JUDGMENT : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. The sole plaintiff in O.S.No.863 of 2007 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, filed this appeal, feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, through judgment dated 26-04-2011. The appellant is a Mutually Aided Co-operative Society. It filed the suit against the 1st respondent, Mandal Revenue Officer, Balanagar Mandal, for the relief of perpetual injunction in respect of 73 acres of land in Sy.No.57 of Shamshiguda Village, Balanagar Mandal. The appellant pleaded that C.S.No.7 of 1958 was filed before this Court by the plaintiff therein, for the relief of partition and separate possession, in respect of various items of property, including the land in Sy.No.57 of Shamshiguda Village and that a compromise decree was passed therein, determining the shares of the respective parties. It is said to have acquired title in respect of the suit schedule property through assignment of interest from some of the decree-holders, and on the basis of such assignment, Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 were filed with prayers to a) implead it in the suit, as one of the defendants, b) recognize the assignment; and c) direct to the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District for delivery of possession thereof. It was pleaded that the applications were ordered by this Court on 20-10-2000, and in E.P.No.38 of 2002, filed in the Court of Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, the possession of the land was delivered to them, by the bailiff. The E.P is also said to have been closed, recording the delivery. The grievance of the appellant was that, after the possession of land was delivered, with the assistance of the officials of the Survey and Land Records Department, the 1st respondent visited the site and proclaimed that the land belongs to Government, and no one should enter it. The appellant has also mentioned that with a view to protect the land from the encroachers, fencing was being erected and the 1st respondent instructed them not to proceed with the work of fencing. In that context, the relief of perpetual injunction was claimed. The 1st respondent filed written-statement, opposing the suit. The appellant has also mentioned that with a view to protect the land from the encroachers, fencing was being erected and the 1st respondent instructed them not to proceed with the work of fencing. In that context, the relief of perpetual injunction was claimed. The 1st respondent filed written-statement, opposing the suit. It is stated that though the Government of A.P., was impleaded as party in C.S.No.7 of 1958, it was deleted thereafter, and in that view of the matter, no adjudication, that has taken place in C.S.No.7 of 1958; would bind the Government. He further stated that the so-called delivery of possession is a fictitious exercise, and the possession of the land continues to be with the Government. According to the 1st respondent, the total extent of land in Sy.No.57 is Ac.274.33 guntas, and that it was not part of paigah properties. It was also pleaded that the orders in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 were set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch, and in that view of the matter, there is absolutely no basis for filing the suit. Other contentions were also urged. In the appeal, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary in Revenue Department was impeladed as the 2nd respondent herein. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the title in respect of the suit schedule property has accrued to the appellant, by virtue of the orders passed by this Court in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000, and possession was also delivered through Court. He contends that though the orders in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 were set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch, no directions were issued therein, for redelivery of possession, nor any application was filed by the respondent, under Section 144 or under Rules 97 or 99 of Order XXI of C.P.C. He submits that the trial Court ought to have protected the possession of the land of the appellant, which was delivered through the process of the Court. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that large scale fraud was committed in respect of valuable lands belonging to the Government by filing C.S.Nos.7, 9 and 14 of 1958 before this Court, and on more occasions than one, this Court has exposed the fraud involved therein. He contends that though the subject-matter of those suits was covered by Jagir Abolition Regulations, fraudulent preliminary decrees were obtained by deleting the Government of Andhra Pradesh, which was impleaded as one of the defendants from the array of parties, and by filing sets of applications from time to time, vast extents of lands were grabbed. He contends that on certain occasions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken exception to the manner in which, the process of law was misused and the present case is one such instance. He submits that the only basis for the appellant to claim rights over the land is the common order passed by this Court in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 in C.S.No.7 of 1958, which, in fact, was bereft of any reasons, and without any notice to the effected parties, and that the said order was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch, marked as Ex.B-13. He further submits that the land in Sy.No.57 was not held by paigah, and that it was not specifically shown in the schedule of C.S.No.7 of 1958. In this appeal, the appellant filed C.M.P.Nos.2283 of 2011 and 1901 of 2013 under Rule 27 of Order XLI C.P.C., with a prayer to receive the additional evidence. Before we take the points for discussion, we deal with the petitions filed for receiving the additional evidence. The appellant wanted this Court to receive certain proceedings, which emanated from different authorities of the Government; on record, as additional evidence. On a close analysis of those applications, it becomes clear that they do not specify the circumstances mentioned in Rule 27 of Order XLI C.P.C. It was not even pleaded that the appellant was not aware of the documents, which are now sought to be filed, when the suit was pending, or that any attempt made by it, to file those documents, was negatived by the trial Court. The third contingency, viz., that the Court itself finding the necessity of having those documents before it, does not arise. The third contingency, viz., that the Court itself finding the necessity of having those documents before it, does not arise. Further, the sole basis for the rights claimed by the appellant is an order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, and once it was set aside by a Division Bench, in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002, any amount of correspondence in the Government, or the expression of views by the officials of revenue department in relation thereto, does not have any bearing. Hence, we dismiss the petitions. As observed earlier, the suit was filed for the relief of injunction-simplicitor, in respect of fairly large extent of valuable land. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property? 2) Whether the Government is in possession of plaint schedule property? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for perpetual injunction as prayed for? The President of the appellant-society deposed as PW-1, and he filed Exs.A-1 to A-9. On behalf of the respondents, Smt. Vanaja Devi deposed as DW-1, and filed Exs.B-1 to B-13. Exs.X-1 and X-2 were also taken on record. In view of the specific submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel, and learned Advocate General, we find that the following points arise for consideration: 1) Whether the appellant has any subsisting rights over the suit schedule property; and 2) Whether the appellant is entitled for the relief of perpetual injunction. Point No.1: The appellant is said to have acquired right, title and interest in respect of about 73 acres of land in Sy.No.57 of Shamshiguda Village, Balanagar Mandal, through assignment, from some of the parties to C.S.No.7 of 1958. The manner in which the said assignment has taken place is that, Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000, were filed with a prayer to implead it in C.S.No.7 of 1958, as one of the defendants to recognize the assignment and to direct to the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District to deliver possession thereof and those applications were ordered. C.S.No.7 of 1958 was filed for the simple relief of partition of the properties, mentioned therein. Even the description of the properties was as vague as it could be. C.S.No.7 of 1958 was filed for the simple relief of partition of the properties, mentioned therein. Even the description of the properties was as vague as it could be. Though the Government of Andhra Pradesh was impleaded as one of the defendants, on account of the fact that the lands are covered by Jagir Abolition Regulations, it was given up at a later point of time. That paved the way for an almost consent, if not collusive preliminary decree in respect of lands, which already vested in the Government by operation of Jagir Abolition Regulation. Unfortunately, this Court became a fertile ground for many fraudulent exercises. The persons operating the suit have been working under a well-designed and perfect plan. Whenever an affluent, agency or organization is able to put the things in their place, a set of applications is filed with a standard prayer of impleading the so-called assignee of rights, recognition of the assignment, and delivery of possession. Almost as a set pattern, this went on for years, not only in C.S.No.7 of 1958, but also in C.S.Nos.9 and 14 of 1958. Unfortunately, those three alone are the civil suits entertained by this Court, though it is not vested with the civil original jurisdiction, like the High Courts of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay. The present suit was filed by the appellant in the year 2007, based upon the common order passed by this Court in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000. E.P.No.38 of 2002 was filed and a warrant, directing delivery of possession was issued on 07-11-2002. It was also stated that the warrant was executed on 08-11-2002. The appellant alleged that when they started fencing work on 05-07-2007, the 1st respondent interfered. The lack of bona fides on the part of the appellant is evident from the fact that though the orders passed in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 were set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch, through judgment dated 10-06-2003, no mention was made to it in the plaint. At least when the respondent mentioned that fact in the written-statement, a rejoinder ought to have been filed. At least when the respondent mentioned that fact in the written-statement, a rejoinder ought to have been filed. However, the plea put forward before the trial Court was that, though the orders in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 were set aside by a Division Bench of this Court, there was no observation to the effect that the delivery of the possession, which was already effected; has been set at naught. The Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002 and batch dealt with a bunch of orders passed in similar applications, including those Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000. Through out the judgment, several observations were made, expressing doubt about the propriety of the orders passed in the applications. Several procedural defects were pointed out. It is not necessary to repeat all of them here. Specific reference was made to the appellant herein in page 21 of the judgment, which was marked as Ex.B-13, in the present suit. It reads, “Some of the applications make an interesting reading. My Palace Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society, Flat No.202, II Floor, Pleasant Park, Shantinagar Colony Cross Roads, Hyderabad is applicant No.2 in Application No.1461 of 2000. It is not stated as to by whom the said Society is represented. Applicant No.9 in the said application is M/s. S. Deshpande and Company represented by Sripad Deshpande, R/o.36, 11-4-654/2, Sumanika Saifabad, Hyderabad-500 004. In Application No.983 of 2002, My Palace Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Limited is represented by its President Sripad Deshpande. Is it clear from a mere reading of this cause title that it is Sripad Deshpande who is appearing on behalf of both My Palace Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society Limited and M/s. S. Deshpande and Company. Such instances are galore in these cases. Since we propose to set aside the orders passed by the learned single Judge and remit the matter for recording evidence, we do not propose to record any further findings. Whatever we have noticed leaves us not only with an unpleasant feeling but we are shocked to realize the depth and magnitude of misrepresentations and manipulations that are apparent even to a naked eye. We have also seen that the respondents-applicants have obtained directions resulting in far reaching consequences where under orders have been passed directing the District Collectors to effect mutation in the revenue records. We have also seen that the respondents-applicants have obtained directions resulting in far reaching consequences where under orders have been passed directing the District Collectors to effect mutation in the revenue records. We do not find any provision of law under which this Court while disposing of the applications in the original side/execution side could have issued such directions compelling the recording authorities or the revisional authorities, as the case may be, to change the entries in the revenue records. It is needless to observe that the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 is a self contained code. It prescribes the procedure that is required to be adopted for updating and modification of the records. This Court without providing an opportunity of being heard to the persons who are likely to be adversely affected cannot pass such orders resulting in such drastic consequences. Directions are also obtained as against the District Judges commanding them to deliver possession of various extents of land to the respondents-applicants.” At the end of the judgment, their Lordships held, “The appeals are accordingly allowed. Consequently, the proceedings, if any pending on the file of the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District and on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad or before any other Court and the District Collectors pursuant to the orders passed by this court shall stand terminated. Having regard to the totality of the case and the nature of objections raised by the respondents in these appeals there shall be an order as regards the costs quantified at Rs.3,000/- in each of the appeals”. Not only the order, that constituted the sole basis for the appellant to claim rights vis-à-vis the land, i.e. the order in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000 was set aside, but also all the proceedings, that were initiated based on that were terminated. Even where no such observation is made, once the appeal is allowed, setting aside the order of the trial Court, all the consequences that have flown from the order under appeal, stand set aside. When specific direction was issued to the effect that proceedings if any, on the file of the Courts or District Collectors shall stand terminated, it is just ununderstandable as to how there would be any trace of right in the appellant. When specific direction was issued to the effect that proceedings if any, on the file of the Courts or District Collectors shall stand terminated, it is just ununderstandable as to how there would be any trace of right in the appellant. As of now, the applications are still pending and they need to be dealt with, duly taking into account the directions and guidelines issued by the Division Bench of this Court in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002. Therefore, we find that the appellant is not vested with any right, title or interest over the suit schedule property as the things stand now. Accordingly the point is answered. Point No.2: To a large extent, point No.2 stands answered in view of our discussion on point No.1. The plea of the appellant is that they filed I.A.No.2270 of 2007 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., in the present suit and on dismissal thereof, by the trial Court, they filed C.M.A.No.872 of 2008 before this Court and that the same was allowed on 30-04-2009. It is also mentioned that an SLP filed against that was dismissed, both on the grounds of limitation and on merits. The observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in C.M.A.No.872 of 2008 are sought to be projected as findings on the question of possession. Firstly, any observation made in the interlocutory proceedings cannot be treated as final, nor would it be binding at the stage of final adjudication. Secondly, with due respect to the Bench, which passed the order in Application Nos.1459, 1460 and 1461 of 2000, we are of the view that, once the common orders passed on 20-10-2000, as well as the consequential proceedings based on that are specifically set aside in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002, and the question of the appellant being in possession of any land does not arise. If such a view is taken, it amounts to recognition of the violation of the judgment, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, in O.S.A.No.58 of 2002. The second point is accordingly answered. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.