voluntary retirement and received around rupees 9 lakhs as compensation under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. These factors disentitled the writ petitioner from claiming for compassionate appointment in terms of clause (a) and (c) of 1995 policy decision. Even otherwise, the aforesaid matters are relevant issues to be considered in the matter of offering compassionate appointment inasmuch as such appointment is not a matter of right or course but one to be offered strictly in terms of the scheme and bearing in mind the financial status of the family. In S. Mohan Vs. Government of T.N. & Anr., (1998) 9 SCC 485 the Apex Court held as follows : “4. …………..The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over. In the present case, at the time of the death of the mother, she was not the sole breadwinner of the family.” In Union Bank of India & Ors. Vs. M.T. Latheesh, (supra) the Apex Court held that the financial condition of the family is a guiding factor in the matter of compassionate appointment and held as follows : “37. It is settled law that the principles regarding compassionate appointment that compassionate appointment being an exception to the general rule the appointment has to be exercised only in warranting situations and circumstances existing in granting appointment and guiding factors should be financial condition of the family.” In assessing the financial status of a family which considering the prayer for compassionate appointment, retiral/terminal benefits received by the family are to be taken into consideration. In this regard learned Single Judge relying on Govind Prakash Verma Vs. L.I.C., (2005) 10 SCC 289 and came to a finding that the retiral benefits received by the mother of the writ petitioner cannot be considered while assessing the financial status of the family. It has been decided in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 384 that in Govind Prakash Verma (supra) the earlier binding precedents of the Apex Court had not been taken notice of. In Mumtaz Yunus Mulani (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows : “11. It has been decided in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 384 that in Govind Prakash Verma (supra) the earlier binding precedents of the Apex Court had not been taken notice of. In Mumtaz Yunus Mulani (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows : “11. However, it is now a well settled principle of law that appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the Public Sector Undertaking is to see that the dependents of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. [See I.G. (Karmik) & Ors. v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi (2007) 6 SCC 162 ]. 12. In General Manager (D&PB) & Ors. v. Kunti Tiwary & Anr. [ (2004) 7 SCC 271 ], this Court laid down the law as under : “8. This recommendation of the Indian Banks’Association was accepted in the Scheme which was finally formulated on 1?1?1998 where the same criteria for determining the financial condition of the family was laid down. It may be noted that the express language for appointment on compassionate grounds reads as follows : “Appointments in the public services are made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. However, exceptions are made in favour of dependants of employees dying in harness and leaving their family in penury and without any means of livelihood.” 13. However, we may notice that in Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja [ (2004) 7 SCC 265 ], this Court relying on the decision of Smt. Sushma Gosain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [( 1989 (4) SCC 468 ] held : “9. One other thing which needs to be considered is whether the retiral benefits are to be taken into consideration while dealing with prayer for compassionate appointment. The High Court was of the view that the same was not to be taken into consideration. The view is contrary to what has been held recently in G.M. (D&PB) v. Kunti Tiwary. It was categorically held that the amounts have to be taken into consideration. The High Court was of the view that the same was not to be taken into consideration. The view is contrary to what has been held recently in G.M. (D&PB) v. Kunti Tiwary. It was categorically held that the amounts have to be taken into consideration. In the instant case, there was a scheme called ‘Scheme for Employment of the Dependants of the Employees Who Die While in the Service of the Bank _ Service on Compassionate Grounds’(in short ‘the Scheme’) operating in Appellant 1 Bank which categorically provides as follows: “Financial condition of the family The dependants of an employee dying in harness may be considered for compassionate appointment provided the family is without sufficient means of livelihood, specifically keeping in view the following: (a) Family pension. (b) Gratuity amount received. (c) Employee’s/Employer’s contribution to PF. (d) Any compensation paid by the Bank or its Welfare Fund. (e) Proceeds of LIC policy and other investments of the deceased employee. (f) income of family from other sources. (g) Employment of other family members. (h) Size of the family and liabilities, if any, etc. It is most respectfully submitted that the Board of Directors of the petitioner Bank had approved the abovesaid Scheme, which was based upon the guidelines circulated by Indian Banks? Association to all the public sector banks which in turn are based upon the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana. The Scheme after approval was circulated vide PDCL 6/97 read with PDCL 11/99 dated 17?4? 1999.” 14. The question came up for consideration yet again in Govind Prakash Varma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. [ (2005) 10 SCC 289 ], wherein it was held : “6.In our view, it was wholly irrelevant for the departmental authorities and the learned Single Judge to take into consideration the amount which was being paid as family pension to the widow of the deceased (which amount, according to the appellant, has now been reduced to half) and other amounts paid on account of terminal benefits under the Rules. The scheme of compassionate appointment is over and above whatever is admissible to the legal representatives of the deceased employee as benefits of service which one gets on the death of the employee. The scheme of compassionate appointment is over and above whatever is admissible to the legal representatives of the deceased employee as benefits of service which one gets on the death of the employee. Therefore, compassionate appointment cannot be refused on the ground that any member of the family received the amounts admissible under the Rules. So far as the question of gainful employment of the elder brother is concerned, we find that it had been given out that he has been engaged in cultivation. We hardly find that it could be considered as gainful employment if the family owns a piece of land and one of the members of the family cultivates the field. This statement is said to have been contradicted when it is said that the elder brother had stated that he works as a painter. This would not necessarily be a contradiction much less leading to the inference drawn that he was gainfully employed somewhere as a painter. He might be working in his field and might casually be getting work as painter also. Nothing has been indicated in the enquiry report as to where he was employed as a regular painter. The other aspects, on which the officer was required to make enquiries, have been conveniently omitted and not a whisper is found in the report submitted by the officer. In the above circumstances, in our view, the orders passed by the High Court are not sustainable. The respondents have wrongly refused compassionate appointment to the appellant. The inference of gainful employment of the elder brother could not be acted upon. The terminal benefits received by the widow and the family pension could not be taken into account.” It, however, does not appear that therein the earlier binding precedent of this Court had been taken notice of.” (emphasis supplied) This view was reiterated in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Shashank Goswami & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 307 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “13. Vs. Shashank Goswami & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 307 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows: “13. In Mumtaz Yunus Mulani v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 384 , this Court examined the scope of employment on compassionate ground in a similar scheme making the dependant of an employee ineligible for the post in case the family receives terminal/ retiral benefits above the sealing limit and held that the judgment in Govind Prakash (supra) had been decided without considering earlier judgments which were binding on the Bench.” The learned Judge, therefore, erred in law in relying on Gobinda Prokash (supra) to come to finding that the retiral benefits of the mother on voluntary retirement could not have been taken into consideration to assess the financial status of the family of the writ petitioner. On the other hand, it is the consistent view of the Apex Court as held in Kunti Tiwary (supra), Ashwini Kumar Taneja (supra) and Shashank Goswami (supra), that retiral benefits received by the family are to be taken into consideration in assessing the financial condition of the family while considering the plea for compassionate appointment. We feel that the writ petitioner has not been discriminated in the instant case. The appellant company has in its opposition unequivocally denied that there was no practice or usage prevalent in the company since 1995 to give compassionate appointment to a dependant of a deceased employee whose spouse was in employment at the time of his/her death. It has also been pleaded that the appointment of Prasenjit Ghatak (whose brother was in employment at the time of his appointment) was procured on fraud and disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against him. Ripa Roy Choudhury was appointed in 1994 prior to the 1995 policy decision to exclude less deserving cases where a spouse/dependant of a deceased employee was in employment can neither be treated as an instance in parity with the writ petitioner nor as a practice/usage prevalent in the post 1995 era in the appellant company. Furthermore, case of the petitioner is to be decided as per the prevalent policies at the time of consideration of his prayer and there cannot be negative equality in matters of employment. Furthermore, case of the petitioner is to be decided as per the prevalent policies at the time of consideration of his prayer and there cannot be negative equality in matters of employment. Hence, consideration of the application of the writ petitioner in 2005 in the light of the wholesome parameters laid down in the 1995 policy decision which was prevalent at the time of consideration of his application cannot be considered to be illegal, unjust or unreasonable. In Union Bank of India & Ors. Vs. M.T. Latheesh (supra) the Apex Court held that illegal appointments de hors the scheme would not vest legal right in an applicant to claim compassionate appointment on the grounds of parity. The Apex Court held as follows : “28. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the Bank has made several compassionate appointments quite contrary to the scheme and, therefore, the respondent should also be considered for such appointment on compassionate grounds. It is well settled that Article 14 cannot be extended to legalize illegal orders though others had wrongly got the benefits of that order on some stray incidents earlier. 29. This Court in Harpal Kaur Chahal (Smt) v. Director, Punjab Instructions, Punjab and Anr., [1995] Supp. 4 SCC 706 held that illegality once committed cannot be pleaded to legalize other illegal acts. This Court also held that where the High Court applying a wrong test found certain ineligible candidates to be eligible and upheld their appointment, such a judgment could not constitute a ground for this Court to extend the benefit thereof to other candidates appointed illegally. 30. In Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR (1996) SC 1175, this Court held as under: “The guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. 30. In Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR (1996) SC 1175, this Court held as under: “The guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, the others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State or an authority of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same but they cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before law. Neither Art. 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Art. 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continuance and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination.” The appellant no. 3 has extensively dealt with the instances of Ripa Roy Choudhury and Prasenjit Ghatak and have given cogent reasons as to why such cases are distinguishable from the petitioners. It was incorrect on the part of the learned Judge to substitute his views in place of the reasonable stance taken by the appellant no. 3 in the matter of compassionate appointment. With regard to Prasenjit Ghatak (who is being proceeded against departmentally) learned Judge ought to have considered that negative equality does not operative in the field of equal treatment under law as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. 3 in the matter of compassionate appointment. With regard to Prasenjit Ghatak (who is being proceeded against departmentally) learned Judge ought to have considered that negative equality does not operative in the field of equal treatment under law as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is trite law that in judicial review Courts shall not substitute its opinion in place of the authority which has considered the prayer for compassionate appointment and found the incumbent unfit as per the prevalent schemes. This view has been emphasized by the Apex Court in Union Bank of India & Ors. Vs. M.T. Latheesh (supra) in the following words: “It is also settled law that the specially constituted authorities in the rules or regulations like the competent authority in this case are better equipped to decide the cases on facts of the case and their objective finding arrived on the appreciation of the full fact should not be disturbed. Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench by directing appointment has fettered the discretion of the appointing and selecting authorities.” We are not impressed by the new plea taken by the appellant that compassionate appointment cannot be extended to cases of death during employment occurring due to natural causes as the said issue is no longer res integra in the light of the decision in Balbir Kaur (supra). In the said report the Apex Court held that in view of prevalent practice/usage and the terms of the 1983 NJCS agreement, compassionate appointment cannot be denied in cases of death arising out of circumstances otherwise than by accident. However, the ratio of Balbir Kaur (supra) has no manner of application in the facts of the instant case as the authority after considering relevant factors had denied the claim for compassionate appointment in terms of the prevalent policy as there was no pressing financial need for such appointment in view of the fact that his mother was in employment at the time when his father died in harness and thereafter she received all benefits under Voluntary Retirement Scheme on voluntary retirement in 1999. The order of the appellant authority is a well reasoned one and has been arrived at after taking all relevant factors into consideration as per the prevalent policies particularly the absence of pressing financial needs of the family necessitating such appointment. The order of the appellant authority is a well reasoned one and has been arrived at after taking all relevant factors into consideration as per the prevalent policies particularly the absence of pressing financial needs of the family necessitating such appointment. Such decision is neither discriminatory nor violative of any practice/usage prevalent in the appellant company in that regard. Handing over the bio?data form to the petitioner cannot operate as an estoppel in dealing with his claim for compassionate appointment on merits as per the prevalent policy of the company and in view of the financial status of his family. As we are of the opinion that the decision of the appellant no. 3 is sustainable on the reasons stated therein the ratio in Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank & Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 244 cited on behalf of the writ petitioner is of no avail to him. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Parties, however, shall bear their own costs.