JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal. J.—As requested and agreed by learned counsels for parties, I proceed to hear this matter finally and decide it at this stage. 2. Heard Sri Y.S. Bohra, learned counsel for appellants and Sri Kumar Anish, learned counsel for respondents. 3. The substantial questions of law involved in this matter are: (1) Whether revenue entries can determine the title as held by lower Appellate Court and unless the revenue record is corrected, the title be deemed with the person whose name is entered in revenue record? (2) Whether lower Appellate Court was right in reversing the judgment of Trial Court in Original Suit No. 166 of 1972 while in respect of Original Suit No. 574 of 1969, while deciding the First Appeal by common judgment, it has already held that as a matter of fact, no such plot on spot is available and it is only in record and, therefore, injunction sought by plaintiff of Suit No. 574 of 1969 has rightly been denied, and, whether such contradictory findings can render judgment based on perverse and illegal findings? 4. There were two suits, one filed by plaintiff-appellants i.e. Original Suit No. 166 of 1972 for cancellation of sale-deed dated 30.10.1969 and permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the property in dispute, i.e., Plot No. 37 situate at village Pootha, Tehsil Anoopshahar, District Bulandshahar. Another suit, i.e., Original Suit No. 574 of 1969 was instituted by defendant-respondents against the plaintiff-appellants in the present second appeal, for permanent injunction restraining them (plaintiff-appellants) from interfering in the peaceful possession of the land forming part of plot No. 37 measuring 1 bigha 3 biswa. 5. The case set up by the plaintiff-appellants in Original Suit No. 166 of 1972 is that there was Abadi No. 296 wherein 10 biswa land belong to Veda and Devi and it was recorded as Abadi in the consolidation proceeding. The land situate towards west of the road. There was another plot No. 296/6 measuring 1 bigha 3 biswa belongs to Sri Imam Baksh, father of defendant Nos. 3 to 5, and it was on the eastern side of the road. Plot No. 296 was given new number as 37 and 48. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in a wholly illegal manner executed sale-deed in respect of plot No. 37 of which neither they were bhumidhar nor in possession. 3 to 5, and it was on the eastern side of the road. Plot No. 296 was given new number as 37 and 48. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in a wholly illegal manner executed sale-deed in respect of plot No. 37 of which neither they were bhumidhar nor in possession. The suit was contested by defendant-respondents stating that the disputed land was part of plot No. 296/6 and was situated on the western side of road. 6. The Trial Court, i.e., 4th Additional Munsif, Bulandshahar dismissed Original Suit No. 574 of 1969 and decreed Original Suit. No. 166 of 1972 observing that land in question, which is part of plot No. 296/6, is presently numbered as 48, and situate on the east of the road and, therefore, defendant-respondents had no right or claim over plot No. 37 which is on the west of the road. Consequently, the Trial Court cancelled the sale-deed dated 30.10.1969, and, issued a permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from interfering in the peaceful possession of property in dispute. 7. Two appeals were preferred. Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1977 had arisen from the decree in Original Suit No. 574 of 1969 and Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1977 had arisen from decree in original Suit No. 166 of 1972. 8. Lower Appellate Court vide judgment dated 24.8.1978 allowed Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1977 and dismissed Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1977. It has observed that Trial Court was right in dismissing Original Suit No. 574 of 1969 and consequently Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1970 arising therefrom was dismissed. 9. Coming to the decree of Trial Court in Original Suit No. 166 of 1972, it has held that in the revenue record, names of Sri Azim Khan, Bashir Ahmad and Mohammad Ali are recorded and thereafter the purchasers are Latif Khan and Shamsuddin. It further held that Khatauni is a record of title and once the name of the executants of sale-deed dated 30.10.1969 are recorded, so long as the revenue record is not corrected, the title would remain with the persons whose names are mentioned in the revenue record, and, therefore, the sale-deed could not have been cancelled. 10. Apparently, in my view, the reasons, logic and the legal proposition followed by lower Appellate Court is misconceived, erroneous and illegal. 10. Apparently, in my view, the reasons, logic and the legal proposition followed by lower Appellate Court is misconceived, erroneous and illegal. It is well established that revenue record is not a record of title but it is a record of possession. 11. In Narain Prasad Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (8) SCALE 250, the Court said: “Record of right is not a document of title.—Entries made therein in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act although are admissible as a relevant piece of evidence and although the same may also carry a presumption of correctness, but it is beyond any doubt that such a presumption is rebuttable.” (emphasis added) 12. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar and others v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund and others, AIR 2008 SC 901 , the Court said: “A revenue record is a not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to the possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act.” (emphasis added) 13. It is in these circumstances, whenever a dispute of title arises, the Court has to look into the relevant and credible evidence, appreciate the same and thereafter decide the issue of title. 14. If the title of the person transferring the land itself was not genuine, he cannot confer a better right than he himself possess. Section 90 of Evidence Act recognizses two well known legal maxims, namely, Nemo dat quid non habet (no one gives what he has not got); and Nemo plus juris tribuit quam ipse habet (no one can bestow or grant a greater right, or a better title than he has himself). The entries in revenue record may refer to the possession of the person on the land in dispute and prima facie it may raise a presumption of title but such presumption is rebuttable. 15. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others, AIR 1968 SC 1165 , construing Section 110 of Evidence Act, the Court said: “Possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 16. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 16. In Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector and others, AIR 2003 SC 1805 , the Court said: “Presumption, which is rebuttable is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.” 17. Recently, referring to above authorities, the Court in State of A.P. and others v. M/s Star Bone Mill and Fertilizer Co., JT 2013 (3) SC 401, said: “13. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act, is based on public policy with the object of preventing persons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the land in question may be. It is for this purpose, that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the afore- said provisions have the same object. The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim “possession follows title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of waste lands, or where nothing is known about possession one-way or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him. A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment etc. A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment etc. Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act.” 18. In the present case, the record relating to possession has been construed as a document of title, and, that is how, lower Appellate Court has committed a patent illegality in reversing the judgment of Trial Court and passing a decree of reversal. The Trial Court has considered the evidence on record and did not base its finding on the issue of title, on the entries in revenue record, but lower Appellate Court, simply, by holding that the revenue record is a record of title, has clearly misdirected itself. The entire approach thereof has led to an apparent illegal and wrongful judgment and decree. 19. In view thereof, I answer both the questions in favour of plaintiff-appellants. 20. The judgment of lower Appellate Court dated 24.8.1978 in Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1977, impugned in this appeal, is patently illegal and cannot sustain. 21. The appeal is allowed. Judgement dated 24.8.1978 passed by lower Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1977 is set aside. 22. Matter is remanded to lower Appellate Court which shall consider and decide the same afresh in accordance with law, and, in the light of observations made above. ——————