JUDGMENT K.J. THAKER, J. 1. The appellants-ori. Accused have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1747/2010 under sec. 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.8.2010 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2, Patan in Sessions Case No. 72/2009, whereby, the learned trial Judge has convicted the appellants. 2.1 The appellants - ori. Accused No. 1 to 4 have been convicted under sec. 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo R/I for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-, in default, to undergo further S/I for six months. They are convicted under section 147 of IPC and sentenced to undergo R/I for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default, to undergo further R/I for two months. They are further convicted under section 148 of IPC and sentenced to undergo R/I for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/-, in default, to undergo further R/I for three months, which is impugned in this appeal. 2.2 Criminal Appeal No. 2223/2010 has been preferred by the State under section 377 of Code of Criminal Procedure for enhancement of sentence and acquittal appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 2224/2010 has been also preferred by the State under section 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure against the acquittal of respondent – original accused no. 5 who has been acquitted for the offence under section 147, 148,149, 302 and 120(B) of IPC by the learned trial Judge, which is impugned in these appeals. 2.3 The case of the prosecution is that the complainant Bhavnaben Rameshbhai Prajapati is residing at Bhilvan, Taluka & Dist. Patan, along with her family, consisting of husband, four daughters and one son. In the night of 3.7.2009, at about 3 O’clock, the complainant and her family members were sleeping, at that time, the accused persons, after forming an unlawful assembly with common object to commit alleged offence, armed with deadly weapon, like knife, came at the residence of the complainant and assaulted her husband Rameshbhai Prajapati and gave knife blows on his neck and hand and killed him in the bed. Thereby, the accused have committed the said offence, and therefore, the aforesaid complaint was lodged. 2.4 The appellants accused came to be arraigned for committing murder. The investigation being complete, the charge-sheet was laid against the present appellants. Thereby, the accused have committed the said offence, and therefore, the aforesaid complaint was lodged. 2.4 The appellants accused came to be arraigned for committing murder. The investigation being complete, the charge-sheet was laid against the present appellants. The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, which was given number as Sessions Case No. 72/2009. 2.5 Thereafter, the Sessions Court framed the charge below Exh. 8 against the appellants for commission of the offence under section 147, 148, 149, 302 and 120(B) of IPC. The appellants- accused have pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.6 To prove the case against the present appellants, the prosecution has examined the following witnesses whose evidence is read before this Court by the learned advocate for the appellants: 1. PW-1 Bhavnaben Rameshbhai Prajapati Ex. 20 2. PW-2 Dr. Mayankbhai Vrajlal Sheth Ex. 25 3. PW-3 Chamanbhai Ambalal Prajapati Ex. 32 4. PW-4 Bhupendrapuri Govindpuri Goswami Ex.34 5. PW-5 Dahyabhai Dalabhai Ex.36 6. PW-6 Kurashibhai Jivabhai Desai Ex. 42 7. PW-7 Shabbirbhai Rasulbhai Sipay Ex. 43 8. PW-8 Rameshji Tarsangji Ex. 44 9. PW-9 Prafulbhai Ishwarbhai Bhatt Ex. 45 10. PW-10 Savitaben Chamanlal Prajapati Ex.51 11. PW-11 Mariumben Adamrahim Maknojiya Ex. 52 12. PW-12 Dasharathji Anandji Ex. 53 13. PW-13 Devendrakumar Haribhai Ex. 56 14. PW-14 Kanubhai Taljabhai Ex. 58 15. PW-15 Dineshchandra Somalal Pundia Ex. 77 2.7 The prosecution also relied upon the following documentary evidences so as to bring home the charges against the appellants-accused. 1. Complaint Ex. 21 2. Copy of FIR of Vagdod Police Station being CR No. 88/2003 Ex. 22 3. Copy of FIR of Vagdod Police Station being CR No. 76/2001 Ex. 23 4. Yadi for PM Ex. 26 5. PM Note Ex. 27 6. Cause of death certificate Ex. 28 7. Inquest panchnama Ex. 33 8. Panchnama of scene of offence place Ex. 35 9. Discovery panchnama Ex. 37 10. Panchnama of clothes of deceased Ex. 38 11. Panchnama of clothes of complainant and witness Ex. 39 12. Blood sample of deceased Ex. 40 13. Yadi to prepare map of scene of offence place Ex. 46 14. Forwarding letter of Executive Magistrate along with map Ex. 47 15. Map of scene of offence place with panchnama Ex. 48 16. Report of handing over dead-body Ex. 54 17. Receipt Ex. 55 18. 39 12. Blood sample of deceased Ex. 40 13. Yadi to prepare map of scene of offence place Ex. 46 14. Forwarding letter of Executive Magistrate along with map Ex. 47 15. Map of scene of offence place with panchnama Ex. 48 16. Report of handing over dead-body Ex. 54 17. Receipt Ex. 55 18. Report to register the complaint Ex. 57 19. Copy of FIR of Vagdod Police Station being CR No. I-17/2004 Ex. 59 20. Abstract of complaints given by deceased Ex. 60 21. Copy of mobile calls details Ex. 61 to 73 22. Copy of PM form Ex. 78 23. Copy of dog squad Ex. 79 24. Report of FSL Van Ex. 80 25. Yadi to Executive Magistrate to prepare a map of scene of offence place Ex. 81 26. Muddamal despatch Nondh Ex. 82 27. Receipt of FSL Ex. 83 28. FSL report Ex. 84 29. Serological report Ex. 85 30. Physical report of FSL Ex. 86 31. Letters of FSL regarding lie detection test Ex. 87 to 90 32. Report of FSL about lie detection test of accused Ex. 91 3. Thereafter, after examining the witnesses, further statement of the appellants-accused under sec. 313 of CrPC was recorded in which the appellants-accused have denied the case of the prosecution. 4. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing the learned advocates for the parties, the learned trial Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 16.8.2010 held the present appellants- original accused guilty of the charge levelled against them under sec. 302, 147, 148 of IPC, convicted and sentenced the appellants-accused, as stated above. 5. We have heard at length learned Senior Advocate Mr. Y.S. Lakhani for appellants and Ms. C.M. Shah learned APP for the respondent-State. 6. The learned senior counsel Mr. Lakhani for the present appellants has contended that the trial court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment and order, inasmuch as it failed to appreciate the material on record in its proper perspective, and hence, the present appellants deserve to be given the benefit of doubt and be acquitted. Mr. 6. The learned senior counsel Mr. Lakhani for the present appellants has contended that the trial court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment and order, inasmuch as it failed to appreciate the material on record in its proper perspective, and hence, the present appellants deserve to be given the benefit of doubt and be acquitted. Mr. Lakhani learned senior counsel for the appellants while pressing that the appellants are innocent and wrongly roped in the case due to earlier disputes between the parties, has submitted that the deposition of the widow is doubtful as it would be borne out that the complaint was at the behest of PW-3 Chamanbhai Ambalal Prajapati Ex. 32, the brother of the deceased. There are no phone call records from the house of the widow to that of PW-3. 7. The next argument was that the knife which was said to have been discovered or recovered was never supported by the panch witnesses and from the other accused, no knife or any incriminating article was found. Even the serological report does not speak about the blood on the clothes of the accused. It is further submitted that it is an undisputed fact that the village has more community of the accused persons and the deceased was black-mailer. It is not proved on record that any of the accused had given threat that they will do away with the deceased. It is further submitted that the phone calls giving threat to Ramesh was from an unknown person in Pune and the same is not investigated and no link is established. The motive which is attributed cannot bring home the charge levelled against the accused that the brother of the deceased had married in the Momna community 10 years before. There was a submission that though the panchnama does not show that there was any bulb in the room which belies theory that the accused were seen and identified by the widow of the deceased. The accused have in their statement under sec. 313 CrPC have not put forth such case except that they have pleaded alibi. 8. There was a submission that though the panchnama does not show that there was any bulb in the room which belies theory that the accused were seen and identified by the widow of the deceased. The accused have in their statement under sec. 313 CrPC have not put forth such case except that they have pleaded alibi. 8. On the other hand, learned APP has strongly opposed the contentions raised by the learned advocate for the present appellants and has submitted that the trial court has passed the impugned judgment and order after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the material, in the form of oral and documentary evidence, produced before it and hence, no interference is called for and the appeals deserve to be dismissed. Learned APP Ms. Shah has submitted that the knife was blood stained. Identification of the accused was made as the widow knew them since they are belonging to the same village. She is a truth loving witness as she has refused to falsely implicate the accused no.5 in the court. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the appellants deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence produced on record and considered the rival submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the parties. We have scrutinized the oral as well as documentary evidence in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court, wherein, it has been held that both, in acquittal appeal, enhancement appeal and conviction appeal, the High Court being the Court of first appellate jurisdiction, must evaluate and re-evaluate the evidence and give its own finding as far as panchas are concerned. 10. The points formulated by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, more particularly, the evidence of PW-2 Dr. Mayankbhai Vrajlal Sheth Ex. 25 will not persuade us to take a different view then the one taken by the learned trial Judge as far as the death of the deceased is concerned, and that the death was nothing but homicidal death. As per the evidence of PW-2, the following injuries were found on the dead-body. 1. Over neck: Incised wound over right anterolateral aspect of neck in middle size of 12 cm x 6 cm x bone cervical vertebra C3. As per the evidence of PW-2, the following injuries were found on the dead-body. 1. Over neck: Incised wound over right anterolateral aspect of neck in middle size of 12 cm x 6 cm x bone cervical vertebra C3. Stab wound over left anterior aspect of neck just 3cm lateral to midline 4cm x2cm x bone depth. 2. Stab wound over right lateral chest wall at the level of 8th rib, about 3cm x 1cm x muscle to bone depth, going downward & medially in sub cutanecus tissue up to right subcostal margin. 3. Stab wound over left hypochondrium 5cm below left costal margin about 3 cm x 1cm x cavity depth to omentum oblique, downward backward and medially. 4. Right upper limb:-(I) incised wound over right posteromedial aspect of right arm lower 2/3, about 15cm x 5 cm x muscle depth, (ii) incised wound over posterior aspect of right forearm middle 1/3rd about 2.5cm x 1 cm x muscle to tendon depth. (iii) incised wound over ulnar border of right forearm middle 1/3rd about 3cm x 1 cm x muscle deep. (iv) incised wound over right shoulder 3 cm x 1 cm x muscle depth. 5. Left hand:-(i) incised wound over palmer aspect of left thumb about 5cm x 0.25 cm x muscle to bone depth, (ii) linear incised wound over terminal phalanges of aspect of left thumb about 1cm x 0.25cm x muscle depth, (iii) incised wound over palmer aspect of distal palmer of left middle finger about 1 cm x 0.5cm x muscle depth, skin & muscle choped off. 11. Therefore, it is not a death which has occurred due to any other aspect but because of the injury no. 1 and it is a homicidal death. 12. This takes us to the next issue as to whether all the accused were involved in the commission of the offence. Whether the learned trial Judge has erred in not holding to be a conspiracy under sec. 120(B) of IPC and convicting four accused persons with the aid of Sec. 147 and 148 of IPC. 13. At the out-set, it would be relevant for us to referred to the provisions of section 147, 148, 149, 300 and 120(B) of IPC, which reads as follows: 147. 120(B) of IPC and convicting four accused persons with the aid of Sec. 147 and 148 of IPC. 13. At the out-set, it would be relevant for us to referred to the provisions of section 147, 148, 149, 300 and 120(B) of IPC, which reads as follows: 147. Punishment for rioting.-Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 148. Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.- Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.-If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. 300. Murder.-Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or- Secondly.-If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or- Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or- Fourthly.-If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 14. From the oral evidence of the witnesses, the presence of accused no. 1 Soyebbhai Yusufbhai Boraniya, though resides outside the village, is established. The knife was also recovered and the panchnama is also proved. Recently, our view is fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendrasingh vs. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2013)4 SCC 713 . 1 Soyebbhai Yusufbhai Boraniya, though resides outside the village, is established. The knife was also recovered and the panchnama is also proved. Recently, our view is fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendrasingh vs. State of Uttaranchal, reported in (2013)4 SCC 713 . The discovery panchnama was drawn as per the provisions of sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. In this case, it would be necessary for us to rely on the old decision of the Privy Council in the case of Pulukuru Kottaya & Ors. vs. Emperor, reported in AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 67, as far as section 27 of the Evidence Act is concerned. In this case, the appellants have done the act. Their overt act as culminated into commission of the criminal offence which was in furtherance of their common intention, namely to do away with the deceased, and therefore, having delved into each and every aspects, we do not think appropriate to take a different view than that taken by the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge has minutely scrutinized the evidence, and therefore, it will not be appropriate or proper even after re-evaluating the evidence to take a different view then that taken by the learned trial Judge after appreciating the entire evidence on record. The decision of the Privy Council and the decision of the Apex Court would not permit us to hold that the appellants cannot get the benefit of doubt even on the submissions of learned senior counsel for the appellants, and we concur with the learned trial Judge. This takes us to the role played by accused no. 2, 3 and 4. The presence of accused no. 2 and 3 was found at the place of offence. The prosecution has successfully proved that there were five and more persons present at the place of offence who had assaulted the deceased. The deceased was assaulted with motive and the motive is proved. The role of accused no. 2 and 3 is also proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. So far as accused no. 4 is concerned, there is no cogent evidence that he was the same person who was present in the mob, is proved. The deceased was assaulted with motive and the motive is proved. The role of accused no. 2 and 3 is also proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. So far as accused no. 4 is concerned, there is no cogent evidence that he was the same person who was present in the mob, is proved. His presence is doubtful as he belonged to Madhya Pradesh and he has sent a fax message and from his statement under section 313 of CrPC is also very clear, and therefore, we think that he is the person with a mistaken identity who has been convicted, and therefore, he requires to be given the benefit of doubt just because of the mistaken identity. SENTENCE: State’s appeal for enhancement from life imprisonment to death sentence: 15. The disparity manifested in awarding appropriate/inappropriate sentence in trials has come to fore and the time has come when the sentences will have to be based on the following touch-stones. 16. The Indian Penal Code, like other major penal statues, prescribes punishment for various offences created under it. It provides for four kinds of punishments; (i) death; (ii) imprisonment for life; (iii) imprisonment for various terms which may be either simple or rigorous, and (iv) fine. A further peep into the legislative paradigm of the code discloses that certain offences are made punishable with a minimum sentence with a cap qua the maximum, with or without fines, For some offences, it prescribes an upper limits of sentence, leaving the minimum, to the discretion of the court, which may even be of one day. 17. The Code, thus, gives much leeway to, and confers wide discretion on, the judiciary to pick up an opt punishment, if the offence concerned is made punishable by different forms of alternate punishment and a choice is given to it to opt either of them, in isolation or combination, and/or to quantify ‘punishment’ within the range of ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ punishment, if any, prescribed for the offence. In the absence of any sentencing policy or standardized guiding principles in India, a court is virtually left to determine sentence which, in its opinion, meets the ends of justice. However, it is the duty of a court to use its judicial discretion to award a sentence that is ‘proper’ in the backdrop of circumstances of the case at hand, and ‘matches’ with the guilt of offender. 18. However, it is the duty of a court to use its judicial discretion to award a sentence that is ‘proper’ in the backdrop of circumstances of the case at hand, and ‘matches’ with the guilt of offender. 18. The Supreme Court, through its judicial pronouncements, debating upon the issue as to when the extreme penalty of death has to be imposed/sustained or be replaced by a lesser sentence of imprisonment for life, has been voicing its concern for ‘proper’ (in the factual matrix and circumstances of case at hand) and ‘proportionate’ (in the context of gravity and nature of the offence committed) sentence. It has justified punishment with these dual attributes on certain philosophical and pragmatic propositions and principles. Some of these propositions and principles again re-surfaced in a couple of the cases handed down by it during 2009. 19. In Gurukukh Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in 2009(11) Scale 688 , the Supreme Court not only emphasized that it is the duty and obligation of every court to award proper sentence but also enumerated various factors that the court is required to consider while determining the sentence. They are (i) motive or previous enmity; (ii) whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (iii) the intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (iv) the gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (v) the age and general health condition of the accused; (vi) whether the injury was caused without pre- meditation in a sudden fight; (vii)the nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (viii) the criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (ix) number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (x) incident occurred within the family members or close relations, and (xi) the conduct and behavior of the accused after the incident, whether the accused had taken the injured/ the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that (s)he gets proper medical treatment ? In the same breath, the apex court has made it clear that these factors are only illustrative and not exhaustive. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view by a sentencing court. Each case, obviously, has to be seen from its special perspective. In the same breath, the apex court has made it clear that these factors are only illustrative and not exhaustive. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view by a sentencing court. Each case, obviously, has to be seen from its special perspective. The court must ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence and that it must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the convict. Proportion between ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ is one of the accepted goals of criminal justice system. The principle of proportion between crime and punishment essentially requires a court to prepare a balance-sheet of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and quantify the ‘punishment’ based thereon. The principle of proportionality is evolved to remove (or at least to minimize) arbitrariness in the sentencing process. 20. In Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2009(13) SCALE 578, the apex court further stressed that the imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminals. Justice, the court stated, demands that the courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime and conscience of the society. It also reminded the courts of the need that they, while modulating sentence, need to be stern or to be tempered with mercy whenever factual matrix of a case at hand warrants. The nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and other attending circumstances may be necessary pointers for the court in tailoring ‘proper’ sentence. 21. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh, reported in (2010)1 SCC (Cri.) 1283, favoured to avoid imposition of capital punishment because the accused were driven by infatuation and deprivation of their senses. It was a case where the accused killed the sons of the woman with whom they had illicit relations. The court seems to console itself because “Though the act of the accused is a gruesome one, but it was a result of human mind going astray. It was a case where the accused killed the sons of the woman with whom they had illicit relations. The court seems to console itself because “Though the act of the accused is a gruesome one, but it was a result of human mind going astray. No doubt, they acted in a ghastly manner...” Indeed, while reasoning, the court drew the discussions from an earlier decision in Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 625 , but did not mention it at all. In the second case, viz. Maniappan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2010) 3 SCC (Cri.) 1402, a bus carrying students was burnt, killing the girl students. The Supreme Court upheld the capital punishment noting that the members of the society, the police and other officials remained inactive while the crime was being committed. The court apparently put this case as the rarest of the rare case. Indeed, one could go on adding reasons for making it so. It appears that Manjit Singh also could have equally been made one of the rarest of rare cases. 22. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 2223/2010 for enhancement of sentence is concerned, so far as the question of sentence is concerned, the same is a matter of discretion of the learned trial Judge. It is well settled law that when the discretion has been granted to the learned trial Judge, if the same is not arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely but has been properly exercised by accepted judicial norms, the appellate court ought not to interfere to the detriment of the accused person unless there are very strong reasons which are not disclosed on the face of the judgment for the lesser punishment. In a matter of enhancement, there should not be interference if the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is menifestly inadequate, and therefore, on the touch-stone of this principle, we do not find it proper in the facts of this case to enhance the sentence. As per the sentencing policy and the recent decision of the Apex Court, it cannot be said that on the touch stone of the judgments, we cannot enhance the sentence because the learned trial judge has not believed that there was a conspiracy to do away with the deceased and no offence under section 120B is believed. As per the sentencing policy and the recent decision of the Apex Court, it cannot be said that on the touch stone of the judgments, we cannot enhance the sentence because the learned trial judge has not believed that there was a conspiracy to do away with the deceased and no offence under section 120B is believed. It is not such a gruesome act and therefore, no death penalty can be imposed. We are not persuaded by the submission made by learned APP Mr. Soni that this is a case where death penalty requires to be imposed. Therefore, Criminal Appeal No. 2223/2010 for enhancement of sentence requires to be dismissed. 23. So far as the acquittal appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 2224/2010 is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006)6 SCC, 39, the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below.” 24. Further, in the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007)4 SCC 415 the Apex Court laid down the following principles: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 25. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 26. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. Reported in (2007)3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision the Court has observed as under: “16. 26. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. Reported in (2007)3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision the Court has observed as under: “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.” 27. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. state of MP, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 28. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. 28. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein, it is held as under: “… This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.” 29. In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: “10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so-called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence. 30. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookiah and Anr. v. State, rep. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para-4 has held as under: “4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. v. State, rep. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para-4 has held as under: “4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Sec. 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the Court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against the acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]” 31. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 32. We have gone through the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. We have also perused the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the trial court and also considered the submissions made by learned APP for the appellant-State. The trial court while considering the oral as well as documentary evidence has clearly observed that there is no any evidence to convict the accused No. 5. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The trial court while considering the oral as well as documentary evidence has clearly observed that there is no any evidence to convict the accused No. 5. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. Even in the present appeal, nothing is produced or pointed out to rebut the conclusion of the trial Court. Thus, from the evidence itself it is established that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 33. Ms. C.M. Shah learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view of the matter or that the approach of the trial court is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the trial court has ignored the material evidence on record. 34. In the above view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the trial court was completely justified in acquitting the respondent of the charges leveled against him. We find that the findings recorded by the trial court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the court below and hence find no reasons to interfere with the same. Hence, the acquittal appeal as well as appeal for enhancement of sentence require to be dismissed. 35. In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 1747/2010 is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.8.2010 passed in Sessions Case No. 72/2009 is confirmed qua appellants No. 1, 2 & 3 – ori. Accused no. 1,2 & 3. However, life would not mean the last breath and the State Government may consider the case of the appellants no. 1,2 & 3 for premature release as admissible under the provisions of law. 36. However, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.8.2010 passed in Sessions Case No. 72/2009 is quashed and set aside qua appellant no. 4 – ori. Accused no. 4. The appellant no. 4 – ori. Accused no. 4 is acquitted by granting benefit of doubt and he is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 37. Criminal Appeal No. 2223/2010 for enhancement of sentence of respondents no. 4 – ori. Accused no. 4. The appellant no. 4 – ori. Accused no. 4 is acquitted by granting benefit of doubt and he is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 37. Criminal Appeal No. 2223/2010 for enhancement of sentence of respondents no. 1 to 4 and Criminal Appeal No. 2224/2010 against the acquittal recorded qua ori. Accused no. 5, are dismissed. R & P to be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith. Order accordingly.