Judgment : A.M. Khanwilkar, J. – 1. This petition, is filed by accused No.2 in complaint arising from FIR No.54 of 2008 dated 12th July, 2008 registered by Police Station Kasauli under Sections 420, 463, 464, 468, 469, 471, 503, 506 and 507 read with Section 120 B of IPC, under Section 482 read with Sections 397 to 404 of Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for somewhat unusual reliefs. The petitioner has asked for multiple reliefs as under: "It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interest of justice, and this Hon'ble Court be pleased to: i) Revise the 'decisions taken in the impugned proceedings, and/or the 'irregularities' therein, and pass favourable orders thereupon. ii) Direct the Police to lay on record of this Hon'ble Court (and/or that of Ld. JMIC, Kasauli) a copy of the entire material collected and/or received by them during the investigation, including materials not intended to be relied upon by them, including materials supplied by the petitioner, including all letters, emails, correspondence with HQ in the captioned FIR, file notings, etc, so that application dated 18032011 (Annexure 9) stands disposed off. iii) Direct (and/or direct Ld. JMIC, Kasauli to issue notice and direct) to the following 7 persons to give a parawise reply on dulysworn affidavit to the application for discharge dated 31 052010 (Annexure 8), the fresh application for discharge on new facts and grounds dated 27052013 (Annexure 12): a) Present SHO PS Kasauli Mr. A. Rana..... Respondent No.2. b) Previous SP Mr. Prem Thakur .....Respondent No.5 c) Present APP (Kasauli) Mr. Y.P. Singh... Respondent No.7 d) Previous APP (Kasauli) Mr. Xx ....Respondent No.6 e) Complainant Mr. Vikram Bakshi ....Respondent No.10. f) Brig. SPS Dhariwal ....Respondent No.11. g) Himanshu Gupta ....Respondent No.12. iv) Direct Ld. JMIC Kasauli (Mr. Gaurav Mahajan) to elaborate on his order of 08042013 (Annexure 10) whether orally or in writing, and/or set out his Court's sources of information relating to observations made in the order dated 08042013, including setting out the source of information on the 13 counts set out at para 9 of the application dated 27052013 seeking elaboration of his order (Annexure 13) and setting out the basis of the 4 statements summarized at para 10 of the same application dated 27052013. v) Direct (and/or direct Ld. v) Direct (and/or direct Ld. JMIC, Kasauli to issue notice and direct) to the following 4 persons to give a parawise reply to the application for criminal contempt dated 27052013 (Annexure 14) and the supplementary submissions made therein dated 02062013 (Annexure 16): a) Present SHO PS Kasauli Mr. Rana .....Respondent No.2. b) Present APP (Kasauli) Mr. YP Singh .....Respondent No.7. c) Previous APP (Kasauli) Mr. Xx ....Respondent No.6. d) Complainant Mr. Vikram Bakshi ....Respondent No.10. vi) Direct Ld. JMIC Kasauli to dispose off the fresh application for discharge dated 27052013 (Annexure 12) by a speaking order upon receipt of replies as prayed for above within a time bound period, say, of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of such replies, or within such period as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, so that application dated 27052013 seeking a similar prayer (Annexure 15) stands disposed off. vii) Direct Ld. JMIC Kasauli to dispose off the application for criminal contempt (annexure 14 and Annexure 16) within a timebound period, say, of 2 weeks from the date of receipt of parawise replies on dulysworn affidavit as prayed for above, or within such period as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit. viii) Direct Ld. JMIC Kasauli to dispose off the application dated 12 062013 (Annexure 20) praying for review and recall of the order(s) taking cognizance and summoning of the petitioner within a time bound period, say, of 2 weeks from the date of disposing of the application dated 7052013 for discharge (Annexure 12) and application dated 27052013 seeking initiation of criminal contempt proceedings (Annexure 14 and annexure 16) whichever of the two is disposed off later, or within such period as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit. ix) Direct Ld. JMIC (Kasauli) to pass a speaking order on the application seeking to place on record the developments of May 27th30th, 2013 (Annexure 17), and if not true and correct in any material particular, to take action against the petitioner under appropriate provisions of law, if he so deems fit. x) Direct Ld. ix) Direct Ld. JMIC (Kasauli) to pass a speaking order on the application seeking to place on record the developments of May 27th30th, 2013 (Annexure 17), and if not true and correct in any material particular, to take action against the petitioner under appropriate provisions of law, if he so deems fit. x) Direct Ld. JMIC (Kasauli) to pass a speaking order on the application seeking initiation of proceedings against the complainant Vikram Bakshi and the Police officials involved under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 182 of the same Code, read with the laws pertaining to false evidence, and any other applicable provision of law within a period of, say, 1 week of passing of his order on the application rt for discharge dated 27052013. xi) Direct the Court of the Ld. JMIC Kasauli to act on the premise of the 19 counts as spelt out at para 43 above. xii) Declare and hold that Ld. Addl. (then) CJM (Kasauli) Mr. Yogesh Jaswal has violated his Oath of Office duly sworn to by him when assuming charge as a 'Judicial Officer' and is no longer fit/legally competent for 'judicial' duties (as he is now "un sworn"). xiii) Declare and hold that Ld. JMIC (Kasauli) Mr. Gaurav Mahajan has violated his Oath of Office duly sworn to by him when assuming charge as a 'Judicial Officer', and is no longer fit/ legally competent for 'judicial' duties (as he is now "un sworn"). xiv) Direct for payment of costs/ compensation/damages to the petitioner of a minimum amount of Rs. 100 lakhs, and which amount be recovered from the present and future estate laying in the control of the State of the concerned Police officials and/or Ld. Addl. CJM Mr. Yogesh Jaswal and/or Ld. JMIC Mr. Gaurav Mahajan and/or the Ld. APP Mr. Name Unknown xx and/or Ld. APP Mr. Y.P. Singh (ref: In Magistrate Gunavathi). xv) Pass a speaking order on each of the above 14 prayers. xvi) Issue an ex parte orders in terms of the above 15 prayers. xvii) Pass such other order(s) or direction(s) as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 2. APP Mr. Y.P. Singh (ref: In Magistrate Gunavathi). xv) Pass a speaking order on each of the above 14 prayers. xvi) Issue an ex parte orders in terms of the above 15 prayers. xvii) Pass such other order(s) or direction(s) as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 2. The petitioner has not only impleaded the complainant as respondent but also the Investigating Officials, Public Prosecutors and including the Judicial Officers, by name, who has had occasion to deal with the said complaint at different stages. The petitioner has done that with clear understanding, nay, on the assertion that their presence was essential being necessary parties. He has also asked for relief of costs/compensation/ damages against them individually and vicariously for their acts of commission and omission. Shorn of details, the petitioner has been named as accused No.2 in the FIR dated 12th July, 2008. Pursuant to the said FIR the matter was investigated by the local police officials. After completion of the investigation, police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted before the concerned Court i.e. before Sh.Yogesh Jaswal, Additional C.J.M. Kasauli. The learned Judge, on 24th November, 2009, passed the following order: 3. Pursuant to this order the petitioner was served with the notice but did not challenge the said order. The petitioner, however, without any demur, chose to file application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. on 31st May, 2010, Annexure-8, praying for discharge. The reliefs claimed in the said application read thus: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and : a) This Hon'ble Court, after taking into account the aforesaid submissions, and the numerous grounds, and by taking the entire facts and legal propositions into consideration, discharge the petitioneraccused (accused) by invoking its powers under Section 239 of the CrPC. b) Initiate prosecution against the complainant Vikram Bakshi and other culpable persons, inter alia, under Sections 166, 177, 182 and 211 of the IPC for misleading the Police, and for filing a false complaint against the petitioneraccused; c) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 4. Whilst the aforesaid application was pending, the petitioner filed another application on 18th March, 2011, Annexure-9, for issuing direction to the police to place all the evidence, statements and other material collected by them during the investigation on the record of the Court. The reliefs claimed in this application read thus: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and: a) this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the Police to place on the record of this Hon'ble Court the entire outcome/record of the investigation lying with the Police, containing all evidences and other material collected (howsoever described), such as but not limited to correspondences made to/by them, statements of all persons, evidence, reports to superiors, etc. b) Pass ex parte orders as prayed for above. c) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." It is stated that no orders have been passed on this application so far. The discharge application filed by the petitioner, however, came to be disposed of by a speaking order dated 8th April, 2013, running into 13 printed pages, by Sh.Gaurav Mahajan, JMIC, Kasauli, District Solan. Notably, the petitioner has not chosen to challenge this order, dismissing his discharge application, in the present petition. On a bare reading of this order, it is noticed that the learned Judge has adverted to the grounds urged by the petitioner, the relevant material relied by the parties and including the case law relied upon before recording opinion of dismissal of the discharge application. Instead of challenging this decision by resorting to appropriate proceedings, the petitioner chose to file another discharge application under Section 239 Cr.P.C., on 27th May, 2013, Annexure-12. The reliefs claimed in this application read thus: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to: a) Exercise its powers under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C, and discharge the applicant. b) Pass a speaking order on this application only after filing of a proper parabypara reply by the Prosecution and the complainant. b) Pass a speaking order on this application only after filing of a proper parabypara reply by the Prosecution and the complainant. c) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." Whether such fresh discharge application is maintainable or otherwise is a matter, to be examined by the concerned Court where the same is pending. 5. Be that as it may, on the same day on 27th May, 2013 the petitioner filed three other applications before the JMIC. 6. The second application (Annexure-13), prays for elaboration of the order dated 8th April, 2013. In this application the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to: a) Set out the source of information on the 13 counts set out at para 9 above. b) Set out the basis of the 4 statements summarized at para 10 above. In the alternative to prayers (a) and (b): c) If the Ld. Presiding Officer is inclined not to allow the prayers because of his interpretation of the provisions of Section 362 of the CrPC, as he would be going against the letter as well as spirit of the norms laid down by the Hon'ble supreme Court on what should be a "speaking order", it is prayed that he may first refer the question of law to the Hon'ble High Court under Section 395(2) of the CrPC instead of hastily dealing with this application. d) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." The third application (Annexure-14), filed on the same day before the JMIC, is to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against the complainant, Investigating Officer and Public Prosecutor. The reliefs claimed in this application read thus: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to: a) Exercise its powers under the Contempt of courts Act and refer the matter for criminal contempt to the Hon'ble High court at Shimla after using notice and inviting the duly sworn reply of the following persons: a) Present SHO PS Kasauli. b) Learned PP who was in charge when the application for discharge dated 2011 was filed and disposed off on 08.04.2013. c) Complainant Vikram Bakshi. b) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this rt Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The fourth application (Annexure-15) filed on the same day before the JMIC, is for directing the persons named in the prayer clause to file para by para reply to the discharge application. The prayers in this application read thus: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to: i) Exercise its powers under Section 239 of the CrPC and other enabling provisions of law and direct the following persons to file a parabypara reply to the discharge application dated 2011 and the discharge application dated 27052013, duly supported by a duly sworn affidavit: a. Complainant Vikram Bakshi. b. Brig. SPS Dhariwal. c. Himanshi Gupta. d. SHO Gobind Ram. e. SP Prem Thakur. f. Learned PP who filed the Final report in 2010. g. Learned PP(s) who was/were in charge when the application for discharge dated 2011 was filed and disposed off on 08 042013. ii) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 8. Since these applications have been filed very recently, the same are pending for orders before the JMIC Kasauli. Whether the reliefs prayed therein can be granted to the petitioner or otherwise is a matter to be considered by that Court in the first instance. The matter does not end with filing of aforesaid four applications on the same day i.e. 27th May, 2013. The petitioner has filed yet another application on 3rd June, 2013, Annexure-17, praying for the following reliefs: "Prayer It is, therefore, prayed that the abovesaid application may kindly be allowed in the interests of justice, and this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to: a) Take on record 7 sets of the new application for discharge (4 sets tendered herewith). b) Take on record 3 sets of the application for criminal contempt (1 set tendered herewith). b) Take on record 3 sets of the application for criminal contempt (1 set tendered herewith). c) Issue notice on the discharge and the criminal contempt application, returnable for 12062013, or such date this Hon'ble Court deems fit. d) Allow service of notices dasti by the applicant. e) Pass exparte orders on the above. f) Pass any other order or orders or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." Even this application is pending for orders before the JMIC. 9. Later, the petitioner filed one more application before the JMIC Kasauli, dated 12th June, 2013, Annexure-20, for the following reliefs: "Prayer In the facts and circumstances and facts arrayed above, it is, therefore, humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Board may be pleased to: 1. Call for the complete file of the Police, including all referrals to HQ at Shimla, including all relevant files at Police HQ at Shimla that are connected to the present case. 2. Make a finding that a fraud has been played upon this Hon'ble Court by false statements and/or misleading made to it, and by deliberate supersession of very vital and material facts from it. 3. As a consequence of the finding on fraud played upon this Hon'ble court, declare that its order(s) taking cognizance and summoning of the applicant to stand trial is/are based on the fraud, and hence, a nullity/ies, void ab initio, as if nonest. 4. As a consequence of the fraud vitiating its order(s) to the point of rendering it/them into a nullity and non est in the eyes of law, review and recall its order(s) taking cognizance and summoning of the applicant to stand trial, with all consequential effects. 5. As a consequence of the fraud played upon this Hon'ble Court, initiate action against the complainant State Police Officers, the Public Prosecutor (who also is a 'public servant') and Vikram Bakshi under Section 182 of the Indian Penal code read with section 211 of the same Code. 6. Initiate action against the complainant State Police Officers, the Public Prosecutor (who also is a 'public servant') and Vikram Bakshi under Section 340 of the CrPC, iner alia, for having made numerous false and/or misleading statements, and for suppression of vital and material facts. 7. 6. Initiate action against the complainant State Police Officers, the Public Prosecutor (who also is a 'public servant') and Vikram Bakshi under Section 340 of the CrPC, iner alia, for having made numerous false and/or misleading statements, and for suppression of vital and material facts. 7. Initiate action against the complainant State Police Officers, the Public Prosecutor (who also is a 'public servant') and Vikram Bakshi under the Contempt of courts Act for criminal contempt of this Hon'ble Court, for having eroded the dignity and majesty of this court, and for having acted with intent to interfere in the due course of judicial proceedings, and in the administration of justice, and made a reference to the Hon'ble H.P. High Court at Shimla under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against them. 8. It this Hon'ble Court be of the view that it does not have the power to review and recall its orders even when a fraud has been placed upon it only because of the bar under Section 362 of the CrPC, make a reference to the Hon'ble High Court under Section 395 (2) of the CrPC on the question of law that has thus arisen. 9. Pass ex parte orders on prayers (1) to (8) above. In the alternative: Pass orders only after inviting parabypara reply from the State of HP/ Police/ the PP/ Vikram Bakshi, and on affidavit. 10. Pass any other order(s)/ direction(s) that this Hon'ble Court may consider fit and suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case." Even this application is pending on the file of JMIC Kasauli. 10. After having resorted to the above said multiple applications, the petitioner has now chosen to file the present petition by invoking provisions of Section 482 read with Section 397 to 404 Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the reliefs which are reproduced hitherto. Alongwith the petition, the petitioner has moved an urgent application dated 23rd June, 2013 wherein he has referred to the prevailing roster announced on 6th June, 2013. Alongwith the petition, the petitioner has moved an urgent application dated 23rd June, 2013 wherein he has referred to the prevailing roster announced on 6th June, 2013. In that application, he has averred that the matter involves two Judicial Officers, by name (respondents 8-9) and for which reason, the matter needs to be placed before DB-I. Ordinarily, the petition, filed by invoking provisions of Section 482 or 397-404 of Cr.P.C and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, ought to proceed for hearing before the Single Bench. However, as the petitioner had impleaded the Judicial Officers by name and was seeking reliefs against the said officers as per the present Roster, the matter was notified before DB-I for admission. 11. We heard the petitioner for quite sometime even though the matter is only at the stage of admission. After considering the argument of the petitioner, for some time, it was suggested to him that if he was content with the direction to be given to the JMIC to expeditiously dispose of all the pending applications, we need not dilate on any other grievance; and more particularly, because the petitioner had not specifically challenged the original order dated 24th November, 2009 or the order dated 8th April, 2013 rejecting his discharge application. However, that suggestion did not meet his approval. As a result, we have to examine the matter in detail. 12. Indeed, we are conscious of the fact that a vague and general prayer is sought by the petitioner in terms of clause (i), to revise the "decisions" taken in the impugned proceedings and/or the "irregularities" therein, and pass favourable orders thereupon. This relief, however, cannot be the basis to allow the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the JMIC, Kasauli on 24th November, 2009 or dated 8th April, 2013. When called upon to point out from the averments in the petition that the petitioner has reserved his right to challenge the said orders, the petitioner had to concede that he has not prayed for that relief in the present petition. At the same time, as is noticed from the chronology of events, the petitioner has resorted to fresh discharge application before the JMIC. Not only that, he has also moved an application before the concerned JMIC to give elaboration on the matters referred to in his order dated 8th April, 2013. At the same time, as is noticed from the chronology of events, the petitioner has resorted to fresh discharge application before the JMIC. Not only that, he has also moved an application before the concerned JMIC to give elaboration on the matters referred to in his order dated 8th April, 2013. Admittedly, those applications are still pending before the JMIC, Kasauli and are expected to be decided in due course by that Court. Thus understood, the petitioner is not and cannot be permitted to challenge the correctness of the order dated 24th November, 2009, or for that matter dated 8th April, 2013, passed by the JMIC, Kasauli, in the present petition. Nor do we think it essential to burden this judgment with the efficacy of the said orders and the correctness of the view taken by the Court therein. Suffice it to observe that the JMIC has already taken cognizance of the offence and the trial has and must proceed before that Court in accordance with law consequent to rejection of the discharge application. We may now turn to the other reliefs and consider whether any one of them deserve consideration. As regards prayer clause (i), we have already noted that it is a vague and general relief asking this Court to revise the decisions passed by the JMIC in the proceedings pending before that Court and to pass order in favour of the petitioner. As noted earlier, the petitioner has not specifically challenged the order of taking cognizance nor the order rejecting his application for discharge passed by the JMIC, Kasauli. That being the position, the only issue that needs consideration is about the pending applications before the JMIC, Kasauli. This petition could be thus disposed of by calling upon the JMIC, Kasauli, to deal with each of the pending applications, filed by the petitioner, in accordance with law, expeditiously. However, the petitioner, who is appearing in person, is not content with that course. He has vehemently pressed the other reliefs claimed in the petition. This petition could be thus disposed of by calling upon the JMIC, Kasauli, to deal with each of the pending applications, filed by the petitioner, in accordance with law, expeditiously. However, the petitioner, who is appearing in person, is not content with that course. He has vehemently pressed the other reliefs claimed in the petition. Therefore, we may now turn to prayer clause (ii), wherein the petitioner has asked for direction against the police to lay on record of this Court entire material collected and/or received by them during the investigation, including materials not intended to be relied upon by them, including material supplied by the petitioner, including all letters, e-mails, correspondence with HQ in the captioned FIR, full noting etc., so that application filed by him dated 18th March, 2011, Annexure 9, can be disposed of. It is not in dispute that the said application, praying for he same relief (see paragraph 5 above), is still pending before the JMIC, who is in the seisin of the proceedings. It is for that Court to examine the said application in the first instance. It is not the case of the petitioner that the said Court has expressed unwillingness to hear that application. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to entertain the relief under consideration, as claimed. Entertaining this relief would be nothing short of allowing the petitioner to overreach the proceeding pending before the JMIC and especially when the relief so prayed can be conveniently considered by that Court. We may, therefore, dispose of this relief with the hope that JMIC, Kasauli, will consider the said application in accordance with law, expeditiously. 13. That takes us to prayer clause (iii). Once again, this relief is overlapping with the relief claimed in the application preferred by the petitioner before the JMIC, Kasauli, Annexure-15, which is still pending on the file of that Court, wherein the petitioner has prayed for directing the named persons ( police officials, public prosecutors and complainant) to give a parawise reply on duly sworn affidavit to the application for discharge dated 31st May, 2010 and 27th May, 2013. As this application, Annexure-15, has been filed on 27th May, 2013 and is pending before JMIC, the question of entertaining the relief under consideration does not arise for the same reason stated while rejecting prayer clause (ii), above. As this application, Annexure-15, has been filed on 27th May, 2013 and is pending before JMIC, the question of entertaining the relief under consideration does not arise for the same reason stated while rejecting prayer clause (ii), above. Indeed, we may observe that the JMIC, Kasauli, may dispose of even this application in accordance with law, expeditiously. 14. The next relief in terms of prayer clause (iv) is overlapping with the relief sought by the petitioner vide application dated 27th May, 2013, Annexure-13, which is pending on the file of JMIC, Kasauli. By that application, the petitioner has sought elaboration from the JMIC, Kasauli, (Shri Gaurav Mahajan), who has passed order dated 8th April, 2013, rejecting the earlier discharge application filed by the petitioner. We may not be understood to have even remotely suggested that such application is maintainable in law. That is a question which will have to be decided by the JMIC, Kasauli, in the first instance. We, therefore, decline to entertain prayer clause (iv) under consideration for the same reasons already noted while rejecting the prayer clauses (ii) & (iii), however, with an observation that the JMIC, Kasauli, may consider the pending application Annexure-13, dated 27th May, 2013, in accordance with law, expeditiously. As regards prayer clause (v), the petitioner is seeking direction against JMIC, Kasauli, to issue notice and to direct the four persons named in the prayer clause to give para-wise reply to the application for criminal contempt dated 27th May, 2013 and the supplementary submissions made therein dated 2nd June, 2013. We are neither inclined to issue notice to the said persons in the present petition, nor we are inclined to issue any direction to them and including to the learned JMIC, Kasauli. For, such direction would be inappropriate when the application preferred by the petitioner Annexure- dated 27th May, 2013 and supplementary submissions Annexure-16, 14, dated 2nd June, 2013 are still pending on the file of learned JMIC, Kasauli, for appropriate decision. We have no manner of doubt that the said Court will consider the said application in accordance with law, expeditiously. Besides this, nothing more is required to be said about prayer clause(v). 15. That takes us to prayer clause (vi) seeking direction against the JMIC, Kasauli, to dispose of the fresh application for discharge dated 27th May, 2013, Annexure-12 and application of the same date Annexure -15, by a speaking order. Besides this, nothing more is required to be said about prayer clause(v). 15. That takes us to prayer clause (vi) seeking direction against the JMIC, Kasauli, to dispose of the fresh application for discharge dated 27th May, 2013, Annexure-12 and application of the same date Annexure -15, by a speaking order. The petitioner, instead of rushing to this Court should have shown some patience and proceeded with the respective applications filed by him before JMIC, Kasauli. Moreso because, the petitioner has not challenged the order dated 8th April, 2013 before this Court or any other superior forum. We, therefore, decline to issue any direction to the learned JMIC, Kasauli, as prayed, but would observe that the JMIC, Kasauli may consider the said pending applications, in accordance with law, expeditiously. 16. That takes us to prayer Clause (vii) wherein direction is sought against JMIC to dispose of the application for criminal contempt Annexure-14 and Annexure-16 dated 27th May, 2013 and 2nd June, 2013 respectively, within a time bound period immediately after receipt of para-wise replies on duly sworn affidavit. For the reasons already recorded while rejecting the previous prayer clauses, for the same reason we decline to issue any direction to the JMIC Kasauli in connection with the relief under consideration. It is open to the petitioner to request the learned JMIC, Kasauli, to take up the pending applications filed by him expeditiously. That request can be considered by that Court appropriately. Indeed, the pending applications/proceedings will have to be decided by the concerned Court, in accordance with law, expeditiously. We may now turn to prayer Clause (viii) wherein, in substance, the petitioner has sought direction against the JMIC Kasauli for expeditious disposal of the application dated 12th June, 2013 Annexure-20 praying for recall of order taking cognizance and of summoning the petitioner. Further, to expeditiously dispose of the application for discharge dated 27.5.2013, Annexure-12 and dated 27.5.2013 for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings, Annexures 14 and 16, respectively. Even with regard to this relief, for the reasons already recorded while rejecting the earlier reliefs, we decline to entertain the same and instead observe that it will be open to the petitioner to request the learned JMIC Kasauli to take up the said applications for hearing expeditiously. It is open to the said Court to entertain such request and proceed in the matter in accordance with law. 17. It is open to the said Court to entertain such request and proceed in the matter in accordance with law. 17. For the same reasons even prayer clause (ix), will have to be turned down which seeks direction against JMIC, Kasauli to pass a speaking order on the application dated 3rd June, 2013 Annexure-17 seeking to place on record the developments between May 27-30, 2013. The petitioner is free to make request to the learned JMIC Kasauli to decide the said application expeditiously. We are not inclined to issue any direction in this behalf. We find that the petitioner has resorted to multiple applications for reasons best known to him. He has unnecessarily rushed to this Court without providing sufficient time to the learned JMIC, Kasauli to deal with those applications. No doubt, it is the right of a litigant to take recourse to successive applications and ask for appropriate reliefs in the pending proceedings, but from the tenor of the applications filed by the petitioner, we may be justified in inferring that the subtle attempt of the petitioner is to browbeat the JMIC Court to entertain the said successive applications filed by him on priority basis and including to protract the trial of the main case. Suffice it to observe that no direction, as sought, need to be issued to JMIC, Kasauli, keeping in mind the fact situation of the present case. Instead, it is open to the petitioner to approach the same Court and request that Court for taking up the respective pending applications for hearing. The petitioner can assist that Court in pointing out the order of precedence as to which application should be taken up first, which request can be suitably dealt with by the concerned Court. 18. Reverting to prayer Clause (x), once again the petitioner is seeking direction against JMIC, Kasauli to pass a speaking order on the application for initiation of proceedings against the complainant and the police officials under Section 211 read with Section 182 IPC, read with laws pertaining to false evidence. As the petitioner has already resorted to that relief by way of a formal application in the concerned Court; and if it is a case of action for giving false evidence before the Court that aspect will have to be considered by that Court only in the first instance. As the petitioner has already resorted to that relief by way of a formal application in the concerned Court; and if it is a case of action for giving false evidence before the Court that aspect will have to be considered by that Court only in the first instance. It is open to the petitioner to request the JMIC Kasauli to decide that application expeditiously, which request can be suitably answered by that Court. We are not inclined to issue any direction even with regard to prayer Clause (x), which, we hold, is most inappropriate request made by the petitioner as in the case of other prayer clauses already dealt with. In prayer Clause (xi), the direction sought against the learned JMIC Kasauli is to act on the premise of the 19 counts spelt out in paragraph Paragraph 43 reads, thus: "43. That in the interests of brevity in the prayer clause (namely, prayer (xi)), it is respectfully elaborated that what is respectfully prayed for from this Hon'ble Court is directions to Ld. JMIC (Kasauli) to the effect that: a. There is a distinction between "monitoring" of an investigation, and "interference" in an investigation, setting out examples thereof; b. Not to loosely call for looselyworded "Status Reports", but when he calls for a report from the Police, he is required to be specific as to what particular point(s) he requires the Police's inputs on, and what makes him dissatisfied with the material already on record, prompting him to ask for more information. c. To abide by the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gazi Khan vs. The State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1990 SC 1361 ), and whenever mala fides against the Police are alleged, the Police are to file their replies on dulysworn affidavit, and which affidavit is to be executed by the concerned Officer himself, no matter how high he may be. d. To direct him to act on the premise that when an applicant/accused files an application, and notice is issued, the State, while it certainly has a "choice" whether or not to file written replies, however, should it choose not to file a written reply, it can cover up its lapse in oral arguments only to the extent of confining itself to legal arguments, and cannot orally contest the factual part of the assertions in the relevant application. e. To direct him to act on the premise that when an applicant/ accused files an application alleging mala fides against Police and/or against the prosecution, and the Court is satisfied prima facie that the matter needs to be looked into deeper, the Court can and should "direct" the Police to file a reply. f. To direct him to act on the premise that when an applicant/accused files an application alleging mala fides against the Police and/or against the prosecution, if the Court does direct the State/Police to file a reply, it can direct that the reply be corresponding parawise to the application to be replied to. g. To direct him to act on the premise that when an applicant/accused files an application alleging mala fides against the Police and/or against the prosecution, if the Court does direct the State/Police to file a reply, it can also direct that the reply be of filed by any specific officer. h. To direct him to act on the premise that when an applicant/accused files an application alleging mala fides against the Police and/or against the prosecution, if the Court does direct the State/Police to file a reply by a specific officer, that such specific officer can be above the rank of SHO. i. To direct him to act on the premise that when criminal contempt of court is alleged, the Ld. Trial Court is required to make a reference to the Hon'ble High Court under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, and to do so, it is required to issue notice to the alleged contemners before it makes up its mind whether or not to issue a reference. j. To direct him to act on the premise that when such a notice be issued, it is not to be confined only to the Prosecution, and may be issued to any person who is alleged to have committed criminal contempt of court in criminal conspiracy between the Prosecution with others, even those are not taking a formal part in the proceedings. k. To direct him to act on the premise that when such a notice be issued, it can be directed to be replied to on parabypara basis. l. To direct him to act on the premise that when such a notice be issued, it can be directed to be replied under a duly sworn affidavit. k. To direct him to act on the premise that when such a notice be issued, it can be directed to be replied to on parabypara basis. l. To direct him to act on the premise that when such a notice be issued, it can be directed to be replied under a duly sworn affidavit. m. To direct him to act on the premise that when an accused request elaboration of an order or seeks the Court to set out the sources of its information in relation to some conclusions reached by it, this is not tantamount to expressing a lack of faith or confidence in the Ld. Presiding Officer of the Court. n. To direct him to act on the premise that when there be no work in the open Court, the Ld. Presiding Officer is not at liberty to rise and continue to work in chambers prior to 4 pm. o. To direct him to act pm the premise that when a request for uncertified copies is made, they must be issued on the spot. p. To direct him to act on the premise that he is obliged to pass all ROAC orders in open Court only, in the presence of the parties, and it is not permissible that even if the "broad" (prospective) contents of an order are disclosed to a party while disposing of its application, the Ld. Presiding Officer is then at liberty to withdraw to chambers, and pass whatever order whenever he deems fit. q. To direct him to act on the premise that once the broad contents of a prospective order are disclosed to a party, then the Presiding Officer is not dutybound to pass the same order. r. To direct him to act on the premise that the Court is dutybound to pass orders on all applications received by it. s. To direct him to act on the premise that the Court is dutybound to pass "speaking" orders on all applications". 19. On a bare reading of paragraph 43, it is seen that the petitioner is seeking direction against the learned JMIC to decide the pending applications keeping in mind the issues raised therein. s. To direct him to act on the premise that the Court is dutybound to pass "speaking" orders on all applications". 19. On a bare reading of paragraph 43, it is seen that the petitioner is seeking direction against the learned JMIC to decide the pending applications keeping in mind the issues raised therein. Since the multiple and successive applications filed by the petitioner before the learned JMIC, Kasauli are still pending, we refrain from examining any of the points noted in paragraph 43, reproduced above, except to observe that each of the pending applications before the learned JMIC Kasauli will have to be decided in accordance with law and including on the question of its maintainability. There is no question of issuing direction as is sought in the prayer clause under consideration. If the decision rendered by the learned JMIC, Kasauli on the concerned application is not favourable to the petitioner, he will be free to challenge the same by way of appropriate proceedings before the Court of competent jurisdiction. 20. The reliefs dealt with until now, though appear to be benign directions sought by the petitioner, the real grouse of the petitioner can be discerned from the remaining three reliefs which we are going to advert to a little later. The substance of those reliefs is to call upon this Court to hold that the learned Judges respondents 8 & 9 have acted in a manner which no reasonable person would have acted by issuing notice to the petitioner in the police complaint proceedings instituted against him and to take cognizance of the crime. This grievance is made without challenging the orders passed by the said Judicial Officers. Notably, the petitioner has already resorted to multiple and successive applications before the concerned Court including on the concluded issue of discharge, without challenging the correctness of that order in the present petition. In absence of challenge to those orders, it is unfathomable to entertain the tall claim of the petitioner about the acts of commission and omission of the Judicial Officer(s) resulting in violation of oath of their office rendering them unfit to discharge the judicial duties and on that basis to ask for compensation/damages/costs from them upon recording such finding. In absence of challenge to those orders, it is unfathomable to entertain the tall claim of the petitioner about the acts of commission and omission of the Judicial Officer(s) resulting in violation of oath of their office rendering them unfit to discharge the judicial duties and on that basis to ask for compensation/damages/costs from them upon recording such finding. We now propose to deal with prayer clauses (xii) and (xiii) together, as it is against two Judicial Officers, respondents No. 8 & 9, respectively, on the same basis. The declaration and direction is sought as he had passed order dated 24th November, against respondent No. 8, 2009. We have already extracted the said order in the earlier part of the judgment. The argument proceeds that this order has been passed negligently and in a mechanical manner, which no reasonable person of average standing or prudence, would have passed, if acting in good faith. From the plain language of that order, however, it is evident that respondent No. 8 passed the said order on being satisfied on the basis of record before him that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused persons for the offence referred to in the complaint. For that reason, the learned Judge issued notices to the accused persons. 21. The argument, is that, the complaint as filed and including the material collected by the investigating officer during investigation does not make out the offence for which notice has been issued to the petitioner. Because of the issuance of that notice in a routine manner, the reputation of the petitioner has been damaged. In the first place, it is not known why the petitioner realized this infirmity after almost 3 1/2 years. The order passed is on 24th November, 2009, whereas the present petition making this grievance has been filed on 23rd June, 2013. Interestingly, in the meantime, the petitioner pursued his remedy before the JMIC, Kasauli, by filing application for discharge on 31st May, 2010 without any demur. It is only after the discharge application was rejected on 8th April, 2013, the petitioner appears to have changed his mind and has now been advised to make grievance about the order dated 24th November, 2009. 22. It is only after the discharge application was rejected on 8th April, 2013, the petitioner appears to have changed his mind and has now been advised to make grievance about the order dated 24th November, 2009. 22. We were at pains to impress upon the petitioner that mere passing of an erroneous order or even for that matter perverse order, cannot be the basis to seek declaration, as is sought in the prayer clauses under consideration. The petitioner wants declaration that the two officers have violated their oath of office and have rendered themselves unfit to discharge the judicial duties. This allegation is nothing short of criticizing the Judge personally and not his judgment. If the petitioner verily believed that the said order was erroneous and untenable, he could have resorted to appropriate remedy permissible in law. The petitioner did not do that. The only legitimate inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner is using this forum to browbeat the JMIC Court before whom the main proceedings are still pending adjudication. The petitioner has been named as accused No. 2 therein. If the petitioner eventually succeeds and is acquitted honorably, at best, he may have remedy against the complainant for resorting to malicious prosecution, but by no stretch of imagination, he can be heard to demean the office of a Judge by making reckless and unsubstantiated allegations that the order passed by the Judge concerned, was not in good faith. No doubt, the protection given to the Judicial Officers in terms of the provisions of Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850 or for that matter, The Judges Protection Act, 1985, is limited to the acts done by the Judicial Officer in discharge of judicial functions in good faith and believing himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. That, however, does not mean that every erroneous order passed by the Judicial Officer must be assumed to be made in bad faith, so as to proceed against him personally. There is marked difference between "acts done in good faith" and not done in good faith or done in bad faith and constituting mens rea. The onus is on the petitioner to substantiate that the judgment or order delivered by the Judicial Officer was not in good faith. There is marked difference between "acts done in good faith" and not done in good faith or done in bad faith and constituting mens rea. The onus is on the petitioner to substantiate that the judgment or order delivered by the Judicial Officer was not in good faith. By vaguely mentioning that no reasonable person of average standing or prudence would have passed such an order, will not be enough to substantiate the fact that the order, as passed, was not in good faith. In the present petition, the petitioner has conceded that he is not alleging malafides against the two Judicial Officers, but his grouse is about "implied malice" - because of the negligence of the Judicial Officer(s) and in not diligently perusing the case materials before them. In our opinion, the averments in the petition are bereft of any material facts to constitute bad faith or malice in law. There can be no general presumption or assumption that every wrong order passed by the Judicial Officer is replete with implied malice. Something more is required to be stated by the petitioner who alleges implied malice. On careful scrutiny of the averments in the petition, we find that no "material fact" has been stated as to how and why it was a case of order not passed in good faith or one of implied malice. To buttress this finding, we deem it apposite to reproduce the averments in the petition on which reliance was placed by the petitioner in support of his argument that the same were sufficient to proceed against the Judicial Officers. The same reads thus: "ARRAYING OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS: .......................... "The situation is similar here, as the petitioner has, inter alia, been defamed by his being maliciously viz. The same reads thus: "ARRAYING OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS: .......................... "The situation is similar here, as the petitioner has, inter alia, been defamed by his being maliciously viz. implied malice on the part of Ld.Addl CJM Mr.Jaswal, stemming from his negligence in not perusing the Final Report/ case material properly and crossreferencing it with FIR No.100 dated 15.11.2007 whose proceedings were before him, including proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. against Mr.Gobind Ram in which he had heard arguments and reserved orders not one but twice (this itself perhaps indicating his judicial reluctance in taking action against a serving Police Officer even if it be the dignity and authority of his own court that has been abused by such Police Officer) committed to a criminal trial, and furthermore, is not being discharged by Ld.JMIC from the same criminal trial on account of similar negligence in perusing the full case material. In law, insofar as defamation of a citizen by any Judicial Officer is concerned, the Nagpur High Court has settled the proposition in the case of Kamla Patel vs. Bhagwandas and others (AIR 1934 Nagpur 123) that no sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC is required, as it is not expected (nor permitted) of a Judicial Officer while acting in good faith in the discharge of his official duties to defame any person. Insofar as the bona fides of the petitioner are concerned, it is relevant to highlight that in the application for interim relief, the petitioner has prayed that this Hon'ble Court invoke its powers under Section 404 of the CrPC read with Section 121 of the Evidence Act, and by special order, require Ld.JMIC (Kasauli) to furnish a parabypara, reply to this Hon'ble Court on the application dated 3.6.2013 filed by the petitioner (Annexure 17), setting out the developments in his Court between 27th 30th May, 2013. He has further prayed to this Hon'ble Court that if the contents of the application dated 3.6.2013 be found false on any material particular, to take action against the petitioner in the manner mandated by law. This itself proves the bona fides of the petitioner, who is willing to voluntarily put his neck on the proverbial chopping block if his statements be found untrue. It is most respectfully submitted that he has not arrayed these Judicial Officers lightly. This itself proves the bona fides of the petitioner, who is willing to voluntarily put his neck on the proverbial chopping block if his statements be found untrue. It is most respectfully submitted that he has not arrayed these Judicial Officers lightly. He is compelled to array them as he seeks justice, whose foreword / preface is "universal accountability" ; therefore, by definition, "accountability" would also include or rather, start with the accountability of Judicial Officers. The reason to array them herein is because it is one thing for a Judicial Officer to pass an order which is not reasonable, but which is not unreasonable either ( in other words, it is one of two possible views of a reasonable person of average intellectual standing acting prudently and in good faith), and therefore, the remedy for challenging such an order lies in revision, or appeal, or writ. But it is another thing altogether to pass an order, or a series of orders ( as is the case here), that no reasonable person of average standing or prudence would, in similar circumstances, have passed, if acting in good faith. The conditionality of 'good faith' is paramount in the functioning of any Judicial Officer in order to claim immunity, as made clear, inter alia, by the provisions of the Judicial Officers Protection Act of 1850, the 104th Law Commission Report (which Report makes it abundantly clear that the definition of 'good faith' as used in the aforesaid Act would be construed and understood within the wider meaning of the phrase as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code, and not within the limited and more narrow meaning as defined in Section 8(22) of the General Clauses Act), and the Judges Protection Act of 1986. When such a thing not only happens but happens repeatedly, clearly, there is something out of the norm which needs looking into. Similarly, he has not arrayed them with any ulterior motive. For example, on 03062013, Ld. JMIC Mr. Gaurav Mahajan unilaterally offered to recuse himself if the petitioner would not withdraw his application dated 03062013 (Annexure 17), as its contents indicated to him that the petitioner did not have confidence in him. Rather than risk him recusing himself, which would meant a huge setback time wise and moneywise to the trial, the petitioner withdrew the said application. Gaurav Mahajan unilaterally offered to recuse himself if the petitioner would not withdraw his application dated 03062013 (Annexure 17), as its contents indicated to him that the petitioner did not have confidence in him. Rather than risk him recusing himself, which would meant a huge setback time wise and moneywise to the trial, the petitioner withdrew the said application. This itself is clear proof that the petitioner does not have the ulterior motive of seeking the recusal of any Judicial Officer by means of arraying him in his personal capacity in the present petition. The petitioner is aware that if he were to follow what some others have done (whether right or wrong), he could have tried to have raised the same issues, albeit, with not the same efficacy, while submitting a letterpetition to the High court (read, Hon'ble the Chief Justice) under Section 6 of the Contempt of Court Act. However, the main reason in raising the issues in this petition instead is so that keeping in mind the provisions of Section 404 of the CrPC read with Section 121 of the Evidence Ac, these Judicial Officers may explain their conduct to this Hon'ble Court while it is acting judicially, rather than to the Ld. Presiding Officer(s) of this Hon'ble Court while acting administratively. While acting administratively, the Ld. Presiding Officer(s) of this Hon'ble Court cannot invoke powers they otherwise possess while acting judicially under Section 404 of the CrPC and/or Section 121 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, since the phrase used in Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act is "....to the High Court" and not "..... to the Chief Justice", coupled with the use of the word "it" in the phrase "....to which it is subordinate.", this adds strength to their being arrayed herein judicially rather than their conduct being reported to an Officer of the High Court departmentally (as a subordinate Court, or even its Presiding Officer, when acting judicially is not 'subordinate' to the High Court or any of its Officers, even to Hon'ble the Chief Justice, when acting administratively). Lastly, it is respectful submission of the petitioner that in context of Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, reporting of judicial conduct has to be raised judicially, whereas reporting of administrative conduct may also be raised administratively/ departmentally (for example, in a letterpetition addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice). Lastly, it is respectful submission of the petitioner that in context of Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, reporting of judicial conduct has to be raised judicially, whereas reporting of administrative conduct may also be raised administratively/ departmentally (for example, in a letterpetition addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice). What is being judicially reported to this Hon'ble Court in the present petition is the judicial conduct of these Judicial Officers. And though selfevident from the petition, nonetheless, it bears highlighting that no mala fides are being alleged against these two Judicial Officers: what is, however, being alleged is implied malice, resulting from their negligence in diligently perusing the case materials before them, both in the instant case, as well as in FIR No.100 dated 15.11.2007 and in the proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC (in FIR No.100 dated 15.11.2007), whose consequence has been defamation of the petitioner, both in society as well as before numerous Hon'ble Courts (in collateral proceedings), as well as numerous personal and financial hardships he has had to bear, all of which run into crores. 3. That before the petitioner proceeds further in the matter, it is most respectfully submitted that he is not so much challenging any particular "order(s) (only), but (or also) the conduct of the rt 'proceedings' in general, for the simple reason that whatever (alleged) "order" has been passed is, in actual fact, a "nullity" in law, void ab initio, as if non est, and therefore, of no legal consequence, significance, relevance or effect. Therefore, in light of the binding dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments, there is 'nothing' to challenge, since the alleged "order(s)" is/ are non est, thereby shutting the door of Section 397 of the CrPC in the face of the petitioner insofar as not giving him any specific 'order' to challenge." (emphasis supplied). From the above quotation, it is amply clear that out of exasperation, because of successive applications taken out by the petitioner, and insinuation against the learned Judge, he offered to recuse himself from the proceedings. However, he continued with the proceedings because the petitioner requested him to do so. Instead of appreciating that gesture of the learned Judge, the petitioner has the audacity to seek relief including of damages/compensation against that Judge. This exposes the mindset of the petitioner. 23. However, he continued with the proceedings because the petitioner requested him to do so. Instead of appreciating that gesture of the learned Judge, the petitioner has the audacity to seek relief including of damages/compensation against that Judge. This exposes the mindset of the petitioner. 23. Be that as it may, a mere assertion that it is a case of "implied malice" is not enough. That is an opinion of the petitioner. The material facts to constitute implied malice ought to have been clearly stated in the petition. As aforesaid, the only averment, is that, no reasonable person of average standing or prudence would have passed such order; and at best, that the order was the outcome of negligence of the Judicial Officers in diligently perusing the case materials before them. None of these facts can be said to be sufficient to infer that the order dated 24th November, 2009, or for that matter 8th April, 2013, have been passed in the manner suggested by the petitioner. On the other hand, the order in question is indicative of the fact that the concerned Judge had perused the material placed before him and upon being satisfied, thought it appropriate to issue notices to the accused persons for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 120B, IPC. In the present petition, the petitioner, advisedly, has not challenged the correctness of the said order. As a matter of fact, challenge to order dated 24th November, 2009 cannot be countenanced. Firstly because, that order has been passed almost about 3 1/2 years back. Secondly, the petitioner unsuccessfully resorted to statutory remedy of discharge in which the efficacy of that order has already been tested. Moreover, the order notes that it has been passed upon being satisfied on the basis of record before the Court. The falsity of that factum has not been put in issue by the petitioner. 24. Even the latter order rejecting the discharge application has not been challenged in this petition. In absence of challenge to these orders, it cannot be assumed that the conclusion reached by the two Judicial Officers in passing the respective orders was unfounded or untenable, muchless not in good faith. 24. Even the latter order rejecting the discharge application has not been challenged in this petition. In absence of challenge to these orders, it cannot be assumed that the conclusion reached by the two Judicial Officers in passing the respective orders was unfounded or untenable, muchless not in good faith. We need not wade through the records to ascertain whether the offences in respect of which the Court has taken cognizance and has decided to proceed against the petitioner, is, in fact, justified or otherwise. That will be indirectly testing the validity of the aforesaid two orders, without the same being challenged before us. Further, that issue has already been redressed in the discharge application filed by the petitioner. Upon rejection of the discharge application and which order has been allowed to attain finality, the grievance of the petitioner under consideration will have to be stated to be rejected. The fact that the petitioner has filed fresh discharge application, or for that matter, for calling upon the learned Judge to elaborate on the points noted in the order dated 8th April, 2013, does not have the same effect of having challenged the orders dated 24th November, 2009 and also 8th April, 2013 as such. It is well settled position that the criminal Court does not have power to review its own order. Suffice it to mention that the assumption of the petitioner that the order dated 24th November, 2009, was passed negligently, in the fact situation of the present case, is completely un-substantiated. No material fact has been averred in the petition as to why it must be inferred contrary to the factual position stated in the said order. The act of negligence can be inferred on the basis of some acts of commission and omission. That cannot be presumed unless those acts of commission and omission are pleaded and substantiated. Merely saying that the order was passed negligently and without perusing the relevant record is nothing short of an argument in desperation consequent to the dismissal of the discharge application of the petitioner. 25. Reverting to the order passed by respondent No.9 dated 8th April, 2013, it is an exhaustive order dealing with the contentions, relevant material and including the precedents relied by both the sides. 25. Reverting to the order passed by respondent No.9 dated 8th April, 2013, it is an exhaustive order dealing with the contentions, relevant material and including the precedents relied by both the sides. Respondent No.9 has reiterated the opinion in this order that prima facie material against both the accused persons to proceed under Sections 420/467 IPC read with Section 120 B of IPC is available on the record. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that this order does not refer to the relevant material for proceeding with the trial against the accused. Assuming that some other material is also available on record which has not been specifically referred to in this order, that does not mean that the decision of the learned Judge suffers from bad faith or not in good faith. Similarly, insufficient or cryptic reasoning in the order cannot be the basis to assume that the same is not passed in good faith. Moreso, when the learned Judge has recorded his satisfaction that prima facie material is available in the record to proceed against the accused, as noted in the said order. At the time of considering discharge application or framing of charge, it is well established position that the Court is not expected to re-appreciate the material and documents on record but is only expected to evaluate the same and take it at its face value to ascertain as to whether it discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court is not expected to deeply examine the probative value of the material on record. It is enough to ascertain whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused. At this stage, even a strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against accused in connection with the commission of that offence. That is precisely what the respondent No.9 has done, as can be discerned from the decision dated 8th April, 2013. It is, therefore, unfathomable that the order of respondent No.9 can be said to have been passed in bad faith as such. 26. That is precisely what the respondent No.9 has done, as can be discerned from the decision dated 8th April, 2013. It is, therefore, unfathomable that the order of respondent No.9 can be said to have been passed in bad faith as such. 26. Thus understood, it must follow that the allegation made by the petitioner against the two Judicial Officers of having passed orders replete with implied malice, is not only an argument of desperation but on the face of the record reckless and irresponsible allegation made with ulterior motive. If the petitioner is so confident of succeeding in the main proceedings must cooperate with the Court concerned for its early disposal instead of resorting to multiple applications. By making such reckless and irresponsible assertion, the subtle attempt of the petitioner appears to be to browbeat the JMIC, Kasauli, where the criminal case against him is pending for trial. This is bordering on interfering with the administration of justice and also demeaning the authority of the Court. The fact that the criminal trial is an adversarial proceeding and that the litigant is free to propagate his views and perceptions does not give him license to embroil the Judicial Officers and other duty holders dealing with their case on the basis of such vague and unsubstantiated allegations. We are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has exceeded his brief by seeking direction from this Court to declare that the two Judicial Officers have violated the oath of their office or have rendered themselves unfit to discharge judicial duties. Indeed, the Court has wide powers under Section 482 of the Code. That, however, has to be exercised for the ends of justice and not to permit the accused to embroil the Judicial Officer(s) in avoidable litigation much less in respect of their official acts done in good faith in discharge of judicial duties. It is a remedy to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In fact, the petitioner himself has engaged in the abuse of process by resorting to multiple and successive applications filed before the concerned Court. Further, without showing patience and without making any sincere effort to get those applications decided one way or the other, he has rushed to this Court with reliefs which, as aforesaid, are frivolous and vexatious. 27. In fact, the petitioner himself has engaged in the abuse of process by resorting to multiple and successive applications filed before the concerned Court. Further, without showing patience and without making any sincere effort to get those applications decided one way or the other, he has rushed to this Court with reliefs which, as aforesaid, are frivolous and vexatious. 27. Even the argument of the petitioner that it is the duty of the Court to come to the aid of the accused by exercising revisional powers under Chapter XXX of Cr.P.C., we are afraid cannot be entertained or exercised at the instance of the litigant, such as the petitioner before this Court, who himself has abused the process of the Court. In any case, the revisional or inherent powers need not be invoked at the instance of this petitioner for redressal of his grievance that the interlocutory applications preferred by the petitioner, in the main pending proceedings, have remained undecided or to merely direct the concerned Court to dispose of the same expeditiously. Further, the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is limited to supervisory jurisdiction and not to issue declaration as prayed for - that the Judicial Officer has violated the oath of his office and has rendered himself unfit to discharge judicial duties. 28. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the reliefs claimed in prayer clauses (xii) and (xiii) are completely ill-advised and founded on reckless, irresponsible and unsubstantiated allegations. The attempt of the petitioner was to persuade us to take the view that even a simply wrong order and if it is palpably untenable, will have to be treated as having been passed by the Judicial Officer in bad faith or implied malice. Further, the test of order passed in "good faith" or otherwise cannot be on the touchstone of the definition of expression provided in the General Clauses Act vide Section 3(22). That provision postulates that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context a thing shall be deemed to be done in "good faith" where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. According to the petitioner, the Court has ample power to order inquiry into the correctness of the allegation made by the petitioner including by resorting to Section 398 and 404 of Cr.P.C. Section 398 of Cr.P.C. reads, thus: "398. According to the petitioner, the Court has ample power to order inquiry into the correctness of the allegation made by the petitioner including by resorting to Section 398 and 404 of Cr.P.C. Section 398 of Cr.P.C. reads, thus: "398. Power to order inquiry. In examining any record under section 397 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrates subordinate to him to make, and the Chief Judicial Magistrate may himself make or direct any subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 of subsection (4) of section 204 or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged: Provided that no court shall make any direction under this section for inquiry into the case of any person who has been discharged unless such person has had an opportunity of showing cause why such direction should not be made" 29. On a bare perusal of this provision it is noticed that the inquiry to be undertaken by the Court is into any complaint which has been dismissed under Section 203 or sub-section (4) of Section 204 or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged. This provision cannot be invoked to inquire into the allegations of this nature at the instance of accused. 30. We may now turn to Section 404 of Cr.P.C. The same reads thus: "404. Statement by Metropolitan Magistrate of grounds of his decision to be considered by High Court. When the record of any trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate is called for by the High Court or Court of Session under section 397, the Magistrate may submit with the record a statement setting forth the grounds of his decision or order and any facts which he thinks material to the issue; and the court shall consider such statement before overruling or setting aside the said decision or order." This provision empowers the High Court to call upon the Metropolitan Magistrate to submit with the record a statement setting forth the grounds of his decision or order and any facts which he thinks material to the issue which the Court can consider before overruling or setting aside the said decision or order. We are afraid, this provision cannot be the basis to assume that in case of every wrong order passed by the Magistrate, such statement must be called for from the Judicial Officer. Nor does this provision impels us to think that calling for such statement presupposes that the order under challenge has not been passed by the Judicial Officer in good faith. The petitioner instead of approaching this Court to challenge the order dated 8th April, 2013 has approached the same Court which had passed that order for settingforth the grounds of his decision or order and any facts which the Judge thinks material to the issue. Whether such relief can be considered by the same Court is a matter to be decided in the said application. Suffice it to observe that the argument of the petitioner that the two orders are not passed in good faith deserves to be stated to be rejected. 31. The petitioner had then relied on Section 121 of the Evidence Act that the Court must issue notice to the two Judicial Officers who in turn would be obliged to explain the basis of their decision to this Court. Section 121 of the Evidence Act reads, thus: "121. Judges and Magistrates. No Judge or Magistrate shall, except upon the special order of some Court to which he is subordinate, be compelled to answer any question as to his own conduct in Court as such Judge or Magistrate, or as to anything which came to his knowledge in Court as such Judge or Magistrate; but he may be examined as to other matters which occurred in his presence whilst he was so acting." 32. This provision enables the superior Court to issue special order to the Judge or Magistrate to compel him to answer any question as to his own conduct in Court as such Judge or Magistrate or as to anything which came to his knowledge in Court in that capacity. The purport of this provision, is indicative of the fact that there is bar against calling upon the Judge or Magistrate to answer any question as to his "own conduct"; except on the special order of some superior Court. For, calling upon the Judge or Magistrate to give statement is a serious order and cannot be passed mechanically. The purport of this provision, is indicative of the fact that there is bar against calling upon the Judge or Magistrate to answer any question as to his "own conduct"; except on the special order of some superior Court. For, calling upon the Judge or Magistrate to give statement is a serious order and cannot be passed mechanically. The petitioner having failed to challenge the concerned orders, the question of calling upon the JMIC to submit statement does not arise and moreso in view of our finding that there is nothing to show that the said orders have not been passed in good faith. Reliance placed on this provision is inapposite. The argument of the petitioner, however, is that, this Court being a superior Court, can and ought to direct the two Judicial Officers to elaborate on the issues referred to in the orders passed by them. That course may have been possible only if we were to at least, prima facie, hold that the orders passed by the two Judicial Officers were not in good faith. 33. We make it clear that we are not accepting the argument of the petitioner that such a course is open by resorting to Section 121 of the Evidence Act. For, it is a provision dictating rule of evidence. Further, that provision pointedly deals with questions as to the own conduct of the Judge or Magistrate in Court as in that capacity and not with regard to the judicial orders passed by him, which can be otherwise made subject matter of challenge in the form of Review, Appeal or Revision. 34. Reverting to the expression "good faith" appearing in the Act of 1850 and Act of 1985, it will have to be understood as antithesis to expression "bad faith" or acts of commission or omission replete with mens rea. It would also mean, act done dishonestly. Unless that interpretation is given, every wrong order so reversed by the superior Court, would partake the colour of order passed in bad faith or passed not in good faith. The expression "good faith" as defined in Indian Penal Code reads thus: "S.52. "Good faith". It would also mean, act done dishonestly. Unless that interpretation is given, every wrong order so reversed by the superior Court, would partake the colour of order passed in bad faith or passed not in good faith. The expression "good faith" as defined in Indian Penal Code reads thus: "S.52. "Good faith". Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention." The expression "dishonestly" will have to be understood in the context of the definition of that word given in Indian Penal Code in Section 24 which reads, thus: "S.24. Dishonestly Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing "dishonestly". 35. Even, the definition of expression fraudulently and reasons to believe appearing in IPC in Sections 25 and 26 may be of some help to understand the purport of expression "good faith". The expression "Fraudulently" as in Section 25 of the IPC reads, thus: "S.25. Fraudulently A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise." 36. The expression "Reason to believe" as in Section 26 of the IPC reads, thus: "S.26. Reason to believe A person is said to have "reason to believe" a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise." Interestingly, the definition of Judge in IPC is also of some significance. The same reads, thus: "S.19. Judge The word "Judge" denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a judge, but also every person. Who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, is confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or Who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment." 37. On a bare reading of the definition of a Judge in Section 19, it re-states the position that if the judgment or order passed by the Judge is not appealed against, it would be definitive. On a bare reading of the definition of a Judge in Section 19, it re-states the position that if the judgment or order passed by the Judge is not appealed against, it would be definitive. In the present case, the orders passed by the two Judicial Officers have been allowed to attain finality by the petitioner so far; and have not been expressly challenged in the present petition. 38. The petitioner was at pains to persuade us that he has expressly stated in the petition that the two Judicial Officers did not act diligently (without due care and attention) which must be read as having acted negligently and not in good faith. We have already negatived this contention having found that no material facts have been stated as to how the two Judicial Officers can be said to have acted negligently. Negligence cannot be assumed. It has to be substantiated from the attending circumstances. Those attending circumstances are not spelt out by the petitioner anywhere in the petition. Moreover, the record reveals that the orders in question were passed by the Judicial Officer(s) with due care and attention having perused the record before them. Thus, the edifice on the basis of which the petition proceeds is completely unfounded and un-substantiated. For the reasons already recorded hereinbefore, the relief claimed in prayer Clause (xiv) deserves to be rejected being completely ill-advised. That relief has been sought against the two Judicial Officers on the assumption that they had not acted in good faith or their acts of commission and omission resulted in implied malice. No doubt in prayer clause (xiv), the petitioner has asked for relief of costs/compensation/damages also from other duty holders, namely, the complainant, Public Prosecutor and Investigating Officer. According to the petitioner, each of them were responsible for misleading the Court and in fact not bringing to the notice of the Court the correct factual position. That part of the relief need not be considered in the present petition as the petitioner has already resorted to a formal application to initiate criminal contempt against the said duty holders on that count. Moreover, if it is a case of malicious prosecution the remedy for the petitioner would be at the end of the proceedings, if acquitted honorably. The relief claimed against those persons, therefore, in any case cannot be countenanced at this stage. 39. Moreover, if it is a case of malicious prosecution the remedy for the petitioner would be at the end of the proceedings, if acquitted honorably. The relief claimed against those persons, therefore, in any case cannot be countenanced at this stage. 39. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Velankanni vs. Chitra Devi and others in WP No.914/2006 decided on 10th April, 2013. We are in agreement with the submission of learned Advocate General that the said decision is in the context of the fact situation of that case. The Court found as of fact that respondent No.2 had not acted bonafide which resulted in deprivation of liberty of the petitioner. In the present case, we have rejected the argument of the petitioner that the two orders on the face of it appear to have been passed negligently by the concerned judicial officers. In the circumstances, we do not intend to dilate any further on the said decision except to place on record that a Review Petition against the said decision is pending before the Madras High Court being Review Application No.72 of 2013 (which fact was ascertained by the Registry). Even the other decisions referred to in the petition, of the Apex Court and of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kamla Patel vs. Bhagwandas and others; AIR 1934 Nagpur 123, Pepsi Foods Ltd vs. Special Judicial Magistrate; AIR 1998(1) SC 128, Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur vs. Shivakant Shukla; Cri.L.J. 1976 (1) page 945, P.L. Lakhanpal vs. A.N. Ray and others; AIR 1975 Del 66 , C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice A.M. Bhattachargee and others; 1995 SCC (5) 457, will be of no avail to the petitioner in view of our finding that there is nothing to indicate that the two orders have been passed by the concerned Judicial Officers in bad faith or not in good faith. 40. Although, we are dismissing this petition at the admission stage, we had to pass a detailed speaking order dealing with each relief claimed by the petitioner as requested by the petitioner in terms of prayer clause (xv), to obviate any further application before us as has been done by the petitioner before the Court of JMIC, Kasauli. 40. Although, we are dismissing this petition at the admission stage, we had to pass a detailed speaking order dealing with each relief claimed by the petitioner as requested by the petitioner in terms of prayer clause (xv), to obviate any further application before us as has been done by the petitioner before the Court of JMIC, Kasauli. At the same time, we are in agreement with the submission of the learned Advocate General that this petition is not a bonafide petition but a frivolous and vexatious proceeding to undermine the authority of the Court and to browbeat the Judicial Officer before whom the trial of criminal case against the petitioner is still pending. For that reason, the petition should be dismissed with exemplary costs. We may remind the petitioner who intends to enter the legal profession very shortly, as was stated by him across the Bar, of the dictum of the Apex Court in Nirmala J. Jhala, versus State of Gujarat and another; (2013) 4 SCC 301 . In paragraphs 20 & 21, the Court observed thus: "20. A subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure-contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. "Judge bashing" has become a favourite pastime of some people. There is growing tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary, to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. {Vide L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 , K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540, Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2007) 14 SCC 1 and Ajay Kumar Pandey, in re (1998) 7 SCC 248 .} 21. The subordinate judiciary works in the supervision of the High Court and it faces problems at the hands of unscrupulous litigants and lawyers, and for them "Judge bashing" becomes a favourable pastime. In case the High Court does not protect honest judicial officers, the survival of the judicial system would itself be in danger." 41. The subordinate judiciary works in the supervision of the High Court and it faces problems at the hands of unscrupulous litigants and lawyers, and for them "Judge bashing" becomes a favourable pastime. In case the High Court does not protect honest judicial officers, the survival of the judicial system would itself be in danger." 41. We hope that if the petitioner eventually enters the legal profession, may keep these observations in mind; and if his real intention is to strengthen the justice delivery system, must engage himself in constructive activities and use his energy, time, resources and intelligence to further the interests of the Institution. He should not engage in calling upon the Judges to keep on explaining their orders passed by them because he is not satisfied with the same. That is no less destructive activity. Instead, he ought to resort to statutory and other remedy available to question the correctness such orders, which, in his view, need reconsideration. By making reckless and unsubstantiated allegations against the Judicial officers, he has inevitably undermined the authority of the Court and also consumed avoidable precious time of the trial Court and also of this Court, which could have been utilized for meaningful activity to cater to the requirements of other deserving litigants. 42. The learned Advocate General submits that because of the multiple applications filed by the petitioner, which on the face of it, are vexatious and frivolous, the inevitable effect will be to interfere with the administration of justice, which ought to be eschewed and dealt with sternly. He submits that no litigant should be allowed to resort to such misadventure. That shakes the confidence of common man in the justice delivery system. We accordingly, dismiss this petition with exemplary costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to be paid to the respondent-State of Himachal Pradesh, represented by Advocate General. The costs shall be paid by the petitioner within two weeks from today and receipt produced in the Registry within such time failing which the Collector Solan, District Solan shall take steps to recover the said amount from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue and to be made over to the State Treasury. In addition, we keep the option of the learned Advocate General to initiate contempt proceedings against the petitioner open. 43. In addition, we keep the option of the learned Advocate General to initiate contempt proceedings against the petitioner open. 43. While parting, we would place on record that because of the stubborn attitude of the petitioner, we were required to spend considerable time to hear this matter - resulting in loss of precious time of this Court, which was avoidable. Even for this reason, we have accepted the plea of the learned Advocate General to impose exemplary costs on the petitioner. Hence, the order of costs. 44. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed with costs, as aforesaid. The miscellaneous applications are also disposed of.