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2013 DIGILAW 689 (HP)

Rajeev Sood v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2013-07-24

A.M.KHANWILKAR, KULDIP SINGH

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JUDGMENT A. M. Khanwilkar, Chief Justice: Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the inquiry report, dated 27th December, 2010, submitted by the Inquiring Authority (District and Sessions Judge), Hamirpur and, in particular, findings recorded therein against the petitioner in relation to Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly); the Full Court Resolution of the High Court, dated 11th August, 2011; and including notification issued by respondent No.1, dated 9th September, 2011, whereby the petitioner has been ordered to be compulsorily retired with all consequential reliefs. 3. The petitioner, at the relevant time, a member of H.P. Judicial Service in the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division), was served with a Statement of Articles of Charge framed against him containing, in all, 9 Articles. The petitioner faced departmental proceedings in relation to the said Articles of Charges. That inquiry culminated with the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, dated 27th December, 2010. The Inquiry Officer was of the opinion that Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) were proved against the petitioner. On submission of such report, the matter was considered by the Full Court of this Court. On analysis of the record, the High Court recorded its tentative reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in relation to Article Nos.III and VI. As a result, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner as to why the findings of the Inquiry Officer in relation to those Articles should not be reversed and the petitioner should be proceeded against even on the basis of those Articles, if proved against the petitioner, in addition to the findings of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer on other Articles. The petitioner submitted his reply, which was considered by the Full Court, alongwith other materials and record, in its meeting held on 11th August, 2011. The Full Court, upon considering all aspects of the matter, affirmed the findings of guilt returned by the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner with regard to the Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) and, in addition, recorded finding of guilt even in relation to Article of Charge No.VI. The Full Court, upon considering all aspects of the matter, affirmed the findings of guilt returned by the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner with regard to the Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) and, in addition, recorded finding of guilt even in relation to Article of Charge No.VI. The Full Court, after considering all aspects of the matter, however, eventually took a lenient view and imposed penalty of compulsory retirement against the petitioner as prescribed vide Rule 11 (vii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. On the basis of the said decision, notification was issued by respondent No.1 on 9th November, 2011 under the signature of Principal Secretary (Home), Government of Himachal Pradesh, as a consequence of which, the petitioner stood compulsorily retired from service. This action taken against the petitioner is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 4. Before we analyze the rival submissions in detail, we may deem it apposite to remind ourselves about the scope of interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction against such decisions. In a recent case decided by the Apex Court in State Bank of India and others versus Narendra Kumar Pandey1, in paragraphs 23 to 26, it is observed thus: “23. The Inquiring Authority has examined each and every charge levelled against the charged officer and the documents produced by the presenting officer and came to the conclusion that most of the charges were proved. In a departmental inquiry, the disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges on preponderance of probability and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court reported in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [ 1972 (4) SCC 618 ] and R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Others [JT 1999 (6) SC 507 : 1999 (8) SCC 90 ]. The documents produced by the bank, which were not controverted by the charged officer, supports all the allegations and charges levelled against the charged officer. In a case, where the charged officer had failed to inspect the documents in respect of the allegations raised by the bank and not controverted it is always open to the Inquiring Authority to accept the same. 24. In a case, where the charged officer had failed to inspect the documents in respect of the allegations raised by the bank and not controverted it is always open to the Inquiring Authority to accept the same. 24. In Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha [ 1994 (2) SCC 615 ], this court held: “4 A bank employee who had refused to avail of the opportunities provided to him in a disciplinary proceeding of defending himself against the charges of misconduct involving his integrity and honesty, cannot be permitted to complain later that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself of the charges levelled against him and the disciplinary proceeding conducted against him by the bank employer had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice of fair hearing”. 25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a well acceptable principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In State Bank of India and Others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde [JT 2006 (7) SC 383 : 2006 (7) SCC 212 ], this Court held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence acting as a court of Appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the Inquiring Authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules. 26. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the Inquiring Authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules. 26. This court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ] held: “7 Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence especially when the charged officer had not participated in the inquiry and had not raised the grounds urged by him before the High Court by the Inquiring Authority.” (emphasis supplied) 5. This legal position is restated in another decision of 3-Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India versus Ram Lal Bhaskar and another2. In paragraphs 12 and 13, the Court observed thus: “12. This Court has held in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ): “7 The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not reappreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against respondent 1 do not constitute any misconduct and that respondent 1 was not guilty of any misconduct.” (emphasis supplied) 6.Reverting back to the factual matrix of the present case, it is noticed that the findings of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer against the petitioner in respect of Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) have been affirmed by the Full Court and in addition, the petitioner has been found guilty even in respect of Article of Charge No.VI. No grievance has been made before us that the petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity or that the proceedings were conducted in violation of principles of natural justice and/or any provisions of law. The argument revolves around the grievance that the finding of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer, which has been affirmed by the Full Court and for that matter, independently recorded by the Full Court, was perverse and no prudent person would come to such conclusion, as has been reached by these Authorities. 7. No doubt, this grievance can be considered and if accepted, judicial review of the decision may be possible, in law. However, we find that the argument of the petitioner was more in the realm of inviting the Court to re-appreciate the evidence, so as to take a view different than the one taken by the two Authorities. That cannot be the basis to interfere, in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the grievance of the petitioner is that some material has not been adverted to by the concerned Authorities. However, the question is – whether non-consideration of that material would render the final conclusion untenable or can be said to be vitiated? That cannot be the basis to interfere, in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the grievance of the petitioner is that some material has not been adverted to by the concerned Authorities. However, the question is – whether non-consideration of that material would render the final conclusion untenable or can be said to be vitiated? If it is a case of no evidence in respect of Articles of Charges or for that matter, a case of having overlooked the material evidence, that would affect the credibility of the final conclusion reached by the Authorities. That can be a possible ground for interfering in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 8. Having said this, we may now turn to the indisputable factual position, which has resulted in recording findings of guilt against the petitioner in relation to the stated Articles of Charges. The case of the Department is that the petitioner “managed to acquire” the land in the name of his wife Smt.Manju Sood for a consideration of Rs.2.00 lacs, without previous knowledge of the Competent Authority and prior intimation, as required under Rule 18(2) of the CCS Conduct Rules; and thus, has committed an act of misconduct by contravention of Rule 3(1) (i) to (iii) of the CCS Conduct Rules and Rule 19 of the H.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2004. The fact that the stated land was purchased in the name of Smt.Manju Sood for a consideration of Rs.2.00 lacs is not in dispute at all. The question is: whether that transaction has been completed after taking prior approval of the Competent Authority of the petitioner. The defence of the petitioner, essentially, is that, the land is purchased by his spouse from her independent income, which she was entitled to under law. For, she was getting handsome salary of her own, being a working wife. Further, she had obtained permission from the prescribed Authority in that behalf. However, it is not in dispute that the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife was executed and registered on 14th December, 2007, whereas the purported permission obtained by the petitioner’s wife is dated 27th May, 2008. Thus understood, it is not a prior permission as such, which is the mandate of Rule 18 of the CCS Conduct Rules. 9. Thus understood, it is not a prior permission as such, which is the mandate of Rule 18 of the CCS Conduct Rules. 9. Not only that, the said permission, in any case, cannot absolve the petitioner from obtaining previous sanction of the prescribed Authority in the Department where he was working. Rule 18 (2) of the CCS Conduct Rules makes this position amply clear. The same reads thus: “18. Movable, immovable and valuable property (1 ((2)No Government servant shall, except with the previous knowledge of the prescribed authority, acquire or dispose of any immovable property by lease, mortgage, purchase, sale, gift or otherwise either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family:Provided that the previous sanction of the prescribed authority shall be obtained by the Government servant if any such transaction is with a person having official dealings with him. (emphasis supplied) 10. On a bare reading of this provision, it is evident that if a Government servant intends to acquire any moveable, immoveable and valuable property in his own name or in the name of his family member, is obliged to take previous approval of the prescribed Authority. The proviso predicates that if the transaction is with a person having official dealings with the Government servant then even if his family member acquires from or disposes immovable property to such person, he must obtain previous sanction of the prescribed Authority. Admittedly, the petitioner did not apply to the prescribed Authority in the Department where he was working. So understood, no fault can be found with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer and affirmed by the Full Court that the petitioner is guilty of having violated the mandate of Rule 18(2) of the CCS Conduct Rules, as a result of which, was liable to be proceeded for that act of misconduct. 11.To get over this position, the petitioner has placed emphasis on Note 8, below Rule 18 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, which refers to the Executive Instructions issued by the Government for guidance of the Administrative Authorities. It postulates that all transactions, both of immoveable and moveable properly, “made out of the funds of the Government servant” (irrespective of the person in whose name the transaction is made) should be governed strictly by Rule 18. It postulates that all transactions, both of immoveable and moveable properly, “made out of the funds of the Government servant” (irrespective of the person in whose name the transaction is made) should be governed strictly by Rule 18. The transaction in immoveable property, in all cases, should be with the previous knowledge of the prescribed Authority. We fail to understand as to how this Executive Instruction will come to the aid of the petitioner in the fact situation of the present case. Inasmuch as, it is found, as of fact, by the Inquiry Officer and that finding has been affirmed by the Full Court, that the consideration amount paid for acquiring the property was from the joint account of the petitioner and his wife; and not from the individual account of the petitioner’s wife Smt.Manju Sood as such. That finding of fact is indisputable and in any case, cannot be reopened merely because of some loose observations are found in the opinion recorded by the Inquiry Officer or for that matter of the Full Court. 12.In other words, the indisputable fact is that the stated property has been purchased in the name of petitioner’s spouse but the consideration has been paid from the joint account of the petitioner and his wife. In that case, it was not only the executor of the sale deed Smt.Manju Sood, wife of the petitioner, who was obliged to obtain prior approval from the prescribed Authority of the Department in which she was working, but even the petitioner was equally liable to obtain similar prior approval from the prescribed Authority of the Department, in which he was working, independently. As aforesaid, the petitioner’s wife failed to obtain prior approval. She got the same much after the execution and registration of the sale deed in her favour. In that, the sale deed was executed and registered on 14th December, 2007, whereas the purported approval was granted to her by the prescribed Authority of the Department in which she was working, on 27th May, 2008. That by itself can be a matter to proceed even against the petitioner’s spouse. In either case, the finding of guilt with regard to Article of Charge No.IV is unexceptionable. On that finding alone, the Disciplinary Authority could have imposed major penalty and including compulsory retirement. That by itself can be a matter to proceed even against the petitioner’s spouse. In either case, the finding of guilt with regard to Article of Charge No.IV is unexceptionable. On that finding alone, the Disciplinary Authority could have imposed major penalty and including compulsory retirement. Notably, in the present case, both the Authorities have concurrently found that the Sale-Deed executed in favour of the petitioner’s wife was by persons who have had official dealings with the petitioner. We will advert to this a little later. In that case, by virtue of the proviso to Rule 18(2), the petitioner was obliged to obtain prior approval of the prescribed Authority, which, admittedly, he has failed to do. 13.That takes us to the concurrent finding of guilt recorded by the two Authorities in respect of Article of Charge No.V. It is alleged that the petitioner “managed to acquire” the land in the name of his wife Smt.Manju Sood, by way of execution of the sale deed, dated 14th December, 2007. In other words, it is a benami transaction. For, the consideration amount was paid from the joint account. This could have been an independent charge. Be that as it may, the second part of the Charge is that the sale deed was executed in the name of petitioner’s wife by Sanjay Kumar, son of Shyam Lal, the General Power of Attorney of one set of vendors, namely, Sh.Fulla, Sh.Nagina and Smt.Kartari, sons and widow of Sh.Inder, residents of Village Bhatanwali, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., and Hukam Chand, son of Sh.Jai Singh, on his own behalf and being General Power of Attorney of Smt.Prito Devi and Smt.Koushalya Devi, daughter and widow, respectively, of Shri Jai Singh, residents of Village Satiwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, being the second set of vendors, witnessed by Shri Sajjan Singh, son of Shri Basant Singh, and “Sandharv Goel son of Shri Vinod Kumar”, knowing fully well that a Civil Suit No.117/1 of 2007, titled Sanjay Kumar versus Som Nath, filed by said Sanjay Kumar, son of Shri Shyam Lal, was pending disposal in the court of which the petitioner was a Judge on the day of execution of the sale deed, dated 14th December, 2007. It is also alleged that Civil Suit No.46/1 of 2008, titled Vinod Goyal versus Ravinder Kumar, and Civil Suit No.81/1 of 2008, titled Ramita Sharma versus Vinod Kumar, filed by the second set of vendors, which was apparent from agreement to sell, dated 18th January, 2008, executed by him for sale of land to Smt.Samita Sharma, which suit was conducted/defended by Shri T.S. Shah, Advocate. Those proceedings were intentionally retained and tried by the petitioner in his Court instead of assigning the same to other Court situated at Paonta Sahib. As a consequence, the petitioner had committed the act of misconduct in contravention of Rule 3(1)(i) to (iii) of the CCS Rules read with Rule 19 of the H.P. Judicial Service Rules. 14.Both the Authorities have concurrently found the petitioner guilty of this Charge as well. On the face of it, the allegation in the Charge, which has been proved during the inquiry, makes it amply clear that the petitioner misconducted himself as a Judicial officer and failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and his conduct was unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. 15.The defence of the petitioner, inter alia, is that the sale deed was executed in favour of his wife Smt.Manju Sood. That defence has been examined by the Inquiry Officer and negatived on the finding that the evidence on record, including the version of petitioner’s wife, who was examined as DW-32, leads to an unmistakable legal inference that the petitioner was not only instrumental in completing the transaction, but, in fact, was throughout involved in the negotiation process and that the petitioner’s wife had no inkling about the ground reality and the basis for finalizing the terms and conditions of the sale deed executed by her. Since that finding has been affirmed by the Full Court and there is no reason to take a different view of the matter, coupled with the fact that finding is supported by the evidence on record, it is unfathomable as to how the concurrent view taken by the two Authorities on this issue can be overturned or discarded. Doing so, would be attempting to lightly brush aside the concurrent opinion which is not only sound but supported by the material on record. 16. Doing so, would be attempting to lightly brush aside the concurrent opinion which is not only sound but supported by the material on record. 16. The defence of the petitioner that he was not aware about the pendency of the stated suits before him has also been negatived by the Inquiry Officer and that finding of fact has been upheld by the Full Court. The inevitable conclusion is that the acts of commission and omission of the petitioner made it possible to acquire the stated property in the name of his wife Smt.Manju Sood, from the funds in their joint account and not the sole account or income of Smt.Manju Sood as such. Moreover, the petitioner interacted with the litigants whose proceedings were pending before him, being Civil Suit No.117/1 of 2007, before the execution of the sale deed, dated 14th December, 2007. The theory propounded by the petitioner that it cannot be assumed that he had knowledge about the pendency of proceedings before him does not commend to us, considering the weighty evidence taken into account by the two Authorities to record finding of guilt against the petitioner in respect of Article of Charge No.V. The concomitant of this finding would be that the petitioner was liable to be proceeded for having committed an act of serious misconduct and for this singular charge, ought to suffer major penalty and including compulsory retirement. 17. Having said this, the petition can be thrown out without going into any other aspect. The argument of the petitioner, however, is that the Full Court has not imposed penalty of compulsory retirement on account of proved Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly), but, essentially, because of the finding recorded in respect of Article of Charge No.VI, for which the petitioner was given show cause notice by the High Court. This argument is totally devoid of merits. On a fair reading of the Full Court Resolution, there can be no manner of doubt that the Full Court, in the first place, proceeded to uphold the findings of guilt returned by the Inquiry Officer with regard to the Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) and then proceeded to examine the other two Articles of Charges, for which show cause notice was issued by it. The final decision taken by the Full Court was, therefore, not limited to finding of guilt in respect of Article of Charge No.VI, as is contended. This argument of the petitioner, in our opinion, is contrary to the record. The Resolution of the Full Court, in no uncertain terms, records that it had considered all the relevant materials before taking the final decision and the penalty of compulsory retirement, in that sense, was on the basis of finding of guilt qua each Article of Charge individually and including the cumulative effect of findings of guilt in respect of Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly) as well. The imposition of penalty is, obviously, after taking into account the totality of the situation. The fact that a lenient view has been taken by the Full Court because of unblemish service record of the petitioner for more than 15 years, cannot be the basis to absolve the Government servant who has been found guilty of such serious charges of not maintaining absolute integrity, devotion to duty and his acts of commission and omission being unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. 18.Nevertheless, we may now revert to Article of Charge No.VII in respect of which there is concurrent finding of guilt recorded by both the Authorities. The charge against the petitioner was that he had links with the local business man, namely, Vinod Kumar, son of Shri Prem Chand, which was apparent from the contents of the sale deed, dated 14th December, 2007, executed in favour of petitioner’s wife Smt.Manju Sood. The sale deed has been witnessed by Sandharv Goel, son of Shri Vinod Kumar and said Shri Vinod Kumar is the General Power of Attorney of Hukam Chand, Smt. Prito Devi and Smt.Koushalya Devi, son, daughter and wife of Shri Jai Singh, who have sold their land to Smt.Manju Sood, through Hukam Chand being one of the vendor and General Power of Attorney of his sister Smt.Prito Devi and mother Koushalya Devi and that Vinod Kumar was instrumental in bringing about the transaction in question. 19.Both the Authorities have accepted the evidence produced by the Department and found, as of fact, that the petitioner had links with the local businessman Vinod Kumar. 19.Both the Authorities have accepted the evidence produced by the Department and found, as of fact, that the petitioner had links with the local businessman Vinod Kumar. The argument of the petitioner, is that, it is too much to assume that some person who had signed as witness, incidentally happens to be son of Vinod Kumar, whose proceedings were pending before the petitioner being Civil Suit No.81/1 of 2008, when, in fact, it has come on record that it is the vendor who had arranged for the witnesses and the petitioner’s wife was not even acquainted with those persons. This version of the petitioner may be partly correct, if viewed in the context of the evidence of petitioner’s wife DW-32, who has gone on record to accept that she was not familiar with any matter except that she had executed the sale deed. That presupposes that it is the petitioner who had organized everything; and because of his coordination with all the stake holders, the sale deed was eventually executed. It would necessarily follow that the petitioner had ensured and ought to have ensured that all precautions were taken for execution of the sale deed in the name of his wife. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend that he did not bother to verify the credentials or antecedents of the persons who have signed as witnesses on the sale deed executed in the name of his wife. Such argument of even a layman cannot be countenanced, muchless coming from a Judicial Officer who is expected to act with complete caution and circumspection in such matters. For, such conduct of the Judicial Officer inevitably exposes the whole institution to disrepute and ridicule. 20. The defence of the petitioner that he was not aware about the pendency of any suit before him in which the father of witness, namely, Vinod Kumar was party, has been considered and negatived by the two Authorities. On considering all aspects, the two Authorities have concurrently found that the petitioner was guilty of Articles of Charge No.VII of having links with the local businessman, which facilitated execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife. On considering all aspects, the two Authorities have concurrently found that the petitioner was guilty of Articles of Charge No.VII of having links with the local businessman, which facilitated execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife. In other words, the factum of the petitioner, who was a Judicial Officer, having links with local businessman and that contact was exploited to execute the sale deed in favour of petitioner’s wife for under­valued consideration, would certainly be a case to proceed against the petitioner for having committed serious misconduct, warranting stern penalty and including compulsory retirement from service. Thus, even this Charge, by itself, was sufficient to proceed against the petitioner for the stated penalty and no fault can be found with the said decision of the Disciplinary Authority in the fact situation of the present case. 21. Reverting to the partly proved Article of Charge No.VIII, both the Authorities have concurrently found that on surprise visit by the Registrar (Vigilance) of this Court to the Judicial Complex, Paonta Sahib on 7th November, 2008, it was noticed that the petitioner was absent. This being a concurrent finding of fact cannot be overturned in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The argument of the petitioner that the complaints were generated by the group of lawyers who were opposed to the petitioner will be of no avail, as, being a Judicial Officer, the petitioner was expected to honour the Court timing and remain present in Court during the working hours. His absence from the Office/Court during the working hours was certainly a case of not maintaining devotion to duty and such conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. Even this Charge, by itself, was sufficient to proceed against the petitioner. We are neither inclined to overturn the finding of fact with regard to this Charge nor the final penalty imposed on the petitioner which is, as aforesaid, after taking into account the totality of the circumstances. 22.The Disciplinary Authority has additionally found the petitioner of being guilty of Article of Charge No.VI, which predicates that the petitioner managed to acquire the land in question for a consideration far below than the actual market rate of the land prevalent in the concerned area at that time. 22.The Disciplinary Authority has additionally found the petitioner of being guilty of Article of Charge No.VI, which predicates that the petitioner managed to acquire the land in question for a consideration far below than the actual market rate of the land prevalent in the concerned area at that time. This was evident from the fact that just about a month after execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife, another agreement in respect of land of the same type and in the same vicinity, fetched consideration of Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa as against the meager amount paid by the petitioner’s wife under the sale deed executed in her favour. The sale deed was executed on 14th December, 2007 and the transaction referred to in Articles of Charge No.VI was effected on 29th January, 2008. This established the under-valuation of the property and/or the property purchased by the petitioner’s wife was for lower rate than the actual market rate of that land. The Full Court has analyzed this aspect in the tentative reasons recorded for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer with regard to Article of Charge No.VI in the following words: “Article-VI Two plots, the total area of which measures 7-1/2 biswas were purchased in the name of wife of the delinquent officer, vide sale deed dated 14.12.2007 Ex.D-1 for sale consideration of Rs.2 lacs. The plots were part of a chunk of land permitted to be converted into house sites by SADA. Plan of the block of plots is part of aforesaid sale deed Ex.D-1. On 8.1.2008 after about one month of the execution of sale deed Ex.D-1 agreement to sell Ex.PW/22-D was executed by the same vendors who executed sale deed in favour of the delinquent officer’s wife, in respect of another plot measuring 195 Sq. Mtrs. As per this agreement, price of the land was Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa. Comparison of the sale consideration of the plots purchased by the delinquent officer’s wife as per Ex.D-1 with the consideration mentioned in sale agreement Ex.PW-22/D demonstrates that the value of the plots purchased by the wife of the delinquent officer was Rs.8.25 lac. Mtrs. As per this agreement, price of the land was Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa. Comparison of the sale consideration of the plots purchased by the delinquent officer’s wife as per Ex.D-1 with the consideration mentioned in sale agreement Ex.PW-22/D demonstrates that the value of the plots purchased by the wife of the delinquent officer was Rs.8.25 lac. Thus she paid less than one fourth of the actual value of the plots, purchased by her from the persons, whose cases were pending in the court of delinquent officer.” 23.On that basis, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and after considering his reply, the Full Court opined as follows: “Also, we have examined the representation of the Delinquent Officer, with regard to our proposal to reverse the findings of exoneration, in respect of Articles of Charge No.III and VI, in the light of tentative reasons recorded by us on Agenda Item NO.3, in the Full Court Meeting held on 4th April, 2011, as also the evidence adduced during inquiry, by both the sides and the reasons recorded by the Inquiry Officer for exonerating the Delinquent Officer of these Articles of Charge. Delinquent Officer, in his representation, does not deny that within a month of the purchase of a plot of land, measuring 7-1/2 biswas, by his wife, for a consideration of Rs.2,00,000/-, there had been an agreement for the sale of another plot, situated nearby, at the rate of Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa. However, his explanation is that the agreement, which was entered into between the vendors and some other persons, for the sale of another plot at the rate of Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa, did not materialize and that as a matter of fact there had been litigation between the parties, by means of a suit, which litigation was compromised and the agreement was revoked. This reason, in no way, disproves the fact that the market value of the property purchased by the wife of the Delinquent Officer, only a month before the aforesaid agreement, was much higher, i. e. above four times the price at which his wife purchased the property, i.e. plot measuring 7- 1/2 biswas. It is also not denied by the Delinquent Officer that a case, in which the vendors were party, was pending before him, at the time when the aforesaid plot was purchased in the name of his wife. It is also not denied by the Delinquent Officer that a case, in which the vendors were party, was pending before him, at the time when the aforesaid plot was purchased in the name of his wife. The aforesaid facts are otherwise also borne out form the evidence adduced during the course of inquiry. Reasoning given by the Inquiry Officer, for exonerating the Delinquent Officer of Article of Charge No.VI, is contrary to the evidence on record. Therefore, it is resolved to affirm the tentative reasoning, which was conveyed to the Delinquent Officer, alongwith the Inquiry Report and to hold him guilty of Article of Charge VI.” 26.Relying on the observations in the opinion of the Full Court, as recorded in the Resolution, dated 11th August, 2011, an attempt was made to suggest that the finding is vitiated being a case of non-application of mind, if not perverse. We are not impressed by this submission. The finding of guilt is consistent with the tentative reasons recorded by the Full Court, which clearly proceeds on having noticed the anomaly arising out of the consideration amount mentioned in the two agreements executed around the “same time” and by the “same vendor”. Some error here or there in the observation cannot be the basis to overturn the said finding of fact recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. The observation in the Resolution must be understood in the context of the Charge and the reason for disagreeing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer with regard to Article of Charge No.VI.25. The fact that on the same day, 13 other agreements were executed and the consideration amount stated in those agreements was much lesser than the consideration amount mentioned in the sale deed executed by the petitioner’s wife cannot be the basis to belie the position emerging from the consideration amount mentioned in the agreement in respect of plot No.14 in the site plan approved by SADA, Paonta Sahib, measuring 195 sq. mtrs. at Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa, which was executed just about a month after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife. This aspect has been considered by the Full Court. Thus, the fact that the Inquiry Officer has not specifically dealt with the other agreements or analyzed the same, does not take the matter any further. mtrs. at Rs.1,10,000/- per biswa, which was executed just about a month after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the petitioner’s wife. This aspect has been considered by the Full Court. Thus, the fact that the Inquiry Officer has not specifically dealt with the other agreements or analyzed the same, does not take the matter any further. The charge has been proved that the petitioner’s wife executed the sale deed for far lower amount than the actual market rate, which was mentioned in the agreement in respect of plot No.14 executed by the same vendors. This is the purport of the observation of the Full Court in the final opinion record by it in relation to Article of Charge No.VI, while rejecting the argument of the petitioner that the said agreement was not finally acted upon by the parties because of settlement, on the basis of which the suit between them was disposed of agreeing to revoke the said agreement. The totality of the opinion will have to be considered and as aforesaid, some error here or there cannot be the basis to label the decision of the Disciplinary Authority as being perverse. The Full Court has finally decided to affirm the tentative reasoning which was conveyed to the petitioner alongwith the inquiry report for holding him guilty even in respect of Article of Charge No.VI. In our considered opinion, the final decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority to compulsory retire the petitioner from service after taking into account all aspects of the matter was and is a lenient view in the fact situation of this case, as is noted by the Full Court. The fact that the Disciplinary Authority has also taken into account that the petitioner’s service for more than 15 years was unblemished does not mean that the findings of guilt are erased or that the gravity and seriousness of the charges against the petitioner can be said to have been diluted and whittled down. The consideration or discussion in this regard was only for deciding on the quantum of penalty. That will have to be understood in that context only. As aforesaid, punishment imposed of compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service, in the fact situation of the present case, is obviously a lenient view. 27. The consideration or discussion in this regard was only for deciding on the quantum of penalty. That will have to be understood in that context only. As aforesaid, punishment imposed of compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service, in the fact situation of the present case, is obviously a lenient view. 27. A priori, the challenge to the decision of the Disciplinary Authority to compulsory retire the petitioner from service, in the fact situation of the present case, is completely ill-advised and untenable. The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the dictum of the Apex court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another3. He extensively read out paragraphs 11, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 20 thereof. While relying on the dictum in paragraph 20 of the said decision , it was argued that the petitioner, in the present case, has been framed by the warring factions in the Bar, one opposed to the petitioner. If this argument is to be accepted, it would mean that there was clear division in the Bar about the reputation of the petitioner as a Judicial Officer. Further, the evidence of the members of the Bar would be material only to consider the Article of Charge No.VIII about being habitually late in coming to the Court. That may not have any bearing on the other part of the same charge and including other charges proved against the petitioner. Thus, we fail to understand as to how the observations in paragraphs 20 and 21 of this judgment will be of any avail to the petitioner, which read thus: “20. A subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure – contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. “ Judge bashing” has become a favorite pastime of some people. There is growing tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary, to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. There is growing tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary, to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. {Vide L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 , K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540, Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2007) 14 SCC 1 and Ajay Kumar Pandey, in re (1998) 7 SCC 248 .} 21. The subordinate judiciary works in the supervision of the High Court and it faces problems at the hands of unscrupulous litigants and lawyers, and for them “Judge bashing” becomes a favourable pastime. In case the High Court does not protect honest judicial officers, the survival of the judicial system would itself be in danger.” 28.In the present case, on analysis of the material on record, two authorities have recorded findings of guilt against the petitioner at least in respect of Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VII and VIII (partly). Each of this Article of Charge was sufficient to proceed against the petitioner and to impose penalty such as compulsorily retiring him from service. The penalties are specified in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. By no stretch of imagination, for the nature of acts of commission and omission, for which findings of guilt have been recorded against the petitioner, it would be a case for imposition of minor penalty provided for in Rule 11 of the aforesaid Rules. The penalty of compulsory retirement is one of the major penalties and if we may say so, in the order of grading, it would be the third last category. The question is whether the major penalty provided in Clauses (v) and (vi), which was somewhat lesser punishment, could have been imposed as major penalty on the petitioner. Clause (v) of Rule 11 provides for reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period and Clause (vi), which is also for reduction to lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service for a period to be specified in the order of penalty. Clause (v) of Rule 11 provides for reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period and Clause (vi), which is also for reduction to lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service for a period to be specified in the order of penalty. By no stretch of imagination, the findings of guilt recorded in respect of Articles of Charge Nos.IV, V, VI, VII and VIII (partly) could be considered so lightly as to only end up with major penalty provided in Clauses (v) and (vi). In any case, the Disciplinary Authority having taken a conscious and well informed decision to impose major penalty of compulsory retirement of the petitioner, this Court cannot sit over the said subjective satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority and more so, when the fact situation of the present case does not deserve any indulgence nor it is possible to hold that the punishment of compulsory retirement is excessive. 29. For the reasons recorded hitherto, we find that this petition is devoid of merits. Hence the same is dismissed.