JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28.5.2002 rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan in Civil Appeal No.31-N/13/2001. 2. Essential facts necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiffs’ for convenience sake) filed a suit for possession against the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as ‘defendants’ for convenience sake). According to the plaintiffs, land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 13 min/25 min, Khasra No. 150 measuring 0-10 bigha situated in Mauza Fatehpur, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’) is owned by them. Claiming the suit land to be a part and parcel of their Abadi. Plaintiffs contended that the suit land adjoins their houses and it had been in their use for common purposes such as dumping and storing etc. Defendants having no right, title or interest in the suit land, encroached upon the part of the suit land and built a thatched hut in the month of July, 1998. They were requested not to do so, but they refused to oblige. Plaintiffs then got the suit land demarcated from the Field Kanungo on 25.10.1998. Thatched hut was found on the suit land. Defendants on 10.11.1998 started collecting the construction material on the suit land. They also started digging the suit land. It is in these circumstances, the suit was filed for decree of possession by demolition of the thatched hut and any other construction. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. They denied the assertion that Chhapper (hut) was built in July, 1998. They also denied having started construction in November, 1998. According to them, no new construction was raised. They have denied that the suit land was part and parcel of the Abadi of the plaintiffs. According to them, they have built a house/Chhaper over 0-4 bigha of land on the Baisakhi day of 1968 and they were using the suit property continuously, peacefully and to the knowledge and exclusion of the plaintiffs ever since and their possession has become adverse and had since been matured into title. 4. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class framed the issues. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class dismissed the suit. Operative portion of the judgment of the learned Sub Judge reads as under: “12. 4. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class framed the issues. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class dismissed the suit. Operative portion of the judgment of the learned Sub Judge reads as under: “12. From the aforesaid discussion it becomes clear that though the plaintiffs are having title over the suit land yet their suit for possession for the whole of the suit land must fail and even a decree for possession of the area underneath the Chapper of the defendants cannot be passed as the plaintiffs have failed to prove the dimensions thereof by a tatima. It is also clear that the defendants cannot be held to be in adverse possession over 0-4 biswas of land out of the suit land as being claimed by them. Both these issues No.1 and 2 thus are replied in negative.” 5. Plaintiffs preferred an appeal bearing No. 31-N/13/2001 before the learned Additional District Judge. Defendants also filed cross-objections bearing No.32-N/13/2001. Learned Additional District Judge partly allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs to the effect that they were entitled to possession of part of the suit land measuring 6 biswas denoted by Khasra No. 150/2 in the Aksh Tatima Shajra attached to the Field Kanungo’s report Ex.P-3. Aksh Tatima Shajra and Field Kanungo’s report were ordered to be form part of the decree by the learned Additional District Judge. Cross-objections preferred by the defendants were dismissed. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. “Whether learned Additional District Judge has committed an error of law in not decreeing the suit for possession of the plaintiffs in its entirety regarding suit land when plaintiffs have proved their title on the suit land and the plea of adverse possession of defendants of 4 biswas of the land out of the suit land did not find favour with the learned Additional District Judge? 2. Whether learned Additional District Judge without any plea of acquiescence on behalf of defendants and any issue to that effect has erred in declining relief of possession to plaintiffs to the extent of 4 biswas of land out of suit land by way of demolition of structure raised thereon by applying the principle of acquiescence? 3. 2. Whether learned Additional District Judge without any plea of acquiescence on behalf of defendants and any issue to that effect has erred in declining relief of possession to plaintiffs to the extent of 4 biswas of land out of suit land by way of demolition of structure raised thereon by applying the principle of acquiescence? 3. Whether learned Additional District Judge has misconstrued, misinterpreted and misapplied the material on record and the view taken by him is not possible on the basis of material on record?” 6. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar has vehemently argued that learned Additional District Judge has erred in law by coming to conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession of 4 biswas of land bearing Khasra No. 150/1 in the Aksh Tatima Shajra. According to him, the plaintiffs have duly proved that they were owners of the suit land as per oral as well as documentary evidence. In other words, his submission is that the suit should have been decreed in its entirety. He also contended that the Additional District Judge has come to a wrong conclusion that the plaintiffs acquiesced to the construction raised by the defendants on the suit land, more particularly, when plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants has not been accepted by the court below. Alternatively, he has prayed that in case the defendants are not to be dispossessed from the hut, decree of compensation may be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 7. Mr. Vikrant Chandel has argued that the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 31-N/13/2001 may be set aside. He has also argued that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in law by decreeing the suit partly to the effect that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of part of the suit land measuring 6 biswas shown to be bearing Khasra No. 150/2 in the Aksh Tatima Shajra attached to the Field Kanungo’s report Ex.P-3. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 9. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, therefore, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussion of evidence. 10. According to PW-1 Chet Ram, total suit land was 10 biswas bearing Khasra No.150. They were owners of the suit land. 9. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, therefore, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussion of evidence. 10. According to PW-1 Chet Ram, total suit land was 10 biswas bearing Khasra No.150. They were owners of the suit land. Defendants have no right on the suit land. They used to dump garbage and used to tether their cattle on the suit land. On 15.7.1998, defendants have raised small Chhapper on the suit land and have kept their belongings. They have laid foundation for two rooms. They were stopped from doing so. The land was got demarcated and the defendants were requested to vacate the same. Thereafter, defendants have also stacked the bricks on the suit land on 10.11.1998. In his cross-examination, he deposed that for the first time, they came to know in the month of July, 1998 that the defendants have raised Chhaper on the suit land. On the date of demarcation, Namberdar Ram Prasad, Pradhan Randhir Singh etc. were also present. He has denied the suggestion that defendants have raised Chapper since 1968. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that Chapper was residential in nature and the defendants were residing there. 11. PW-2 Nertu Ram has deposed that he was conversant with the suit land. The same measured 10 biswas. Plaintiffs were owners of the suit land. Defendants have no right over 10 biswas of land. Defendants have raised Chhapper on the suit land in the year 1998. Before 1998, land was in possession of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, volunteered that it was in possession of defendants. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that Chhaper was raised at 6-7 P.M. at night. 12. DW-1 Kesho Ram has deposed that he has constructed the residential Chhaper on the day of Baishakhi. According to him, he was in possession of the suit land openly and the entire village is aware of it. Plaintiffs have never raised objection to his possession. The dimension of Chapper was 24-25 feet in length and 14-15 feet in width. He has admitted that he has occupied 4 biswas of land. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the suit land was owned by the plaintiffs in the year 1968. He has further testified that plaintiffs are owners of 10 biswas of land. Volunteered that he is in possession of 4 biswas of land. He has admitted that he has occupied 4 biswas of land. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the suit land was owned by the plaintiffs in the year 1968. He has further testified that plaintiffs are owners of 10 biswas of land. Volunteered that he is in possession of 4 biswas of land. He has also admitted that though the Patwari visits the village but he has not got any entry made in the revenue records in the Girdawari. He has not submitted any application before the Tehsildar for making entry in Girdawari. He has also deposed that his family is residing in Chhaper and in the pucca house constructed adjoining to the suit land, he stacks grass etc. and his sons reside their. He has denied the suggestion that he has constructed the shed in the year 1998. 13. DW-2 Bahadur Singh has deposed that defendant has occupied 4 biswas of land. There is a Chhaper and foundations were also filled up. Defendants have constructed Chhaper on the Baishakhi day of 1968. He is residing in the same. His possession is open since 1968. The entire village is aware of this fact. 14. According to jamabndi for the year 1958-59, the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs were owners in possession of the suit land. However, according to jamabandi for the year 1964-65 Ex.PB, Gair Mumkin Chhaper is shown to be existing on Khasra No. 150, i.e. owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. Similar entry exists in subsequent jamabandis for the year 1969-70 Ex.PC, 1974-75 Ex. PD, 1979-80 Ex. PE and 1984-85 Ex.PF. According to jamabandi for the year 1984-85 Ex.PF, Mangtu has died and his share has been inherited by his sons Prem Chand, Chet Singh and Malethi Ram. Singh Lal also died and his share in the suit land came to be inherited by the plaintiffs. In the jamabandi for the year 1989-90 Ex.PG, the suit land came to be shown as Gair Mumkin Abadi owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. This entry has been repeated in jamabandis for the year 1994-95 Ex.PI and 1999-2000 Ex.PH. It is, thus, duly proved on the basis of revenue records that the Chhaper was in existence before July, 1998. According to the demarcation report Ex.P3 carried out by the Field Kanungo, defendants have encroached upon the suit land on Khasra No. 150. Defendants have not placed on record any revenue records. It is, thus, duly proved on the basis of revenue records that the Chhaper was in existence before July, 1998. According to the demarcation report Ex.P3 carried out by the Field Kanungo, defendants have encroached upon the suit land on Khasra No. 150. Defendants have not placed on record any revenue records. The demarcation report was also not challenged by the defendants. Relevant portion of the demarcation report Ex.P3 reads as under: “It was found on demarcation that the dispute between Rati Ram (one of the plaintiffs) and Kesho Ram (one of the defendants) is over the common extremity of Khasra Nos. 150 and 269/151, which has been depicted by the line DF in the Aksh Tatima. Respondent Kesho Ram considers the area upto the 18 Karam extremity of Khasra No. 150/1 to be under his ownership, whereas according to demarcation of the spot, this area falls in Khasra No. 150, which according to the revenue records is owned and possessed by Ratti Ram.” 15. Defendant Kesho Ram has himself admitted that he has occupied 4 biswas of land. The plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants has rightly been rejected by both the courts below. 16. Since the defendants were claiming themselves to be the owners of the suit land, they could not take up the plea of adverse possession also. Even according to statement of PW-1 Chet Ram, he came to know for the first time about the construction of Chhaper at the time of demarcation. Learned Additional District Judge has held that the plaintiffs are entitled only to possession of part of the suit land shown as Khasra No. 150/2 in Aksh tatima sajra attached to the report of the Field Kanungo Ex.P3. The land under Chhaper is measuring 4 biswas vide Aksh Tatima Sajra. The plaintiffs have come to know about the factum of Chhapper being built on their land at the time of demarcation and thus the findings recorded by learned Additional District Judge that the plaintiffs acquiesced the construction of Chhaper on the suit land is liable to be reversed. 17. What emerges from the facts enumerated is that the plaintiffs are continuously shown to be owners in possession of Khasra No. 150 measuring 10 biswas of the suit land. According to the revenue record, as discussed hereinabove, Chhaper was shown in existence even in Jamabandi for the year 1964-65 Ex. PB. 17. What emerges from the facts enumerated is that the plaintiffs are continuously shown to be owners in possession of Khasra No. 150 measuring 10 biswas of the suit land. According to the revenue record, as discussed hereinabove, Chhaper was shown in existence even in Jamabandi for the year 1964-65 Ex. PB. Rather, these entries were upto the years 1994-95 Ex.PI and 1999-2000 Ex.PH. According to the evidence, the defendants are also living in Chhaper as per statements of DW-1 Kesho Ram and DW-2 Bahadur Singh. In normal circumstances, once the plaintiffs are found to be owners of the suit land, decree of possession by demolition of the Chhaper would have been granted. However, in this case, since the construction was raised more than 40 years back, the decree for possession by demolition would be inequitable. The plaintiffs have not acquiesced to the construction raised by the defendants. Since the defendants are residing in the hut, it would be inequitable to pass a decree of possession by demolition and in order to balance the equities; plaintiffs are entitled to the decree of compensation. Since the land is situated in the Abadi, its value would not be less than 2.5 lakhs. 18. What is acquiescence or waiver has been explained succinctly by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Dr. Abdul Khair versus Miss Shella Myrtla James and another, AIR 1957 Patna 308. The Division Bench has held that there can be no acquiescence or waiver in a case where both the parties are unaware of their rights in the disputed property. The Division Bench has also held that generally speaking if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done has full notice of its having been done and acquiesces in it so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license. In this case, plaintiff and defendants were plot owners. In constructing their houses, the defendants made encroachment in the land of plaintiff. None of the parties knew their respective rights in regard to the encroached land and both were labouring under some sort of mistake about their respective right in the said land. In this case, plaintiff and defendants were plot owners. In constructing their houses, the defendants made encroachment in the land of plaintiff. None of the parties knew their respective rights in regard to the encroached land and both were labouring under some sort of mistake about their respective right in the said land. It is only when defendants’ construction progressed for several months, and when a boundary dispute cropped up between the parties and when the plaintiff measured the land that he learnt that the portion on which the defendants were constructing the building belonged to him and immediately thereafter he brought a suit. The Division Bench has also held that no equity has arisen in favour of the defendants nor any equitable rights have sprung up in their favour which can prevent the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case to claim possession by demolition of the building on the encroached portion of his land. The Division Bench has further held that where the defendants encroached by building on the land belonging to the plaintiff and no acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff is established a decree for compensation in lieu of ejectment is contrary to law. The Division Bench has held as under: “(9) In order to answer the first question, as to whether on the finding of the Court of appeal below that both thep arties were labouring under some sort of mistake about their respective rights in regard to the encroachment portion of the land, acquiescence has, in law, been proved, it is necessary at first to know the principles underlying the rules of acquiescence or waiver. It is well established that parties cannot be said to acquiesce in the claims of others unless they are fully cognizant of their right to dispute them, and that, where acquiescence is relied on, it must be shown that the person acquiescing was aware of the matter in which he acquiesced, and of the effect of such acquiescence. Recognition, like waiver, must be an intentional act with knowledge: -“Bhonu Lal Chowdhury v. W.A. Vincent', AIR 1922 Pat 619 (FB) A(A). Recognition, like waiver, must be an intentional act with knowledge: -“Bhonu Lal Chowdhury v. W.A. Vincent', AIR 1922 Pat 619 (FB) A(A). This principle is further reinforced by a decision of the Judicial Committee in 'Premila Devi v. Peoples Bank of Northern India, Ltd.' AIR 1938 PC 284 (B), which followed-“Spachkman v. Evans', (1868) 3 HL 171 (c) ; and ''Trvine v. The Union Bank of Austraila,' (1877) 2 ac 366 (D). Lord Romer, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed that “there can in truth be no ratification without an intention to ratify, and there can be no intention to ratify an illegal act without knowledge of the illegality.” The learned noble Lord further quoted with approval what Lord Chelmsford said in ''Spack-man v. Evans (C), (supra). “To render valid an act of the directors of a company which is ultra vires, the acquiescence of the share-holders must be of the same extent as the consent which would have given validity from the first, viz., the acquiescence of each and every member of the company. Of course, this acquiescence cannot be presumed unless knowledge of the transaction can be brought home to every one of the remaining share-holders.” By knowledge of the transaction is clearly meant knowledge of the invalidity of transaction. From the principles laid down in the above cases, therefore, it is clear that there can be no acquiescence or waiver in a case where both parties are unaware of their rights in the disputed property, both are labouring under some mistake about their respective rights in regard to such land. Unless both are fully cognizant of their right to dispute them, the parties cannot be said to acquiesce in the claims of the other. Where, therefore, acquiescence is relied on, it must be shown that the person acquiescing was aware of the matter in which he acquiesced, and of the effect of such acquiescence. In my judgment, therefore, on the finding, there can be no acquiescence or waiver on the part of the plaintiff. 11. This question of, what is called, 'building equity' has been considered by this Bench also in', 1956 Pat LR 498: ( AIR 1957 Pat 303 ) (F). In my judgment, therefore, on the finding, there can be no acquiescence or waiver on the part of the plaintiff. 11. This question of, what is called, 'building equity' has been considered by this Bench also in', 1956 Pat LR 498: ( AIR 1957 Pat 303 ) (F). My Lord the Chief Justice, who delivered the judgment of the Court, and with whom I agreed, while considering the effect of S. 191 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act (VII of 1922), observed: “This section embodies a principle somewhat similar, though not identical, to the equitable principle laid down in -'Plimmer v. Welligntion Corporation', (1884) 9 AC 699 (G). I have already said, the sanction of the 2nd of February, 1955, maybe illegal in certain respects; but the Patna City Municipality or the Patna Municipal Corporation has no power to revoke these orders after the erection of the building had commenced. The reason is that equitable rights have sprung up in favour of respondent No.1 and and statutory protection has been granted to her against any action on the part of the Patna Corporation or the Patna City Municipality.” In my opinion, no such building equity has arisen in favour of the defendants, no any equitable rights sprung up in their favour, which can prevent the plaintiff, in the circumstances of the case, to claim possession by demolition of the building on the encroached portion of his land. In order to raise such an equity in favour of the defendants, the two conditions laid down in that case of 'Ramsden v. Dyson', (E) (supra), must be established; but in the present case, none of two conditions which must co-exist is present, because on the finding of the court of appeal below none of the parties knew their respective rights in regard to the encroached land, and, both were labouring under some sort of mistake about their respective right in the said land. Only when the defendants' construction had progressed for several months, and when a boundary dispute cropped up between the parties, and when the plaintiff measured the land that he learnt that the portion on which the defendants were constructing the building belonged to him, and, immediately thereafter he brought a suit for possession. The plaintiff's right to recover the encroached portion arises out of his ownership. The plaintiff's right to recover the encroached portion arises out of his ownership. It is well established that if a stranger builds on the land of another, believing it to be his own, the owner is entitled to recover the land, and the party building on the land of another is allowed to remove the building unless there are special circumstances amounting to a standing by so as to induce the belief that the owner intended to forgo his right, or to an acquiescence in his building on the land. No such special circumstances were found to exist in the present case. In my opinion, therefore, as no finding of acquiescence or waiver can be founded on the finding of the court of appeal below that both the parties were labouring under some sort of mistake about their respective rights in regard to the encroached portion of the land, the plaintiff is not estoppsed from claiming vacant possession of the encroached land by demolition of the building standing thereon. 12(a) Estoppel is a rule of evidence, and the general rule is enacted in S. 115 of the Evidence Act. This is rule of estoppel by conduct as distinguished from record which constitutes the bar of res judicata. The exposition of the rule of estoppel embodied in S. 115 of the Indian evidence Act by Lord Shand in “Sarat Chunder Day v. Gopal Chunder Lala' 19 Ind. App. 203 at page 215 (H), may be quoted in extenso. This principle was followed in 'Sir L. E. Ralli', 52 Ind App 178: (AIR 1925 PC 146) (J), in which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee recorded their full concurrence with the principle laid down there. Lord Shand observed: “ The law of this country gives no countenance to the doctrine that in order to create estoppel the person whose acts or declarations induced another to act in a particular way must have been under no mistake himself, or must have acted with an intention to mislead or deceive. Lord Shand observed: “ The law of this country gives no countenance to the doctrine that in order to create estoppel the person whose acts or declarations induced another to act in a particular way must have been under no mistake himself, or must have acted with an intention to mislead or deceive. What the law and the Indian Statute mainly regard is the position of person who was induced to act, and the principle on which the law and the statute rest is, that it would be most inequitable and unjust to him, that if another, by a representation made, or by conduct amounting to a representation has induced him to act as he would not otherwise have done, the person who made the representation, should be allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his former statement, to the loss and injury of the person who acted on it. It if the person who made the statement did so without full knowledge, or under error, sibi imputet. It may, in the result be unfortunate for him, but it would be unjust, even though he acted under error, to throw, the consequences on the person who believed his statement and acted on it as it was intended he should do.” The doctrine will apply, that if a man, either by words or by conduct, has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent, and, he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained, he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned, to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. This general principle is thus stated by the learned Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell), with the full concurrence of Lord Kingsdown, in the case of – 'Cairncross v. Lorimer', (1860) 3 Macq 827 at 829 (K), which was quoted with approval by Lord Shand in 'Sarat Chuner Day v. Gopal Chunder Laha', (H) (supra). This general principle is thus stated by the learned Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell), with the full concurrence of Lord Kingsdown, in the case of – 'Cairncross v. Lorimer', (1860) 3 Macq 827 at 829 (K), which was quoted with approval by Lord Shand in 'Sarat Chuner Day v. Gopal Chunder Laha', (H) (supra). In my opinion, therefore, generally speaking if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done has full notice to its having been done, and acquiesces in it, so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity, he has no more right to challenge the act to their prejudice than he would have had if it had been done by his previous license. An estoppel does not itself give a cause of action, it prevents a person from denying a certain state of affairs. (15) The next important question for consideration is, is the decree for compensation in lieu of the ejectment, awarded by the first court of appeal, which has been affirmed by Mr. Justice Misra, correct in law? In my opinion such a decree is contrary to law. When the first court of appeal found in agreement with the first court, that the land in question belonged to the plaintiff, such being the findings as to the property in the land, the courts could not compel the plaintiff to part with his legal rights and accept compensation against will, howsoever reasonable it might appear to be. A similar question came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in two cases, - 'Govind Vankaji Kulkarni v. Sadashiv Bharma Shet', ILR 17 Bom 771 (L); and – Jethalal Hirachand v. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai', ILR 28 Bom 298 (M). A similar question came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in two cases, - 'Govind Vankaji Kulkarni v. Sadashiv Bharma Shet', ILR 17 Bom 771 (L); and – Jethalal Hirachand v. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai', ILR 28 Bom 298 (M). In the latter case, in which the first case was affirmed, Chandavarkar J., while considering the finding of the learned District Judge that the plaintiff was entitled to no more than compensation, because there has been on the part of the defendant a technical encroachment in as much as a foot, or so of the plaintiffs ground had been taken to support the wall which divided the properties of the parties observed: “But if the foot or so of ground so taken by the defendant belongs to the plaintiff the act of the defendant is one of continuous trespass on the plaintiff's property and the wrongdoer cannot be heard to say that he has deprived the owner of only a little and that of not much use to the latter. Too allow such a defence and on the strength of it to award compensation is to let a trespasser put a value of money's worth on another man's property and deprive him of its against his will”. His Lordship went on further to observe: “But where a man builds on another man's property against the will of the latter or without his consent, the invasion, is practically one where pecuniary compensation cannot be regarded as not only deprived of the property but he is also entitled to make. How are the damages to be estimated in such a case and how can it be said that an award of compensation can do justice to the owner who leases the property, and all opportunity besides of using it for purposes which he may consider profitable, on beneficial to himself.” His Lordship for the above principle relied on (N). I respectfully agree with his Lordship Chandavarkar J., with his above statement of law on the subject, and consider that his Lordship has laid down the correct statement of law on the point. Relief by way of compensation in such a case is tantamount to allowing a trespasser to purchase another man's property against that man's will. On no principle of law or equity is that allowable. Relief by way of compensation in such a case is tantamount to allowing a trespasser to purchase another man's property against that man's will. On no principle of law or equity is that allowable. In my opinion therefore, the second question posed by me must also be answered in the negative by saying that the plaintiff cannot in law or equity be awarded compensation in lieu of ejectment to which he is legally entitled. His right to recover the encroached land arises out of his ownership and he is no estopped, either by acquiescence or waiver, to estoppel by conduct, from claiming his right to possession.” 19. The Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sirinivas Fogla and others versus Satyanand Gupta and others, AIR 1969 Patna 64 have held that unless both the parties are cognizant of their rights, there can be no acquiescence. The Division Bench has held as under: “9................ The cases relied upon by him, namely, AIR 1965 Pat 262 , Khadimul Haque v. Bharat Singh v. Mt. Bhagirathi are distinguishable and do not support the contention made on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Prem Lall also relied upon the cases Sarat Chunder Day v. Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) 19 Ind. App. 203 (PC), Sir L. E. Ralli v. A. R. Forbes, ILR 1 Pat 717=(AIR 1922 Pat 258) and Dr. Abdul Khair v. Miss Sheilla Myrtla James, AIR 1957 Pat 308 in support of his contention that if a party having an interest to prevent an act being done acquiesces in its so as to induce a reasonable belief that he consents to it, and the position of others is altered by their giving credit to his sincerity he has no more right to challenge the act. But there can be no acquiescence or waiver in a case where both parties are unaware of their rights in the disputed property. Unless both are fully cognizant of their right to dispute them, the parties cannot be said to acquiesce in the claims of the other. In the instant case there is nothing to show that Raghunandan Sao or the plaintiff was aware that the unilateral acts of the defendants would change the nature of the rights. Unless both are fully cognizant of their right to dispute them, the parties cannot be said to acquiesce in the claims of the other. In the instant case there is nothing to show that Raghunandan Sao or the plaintiff was aware that the unilateral acts of the defendants would change the nature of the rights. Therefore, no building estoppel or equity has arisen in favour of the defendants which can prevent the plaintiff in circumstances of the case to claim redemption of the suit houses.” 20. Consequently, in view of the observations and analysis made hereinabove, the Regular Second Appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree dated 28.5.2002 passed by the learned Additional District Judge is modified only to the extent that the decree of compensation amounting to ` 2.5 lakhs is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and rest of the judgment and decree is upheld. This amount shall be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs within a period of six weeks from today, failing which; plaintiffs shall be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum till the realization of decretal amount. 21. In view of discussions made in the Regular Second Appeal No. 390 of 2002, there is no merit in the cross-objections No. 558/2002 and the same are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.