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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 697 (MP)

Sukhlal v. State of M. P.

2013-06-24

M.C.GARG, SHANTANU KEMKAR

body2013
JUDGMENT M.C. Garg, J. This judgment shall dispose of the aforesaid criminal appeal which arises out of the judgment dated 30-8-2005 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sendhwa in S.T. No. 158/2004 convicting the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.250/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month additional RI. 2. Briefly stating the facts of the case are that on 23-4-2004 complainant-Gyansingh lodged a report at Police Station, Sendhwa that on 22-4-2004 at about 9.30 p.m., there was a marriage in the house of Jagdish where his brother Shankar and family members were also present. Sukhlal also came to attend the marriage. Near about 15 months before Sukhlal committed rape on the daughter of Shankar which matter was settled in the Panchayat. While Sukhlal was dancing, Shankar hit him on the head with a torch. In turn, Sukhlal also gave Gupti blow on the chest of Shankar due to which he fell on the ground. One Dursingh took him to Sendhwa Hospital where doctor declared him dead. On the basis of the report, police registered the offence and body was sent for post-mortem. FIR in this case was registered as Crime No. 104/2004 at the instance of Gyansingh, who has appeared as P.W. 4. In his statement Shri Gyansingh deposed as under:-- XXX XXX XXX 3. After the registration of the FIR, police investigated the matter. During the course of investigation recorded the statement of various witnesses including eye-witnesses namely Gyansingh, Dursingh, Ranglibai and Roomsingh. The prosecution also relied upon the statement of Dr. M.C. Verma, who conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of the deceased. After filing of the challan, the case was committed for trial to Sessions. The appellant denied the charges and faced the trial. 4. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses namely Dursingh s/o Gatu (P.W. 1), Ikalya (P.W. 2), Jagdish (P.W. 3), Gyansingh (P.W. 4), Dursingh s/o Reechha (P.W. 5), Ranglibai (P.W. 6), Jaimal (P.W. 7), Roomsingh (P.W. 8), Chamariya (P.W. 9), M.C. Verma (P.W. 10) and Anil Singh (P.W. 11), out of whom Dursingh (P.W. 1), Gyansingh (P.W. 4), Ranglibai (P.W. 6) and Roomsingh (P.W. 8) are the eye-witnesses. 5. Statement of Dursingh and Gyansingh is relevant which is reproduced for the sake of reference. 5. Statement of Dursingh and Gyansingh is relevant which is reproduced for the sake of reference. Dursingh in his statement has deposed as under:-- XXX XXX XXX Thus from his statement it was not clear as to whether the weapon used was pechcus or Gupti. 6. The next witness Gyansingh in his statement deposed as under:-- XXX XXX XXX His statement is in line with the statement of Dursingh. Some portion of the cross-examination of Gyansingh is also relevant which is reproduced hereunder:-- XXX XXX XXX 7. The statement of these two witnesses shows that they were not sure as to what weapon was used for the purpose of causing injury to the deceased. According to the prosecution, only pechcus was recovered at the instance of the appellant which they have relied upon as a weapon of offence. The statement of these witnesses clearly shows that only one injury was caused by the appellant that also after he was hit by the torch by Shankar, the deceased. The appellant has denied the version of the prosecution and as such he has been falsely implicated. He has also examined two defence witnesses Foolsingh (D.W. 1) and Munna @ Munta (D.W. 2). 8. The learned Single Judge, after holding the trial convicted the appellant under Section 302, IPC and has sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 250/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month additional RI. 9. The reasons given by the learned Single Judge in having found the appellant guilty appears in Paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 which are reproduced hereunder:-- XXX XXX XXX 10. A perusal of these paragraphs goes to show that in the incident the appellant used apechcus which is the weapon recovered from him after the deceased hit on his head with a torch. This fact finds mention by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph 15 of the judgment which is also reproduced hereunder:-- XXX XXX XXX 11. Thus, even from the analysis made by the learned Additional sessions Judge, it was not clear as to what was the weapon of offence. However, it is not clear that Gupti had been brought by the appellant alongwith him while coming to attend the marriage. Thus, even from the analysis made by the learned Additional sessions Judge, it was not clear as to what was the weapon of offence. However, it is not clear that Gupti had been brought by the appellant alongwith him while coming to attend the marriage. Taking the case of the prosecution, it was pechcus which has been gathered by the appellant from the place where he had gone to attend the marriage and he used the pechcus only after he was hit by torch by the deceased. This aspect ought to have been considered by the learned Trial Court, but this is missing. 12. At this juncture, it will be appropriate to take note of the opinion given by the Dr. M.C. Verma, who conducted the post-mortem on the dead body of the deceased. In his deposition, he has deposed as under:-- XXX XXX XXX 13. Some further portion of the statement of Dr. M.C. Verma (P.W. 10) during cross-examination and re-examination is also relevant which is reproduced hereunder:-- XXX XXX XXX 14. This deposition of Dr. M.C. Verma (P.W. 10) is, therefore, not clear regarding the cause of death. It does not specifically state that the injury caused by the appellant was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course or that the injury was such which was intended to cause death of the deceased. 15. The question therefore, arises as to whether the conviction of the appellant in this case as held by the Trial Judge under Section 302, IPC is sustainable or not. 16. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that taking into consideration the facts of this case, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant needs to be converted from Section 302 to Section 304-I, IPC and accordingly the sentence is required to be reduced appropriately. It is also submitted that the appellant is in jail for last more than 9 years and thus, the jail sentence of the appellant be reduced to the period already undergone. 17. Learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that in view of the injury caused on the vital part of the body conviction under Section 302, IPC is justified and correct. He further submits that even in cases of single injury on the vital part of the body conviction under Section 302, IPC is sustainable and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. He further submits that even in cases of single injury on the vital part of the body conviction under Section 302, IPC is sustainable and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 18. The issue as to whether the death of the deceased is culpable homicide or culpable homicide not amounting to murder which has always been a vexed question for decision more so when it is a case of single injury. The issue had come up for discussion before the Apex Court in the light of the language of Section 299 and Section 300 of IPC by which the legislature has drawn a distinction between the murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In the second situation Courts have come to a conclusion that conviction at the most be under Section 304 Part I or Part II of IPC and not under Section 302, IPC. 19. One such judgment which come to the notice of this Court is a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 22/2009, in case of Suraj and others Vs. State, decided on 16th May, 2013. In this case also the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC was converted to conviction under Section 304-I of IPC. 20. The question which was considered in that judgment was as to whether the conviction of the appellant Suraj in that case under Section 302, IPC was right or that he ought to have been convicted under Section 304 Part I or Part II of IPC. The question also relates to conviction of other appellants who were appellants in Cr. A. No. 22/09. Some relevant facts which have been taken into consideration in that judgment are reproduced hereunder for the sake of reference:-- “18. Maya Ram was admitted to the hospital in coma on 29th March, 2007 at 1.45 a.m. He succumbed and died while in coma on 4th April, 2007 at 1.00 a.m., i.e., after nearly six days. As per the post-mortem report (Exh. P-16/A), the deceased had an incised wound on the occipital region of 1 x .5 x .5 cm. He also had an abrasion on the zygomatic region. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that in view of the injury caused on the vital part of the body, i.e., the head, conviction under Section 302, IPC is justified and correct. He also had an abrasion on the zygomatic region. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that in view of the injury caused on the vital part of the body, i.e., the head, conviction under Section 302, IPC is justified and correct. She has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Gudar Disadh Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952 , Ramesh Singh @ Photti Vs. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 305 and Israr vs. State of U.P., AIR 2005 SC 249 . Her contention is that even in cases of single injury on the vital part of the body conviction under Section 302, IPC is sustainable. Per contra, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that at best and as per the case of the prosecution, Clause III of Section 300, IPC is being applied but the prosecution evidence does not satisfy the objective requirement of the said clause that the injury caused was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. It is stated that the injury was not sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is no such deposition or statement to the said effect by the doctors, who had examined the deceased or had conducted the post Cr. A. No. 22/2009, Page 16 of 34 mortem. It is submitted that the present case would not be, therefore covered by Clause III to Section300, IPC. Secondly, and in alternative reliance is placed on Exception IV to Section 300, IPC.” 21. In this case, the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 , was also discussed. Referring to the aforesaid judgment in Para 19, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court observed as under:-- “19. In Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 , the Supreme Court examined the difference between Clause III of Section 300 and Section304, IPC. The Supreme Court expounded upon the requisites of clause (3), Sections 300,302 and 304, Part I, IPC. It was observed as under:-- ‘14. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 thirdly'; 15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; 16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations; 17. It was observed as under:-- ‘14. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 thirdly'; 15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; 16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations; 17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended; 18. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further; and 19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.’ 20. Similarly, in State of U.P. Vs. Virendra Prasad, (2004) 9 SCC 37 , the distinction between the two sections was elucidated and tabulated as under:-- ‘7. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:-- Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done-Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done- Intention: (a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or Knowledge: (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 8. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300. Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 9. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature' have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words 'bodily injury ...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean that death will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.’ 21. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words 'bodily injury ...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean that death will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.’ 21. In Virsa Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had expounded that it is not the number of injuries which matters but the test to be applied is whether the offence falls under Section 302 or Section 304, Part I, IPC. It was elucidated and explained:-- ‘23. The learned Counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor Vs. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, (1917) ILR 41 Bom 27, 29, where Beaman, J. says that;-- 'where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended'. With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. 24. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, of if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact; and whether the conclusion should be one way or the other is a matter of proof, where necessary, by calling in aid all reasonable inferences of fact in the absence of direct testimony. It is not one for guesswork and fanciful conjecture. The aforesaid paragraphs show that the question whether Section 302 or Section 304, Part I, IPC is applicable requires determination of two aspects. Firstly, whether the injury caused was injury intended and, secondly, whether the injury suffered, when examined objectively, can be categorised as sufficient in ordinary course of nature to pause death or was likely to cause death. The injuries of the first type are far more serious as compared to the second type of injuries. Thus, we have to examine whether the wound/injury was serious, if so, how serious. It is in this context that we should examine the judgments, which have been relied upon by the State. In Gudar Disadh (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that Clause III of Section 300, IPC was applicable as it was a case of pre-meditated and not an accidental attack and the injuries inflicted in ordinary course of nature were sufficient to cause death. In Gudar Disadh (supra), the Supreme Court had observed that Clause III of Section 300, IPC was applicable as it was a case of pre-meditated and not an accidental attack and the injuries inflicted in ordinary course of nature were sufficient to cause death. The injuries in the said case had been caused by a lathi hit on the head but it was observed that it would not mitigate the offence and convert it into culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court, in fact, had relied upon the evidence of the doctor, who had conducted the post-mortem and opined that the injuries caused were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death and had actually resulted in death. Reliance placed by the accused on Exception IV to Section 300, IPC in the said case was rejected.” 22. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, the Division Bench has held that the conviction of Suraj could not be sustained under Section 302 of IPC and converted the sentence of the appellant to conviction under Section 304 Part I of IPC. 23. Before dealing with the facts of this case we also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Vs. State of M.P., reported in JT 2002 (6) SC 310. Considering the causing of a single injury, the Apex Court observed as under:-- “4. Shri Ranjan Mukherjee, learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant contended before us that assuming that the prosecution has established the incident as put forward by it and assuming injuries suffered by the deceased and P.W. 2 are as alleged by the prosecution is true. Even then according to the learned Counsel act of the accused cannot be construed as amounting to murder as punishable under Section 302, IPC nor the injury on P.W. 2 would amount to offence under Section 307, IPC His contention is that it is the incident in question, even according to the prosecution had occurred suddenly therefore, the offence if at all would come under Exception 4 of Section 300, IPC, which reads thus:-- ‘Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 5. According to the learned Counsel that the present incident in question was without premeditation in a sudden fight. He also submitted that the appellant had not taken any undue advantage of the victim nor has acted in a cruel or unusual manner. He submitted that after the deceased fell down after his attack he did not further attacked him which shows that assuming the deceased died due to the injuries caused by him same will not be an act punishable under Section 302, IPC. In support of his case, the learned Counsel has strongly relied on the case of Sukhbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, wherein this Court held: 'All fatal injuries resulting in death cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the purposes of not availing the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300, IPC. After the injuries were inflicted and the injured had fallen down, the appellant is not shown to have inflicted any other injury upon his person when he was in a helpless position. It is proved that in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight, the accused who was armed with bhala caused injuries at random and thus did not act in a cruel or unusual manner'. Based on the said finding, this Court in that case has reduced the sentence of the appellant from one under Section 302, IPC to under Section 302 (Para 1), IPC. The learned Counsel submitted that the fact situation in this appeal is almost identical with the case of Sukhbir Singh (supra). Therefore, the appellant herein is also entitled for the same benefit. 8. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and modify the sentence from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part I and sentence the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years. In regard to the offence under Section 307, IPC we convert it to one under Section 326, IPC and award a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. We direct both the sentences to run concurrently. If the appellant has served out the time he shall be entitled to the benefit of the sentence already undergone. 24. In regard to the offence under Section 307, IPC we convert it to one under Section 326, IPC and award a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. We direct both the sentences to run concurrently. If the appellant has served out the time he shall be entitled to the benefit of the sentence already undergone. 24. So in a case where the Court found that the injury was without any premeditation in sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, it was not a case of his conviction under Section 302, IPC. 25. The Apex Court in the case of Kulwant Rai Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1982 SC 126 , has observed as under:-- “3. When the matter was before the High Court, it was strenuously urged that in the circumstances of the case Part I of Section 300 would not be attracted because it cannot be said that the accused had the intention to commit the murder of the deceased. In fact, that is conceded. More often, a suggestion is made that the case would be covered by Part 3 of Section 300 Penal Code in that not only the accused intended to inflict that particular injury but the injury intended to be inflicted was by objective medical test found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The question is in the circumstances in which the offence came to be committed, could it ever be said that the accused intended to inflict that injury which proved to be fatal. To repeat, there was an altercation. There was no premeditation. It was something like hit and run. In such a case, Part 3 of Section 300 would not be attracted because it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the circumstances herein discussed, it would appear that the accused inflicted an injury which he knew to be likely to cause death and the case would accordingly fall under Section 304 Part II, Penal Code.” 26. Similarly, in the case of Tholan Vs. In the circumstances herein discussed, it would appear that the accused inflicted an injury which he knew to be likely to cause death and the case would accordingly fall under Section 304 Part II, Penal Code.” 26. Similarly, in the case of Tholan Vs. State of Tamilnadu, the Apex Court in its judgment reported in AIR 1984 SC 759 , in a case where only one blow was given with knife observed as under:-- “12. It is equally not in dispute that appellant gave only one blow with a knife. Appellant had no quarrel or dispute with deceased Sampat. It is not shown that deceased Sampat had anything to do with the chit organised by K.G. Rajan. No malice has been alleged to have been entertained by the accused towards deceased Sampat. The incident occurred on the spur of the moment. It appears that the house of the deceased Sampat was somewhere near the house in which the organizers or at least one of them was residing. Appellant had his dispute and grievance with the organisers of the chit. It is the prosecution case that accused abused organisers of the chit. Deceased Sampat is not shown to be the organiser of the chit. Probably, when the deceased Sampat told the accused not to misbehave in the presence of ladies and not to use vulgar and filthy language the appellant retorted by questioning the authority of Sampat to ask him to leave the place. Presence of Sampat is wholly accidental. Altercation with Sampat was on the spur of the moment. Even the meeting was accidental. There arose a situation in which appellant probably misguided by his own egocentric nature objected as to why Sampat should ask him to leave the place and in this background he gave one blow with a knife which landed on the right side chest of the deceased, which has proved fatal. Could the appellant be said to have committed murder! In other words, whether Part I or Part III of Section 300, IPC would be attracted in the facts of this case. Even Mr. Rangam, learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu could not very seriously contend that the appellant intended to commit murder of Sampat. Could the appellant be said to have committed murder! In other words, whether Part I or Part III of Section 300, IPC would be attracted in the facts of this case. Even Mr. Rangam, learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu could not very seriously contend that the appellant intended to commit murder of Sampat. His submission was that at any rate appellant when he wielded a weapon like a knife and gave a blow on the chest, a vital part of the body, must have intended to cause that particular injury and this injury is objectively found by the medical evidence to be fatal and therefore Part III of Section 300would be attracted. On this aspect, the decisions are legion and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here merely to cover idle parade of familiar knowledge. One can profitably refer to Jagrup Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 : AIR 1981 SC 1552 , Randhir Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 55 : 1982 Cri. LJ 195; Kulwant Rai Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 126 and Hari Ram Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185 : 1983 Cri. LJ 346. To this list two more cases can be added Jagtar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, Cri. A. No. 81/83, decided on 14-2-1983, reported in AIR 1983 SC 463 and Ram Sunder Vs. State of U.P., Cri. A. No. 555/83, decided on 24-10-83. Having regard to the ratio of each of these decisions, we are satisfied that even if Exception I is not attracted the requisite intention cannot be attributed to the appellant. But in the circumstances herein discussed he wielded a weapon like a knife and therefore, he can be attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. In such a situation, he would be guilty of committing an offence under Section 304 Part II of the Penal Code. Having regard to the circumstances of the case a sentence of 5 years would be quite adequate.” 27. Reference can also be made to a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Hariram Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185 , wherein it has been observed as under:-- “3. Having regard to the circumstances of the case a sentence of 5 years would be quite adequate.” 27. Reference can also be made to a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Hariram Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185 , wherein it has been observed as under:-- “3. The only contention of learned Counsel for the appellant before us is that the facts do not make out an offence under Section 302 against the appellant and that a conviction under the second part of Section 304 is called for instead. We agree with learned Counsel. It does seem that in the heat of the altercation between Ran Singh on the one hand and the appellant and his comrades on the other, the appellant seized a jelli and thrust it into the chest of Ran Singh. It will be noted that this was preceded by his remark that Ran Singh must be beaten to make him behave. Only one blow was struck by the appellant at Ran Singh. On the evidence it does not appear, that there was any intention to kill Ran Singh. We are, therefore, satisfied that the conviction under Section 302 cannot be sustained and that, on the contrary, the facts make out an offence under the second part of Section 304.” 28. Now coming to the facts of this case, it is not disputed that the appellant has only caused single injury that also with a pechcus inasmuch as the theory of Gupti has not been substantiated. However, the injury was not premeditated. It was not with intention to cause death of the deceased. There is no dispute that the appellant had come to the place of incidence to participate in a marriage and at that time Shankar hit him on the head with a torch. In turn, Sukhlal also gave a blow on the chest of Shankar due to which he fell on the ground. The story of the prosecution that Sukhlal used Gupti has not been substantiated. The prosecution has changed its version about the weapon used to that of pechcus. This goes not show that it is not a case where the appellant had come prepared to cause any serious injury in the marriage. The story of the prosecution that Sukhlal used Gupti has not been substantiated. The prosecution has changed its version about the weapon used to that of pechcus. This goes not show that it is not a case where the appellant had come prepared to cause any serious injury in the marriage. Even on account of the circumstances, which compelled him to react once he was hit with a torch on his head and to save himself in that process he used the weapon which he found in the place he had gone. It is not a case that the appellant had brought the weapon of offence alongwith him. It is also a matter of record that only one injury has been caused by the appellant upon Shankar who himself was assailant having given a blow on the head of the appellant before appellant caused injury on the chest of the deceased. 29. In fact, the case is also covered in the realm of private defence though one may say that the right might have been exceeded. However, the fact would remain that the appellant had not caused more than one blow. The opinion of Dr. M.C. Verma is not very specific that the injury which was caused by the appellant was with an intention to cause death of the deceased or that the injury so caused was sufficient to cause death of the deceased in the ordinary course. 30. Taking into consideration all these facts it can safely be inferred in the case that appellant had no intention to cause death of the deceased. The injury was caused only as self defence after he was hit by the deceased. He only caused a single blow and the blow was not premeditated. Thus, in the present case, the dispute that the injury was caused in the chest area, we cannot say that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and thus, case would be squarely covered between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 and therefore, it will be a fit case to convert the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I, IPC. In this case, the appellant was in jail for a period of 9 years. The sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. C.C. as per rules.