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2013 DIGILAW 69 (CHH)

GOPAL MISHRA v. PT. RAVISHANKAR SHUKLA UNIVERSITY

2013-02-20

PRITINKER DIWAKER, YATINDRA SINGH

body2013
ORDER 1. The main question involved in this writ appeal is, 'Whether Pandit Ravishankar Shukla University, Raipur (the University) is liable to issue mark sheet to the students, who are permitted to appear in the examination for improving division of M.Com examination (the subsequent-examination) under Ordinance 24 of the University (the Ordinance), even if the division does not change.' The answer to the question depends upon the meaning of the word 'division' in the main clause 9 of the Ordinance; does it includes 'marks' also or not. THE FACTS 2. Shri Gopal Mishra (the Appellant) is physically handicapped person. He took admission in 2006 for M.Com course. He passed out M.Com previous and final examination in the year 2007 and 2008 with aggregate of 49.54% of marks. 3. The Ordinance of the University permits some students (explained in the Ordinance) to improve their M.Com division by permitting them to take another chance by appearing in the subsequent-examination. 4. The Appellant appeared in the subsequent-examination for M.com previous and final in the year March, 2010. However, his result was not declared. 5. The Appellant filed WP-C-1467 of 2011 for declaration of his results and for issuing mark-sheet. It was disposed of on 29.09.2011 directing the University to supply the marks obtained by the Appellant in the subsequent-examination held in March, 2010. 6. The Appellant was informed of the marks obtained by him in the subsequent-examination on 11.11.2011. He secured 56.30% of marks. However, it was in the form of a letter and no mark-sheet was issued. 7. The Appellant filed Contempt Petition (C)-450 of 2011 on the ground that the University had not issued the mark-sheet. It was dismissed on 31.01.2012 on the ground that there was only direction for intimating marks but there was no direction for issuing mark-sheet. 8. The Appellant filed fresh WP-C-483 of 2012 for a direction to issue the mark-sheet. It was withdrawn on 03.09.2012 with liberty to take appropriate legal action. 9. The Appellant filed review application against the order dated 29.09.2011 in WP-C-1467 of 2011. It was dismissed on 16.01.2013. Hence, the present appeal against both the orders. Appellant–visually & physically challenged 10. The Appellant is visually challenged. His visual disability is to the extent of 75% and a copy of the disability certificate is attached with the writ petition. 11. The Appellant filed review application against the order dated 29.09.2011 in WP-C-1467 of 2011. It was dismissed on 16.01.2013. Hence, the present appeal against both the orders. Appellant–visually & physically challenged 10. The Appellant is visually challenged. His visual disability is to the extent of 75% and a copy of the disability certificate is attached with the writ petition. 11. The Appellant had filed the writ appeal personally and had appeared before us on 13.02.2013 to argue his appeal. On that date, he was not able, to walk or stand properly. He was walking with great difficulty, with the help of crutches. When we had asked him about the reason for the same, he informed us that he had polio in the childhood and is unable to walk or stand properly for this reason. The Appellant is also physically challenged person. 12. Considering the aforesaid circumstances, we requested Shri P.S. Koshy, Advocate to appear on behalf of the Appellant as a friend of the court and the Appellant was requested not to attend the court. THE DECISION–MARK-SHEET SHOULD BE ISSUED Appellant's Submissions 13. The counsel for the Appellant submits that : • Under the Ordinance, there is no prohibition for issuing the mark-sheet. The University has already communicated the marks and they should now, issue a mark-sheet; • In the earlier examination, the Appellant had secured 49.54% of marks in the M.Com examination. In the subsequent-examination, he secured 56.30% of marks. In case, the mark-sheet is not given to him, he will not get the advantage of securing 56.30% marks; • On securing more than 55% marks, the Appellant, apart from having other advantages, can appear in the National Eligibility Test (NET) examination conducted by the University Grants Commission (UGC), as well as can join PhD or MPhil course. If the mark-sheet is not given to him, he can neither appear in the NET nor join MPhil or PhD Course; • The Appellant is visually and physically challenged person. He should be given an opportunity to go ahead in life rather than being stopped from joining a MPhil or PhD course or appearing in the NET; • In case of change in division, the mark-sheet, as well as degree is changed. However, in case division is not changed, then mark-sheet is not issued even if marks have improved. He should be given an opportunity to go ahead in life rather than being stopped from joining a MPhil or PhD course or appearing in the NET; • In case of change in division, the mark-sheet, as well as degree is changed. However, in case division is not changed, then mark-sheet is not issued even if marks have improved. Both groups fall in the same class and should be given similar treatment; they cannot be treated differently. 14. A reading of Clause 9 of the Ordinance (relevant clauses 7 to 9 of the Ordinance are appended as Appendix-1 to this judgment) indicates that only those candidates, who have passed in third division (36% to less than 48%) or second division (48% to less than 60%) can appear in the subsequent-examination. The candidate securing first division (60% or more than that) cannot appear in the subsequent-examination. 15. The reason for not permitting the first divisioners to appear in the subsequent-examination in contra-distinction to the third or second divisioners appear to be simple: the first divisioners already have the best advantage; they can always appear in all subsequent examinations or apply for the career that they want. This is not true for third or second divisioners, who secure less than 55% of marks. 16. The students on the basis of better percentage of marks not only have better prospects but can also appear in different examinations that they may not be permitted to appear otherwise. 17. It is admitted to both the sides that the students securing 55% or more only can appear in the NET conducted by the UGC or join PhD or MPhil course. However, the Appellant cannot take advantage of better percentage, as the marks were given to him in the form of a letter and not in the form of mark-sheet. The letter informing marks is not accepted by the universities or other authorities as a substitute for the mark-sheet. 18. The Appellant had passed in the second division. He was entitled and was rightly permitted to appear in the subsequent-examination. There is no dispute on this account. However, the dispute is whether the University should issue fresh mark-sheet in case there is no change in the division; even though percentage of marks have been improved, conferring substantial benefit to him. 19. He was entitled and was rightly permitted to appear in the subsequent-examination. There is no dispute on this account. However, the dispute is whether the University should issue fresh mark-sheet in case there is no change in the division; even though percentage of marks have been improved, conferring substantial benefit to him. 19. Sub-clause (ii) of Clause 9 {Clause 9(ii)} (see Appendix-1) of the Ordinance provides that the result of the candidate obtaining less than 48% of marks in previous and final subsequent-examination shall not be declared. The Appellant has secured more than 48% of marks, namely 56%. There is no prohibition in the Ordinance for not declaring the marks in this case. The action of the University is not justified. University's submission 20. The counsel for the University submits that : • The main clause 9 of the Ordinance (see Appendix-1) states that the candidates can appear in the subsequent-examination to improve their division; • The word 'division' does not include marks. The candidate, who passed M.Com examination, can only appear in the subsequent-examination for improving the division and not for improving the marks; • The fresh degree is to be issued under Clause 9(vii) of the Ordinance only if degree is improved and not if only marks are improved; • The division of the Appellant has not improved and no fresh degree or mark-sheet can be issued. 21. Sub-clause (vii) of Clause 9 {Clause 9(vii)} of the Ordinance (see Appendix-1) provides that in case division changes in the subsequent-examination, then fresh degree will be issued cancelling the earlier degree. This is the natural consequence if the division changes. Even if this provision was not there, the result would have been the same. The reason is mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs. 22. The degree contains a recital regarding division of the candidates. In case division changes, then the degree has to be changed and a fresh degree is to be issued. Apart from it, fresh mark-sheet has to be issued, as division depends upon the marks obtained. Unless there are marks justifying the new division, changed degree would not be valid. 23. It is not disputed by the University that in case division changes then it will issue fresh mark-sheet cancelling the earlier one. However they dispute issuing fresh mark-sheet if only marks improve. 24. Unless there are marks justifying the new division, changed degree would not be valid. 23. It is not disputed by the University that in case division changes then it will issue fresh mark-sheet cancelling the earlier one. However they dispute issuing fresh mark-sheet if only marks improve. 24. The relevant point to note in clause 9(vii) is that sub-clause does not provide otherwise; it does not prohibit that in case division is not changed and only marks improve, then no fresh mark-sheet will be issued. 25. There is no prohibition in the Ordinance that improved mark-sheet will not be issued. In fact, if the marks improve, the division does not change then no fresh degree is required. It is the same degree that works. 26. In the present case, only mark-sheet will be changed. It will confer substantial benefit to the Appellant. He not only gets better job opportunities, but also gets permission to join PhD or MPhil course or can appear in the NET examination. The question is, should he be stopped even though the purpose of subsequent-examination is improvement; should he be deprived of this benefit? Division includes Marks 27. In case, the word 'division' is read literally it would give the same result as is being canvassed by the counsel for the University but in case it is read liberally so as to include 'marks' also-after all division depends on marks and cannot be excluded from it-then it would permit candidates similar to the Appellant to appear in the subsequent-examination. Should we adopt literal or broader interpretation so that as not to deny benefit of improvement is not denied and the purpose as well as object of the subsequent-examination is also fulfilled; should we adopt purposive interpretation? Purposive Interpretation–Outside India 28. The function of a court is to give effect to the legislative purpose, the intention of the legislature. It is often achieved by following the literal meaning. But if literal meaning is not in tune with the legislative purpose, then what may be done? In such a situation, the courts have been adopting strained meaning to achieve legislative purpose. This has been termed as purposive interpretation or construction. 29. It is said that the duty of the Courts is to ascertain and give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In such a situation, the courts have been adopting strained meaning to achieve legislative purpose. This has been termed as purposive interpretation or construction. 29. It is said that the duty of the Courts is to ascertain and give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In the performance of this duty, the Judges do not act as computers into which are fed the statutes and the rules for the construction of statutes and from whom issues forth the mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of statutes is a craft as much as a science and the judges, as craftsmen, select and apply the appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing.' (Donaldson, J. in Corocraft Ltd. Vs. Pan American Airways Inc 1968 3 WLR 714 : (1968) 2 All ER 1059). It is in such a process that purposive interpretation is evolved. 30. It is accepted that 'general judicial adoption of the term purposive construction is recent, but the concept is not new; and it may now be fashionable to talk of the purposive construction of a statute but the need for such a construction has been recognised since the seventeenth century.' (Viscount Dilhorne in Stock Vs. Fank Jones 1978 (1) All ER 948) 31. Historically, 'If one looks back to the actual decisions of [the House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the past thirty years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions. Changes in the judicial approach to questions of statutory construction are not the result of some specific decision of your Lordships House identifiable as a landmark in this field of law. They have been fostered by the influence, persuasive and pervasive, of the similarity of reasoning to be found in the judgments of individual judges even though they may differ as to the result of applying that reasoning to the particular words of the particular statute which is under consideration in the case.' (Lord Diplock in Carter Vs. Bradbeer 1975(3) All ER 158). 32. Bradbeer 1975(3) All ER 158). 32. In middle of 20th Century, Lord Denning stated it in a new form by explaining, 'When a defect appears [in a statute] a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the drafts-man. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature. ...A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.' (See Seaford Court Estates Ltd. Vs. Asher 1949(2) 342 All ER 155 (at page 164)) 33. Lord Simonds in a later decision cautioned against the approach of Lord Denning by observing that 'this proposition in a new form cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation [see below for our comment on naked usurpation]. We would like to say few words regarding comments of Lord Simonds, 'naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation'. The courts have always maintained that they interpret the law, and not make the law. This has been subject matter of debates amongst jurists. House of Lords in Shaw vs. DPP: 1961 (2) AII ER 446 convicted a publisher of the Ladies Directory a 'Who's Who' of London prostitutes, for corrupting the public morals. The courts have always maintained that they interpret the law, and not make the law. This has been subject matter of debates amongst jurists. House of Lords in Shaw vs. DPP: 1961 (2) AII ER 446 convicted a publisher of the Ladies Directory a 'Who's Who' of London prostitutes, for corrupting the public morals. Dennis Lloyd in The Idea of Law page 63' says '[I]n doing so House of Lords did not shrink from the fact that this was in effect to confer on judge and juries a discretion to create new offences in accordance with the exigencies of public morals as these might vary from time to time.' David Pannick in his book 'Judges' says 'With increasing regularity as he advances up the legal hierarchy, the judge will need to decide hard cases in which alternative solutions to the dispute may be (and often are in majority and dissenting judgments) respectably justified by reference to existing law. In such cases, the judge makes law. For centuries, English judges deceived each other into thinking that they merely applied the law made by parliament, that their job was only 'to interpret law and not to make law or give law'. {Francis Bacon of Judicature in Essays (1625) (Everyman ed. 1973), p. 162}. This has changed. In considering how judges decide hard cases, 'we do not believe in fairy tales any more'. {Lord Reid, 'The judge as Law Maker' 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22 (1972)}.' Lord Diplock while advocating for adoption of purposive construction laid down three conditions in Jones Vs. Wrotham Park Settled Estates: 1979 (1) All ER 286 (at page 289): 'First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.' The third condition is relevant to ponder. Our Supreme Court too in Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan: (1997) 7 SCC 241 laid down guide lines and norms and said : 'We lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all workplaces or other institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.' This is not a point involved in this writ petition and we leave it here to be debated among the jurists. and it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act. Since then English courts have adopted a middle road.' {See Magor and St. Alelions Rural District Council Vs. Newport Corporation 1951 (2) Al1 ER 839 (at page 841)} 34. However, at present in England, the law is, 'It is thus impossible to arrive at the terms of the relevant exception by the literal approach. This can be done only by the purposive approach, viz. imputing to Parliament an intention not to impose a prohibition inconsistent with the objects which the statute was designed to achieve, though the draughtsman has omitted to incorporate in express words any reference to that intention.' {See Lord Diplock in Kammins Ballrooms Vs. Zenith Investments 1970(2) Al1 ER 871 (at page 893)}. 35. In Anderton Vs. Ryan (1985) 2 All ER 355 (at page 359), House of Lords observed, 'Statutes should be given what has become known as a purpose construction, that is to say that the courts should where possible identify 'the mischief' which existed before the passing of the statute and then if more than one construction is possible, favour that which will eliminate 'the mischief so identified.' This is how the law stands at present on this point. Purposive Interpretation in India 36. Purposive interpretation or construction has found its root in our jurisprudence too. The Apex Court adopted the purposive interpretation in place of literal interpretation to prevent corruption as a penal offence in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others Vs. Purposive Interpretation in India 36. Purposive interpretation or construction has found its root in our jurisprudence too. The Apex Court adopted the purposive interpretation in place of literal interpretation to prevent corruption as a penal offence in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 1991 Supp (2) SCC 18 and advocated purposive interpretation in various cases while interpreting the law. Some examples are as follows: • 'Judge must be a jurist endowed with the legislator's wisdom, historian's search for truth, prophet's vision, capacity to respond to the needs of the present, resilience to cope with the demands of the future and to decide objectively disengaging himself/herself from every personal influence or predilections. Therefore, the judges should adopt purposive interpretation of the dynamic concepts of the Constitution and the Act with its interpretative armoury to articulate the felt necessities of the time.' {State of Karnataka vs. Appa Balu Ingale: 1995 Supp (4) SCC 469 (para 34}; • 'It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act.' {S.P. Jain vs. Krishna Mohan Gupta: (1987) 1 SCC 191 (para 18 at page 201)}; • 'The word wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation drawing upon the context in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to sub-serve. The restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning. The legislature does not intent to restrict the word wood oil nor do we find any compelling circumstances in the Act to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the accused and which found acceptance by the learned Single Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandalwood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling and-transportation of them and make the manufacturers of sandalwood oil accountable for the possession of sandalwood trees or chips or roots etc' {Forest Range Officer Vs. P. Mohammed Ali: 1993 Supp (3) SCC 627 (para 8)}. 37. Thus strained meaning, applying purposive interpretation or construction, may be adopted where literal meaning is not in tune with the legislative purpose. P. Mohammed Ali: 1993 Supp (3) SCC 627 (para 8)}. 37. Thus strained meaning, applying purposive interpretation or construction, may be adopted where literal meaning is not in tune with the legislative purpose. This legislative purpose may be seen in the light of mischief sought to be remedied. Otherwise violative of Article 14 38. Apart from purposive interpretation, confining the word 'division' would leave this clause to the vice of discrimination-violating constitutional mandate under article 14 of the Constitution. 39. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equal protection of law. It means equal treatment in similar circumstances (for rulings, see below) Shrikishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1955 (2) SCR 531 AIR 1955 SC 795 ; TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 , 655 (para 345); Govt. of AP v. Maharshi Publishers Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 1 SCC 95 , 98-99 (para 7); Amit v UOI (2005) 13 SCC 721 ; State of UP v. Maqbool Ahmad (2006) 7 SCC 521 , 525 (para 13); Soma Chakravarty v. State (2007) 5 SCC 403 , 411 (para 23) AIR 2007 SC 2149 . Equals cannot treated as unequal (for rulings SCC below) State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh (2006) 12 SCC 709 , 722 (para 19) AIR 2007 SC 641 . 40. The purpose of the subsequent-examination is to improve and to provide better opportunities to the candidates; the groups, where division is changed or marks are improved granting substantial benefit (as in the present case) fall in one class. It seems strange, as to why there should be a discrimination. 41. In case division changes from third to second or from second to the first, the candidate gets advantage' in life. So is the case if a candidate secures 55% or more marks in the subsequent- exams. Both fall in the same class however, in the first case, the mark-sheet is issued but in the other case it is not issued. This is discriminatory; it is impermissible. This will invalidate clause 9. No such construction should be adopted. Let's apply the aforesaid principle to interpret the word 'division' in clause 9 of the Ordinance. 42. Considering the purpose and object of the 'Ordinance, the effort to save it from charge of discrimination-we give broader meaning to the word 'division' as including marks also. 43. This will invalidate clause 9. No such construction should be adopted. Let's apply the aforesaid principle to interpret the word 'division' in clause 9 of the Ordinance. 42. Considering the purpose and object of the 'Ordinance, the effort to save it from charge of discrimination-we give broader meaning to the word 'division' as including marks also. 43. In our opinion, the words 'for improving division' a candidate can appear in the subsequent-examination in clause 9 includes 'for improving marks' as well to improve his marks. Of course, the candidate has to satisfy other conditions, namely he should have passed in third or second division. SOME OBSERVATIONS 44. We are not happy the way the University acted in this case. We wish to say something in this regard as well. However, we must confess, 'We, [the judges] do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by. (Justice Cardozo in 'Nature of Judicial Process') 45. The Appellant is visually challenged to the extent of 75%. He was neither given a writer in the exam nor an hour extra to write the answer as the University was supposed to do. 46. The Appellant is physically challenged as well. He had polio and can walk with great difficulty with help of crutches. On the earlier occasion we had permitted him to sit and argue the case, as he was having difficulty in arguing the case in the upright position. It was for this reason that we appointed a lawyer on his behalf to conduct his case as a friend of the court. 47. A person with such challenges in his life ought to have been encouraged by the University rather than to take the rigid stand taken by it. Law-without compassion and empathy-is meaningless, an empty formality. So is true about administration: it is not worth the paper it's written on. 48. In our opinion, the University should have looked into the hardship and dealt the case with understanding that it deserved rather than to deal it strictly as it did, despite time being granted to consider it. The case should not have come to the court. So is true about administration: it is not worth the paper it's written on. 48. In our opinion, the University should have looked into the hardship and dealt the case with understanding that it deserved rather than to deal it strictly as it did, despite time being granted to consider it. The case should not have come to the court. We leave it here: it is for the University to give it a deeper thought. CONCLUSIONS 49. Our conclusions are as follows: (a) Only candidates securing second' or third division are entitled to appear in the subsequent-examination of M.Com to improve their division; (b) The word division includes marks also; (c) In case marks are improved granting benefit to the candidates, then proper mark-sheet is to be issued; (d) The Appellant should be issued a fresh mark-sheet and the University will do so; (e) The Appellant shall be treated to have passed the exams as if he had secured the marks secured by him in the subsequent examination under clause 9 of the Ordinance and will be entitled to the same benefits as given to the other candidates securing such marks. With these observations, the appeal is allowed. Appeal Allowed. APPENDIX-1 Clauses number 7 to 9 of the Ordinance are as follows 7. For both the previous and final examination a candidate will be declared successful if he/she obtains at least 36% of the aggregate marks in the subject. No division will be assigned on the result of the previous examination. The division in which a candidate is placed shall be determined on the basis of aggregate of marks obtained in both the M.Com previous and M.Com final examination. 8. Successful candidates who obtain 60% or more of the aggregate marks shall be placed in the first division, those obtaining less than 60% but not less than 48% in the second division and all other successful candidates obtaining less than 48% in the third division. 9. 8. Successful candidates who obtain 60% or more of the aggregate marks shall be placed in the first division, those obtaining less than 60% but not less than 48% in the second division and all other successful candidates obtaining less than 48% in the third division. 9. Candidates who have passed the M.Com examination of the University in Third or Second Division and desire to appear at the M.Com Examination for improving division may, without attending a regular course of study in a college affiliated to the University or in a Teaching Department of the University be allowed to appear at the aforesaid examination as non collegiate student on the following conditions: (i) There shall be only two division for such candidates i.e. First Division and Second Division. The marks required for obtaining these divisions shall be the same as prescribed in the Ordinance i.e. examinees who are successful in final of the examination and have obtained 60% or more of the aggregate of the marks in Previous and Final of the examinations taken together shall be placed in the First Division and examinees who are successful in Final of the examination and have obtained less than 60% but not less than 48% of the aggregate marks in Previous and Final of the Examination taken together shall be placed in the Second Division. (ii) The results of the candidates obtaining less than 48% of the aggregate marks in Previous and Final of the examination taken together shall not be declared. (iii) Candidates shall have the option to appear at both the Previous and Final examination in one and the same year and for being successful at the examination, the candidates shall obtain 48% of the aggregate marks. Provided that such candidates who opt to appear in Previous and Final examinations separately shall have to obtain minimum aggregate required for the Previous examination but he will have to obtain at least 48% in the aggregate of the Previous and Final examinations taken together or else his result will be cancelled. (iv) The syllabus for the examinations shall be the same as prescribed for the year in which the examination is held. (v) Not more than two attempts shall be allowed to such candidates. Failure or non-appearance at the examination after permission has been accorded by the University shall be counted as an attempt. (iv) The syllabus for the examinations shall be the same as prescribed for the year in which the examination is held. (v) Not more than two attempts shall be allowed to such candidates. Failure or non-appearance at the examination after permission has been accorded by the University shall be counted as an attempt. Provided however such candidates who opt to appear at the Previous and Final examinations separately will be allowed one attempt at the Previous examination and two attempts at the Final examination. (vi) Candidates who wish to avail the opportunity given in foregoing paras will have to apply for permission as required in the Ordinance relating to Admission of non-collegiate students to the University examination along with requisite Registration Fees. (vii) In case a student improves his division under provision of this para, the fresh degree will be issued after cancelling his first degree.