JUDGMENT Adarsh Kumar Goel, C.J. 1. This order will dispose of Writ Appeal No. 291 and 293 of 2013 as both the appeals have been preferred by the State of Assam against common order of learned Single Judge and raise identical question of competence of the State to require owning of immoveable property as a condition to prove permanent residence in the State. The requirement of permanent residence in the State has been laid down under Rule 3(2)(b) of the Medical Colleges of Assam, Regional Dental College, Guwahati and Government Ayurvedic College, Guwahati (Regulation of Admission of Under-Graduate Students) Rules, 2007 ("the Rules"). In Writ Appeal No. 291 of 2013, the respondent-writ petitioner Sitalakshmi Srinivasan challenged the decision of the Selection Board constituted under the Rules rejecting her application for admission to the MBBS course and order dated 26.07.2013 passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam, Health and Family Welfare Department rejecting her appeal against the said decision. 2. Case pleaded by the writ petitioner is that she was born at Delhi on 07.12.1995. Her father joined services as Reader in the Department of Physics, Assam University at Silchar on 23.04.1996 and thereafter on 13.02.1997 when he was posted as Assistant Professor in the Department of Physics at Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati. She has been living with her father and she completed her entire schooling upto the 12th Class in the year 2013 at Guwahati. She then appeared for the Combined Entrance Examination for MBBS/BDS courses in Medical/Dental Colleges of Assam in May, 2013 and got 157th rank in merit list in the result announced on 06.06.2013. She was called for counseling and was eligible to be allotted 46th General seats out of 61 General seats available in Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh, but candidature was rejected on the ground that she was not permanent resident of the State of Assam. Her father preferred an appeal against the decision of the Selection Board but on account of urgency she also moved this Court by filing WP(C) No. 3920/2013 which was disposed of on 18.07.2013 with the direction that her appeal be decided on or before 26.07.2013 by a speaking order. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26.07.2013 was passed rejecting her appeal. Her father preferred an appeal against the decision of the Selection Board but on account of urgency she also moved this Court by filing WP(C) No. 3920/2013 which was disposed of on 18.07.2013 with the direction that her appeal be decided on or before 26.07.2013 by a speaking order. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26.07.2013 was passed rejecting her appeal. Challenging the said decision, she again moved this Court invoking her fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution and submitting that rejection of her candidature was illegal and arbitrary. She submitted that it could not be held that she was not a permanent resident only because she did not own immoveable property nor purchase of property just a day before counseling could be taken against her as acquisition of property even one day before counseling met the requirement of owning of immoveable property. She relied upon Sale Deed registered on 08.07.2013 in favour of her father and certificate issued by the Registrar of IIT, Guwahati to the effect that her father was permanent employee of the IIT, Guwahati since 13.02.1997. She also relied upon voters list, driving licence and passport and permanent residence certificate (PRC) issued by Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro) dated 27.06.2013. 3. The petition was contested by filing an affidavit in opposition on behalf of the Director of Medical Education, Assam. It was submitted that the PRC was issued on 27.6.2013 while the document of purchase of immoveable property was dated 08.07.2013. The Selection Board was not satisfied regarding permanent residence status of the petitioner. There was no convincing proof of continuous stay of her parents for more than 15 years in the State of Assam. Voter list submitted was only of the year 2013. She was also not daughter of an employee of the Govt. of Assam or a member or of All India Services. Condition of owning of immoveable property was part of the Rules. The State quota seats are primarily meant for sons and daughters of indigenous people of Assam. Number of seats in the State are limited in comparison to the population Such precious seats could not allotted to those who reside in Assam for purposes like services in Central Govt. sector, industries or private business as this will deprive the genuine and deserving indigenous candidates of the State of Assam. 4. Number of seats in the State are limited in comparison to the population Such precious seats could not allotted to those who reside in Assam for purposes like services in Central Govt. sector, industries or private business as this will deprive the genuine and deserving indigenous candidates of the State of Assam. 4. Facts in Writ Appeal No. 293 of 2013 are almost identical. The writ petitioner challenged the decision of the Selection Board rejecting her candidature for admission to MBBS course for the session 2013-14. Her case was that she studied at Silchar in the State of Assam upto Class XII. She applied for admission to the MBBS course in Medical Colleges of Assam for the sessions 2013-14. She was ranked at Serial No. 160 in the list of successful candidates and was called for counseling before the Selection Board on 09.07.2013. She submitted permanent residence certificate (PRC), school certificate, voters list of 1997 containing name of her father, certificate from employer of her father but her father did not have any immoveable property in Assam. Her candidature was rejected on the ground that her father was not permanent resident of Assam. She made a representation dated 11.7.2013 to the State Government but since the same was not disposed of she approached this Court by submitting that she fulfilled the requirement of being a permanent resident of the State and rejection of her candidature on the ground of her family not having immoveable property was misconceived as the said requirement was not laid down under the Rules but only in the Annexure to the Form. Her father was residing in the State of Assam for more than 20 years as reflected in the voters list. She also produced the certificate of permanent residence (PRC) from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Silchar. 5. An affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the Director of Medical Education, Assam contesting the petition and submitting that she did not furnish documents as proof of her continuous stay in Assam for 15 years. 6. Learned Single Judge took up both the writ petitions together along with two other similar writ petitions and upheld the stand of the writ petitioners. It was observed: "22. 6. Learned Single Judge took up both the writ petitions together along with two other similar writ petitions and upheld the stand of the writ petitioners. It was observed: "22. While the State is certainly empowered to protect the interest of local students to ensure that sufficient doctors are available to serve the people of Assam, rejection of the candidature of me petitioners on me ground that their family do not possess immovable property, will be illogical since the ground for rejection has no reasonable nexus with the object of providing for medicare to the residents of the State. The stated objective is already addressed by requiring the students to do their schooling in Assam and by requiring the parents who are domicile by birth of another State to reside continuously in Assam for certain number of years. But the additional requirement of ownership of property is unlikely to further advance the otherwise laudable objective of the State, to provide for doctors who might opt to serve in the State. Moreover there is nothing to prevent a person to sale away his property if it is acquired with the oblique motive of securing admission, once the purpose is achieved. 23. That apart, even those who are domicile of the State by birth after qualifying from the State Medical Colleges may migrate to another State for better career prospects and for such violators, the Bond penalty under the Rule 13 is me only barrier. The petitioners herein are also covered by similar bond conditions and seeing that they have lived in mis State for long and since their parents work life has not yet ended, it can't be said with certainty mat they will never serve in Assam. Therefore as the petitioners satisfy the permanent residentship criteria they are held to be eligible for admission. Consequently me impugned order(s) dated 26.7.2013 of me Appellate Authority is quashed and the respondents are directed to give admission to the petitioners as per their entitlement and respective merit position. Since the classes for 2013 session has already started from 1st August 2013, there should not be any unnecessary delay and admission should be granted within 7 days from today." 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Since the classes for 2013 session has already started from 1st August 2013, there should not be any unnecessary delay and admission should be granted within 7 days from today." 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Assam submits that Rule 3(2) requires permanent residence in Assam as a condition for eligibility for admission to the MBBS. Rule 7(3) requires the candidate to satisfy himself/herself about the eligibility by going through the Rules and instructions. The Form appended to the Rules requires proof of ownership of immoveable property and in absence thereof certificate of residency could not be issued. Mere fact that under Circular dated 24.7.1987 issued by the State Government, PRC could be issued without owning any property could not dispense with the statutory requirement of the Rules. In absence of challenge to the Rules, learned Single Judge could not brush aside the said requirement. In Writ Appeal No. 291/2013, purchase of the property one day before the counseling could not be taken to be compliance with the Rules and in Writ Appeal No. 293/2013, the family of the writ petitioner did not own immoveable property and thus requirement under the Rules was not fulfilled. 9. An additional affidavit has been filed during the course of hearing to the effect that in case of genuine residents when family of a candidate resides in Assam not for any profession/service purpose but voluntarily and indefinitely and the family is resident of Assam originally, requirement of ownership of property could be waived. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon following judgments to submit that in absence of challenge to the Rules, the Rule could not be ignored or quashed :- "(i) Union of India & Ann Vs. Satish Kumar, (2006)1 SCC 360 . (ii) State of Maharashtra Vs. Narmada Estates (P) Ltd., (2010)12 SCC 419 . (iii) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr., (2011)7 SCC 639 ." 11. He also relied upon following judgments to submit that requirement of permanent residence in the State could be laid down for eligibility for admission to the MBBS in the State Colleges: "(i) Jagadish Saran (Dr) Vs. Union of India, (1980)2 SCC 768 . (ii) Pradeep Jain Vs. Union of India, (1984)3 SCC 654 . (iii) Anant Madaan Vs. State of Haryana (1995)2 SCC 135 (iv) Parag Gupta (Dr) Vs. Union of India, (1980)2 SCC 768 . (ii) Pradeep Jain Vs. Union of India, (1984)3 SCC 654 . (iii) Anant Madaan Vs. State of Haryana (1995)2 SCC 135 (iv) Parag Gupta (Dr) Vs. University of Delhi, (2000) 5 SCC 684 ." 12. Learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners supported the view taken by learned Single Judge and submitted that the pleadings could not be construed rigidly, Once parties are conscious of the issue, hyper-technical approach was not permissible. Object of pleadings is that the parties are not taken by surprise. Mere absence of specific challenge did not debar the Court from giving effect to Article 14 of the Constitution when requirement was patently unconstitutional. It was also submitted that the requirement under the Rules was for permanent residence and requirement of owning immoveable property was mentioned only in the Form. In a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Shri Saikan Mallik Vs. State of Assam & Ors.,1995(3) GLT 116, it was observed that such a requirement could not be mentioned in the Form in absence of specific provision to that effect in the Rules. Requirement of owning immoveable property was arbitrary and had no nexus with the requirement of permanent residence. Alternatively, the said requirement could at best be taken to be a piece of evidence for proving permanent residence. Absence of owning property could not be treated to be conclusive proof that a person was not permanent resident of the State. While requirement of permanent residence could be laid down to be proved by relevant objective parameters, requirement of owing property could not be equated with the requirement of permanent residence. The owning of property may sometimes be evidence of a person's residence but not always. A person may not be permanent resident and may still own property. Similarly, a person may be permanent resident without owning a property. 13. The question for consideration, thus, is whether a rigid condition for owning immovable property to prove permanent residence could be laid down as condition precedent for eligibility for admission to MBBS. In other words, whether a more meritorious candidate who fulfills all other requirements of permanent residence in the State can be discriminated only on the ground that his family did not own immovable property in the State. 14. In other words, whether a more meritorious candidate who fulfills all other requirements of permanent residence in the State can be discriminated only on the ground that his family did not own immovable property in the State. 14. On due consideration, we are of the view that answer to the question has to be against the State and in favour of the writ petitioners. 15. Rule 3(2)(b) is as follows: "(b) is a permanent resident of Assam; Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall be applicable to the sons and daughters of the employees of the Govt. of Assam." 16. Rule 7(2) is as follows :- "(2) The Form contains two parts "A" & "B" (bearing the same serial number). The "Form A" is to be submitted as the first Application Form for appearing in the Common Entrance Examination. "Form B" will all enclosures is to be submitted at the time of counseling if called for. Candidates are asked to submit "Form A" at the time of applying for Common Entrance Examination (not "Form B" or both "Form A & B" which will disqualify their candidature)." 17. Form-A is an Application Form which requires a candidate to disclose the name of school/College where studies were undertaken apart from giving other particulars, while Form-B which is to be submitted at the time of counseling is more detailed form which requires giving of particulars of permanent home address. Annexure-III(A) thereto requires giving proof of ownership of immoveable property. Annexure-III(C) requires certificate of residency with following particulars :- "a) The candidate/his father (wherever applicable) has completed the mandatory schooling in a school situated in the state of Assam as certified in certificate of schooling. b) The candidate or his father owns immovable property in the district....................as certified in certificate of proof of ownership of immovable property in the state as stated in Annexure-III(A). c) The parents of the candidates have stayed continuously for more than 15 years in the state of Assam as per proof of residence supplied to me as stated in Annexure III(B)." 18. The above particulars are sought to be read as part of Rule 7(2). There is no dispute that requirements of clause (a) and (c) have been fulfilled in the present case. Finding recorded by learned Single Judge to this effect has not be challenged before us. Only dispute is about compliance of clause (b). The above particulars are sought to be read as part of Rule 7(2). There is no dispute that requirements of clause (a) and (c) have been fulfilled in the present case. Finding recorded by learned Single Judge to this effect has not be challenged before us. Only dispute is about compliance of clause (b). In our view, this certification cannot be read as requirement of eligibility but merely a piece of evidence to prove of permanent residency. It cannot be laid down that without owing immovable property a person is not permanent resident. Article 14 does not permit discrimination on the ground of owing or not owing property. If the requirement of owing property is treated as requirement of residence, the same will be irrational and arbitrary. The said requirement cannot, thus, be read as mandatory. Even on behalf of the appellants it has been mentioned that in case of a person originally belonging to the State of Assam, the requirement of property is not taken to be mandatory. The statement in the affidavit filed during the course of hearing is as follows:- ".....During such verification, the candidate was allowed to furnish additional documents to prove the residency status of his parents and on being given such opportunity, the candidate vide his letter dated 16.7.2013 furnished 19 Nos. of documents from which it can be easily discerned that at present there is no landed property in the name of, his parents and they are living in rented premises since 1985 till today, they had landed property which was disposed of and also it was considered that the family of the candidate having resided in Assam not for any professional/service purpose but purely voluntarily and indefinitely and from the attending facts the Selection Committee came to the conclusion that the family of the candidate is likely to remain in Assam indefinitely. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Selection Committee considered all relevant factors from which it can be ascertained that whether a candidate and his parents voluntarily and indefinitely resides in Assam or they are residents of Assam but originally from another state and only for professional purpose residing in the State and upon due consideration of all attending facts, indicates whether a candidate is a permanent resident of Assam or not. Be it also stated that after verification of all the documents submitted by Ratnadeep Dhar on 16.07.2013, the Selection Committee cleared his admission on 18.07.2013." 19. Thus, distinction has been sought to be made between candidates, whose parents originally belong to the State of Assam and candidates whose parents subsequently came to the State of Assam for employment. Such distinction violates Article 14 of the Constitution. If for original Assam residents the requirement of owning property is not taken to be mandatory, those who come front outside and settle in the State cannot be differently treated. What is permissible to lay down is the requirement of permanent residence and not to lay down the requirement of owning of property. The Selection Board cannot enter into speculation as to whether a person will finally continue to remain in the State of Assam or not. The requirements for testing permanent residence have to be specific and objective and have to be clearly and expressly mentioned in the Rules. Such requirements have to be followed uniformally for all candidates whether their parents originally belonged to the State of Assam or come to the State of Assam subsequently. Admittedly, the parents of the writ petitioners are settled in the State of Assam for more than 15 years and the students have undertaken their studies in the State of Assam. This itself fully meets the requirement of permanent residence as laid down under the rules. The State cannot lay down any irrational requirement nor enter into speculation whether a person will or will not continue to be in the State of Assam. It can certainly lay down objective norms such as requirement of residence in the State for a reasonable period, requirement of undertaking studies for a reasonable period and requirement of serving in the State of Assam for a reasonable period. Beyond this, a citizen of India either settled originally in the State of Assam or who subsequently settled in the State of Assam have to be treated equally under Article 14. 20. There is no denying the fact that under the present dispensation, 85% seats can be reserved for the permanent residents of the State and such requirement does not violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Nonetheless, there can be no distinction among the persons settled in a State originally and those who come and settle subsequently. 20. There is no denying the fact that under the present dispensation, 85% seats can be reserved for the permanent residents of the State and such requirement does not violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Nonetheless, there can be no distinction among the persons settled in a State originally and those who come and settle subsequently. Under the scheme of the Constitution, an Indian citizen can reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and in doing so he cannot be discriminated in comparison to a person already settled in that State. Thus, a person originally from the State of Assam and a person not originally from the State of Assam will stand on the same footing so long as requirement of establishing permanent residence is fulfilled. Owning property cannot be treated as at par with the requirement of permanent residence. India is one nation and we are Indians first and Indians last. No regional interest can override the interest of national integrity. The entire country is one nation with one citizenship and irrespective of the place of birth or language or religion, a citizen can reside and settle in any part of the country and claim equality with other citizens in every such part. 'Sons of the soil' claim for special treatment cannot be pursued beyond a point. The requirement of 'permanent residence' cannot be treated to be at par with the 'domicile' which expression is used to identify personal law by which an individual is governed. Concept of 'domicile of origin' and 'domicile of choice' are well known in private international law but such concepts cannot be imported in determining the question of permanent residence. In Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 654 , it was observed: ".......The concept of "Domicile" has no relevance to the applicability of municipal laws, whether made by the Union of India or by the States. It would not, therefore, in our opinion be right to say that a citizen of India is domiciled in one State or another forming part of the Union of India. The domicile which he has is only one domicile, namely, domicile in the territory of India. It would not, therefore, in our opinion be right to say that a citizen of India is domiciled in one State or another forming part of the Union of India. The domicile which he has is only one domicile, namely, domicile in the territory of India. When a person who is permanently resident in one State goes to another State with intention to reside there permanently or indefinitely, his domicile does not undergo any change: he does not acquire a new domicile of choice. His domicile remains the same, namely, Indian domicile. We think it highly detrimental to the concept of unity and integrity of India to think in terms of State domicile. It is true and there we agree with the argument advanced on behalf of the State Governments, that the word "Domicile" in the rules of some of the State Governments prescribing domiciliary requirement for admission to medical colleges situate within their territories, is used not in its technical legal sense but in a popular sense as meaning residence and is intended to convey the idea of intention to reside permanently or indefinitely. That is, in fact, the sense in which the word "Domicile" was understood by a five-Judge Bench of this Court in D.P. Joshi case, AIR 1955 SC 334 , while construing a rule prescribing capitation fee for admission to a medical college in the State of Madhya Bharat and it was in the same sense that word "Domicile" was understood in Rule 3 of the Selection Rules made by the State of Mysore in N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore, AIR 1971 S 1439. We would also, therefore, interpret the word "Domicile" used in the rules regulating admissions to medical colleges framed by some of the States in the same loose sense of permanent residence and not in the technical sense in which it is used in private international law. But even so we wish to warn against the use of the word "Domicile" with reference to States forming part of the Union of India, because it is a word which is likely to conjure up the notion of an independent State and encourage in a subtle and insidious manner the dormant sovereign impulses of different regions. But even so we wish to warn against the use of the word "Domicile" with reference to States forming part of the Union of India, because it is a word which is likely to conjure up the notion of an independent State and encourage in a subtle and insidious manner the dormant sovereign impulses of different regions. We think it is dangerous to use a legal concept for conveying a sense different from that which is ordinarily associated with it as a result of legal usage over the years. When we use a word which has come to represent a concept or idea, for conveying a different concept or idea, it is easy for the mind to slide into an assumption that the verbal identity is accompanied in all its sequences by identity of meaning. The concept of domicile if used for a purpose other than its legitimate purpose may give rise to lethal radiations which may in the long run tend to break up the unity and integrity of the country. We would, therefore, strongly urge upon the State Governments to exercise this wrong use of the expression "domicile" from the rules regulating admissions to their educational institutions and particularly medical colleges and to desist from introducing and maintaining domiciliary requirement as a condition of eligibility for such admissions." Other pertinent observations in the judgment are: "......We tend to forget that India is one nation and we are all Indians first and Indians last. It is time we remind ourselves what the great visionary and builder of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru said, "Who dies if India lives; who lives if India dies?" We must realise, and this is unfortunate that many in public life tend to overlook, sometimes out of ignorance of the forces of history and sometimes deliberately with a view to promoting their self-interest, that national interest must inevitably and for ever prevail over any other considerations proceeding from regional, linguistic or communal attachments........" "......This concept of one nation took firm roots in the minds and hearts of the people during the struggle for independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. He has rightly been called the Father of the Nation because it was he who awakened in the people of this country a sense of national consciousness and instilled in them a high sense of patriotism without which it is not possible to build a country into nationhood....." "...........Now if India is one nation and there is only one citizenship, namely, citizenship of India, and every citizen has a right to move freely throughout the territory of India and to reside and settle in any part of India, irrespective of the place where he is born or the language which he speaks or the religion which he professes and he is guaranteed freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the law with other citizens in every part of the territory of India, it is difficult to see how a citizen having his permanent home in Tamil Nadu or speaking Tamil language can be regarded as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh or a Citizen having his permanent home in Maharashtra or speaking Marathi language be regarded as an outsider in Karnataka. He must be held entitled to the same rights as a citizen having his permanent home in Uttar Pradesh or Karnataka, as the case may be. To regard him as an outsider would be to deny him his constitutional rights and to derecognise the essential unity and integrity of the country by treating it as if it were a mere conglomeration of independent States." ".....We allowed "sons of the soil" demands to develop claiming special treatment on the basis of residence in the concerned State, because recognising and conceding such demands had a populist appeal. The result is that "sons of the soil" claims, though not altogether illegitimate if confined within reasonable bounds, are breaking as under the unity and integrity of the nation by fostering and strengthening narrow parochial loyalties based on language and residence within a State....." "...Now, the primary imperative of Article 14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation for education and advancement and, as pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J., in Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SG 820, "this has burning relevance to our times when the country is gradually being 'broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls' by surrender to narrow parochial loyalties". What is fundamental, as an enduring value of our polity, is guarantee to each of equal opportunity to unfold the full potential of his personality. Anyone anywhere, humble or high, agrestic or urban, man or woman, whatever be his language or religion, place of birth of residence, is entitled to be afforded equal chance for admission to any secular educational course for cultural growth, training facility, specialty or employment. It would run counter to the basic principle of equality before the law and equal protection of the law if a citizen by reason of his residence in State A, which ordinarily in the commonality of cases, would be the result of his birth in a place situate within that State, should have opportunity for education or advancement which is denied to another citizen because he happens to be resident in State B, It is axiomatic that talent is not the monopoly of the residents of any particular State; it is more or less evenly distributed and given proper opportunity and environment, everyone has a prospect of rising to the peak. What is necessary is equality of opportunity and that cannot be made dependent upon where a citizen resides. If every citizen is afforded equal opportunity, genetically and environmentally, to develop his potential, he will be able in his own way to manifest his faculties fully leading to all round improvement in excellence. The philosophy and pragmatism of universal excellence through equality of opportunity for education and advancement across the nation is part of our founding faith and constitutional creed. The effort must, therefore, always be to select the best and most meritorious students for admission to technical institutions and medical colleges by providing equal opportunity to all citizens in the country and no citizen can legitimately, without serious detriment to the unity and integrity of the nation, be regarded as an outsider in our constitutional set-up. Moreover, it would be against national interest to admit in medical colleges or other institutions giving instruction in specialties, less meritorious students when more meritorious students are available, simply because the former are permanent residents or residents for a certain number of years in the State while the latter are not, though both categories are citizens of India. Moreover, it would be against national interest to admit in medical colleges or other institutions giving instruction in specialties, less meritorious students when more meritorious students are available, simply because the former are permanent residents or residents for a certain number of years in the State while the latter are not, though both categories are citizens of India. Exclusion of more meritorious students on the ground that they are not resident within the State would be likely to promote substandard candidates and bring about fall in medical competence, injurious in the long run to the very region. "It is no blessing to inflict quacks and medical midgets on people by wholesale sacrifice of talent at the threshold. Nor can the very best be rejected from admission because that will be a national loss and the interests of no region can be higher than those of the nation." The primary consideration in selection of candidates for admission, to. the medical colleges must, therefore, be merit. The object of any rules which may be made for regulating admissions to the medical colleges must be to secure the best and most meritorious students." "We cannot, therefore, have arid equality which does not take into account the social and economic disabilities and inequalities from which large masses of people suffer in the country. Equality in law must produce real equality; de jure equality must ultimately find its raison d'etre in de facto equality. The State must, therefore, resort to compensatory State action for the purpose of making people who are factually unequal in their wealth, education or social environment, equal in specified areas. The State must, to use again the words of Krishna Iyer, J., in Jagdish Saran case, (1980)2 SCC 768 (SCC p. 782, para 29) "weave those special facilities into the web of equality which, in an equitable setting, provide for the weak and promote their leveling up so that, in the long run, the community at large may enjoy a general measure of real equal opportunity.... equality is not negated or neglected where special provisions are geared to the larger goal of the disabled getting over their disablement consistently with the general good and individual merit". equality is not negated or neglected where special provisions are geared to the larger goal of the disabled getting over their disablement consistently with the general good and individual merit". The scheme of admission to medical colleges may, therefore, depart from the principle of selection based on merit, where it is necessary to do so for the purpose of bringing about real equality of opportunity between those who are unequals." ".....These decisions which all relate to admission to MBBS course are binding upon us and it is therefore not possible for us to hold, in the face of these decisions, that residence requirement in a State for admission to MBBS course is irrational and irrelevant and cannot be introduced as a condition for admission without violating the mandate of equality of opportunity contained in Article 14...." "We agree wholly with these observations made by the learned Judge and we unreservedly condemn wholesale reservation made by some of the State Governments on the basis of "domicile" or residence requirement within the State or on the basis of institutional preference for students who have passed the qualifying examination held by the university or the State excluding all students not satisfying this requirement, regardless of merit. We declare such wholesale reservation to be unconstitutional and void as being in violation of Article 14 of me Constitution." 21. There is no doubt that demand for admission to Medical Colleges is far in excess of availability of seats. The doctors who are brought up and educated in urban areas prefer not to go to rural areas either by choice or on account of lack of facilities for personal comforts or for professional requirements. While effort must be to select the best and most meritorious for admission to the MBBS, consideration of providing adequate medical services to people of the State by imparting medical education to students who are likely to settle down and serve the people of the State justifies requirement of permanent residence. As observed in Pradeep Jain (supra), reservation on the ground of permanent residence should the progressively reduced. Therein it was observed :- "..........We are of the opinion that this outer limit fixed by us gradually over the years be progressively reduced but that is a task which would have to be performed by me Indian Medical Council. As observed in Pradeep Jain (supra), reservation on the ground of permanent residence should the progressively reduced. Therein it was observed :- "..........We are of the opinion that this outer limit fixed by us gradually over the years be progressively reduced but that is a task which would have to be performed by me Indian Medical Council. We would direct the Indian Medical Council to consider within a period of nine months from today whether the outer limit of 70 per cent fixed by us needs to be reduced and if the Indian Medical Council determines a shorter outer limit, it will be binding on the States and the Union Territories. We would also direct the Indian Medical Council to subject the outer limit so fixed to reconsideration at the end of every three years but in no event should the outer limit exceed 70 per cent fixed by us." The above observation shows that reservation for permanent residents has not to be perpetuated but to be progressively reduced. 22. In Yogesh Bhardwaj Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 355 , it was observed that while 'domicile' required not merely physical fact of residence but also intention to reside permanently, 'residence' did not require such intention. Residence was only bodily presencer and animus manendi is much less in quality and content for such requirement compared to domicile. Even a short period may constitute residence if it is not transitory, fleeting or casual. It was observed: "16. In the present case, the appellant came to the State of Uttar Pradesh with a predetermined mind, namely, to complete the chosen course of studies and return to the State which had nominated him for the purpose. Having regard to the time and duration, the object and obligation, and the uncontroverted facts, the appellant was undoubtedly a bona fide student who resided in Uttar Pradesh for over five years, but whose residence did not acquire the attributes of 'domicile' within the meaning of clause 4(a). The question then is whether the appellant is a 'bona fide resident of Uttar Pradesh' within the meaning of clause 4(b). 17. Residence is a physical fact. No volition is needed to establish it. Unlike in the case of a domicile of choice, animus manendi is not an essential requirement of residence. The question then is whether the appellant is a 'bona fide resident of Uttar Pradesh' within the meaning of clause 4(b). 17. Residence is a physical fact. No volition is needed to establish it. Unlike in the case of a domicile of choice, animus manendi is not an essential requirement of residence. Any period of physical presence, however short, may constitute residence provided it is not transitory, fleeting or casual. Intention is not relevant to prove the physical fact of residence except to the extent of showing that it is not a mere fleeting or transitory existence. To insist on an element of volition is to confuse the features of 'residence' with those of 'domicile'. 18. A person is ordinarily resident in a country if his residence there is not casual or uncertain, but is in the ordinary course of his life. A man may be ordinarily resident or habitually resident in more than one place. While 'ordinary residence' is the physical residence in regard to which intention is irrelevant, except to show that the residence is not merely fleeting, 'habitual residence' may denote a quality of endurance longer than ordinary residence, although duration, past or prospective, is only one of the many relevant factors, and there is no requirement of any particular minimum period. 19. In Reg v. Bamet L.B.C., Exp. Nilish Shah, (1983)2 AC 309, the House of Lords held that a person was ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, if he normally resided lawfully in that country from choice and for a settled purpose. If a person resided there for the specific and limited purpose of education, he was ordinarily resident in that country, even if his permanent residence or real home was outside that country or his future intention or expectation was to live outside that country. 20. Residence must be voluntary. "Enforced presence by reason of kidnapping or imprisonment, or a Robinson Crusoe existence on a desert island with no opportunity of escape, may be so overwhelming a factor as to negative the will to be where one is." 16 Education, business, profession, employment, health, family, or merely love of the place are some of the reasons commonly regarded as sufficient for a choice of regular abode. It is only lawful residence that can be taken into account. It is only lawful residence that can be taken into account. If a man stays in a country in breach of immigration laws, his presence there does not constitute ordinary residence. 21. While residence and intention are the two essential elements constituting the 'domicile of choice', residence in its own right is a connecting factor in a national legal system for purposes of taxation, jurisdiction, service of summons, voting etc. To read into residence volition as a necessary element is, as stated above, to mistake residence for domicile of choice, and that is the error which the High Court appears to have committed. Where residence is prescribed within a unified legal system as a qualifying condition, it is essential that the expression is so understood as to have the widest room for the full enjoyment of the right of equality before the law. Any construction which works to the disadvantage of the citizen lawfully seeking legitimate avenues of progress within the country will be out of harmony with the guaranteed rights under the Constitution, and such a construction must necessarily be avoided. 22. Clause 2, which we have set out above, refers to a 'bona fide resident' and such a person is defined under clause 4 to include a person who has resided in Uttar Pradesh for not less than five years at the time of making his application. These two clauses indicate that a person should have resided in Uttar Pradesh for the requisite period lawfully and bona fide. The converse of bona fide being mala fide, meaning lack of good faith, in the absence of any allegation that the appellant's residence in that State was in any manner opposed to the law of the land, or tainted by lack of good faith, and in the light of the undisputed fact that his residence was neither casual nor fleeting, but in excess of the minimum period of five years, and for the definite purpose of education, he satisfies the definition of a 'bona fide resident'. Any other construction of the clauses would, in our view, be unreasonably restrictive and thus conflict with the appellant's constitutional rights. 23. Viewed in this light, we have no doubt that the construction placed by the High Court upon sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the notification is unsustainable. Any other construction of the clauses would, in our view, be unreasonably restrictive and thus conflict with the appellant's constitutional rights. 23. Viewed in this light, we have no doubt that the construction placed by the High Court upon sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the notification is unsustainable. In our opinion, a person, such as the appellant, who resided in the State of Uttar Pradesh specifically for the purpose of undergoing a course of studies for not less than five years, albeit with the intention of finally returning to his home State, also comes within the meaning of the expression 'bona fide resident' as defined in the said clause." 23. Owing property can at best be evidence of permanent residence, though it may not be conclusive. Even permanent resident may not own property. Conversely owner of property may not be resident or permanent resident. Unless a factor is conclusive, it cannot be equated with condition of eligibility. 24. In Sodhi Transport Co. & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1986)2 SCC 486 , the question which arose for consideration was whether a transporter not carrying prescribed documents can be held to be evading tax. It was held that statutory presumption to the effect that such a person is presumed to be evading tax could not be taken to be conclusive. It was observed :- "16. In our opinion a statutory provision which creates a rebuttable presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the legislature cannot otherwise levy. A rebuttable presumption which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and it is hard to see how it is unconstitutional when the person concerned has the opportunity to displace the presumption by leading evidence. 17. We are of the view that the words contained in Section 28-B of the Act only require the authorities concerned to raise a rebuttable presumption, that the goods must have been sold in the State if the transit pass is not handed over to the officer at the check-post or the barrier near the place of exit from the State. We are of the view that the words contained in Section 28-B of the Act only require the authorities concerned to raise a rebuttable presumption, that the goods must have been sold in the State if the transit pass is not handed over to the officer at the check-post or the barrier near the place of exit from the State. The transporter concerned is not shut out from showing by producing reliable evidence that the goods have not been actually sold inside the State. It is still open to him to establish that the goods had been disposed of in a different way. He may establish that the goods have been delivered to some other person under a transaction which is not a sale, they have been consumed inside the State or have been redespatched outside the State without effecting a sale within the State etc. It is only where the presumption is not successfully rebutted the authorities concerned are required to rely upon the rule of presumption in Section 28-B of the Act. It is, therefore, not correct to say that a transaction which is proved to be not a sale is being subjected to sales tax. The authority concerned before levying sales tax arrives at the conclusion by a judicial process that the goods have been sold inside the State and in doing so relies upon the statutory rule of presumption contained in Section 28-B of the Act which may be rebutted by the person against whom action is taken under Section 28-B of the Act. When once a finding is recorded that a person has sold the goods which he had brought inside the State, then he would be a dealer even according to the definition of the word 'dealer' as it stood from the very commencement of the Act subject to the other conditions prescribed in this behalf being fulfilled. A person who sells goods inside the State of Uttar Pradesh and fulfills the other conditions prescribed in that behalf is a dealer even as per amendments made in 1959, 1961, 1964, 1973 and 1978 to the said definition. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that a transporter was being made liable for the first time after 1979 with retrospective effect to pay sales tax on a transaction which is not a sale. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that a transporter was being made liable for the first time after 1979 with retrospective effect to pay sales tax on a transaction which is not a sale. Tax becomes payable by him only after a finding is recorded that he has sold the goods inside the State though with the help of the presumption which is a rebuttable one." On the same analogy, mere owning of property cannot be taken to be conclusive for permanent residence nor absence of ownership of property can rule out permanent residence. Thus, it will be arbitrary and unreasonable to prescribe such requirement as proof of permanent residence. 25. As laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, permanent residence, cannot be equated to 'domicile' where intention to permanently settle has also to be established. Permanent residence can be proved by physical residence for prescribed reasonable duration and study in the State for prescribed reasonable period. In the present Case, these conditions admittedly stand fulfilled. Persons belonging to other states who may take up employment or business for prescribed duration cannot be treated differently from people originally settled in Assam. Objective of national integration cannot be lost sight of. "We the People" of India are one nation. Narrow parochial approach cannot be encouraged. For general seats, merit cannot be sacrificed. "Narrow domestic walls" which Tagore wanted to see demolished cannot be erected. 26. We are unable to accept the submission that merely because a specific prayer is not made in the writ petition. Article 14 of the Constitution could not be invoked during the course of argument. It is not a case where there is no pleading that Article 14was violated. There is no specific prayer or plea that requirement of owning property is invalid and be quashed. Rules, of pleading applicable to the writ proceedings cannot be read so rigidly as to exclude invocation of constitutional provisions in appropriate cases without taking either of party by surprise. The judgments relied upon on behalf of the appellants are on individual facts and do not lay down any rigid rule contrary to these observations. The judgments relied upon contain general principle that the Court has to go by pleadings. The judgments relied upon on behalf of the appellants are on individual facts and do not lay down any rigid rule contrary to these observations. The judgments relied upon contain general principle that the Court has to go by pleadings. There is no dispute with the said proposition, At the same time, if parties are conscious of legal issue, by hyper technical approach, fundamental right under Article 14 cannot be brushed aside. From the judgment of learned Single Judge, it is clear that parties are conscious of the issue raised. We have fully heard learned counsel on this issue. There is, thus, no prejudice to the State in any manner. 27. In Ram Sarup Gupta Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College (1987)2 SCC 555 , it was observed: "6.......The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Some times, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735 , a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed: "If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the court cannot do injustice to another." 28. We, thus, conclude that laying down of requirement of owning property as a condition for eligibility for admission is not permissible. Requirement of residence in the State can be laid down by specific and objective parameters such as residence for particular period or study in the State for particular duration. These requirements have been validly laid down and stand admittedly complied with in the present case. Requirement of residence in the State can be laid down by specific and objective parameters such as residence for particular period or study in the State for particular duration. These requirements have been validly laid down and stand admittedly complied with in the present case. Such requirement cannot be equated to requirement of domicile which may additionally require proof of intention to permanently settle down at a particular place. For the above reasons, we do not find any ground to interfere with the view taken by learned Single Judge. The appeals are dismissed accordingly. Appeal dismissed.