ORDER This petition had been filed by the petitioner for initiating a proceeding of contempt against opposite party nos.1 and 2 and for punishing them for their alleged deliberate and willful disobedience of order of a Bench of this Court dated 16.06.2011 passed in I.A. No.3982 of 2011 which was filed in M.A. No.907 of 2010. 2. The aforesaid M.A. No.907 of 2010 had arisen out of Title Suit No.335 of 2006, which was filed by the petitioner against the Bihar State Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Housing Board’ for the sake of brevity) and others for declaration that the plaintiff’s removal from the suit house (M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna) was illegal and the plaintiff was entitled to be put in occupation of the same through the process of the Court and also for a decree of permanent mandatory injunction against the defendants in the said suit. Full court fee was paid and the suit was admitted, notices were sent to all the defendants and written statement was also filed by all the defendants except defendant no.1 and learned trial court vide order dated 31.08.2009 rejected the plea of defendants to decide the suit on preliminary issue because it was found that sufficient cause of action had been disclosed and full facts had been mentioned in the plaint. 3. Thereafter on 19.05.2007 plaintiff filed an interlocutory application for ad-interim injunction restraining defendant nos.6 and 7 from alienating, selling or parting with possession or creating encumbrance during the pendency of the suit with respect to the suit house, which was in their possession. However, the said interlocutory application was rejected by learned Sub-ordinate Judge-12, Patna vide order dated 06.09.2010, which was challenged by the plaintiff in M.A. No.907 of 2010. In the said miscellaneous appeal I.A. No.3982 of 2011 was filed by the plaintiff and by interim order dated 16.06.2011 this court restrained the authorities of the Board from alienating, encumbering or making constructions with respect to the property in question. 4. In the said miscellaneous appeal I.A. No.3982 of 2011 was filed by the plaintiff and by interim order dated 16.06.2011 this court restrained the authorities of the Board from alienating, encumbering or making constructions with respect to the property in question. 4. In this M.J.C. case the claim of petitioner is that in spite of the said order opposite party nos.1 and 2 in collusion with each other started constructing floor-wise school known as New Era High School in the residential suit house without any sanction of map specially when no construction or conversion is permitted to any unauthorized occupant of the house/flat of the Housing Board. 5. Subsequently on 28.09.2012 petitioner filed I.A. No.6635 of 2012 in the instant contempt matter for an enquiry to be held under section 340 read with section 195 (i) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the opposite parties for producing and acting upon documents, which were fraudulent, forged and fabricated and were mere nullity such as allotment of house to Anil Kumar Sinha in 1975 and the tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 executed by the authority of the Board, heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha and Neena Prasad for giving petitioner’s M.I.G. House No.237 to Neena Prasad on lease as well as the alleged Power of Attorney purported to have been given by the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha from Chicago, U.S.A. to Mrs. Neena Girish. 6. In the said I.A. No.6635 of 2012 filed under section 340 read with section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner has specifically raised the following issues:- (i) Allotment of house in favour of Anil Kumar Sinha was made only on the orders of Managing Director of the Board and not by all the members of the Board as is required in law. Neither any resolution was passed by the Board duly signed by all members of the Board nor it was ever approved by the Board nor any such document has been produced or filed by the opposite parties in any case as yet. Hence the said allotment apart from being fraudulent is a nullity. In this connection he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in case of Rajendra Sharma vs. The State of Bihar & Others, reported in A.I.R. 1985 Patna 21. Hence the said allotment apart from being fraudulent is a nullity. In this connection he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in case of Rajendra Sharma vs. The State of Bihar & Others, reported in A.I.R. 1985 Patna 21. (ii) The heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha or the Board were not legally entitled to make any lease by such tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 in favour of Neena Prasad (opposite party no.2) specially when house was allotted to the petitioner, whereas the said opposite party no.2 had not even deposited any money in the Housing Board prior to the said tripartite agreement and she had become applicant three months after the said agreement on 02.09.2002. Furthermore, the said opposite party no.2 Neena Prasad having several houses in the town, allotment of a house of the Board to her was clearly against the spirit and provisions of the Act, which provided allotment of house only to homeless person. (iii) Furthermore, the said tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 was executed by one Mrs. Neena Girish on behalf of the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha on the basis of alleged Power of Attorney granted to her, but the said Power of Attorney was not even stamped as per the provisions of section 18 (1)(2) of the Indian Stamps Act and hence on the basis of such frivolous and illegal Power of Attorney no agreement could be legally executed by the attorney. 7. Hence the petitioner, who is appearing in person specifically argued that the reliance upon and production of such illegal, fraudulent and fabricated documents before this court by the opposite parties in their affidavits clearly called for such strict action against the opposite parties concerned under the above mentioned clear provisions of law. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for opposite party no.1, namely the Board, stated that one Anil Kumar Sinha, a retired Lieutenant Colonel, applied for allotment of M.I.G. House in the year 1975 and after considering his application the Housing Board allotted M.I.G. House No.237 situated at Lohiya Nagar, Patna to him vide letter dated 02.05.1975, whereafter the allottee made initial payment of Rs.13,000.00 towards tentative cost fixed by the Housing Board as Rs.65,000.00, whereafter the Housing Board executed an agreement dated 26.10.1978 in favour of the said allottee and the balance amount of Rs.52,000.00 was required to be paid in 180 monthly equal installment. However, since the petitioner forcibly occupied the said house and was under unauthorized occupation, the possession of the house could not be given to the allottee Anil Kumar Sinha and the Housing Board filed Eviction Case No.518 of 1979 before the competent authority for eviction of the petitioner under section 59 (i) (b) of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, but the said case was dismissed on 07.06.1980 and the said order was also affirmed by the appellate authority, which dismissed Board’s Appeal No.04 of 1980 vide order dated 30.07.1983. 9. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 submitted that against the aforesaid orders of the competent authority and the appellate authority the Board filed C.W.J.C. No.6078 of 1985, whereas the original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha also challenged the said orders vide C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988. However, while both the aforesaid writ petitions were pending, the State Government vide letter dated 29.08.1985 and 03.09.1986 issued direction to the Housing Board to cancel the allotment of the original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha and to allot the same to the petitioner. Accordingly, a resolution was taken by the Housing Board in its meeting dated 11.07.1991 to allot the said house in favour of the petitioner cancelling the allotment of original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha. Hence, in these changed circumstances the Housing Board did not press its writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No.6078 of 1985, which was dismissed on 13.07.1998 by a Bench of this Court as having become infructuous. 10. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 averred that however the writ petition of Anil Kumar Sinha bearing C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988 continued, in which the petitioner and the Housing Board appeared and contested the case. Subsequently, the said writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988 was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.09.1998 quashing the resolution of the Housing Board dated 11.07.1991 and also giving certain directions with respect to possession and the decision of right and title of the parties by appropriate forum in accordance with law. 11. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 claimed that Mrs. 11. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 claimed that Mrs. Neena Girish, daughter of the original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha filed C.W.J.C. No.4022 of 1999 challenging the demand made by the Housing Board for an amount of Rs.3,19,244.00 as outstanding dues existing on 28.02.1999 before handing over possession and the said writ petition was finally disposed of by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.11.1999 allowing the writ petition by quashing the demand letter of the Housing Board. Against the said order, the Housing Board filed L.P.A. No.1608 of 1999 which was dismissed on 26.04.2000 by a Division Bench of this Court directing that possession of M.I.G. House No.237 be given within one month from the date of order. Hence in terms of the said order of the High Court possession of M.I.G. House No.237 was given to the heirs of original allottee and a perpetual lease was executed by the Housing Board on 19.07.2001 in their favour. 12. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 asserted that in the meantime the heirs of original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha wanted to dispose of the said M.I.G. House No.237 and after negotiation with opposite party no.2 Neena Prasad, the heirs of original allottee agreed to sell the said house to her and accordingly the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha applied before the Housing Board for permission to transfer the said house to opposite party no.2, whereafter permission was granted by the Housing Board and on its direction Rs.4,91,945.00 being the amount of earned income (Lavansh) was also deposited. Only after fulfillment of the entire paraphernalia a tripartite perpetual lease was executed by the Housing Board, the heirs of original allottee through their Power of Attorney Holder Mrs. Neena Girish and opposite party no.2 Neena Prasad on 03.06.2002, which was also registered on 06.06.2002 and since then opposite party no.2 was coming in peaceful possession of the said house and her name had also been substituted as owner of M.I.G. House No.237 in the Housing Board. 13. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 argued that all the relevant facts of the case had been taken note of by the Bench deciding C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988 in its order dated 02.09.1998 and the Housing Board had acted only in accordance with the direction of High Court in the said order. 13. Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 argued that all the relevant facts of the case had been taken note of by the Bench deciding C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988 in its order dated 02.09.1998 and the Housing Board had acted only in accordance with the direction of High Court in the said order. However, all the said points can be raised and decided in Title Suit No.335 of 2006 pending between the parties before the trial court and hence there was no occasion for continuation of this contempt matter because everything was done by the Housing Board prior to 16.06.2011 when interim order was passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 and hence there was no violation of the said order by the Housing Board or its authorities. 14. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2- Smt. Neena Prasad claimed that she was a subsequent purchaser from the heirs of original allottee Anil Kumar Sinha, whereas this Court vide order dated 16.06.2011 passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 only restrained the authorities of the Housing Board from alienating, encumbering or making constructions with respect to the properties in question till further orders. Opposite party no.2 not being any authority of the Board whom direction was given, there was no question of commission of any contempt by opposite party no.2. Furthermore, M.A. No.907 of 2010 having already been disposed of on 28.02.2012 with certain observations and no grievance having been raised by the petitioner at the time of final decision on 28.02.2012, no contempt can validly be made out thereafter. 15. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 submitted that interim order dated 16.06.2011 was passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 at the time when even notices were not sent to opposite party no.2 and subsequently M.A. No.907 of 2010 along with I.A. No.3982 of 2011 was disposed of on 28.02.2012 giving nine months time to the trial court for disposal of the suit, hence the contempt matter was unnecessarily delaying the disposal of the suit. 16. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 averred that opposite party no.2 had adhered to all the orders of High Court including orders dated 16.06.2011 and 28.02.2012 and hence no contempt was made out. 16. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 averred that opposite party no.2 had adhered to all the orders of High Court including orders dated 16.06.2011 and 28.02.2012 and hence no contempt was made out. Furthermore, so far the claim of parties are concerned it has already been settled by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.09.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988, reported in 1998 (3) P.L.J.R. 437 and all the parties are bound to adhere to the same. 17. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 asserted that the law was well settled that the merit of the case was not to be considered while deciding a contempt matter and in the garb of a contempt proceeding the matter of title cannot be reopened. In this connection the parameters of contempt petition have been duly prescribed by the Apex Court in case of Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami and others, reported in (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 339. 18. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 argued that in the aforesaid circumstances, the matter was not res-integra. Even equity cannot be taken into consideration in such matter nor any additional direction can be given nor the order in question can be reviewed. Furthermore, question of right and title cannot be considered in this M.J.C. petition and for deciding the right and title of the parties a suit bearing Title Suit No.335 of 2006 is proceeding before Sub-ordinate Judge-12, Patna but it has to be dealt with as per the aforesaid order of the Division Bench of this court. 19. Considering the aforesaid arguments of learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it is quite apparent that originally this M.J.C. case was filed for initiating a proceeding of contempt against opposite party nos.1 and 2 and for punishing them for their alleged deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of a Bench of this Court dated 16.06.2011 passed in I.A. No.3982 of 2011, which was filed in M.A. No.907 of 2010. Subsequently by filing I.A. No.6635 of 2012 in the instant M.J.C., an additional relief for an enquiry under section 340 read with section 195 (i) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the opposite parties has been sought for producing and acting upon documents, which were fraudulent, forged and fabricated and were mere nullity in the eye of law. Hence, now this court has to consider and decide both the aforesaid two questions separately. 20. So far the first question of contempt is concerned, it revolves around order of this court dated 16.06.2011 passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 by which notice of I.A. No.3982 of 2011 was directed to be issued against opposite party no.2 and following interim order was passed therein:- “Till further orders, the authorities of the Bihar State Housing Board shall not alienate, encumber or make constructions with respect to the properties in question.” 21. The opposite parties have pleaded that the said M.A. No.907 of 2010 having been disposed of by a Bench of this Court on 28.02.2012, the interim order dated 16.06.2011 passed in the said miscellaneous appeal lost its force and hence no contempt can be made out for alleged disobedience of the said order. This argument of the opposite parties does not appear to be legal and justified because when an order is passed, even if it is an interim order passed on an interlocutory application, it has to be followed and complied immediately and its violation cannot be justified by a much subsequent disposal of the case. 22. Furthermore, the court while disposing of the aforesaid miscellaneous appeal vide order dated 28.02.2012 had specifically held in paragraph 15 thereof that it shall not be proper to vacate the aforesaid order dated 16.06.2011 and allow respondent no.2 to alienate or encumber the suit property till the final disposal of title suit. In the said circumstances by final order dated 28.02.2012, disposing of M.A. No.907 of 2010, the interim order dated 16.06.2011 passed by this court did not lose its force, rather it was directed to continue till disposal of the suit, namely Title Suit No.335 of 2006, which is still pending before learned Subordinate Judge-12, Patna. 23. In the said circumstances by final order dated 28.02.2012, disposing of M.A. No.907 of 2010, the interim order dated 16.06.2011 passed by this court did not lose its force, rather it was directed to continue till disposal of the suit, namely Title Suit No.335 of 2006, which is still pending before learned Subordinate Judge-12, Patna. 23. No doubt, by order dated 16.06.2011 this court restrained only opposite party no.1 Bihar State Housing Board from alienating, encumbering or making constructions with respect to the properties in question, hence till the final order dated 28.02.2012 was passed it was only opposite party no.1 which had to abide by the said order. But while disposing of M.A. No.907 of 2010 vide paragraph 16 (H) of order dated 28.02.2012 this court specifically directed all the parties including both the opposite parties to maintain status quo over the suit property restraining them from alienating, encumbering or changing the physical feature of suit property in any manner till the disposal of title suit. 24. Although the said order of this court dated 28.02.2012 passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 was challenged by opposite party no.2 in the Apex Court vide Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.16521-16523 of 2012, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 03.07.2012. In the said circumstances it was the duty of both the opposite parties to follow the aforesaid directions given by this court in order dated 28.02.2012 passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010. In addition thereto opposite party no.1, namely the Board was also bound to abide by the interim order of this court dated 16.06.2011 not only till the disposal of miscellaneous appeal but till the disposal of title suit, which is still pending. 25. In this regard the specific allegation of petitioner in the M.J.C. petition is that even after the aforesaid orders passed by this court in M.A. No.907 of 2010 opposite party no.2 in collusion with opposite party no.1, namely the Board and its authorities made constructions and were still constructing floor wise building of school known as “New Era High School” on the land in question, namely M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna. It is also vehemently argued that the entire M.I.G. colony is a residential colony and the said house was also allotted for residential purposes but opposite parties are trying to convert it to a commercial building and without any sanction opposite party no.1 permitted opposite party no.2 to make such constructions although the said opposite party no.2 is an unauthorized occupant of the said house which legally belonged to the petitioner and opposite party no.1 had no authority to grant such permission to opposite party no.2. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that apart from the constructions being absolutely illegal, it was being made by disobeying the orders passed by this court in question willfully and deliberately. 26. The aforesaid statements have been clearly made by the petitioner in paragraphs-69, 70 and 71 of his M.J.C. petition, but opposite party no.1 in its show-cause dated 02.04.2012 did not categorically deny the aforesaid statement and merely reiterated its own version of the earlier history of the case, but for the period after the said order dated 16.06.2011 it was only stated that it did not disobey any order passed by this court and the averments made in the contempt petition were not necessary for deciding the matter and the opposite parties had only followed the earlier decision of a Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha vs. The Bihar State Housing Board and others reported in 1998 (3) P.L.J.R. 437 , which was passed with respect to the same M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna. Furthermore, opposite party no.2 in her show-cause dated 08.11.2012 had stated that she did not violate the aforesaid order of this court, claiming that the property in question had neither been alienated or encumbered nor any construction had been made since the interim order. From the statements made in show-cause of opposite party no.2, it is quite apparent that she has not denied constructions over the land in question nor she has given the date of such constructions to falsify the claim of petitioner. 27. From the statements made in show-cause of opposite party no.2, it is quite apparent that she has not denied constructions over the land in question nor she has given the date of such constructions to falsify the claim of petitioner. 27. It is thus quite apparent that the petitioner had specifically stated on oath that opposite parties had made constructions and were making constructions over the premises in question even after passing of the aforesaid orders of this court in M.A. No.907 of 2010, whereas opposite party no.2 has not denied constructions having been made on the said premises but has merely stated that she has not violated the aforesaid order of this court without giving dates or even year of such constructions. In the said circumstances, her statement is absolutely unreliable and untrustworthy on the basis of which the claim of petitioner could be validly refused. 28. Furthermore, opposite party no.1 has not denied the specific claim of petitioner made in paragraphs-69, 70 and 71 of the M.J.C. petition and has merely relied upon a decision of Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra), but the said decision has got no impact at all upon the orders passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 or the violation of the said orders, as by the said decision of the Division Bench of this court the petitioner of this case, who was respondent no.5 in the said case, was also given liberty to raise his claims, which was to proceed and decide in accordance with law and only in that view of the matter Title Suite No.335 of 2006 was filed by the petitioner out of which M.A. No.907 of 2010 had arisen. 29. Opposite party no.1 has stated that it has neither alienated nor encumbered nor even made any constructions with respect to the properties in question and hence it has not violated any order of this court. But from the aforesaid facts and circumstances it is quite apparent that although opposite party no.1 has itself not made any construction over the properties in question but its authorities clearly connived and colluded with opposite party no.2 who made constructions over the property in question violating the specific orders of this court dated 16.06.2011 and 28.02.2012 passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010. Hence, opposite party no.1 cannot legally be exonerated from its liabilities and responsibilities in the said matter. 30. Accordingly, both the opposite parties are hereby held guilty of disobeying the orders of this court passed in M.A. No.907 of 2010 and committing contempt of this court. Hence both the opposite parties, namely Anupam Kumar Suman, Managing Director of Bihar State Housing Board (opposite party no.1) and Smt. Neena Prasad (opposite party no.2) are hereby punished for contempt by imposition of fine amounting to Rs.2,000.00 (rupees two thousand) to each of them separately which they must deposit within one month failing which the Registrar General of this court shall take action in any one of the ways provided in section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted by the opposite parties that if they continue to further violate the orders of this court in the instant matter, a harsher punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall be levied against them. 31. So far the second question regarding relief claimed by the petitioner in I.A. No.6635 of 2012 filed in the instant M.J.C. case is concerned, it is with respect to an enquiry under section 340 read with section 195 (i) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be held against the opposite parties for producing and acting upon documents, which were fraudulent, forged and fabricated and were mere nullity in the eye of law as claimed by the petitioner. The said documents include the order of allotment of M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna to one Anil Kumar Sinha in the year 1975; a tripartite agreement for perpetual lease between opposite party no.1, opposite party no.2 and the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha dated 03.06.2002 registered on 06.06.2002; as well as the alleged Power of Attorney dated 18.08.2001 said to have been executed in Chicago by the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha in favour of one Mrs. Neena Girish, who executed the tripartite agreement on their behalf. 32. Neena Girish, who executed the tripartite agreement on their behalf. 32. Against the aforesaid interlocutory application of the petitioner a reply dated 26.02.2013 has been filed by opposite party no.2 denying the aforesaid allegations and stating that this court in the instant M.J.C. petition has no power to entertain such interlocutory application for the relief claimed by the petitioner, specially when all the claims with regard to the property in question stand finally terminated vide order dated 02.09.1998 passed by a Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra) reported in 1998 (3) P.L.J.R. 437 . Learned counsel for opposite party no.1 has also raised similar objections. In the said circumstances and in view of the aforesaid objection raised by learned counsel for the opposite parties this court has to first consider the competency and desirability of this court in deciding such matters, specially in view of the aforementioned decision of Division Bench of this court. 33. For deciding the aforesaid issue the provision of section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be perused which provides as follows:- 340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.- (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, - (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court. (4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195. 34. The provision of section 195 specially sub-section (1) (b) (i) speaks of any proceeding in any court. The interpretation clause i.e. section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prescribes that court includes all Judges, Magistrates and all persons, except Arbitrators, legally authorized to take evidence. Hence the High Court cannot be legally precluded in that regard. 35. The law is also well settled that if any fraud or forgery or fabrication is brought on record and comes to the knowledge of a court even in a collateral proceeding, the court of law specially a High Court cannot legally ignore the same. The act of any authority or the order of any court whether superior or inferior obtained by fraud, forgery or fabrication has to be treated as a nullity by every court. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others reported in A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 853. This case law has been subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in many cases including judgment dated 22.05.2012 passed in Civil Appeal No.1723 of 2008 (Smt. Badami (deceased) by her L.R. V. Bhali). 36. In any proceeding regarding administration of justice truth should be the guiding star in entire judicial process because truth is the foundation of justice and thus it is the fundamental duty of a court of law in any proceeding even in collateral proceeding to ascertain truth and do justice on the basis of truth. 36. In any proceeding regarding administration of justice truth should be the guiding star in entire judicial process because truth is the foundation of justice and thus it is the fundamental duty of a court of law in any proceeding even in collateral proceeding to ascertain truth and do justice on the basis of truth. It has to be noted that people would have faith in court only when the said principle is followed and truth alone triumphs. In this regard reference may be made to a decision of the Delhi High Court in case of Ved Parkash Kharbanda V. Vimal Bindal reported in 198 (2013) Delhi Law Times 555. 37. With respect to the effect of judgment of a Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the opposite parties, it is quite apparent that the same is based upon the alleged allotment of M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna by the Board in favour of Anil Kumar Sinha in the year 1975, which has been specifically claimed by the petitioner to be fraudulent and hence as per the petitioner the said order has been obtained by playing fraud upon the court and accordingly it is a nullity in view of the settled principles of law. 38. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon an earlier decision of a Division Bench of this court dated 20.12.1983 passed in C.W.J.C. No.4187 of 1982 (Hari Bansh Mishra V. The State of Bihar and others), which was also with respect to an M.I.G. House at Lohiya Nagar, Patna. In the said decision it had been held that a very sordid picture of the Board was presented as no dependable records were available to comment upon and the resolution of allotment transgressed all the terms and conditions of prospectus and hence it was void and inoperative. It was also found that no consideration for reserved categories was made and hence the claim of allottee for the M.I.G. House was not tenable. 39. It was also observed in the said decision that affairs of the Board did not inspire any confidence as there was rampant misuse of power by the person in authority. It was also found that no consideration for reserved categories was made and hence the claim of allottee for the M.I.G. House was not tenable. 39. It was also observed in the said decision that affairs of the Board did not inspire any confidence as there was rampant misuse of power by the person in authority. Although the Board is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and was bound to act fairly but there had been a flagrant abuse of all norms and even the reservation as propounded in the prospectus was given a go-by. This decision of earlier Division Bench of this court was neither placed before the subsequent Division Bench nor the said Division Bench considered the same while passing its aforesaid order dated 02.09.1998 passed in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra). 40. The opposite parties have also challenged the validity of Title Suit No.335 of 2006 filed by the petitioner and its pendency before Sub-ordinate Judge-12, Patna in view of the abovementioned decision of Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra). But from a perusal of the said decision, it is quite apparent that the petitioner was not barred from filing any suit, rather all the parties were given liberty to raise their claims before a competent authority in accordance with law. Furthermore, the question of right, title, interest and possession which are issues of facts and law both intermingled together and hence the proper court to decide the matter is definitely the trial court having the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the same after following the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. 41. Furthermore, on the same grounds opposite party no.2 had filed an interlocutory application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Title Suit No.335 of 2006 for rejection of the plaint. The said application of opposite party no.2 was rejected by the trial court against which opposite party no.2 filed Civil Revision No.2036 of 2009 which was rejected by a Bench of this court vide order dated 14.03.2012. The said application of opposite party no.2 was rejected by the trial court against which opposite party no.2 filed Civil Revision No.2036 of 2009 which was rejected by a Bench of this court vide order dated 14.03.2012. Furthermore, while disposing of M.A. No.907 of 2010 a Bench of this court vide order dated 28.02.2012 directed the trial court to decide the said title suit expeditiously and the said order of a Bench of this court was affirmed by the Apex Court vide order dated 03.07.2012 passed in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.16521-16523 of 2012 directing the trial court to examine other matters also. 42. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be validly claimed by the opposite parties at this stage that the said suit bearing Title Suit No.335 of 2006 pending before Subordinate Judge-12, Patna is not maintainable in view of the decision of Division Bench of this court in case of Anil Kumar Sinha (supra). They appear to be merely trying to misinterpret and misconstrue the said order for taking undue advantage in the instant case merely with a view to subvert their acts of fraud, forgery and fabrication by producing and acting upon documents, which were mere nullity in the eye of law. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the settled principles of law, this court even in this collateral proceeding is bound by the abovementioned provisions of law and the case laws to look into the aforesaid allegations of petitioner and give its finding with respect thereto in the instant case in the larger ends of justice, without being bogged down by mere technicalities. 43. The first allegation of petitioner is the illegal allotment of M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna to Anil Kumar Sinha in the year 1975 as well as the legal allotment of the said M.I.G. House in favour of the petitioner. In this connection record of the Board with respect to the said M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna has been produced in court by learned counsel for the Board. A perusal of the said record clearly shows that the said house was allotted to Anil Kumar Sinha only on the order of a single person, namely Managing Director of the Board and not by all the members constituting the Board. A perusal of the said record clearly shows that the said house was allotted to Anil Kumar Sinha only on the order of a single person, namely Managing Director of the Board and not by all the members constituting the Board. Although on the said order of Managing Director letter of allotment dated 02.05.1975 was issued to the said Anil Kumar Sinha, who paid only Rs.13,000.00 out of the tentative cost of Rs.65,000.00 but the said order of Managing Director was never approved or ratified by the Board nor any document has been produced or filed by the opposite parties in this case with respect thereto. A Division Bench of this court in case of Rajendra Sharma V. The State of Bihar & others, reported in A.I.R. 1985 Patna 21 had specifically held that only the Board in the meeting of all its members can make allotment and any officer of the Board had no authority or legal right to make allotment even on the basis of the report of any Sub-Committee signed only by some of the members. It was also held that the Board was not bound by such illegal action of its authorities and hence no right accrued to such an allottee. 44. In view of the aforesaid settled principle of law, the allotment and any consequential action taken by the authorities were invalid acts of officers of the Board and hence neither the Board was bound by such illegalities nor any right had accrued to Anil Kumar Sinha on the basis of such allotment. This position was perhaps realised by Anil Kumar Sinha also as it further transpires from the record that thereafter the said Anil Kumar Sinha neither made any deposit nor did he approach the Board for taking possession of the M.I.G. House allotted to him for more than a decade. Hence the provision of Rule 32 of the Bihar State Housing Board Regulation, 1983 became applicable after completion of two months from the date of issue of the aforesaid letter of allotment dated 02.05.1975 and the said property became free for allotment to any other person. 45. Hence the provision of Rule 32 of the Bihar State Housing Board Regulation, 1983 became applicable after completion of two months from the date of issue of the aforesaid letter of allotment dated 02.05.1975 and the said property became free for allotment to any other person. 45. On the other hand the petitioner, who is now a renowned lawyer of this court and had earlier served the nation as a Naval Officer being recipient of ‘Raksha Medal’ for his gallantry service, after leaving the said service decided to settle in Patna and start legal practice in the High Court, but since he had no house of his own he applied before the Housing Board through Zila Sainik Board for allotment of an M.I.G. House, whereafter he along with nine other persons were selected and he was put in possession of the vacant M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna on the orders of Chairman of the Board dated 11.02.1979 which is sufficient evidence of consent, approval, sanction and declaration of the Board as per the provision of section 93 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for the sake of brevity). Furthermore, when the authorities of the Board granted permission for issuance of prospectus and for depositing earnest money, petitioner deposited the earnest money immediately thereafter and subsequently when he was directed by the authorities to deposit 30% of the tentative cost of the said house on commercial rate, he deposited the same within two weeks thereafter on 07.03.1992 and thereafter on the direction of the authorities he deposited the remaining amount also on 04.06.1996 for which also money receipt was issued to him. Hence the entire cost of the said M.I.G. House has already been deposited by the petitioner. 46. In the meantime, authorities of the Board for reasons best known to them filed eviction suit before the Competent Authority-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sadar, Patna under section 59 (B) of the Act to evict the petitioner but it was rejected by the said authority vide order dated 07.06.1980 which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority, namely the State Government vide order dated 30.07.1983 passed in Appeal No.04 of 1980 filed by the Board. Hence the possession of petitioner having been affirmed by the authorities under the Act, the Urban Development Department issued order dated 16.08.1983 to the Board for necessary action under sections 60 and 62 of the Act but when no action was taken in that regard, the Urban Development Department issued letter no.2380 dated 05.09.1985 directing the Board to allow and execute registration of the said house in favour of the petitioner. 47. It was only thereafter that the Board filed C.W.J.C. No.6078 of 1985 challenging the orders passed by the authorities in the eviction suit and eviction appeal, but surprisingly enough order of the State Government dated 05.09.1985 was never challenged by the Board. The said order of the government was clearly under section 109 of the Act, which enabled the government to give such directions to the Board which were necessary and expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act and a duty was cast upon the Board to comply such directions. In the said circumstances the matter travelled to different authorities of the Board and finally the Board in its 141st meeting dated 11.07.1991 complied the said government order and directed that firstly Anil Kumar Sinha be allotted an alternative flat and thereafter M.I.G. House No.237 be allotted to the petitioner and cost thereof be received from him at commercial rate and the writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No.6078 of 1985 filed by the Board against the petitioner be withdrawn from the High Court. 48. Accordingly, previous allotment of M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna to Anil Kumar Sinha was cancelled vide Board’s memo dated 23.12.1991 and allotment order of M.I.G. Flat No.3 MF-4/43 at Bahadurpur, Patna in favour of the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha was issued and only thereafter the Board issued letter dated 28.02.1992 allotting M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna to the petitioner. When authorities of the Board as per its Resolution dated 11.07.1991 brought the said facts before a Bench of this court, C.W.J.C. No.6078 of 1985 was dismissed as having become infructuous vide order dated 13.07.1998. With the said dismissal not only the orders of authorities passed in eviction suit and eviction appeal in favour of the petitioner attained finality rather the said Resolution of the Board dated 11.07.1991 was also given effect to. 49. With the said dismissal not only the orders of authorities passed in eviction suit and eviction appeal in favour of the petitioner attained finality rather the said Resolution of the Board dated 11.07.1991 was also given effect to. 49. It was only in these circumstances that Anil Kumar Sinha after more than 12 years from the date he became disentitled for allotment according to Rule 32 of the Regulation in 1975, filed C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988 before this court challenging the above mentioned orders of the Urban Development Department, Government of Bihar dated 16.08.1983 and 05.09.1985. In the said writ petition no order of stay having been passed, the authorities of the Board continued with the proceeding in accordance with law and passed orders dated 23.12.1991 and 28.02.1992 in view of the Resolution passed by the Board in its meeting dated 11.07.1991. The said writ petition was allowed by a Division Bench of this court vide order dated 02.09.1998 reported in 1998 (3) P.L.J.R. 437 . 50. From the aforesaid decision, it is quite apparent that only the Resolution of the Board in its meeting dated 11.07.1991 was quashed by the abovementioned decision of this court dated 02.09.1998, although in the meantime the said agenda and resolution had been implemented and the house in question bearing M.I.G. House No.237 of Lohiya Nagar, Patna was allotted to the petitioner vide order dated 28.02.1992 and an alternative flat was given to Anil Kumar Sinha vide order dated 23.12.1991 after cancelling his previous allotment. These subsequent acts and orders of the Board were neither challenged by Anil Kumar Sinha or his heirs, who were substituted in the said writ petition after the death of Anil Kumar Sinha nor they were ever quashed either by the said order of this court dated 02.09.1998 or by any other order. Thus it can only be said that the womb has been removed after the child was born, which cannot in any manner affect the existence of child. Furthermore, it is like the stable being destroyed after the steeds had bolted away from all bondages. 51. Thus it can only be said that the womb has been removed after the child was born, which cannot in any manner affect the existence of child. Furthermore, it is like the stable being destroyed after the steeds had bolted away from all bondages. 51. This clearly shows that not only the initial allotment of M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna in favour of Anil Kumar Sinha in the year 1975 was illegal and bad, rather subsequently also the said allottee made himself disentitled from allotment of the house in question in view of the specific provisions of law by his own omissions and commissions. These clear facts supported by the specific provisions of law had been fraudulently concealed by Anil Kumar Sinha and his heirs at the time of arguments in the abovementioned C.W.J.C. No.6617 of 1988. 52. The second allegation of petitioner is the illegality of the tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 executed by the authority of the Housing Board, the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha through their Attorney Mrs. Neena Girish and opposite party no.2, namely Smt. Neena Prasad for giving the house in question bearing M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna to opposite party no.2 on lease. It is quite apparent that the allotment of house by the Board was for residential purpose of the allottee himself and hence neither the Board nor the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha were entitled or authorized in law to make such lease in favour of a third person, namely opposite party no.2, who had never been an applicant or allottee of the Board nor had ever deposited any money not even earnest money in the Board before the tripartite agreement. Hence, no settlement by lease could have been legally made in favour of opposite party no.2. 53. Furthermore, the petitioner had specifically stated on oath that opposite party no.2 Smt. Neena Prasad had several houses of her own. This fact has not been categorically denied by the opposite parties and thus it stands unrebutted. Hence allotment of the said house was clearly against the spirit of the Act and the Rules which provide allotment of such houses of the Board to homeless persons. This fact has not been categorically denied by the opposite parties and thus it stands unrebutted. Hence allotment of the said house was clearly against the spirit of the Act and the Rules which provide allotment of such houses of the Board to homeless persons. Furthermore, as per Rule 38 of the Regulation no allottee can enter into a second lease as during the said period he had to remain tenant of the Board and shall have no other right except that of tenancy. Hence the said tripartite agreement having been executed by suppressing the rules for allotment of house, this is a clear case of fraud and fabrication not only on the part of the authorities of the Board but also on the part of the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha as well as opposite party no.2. 54. The third allegation of petitioner is the production and use of Power of Attorney dated 18.08.2001 by Mrs. Neena Girish, the authority of the Board, namely opposite party no.1 and Smt. Neena Prasad (opposite party no.2). The said Power of Attorney appears to have been executed in Chicago (U.S.A.) by the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha in favour of their alleged attorney Mrs. Neena Girish, who executed the abovementioned tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 on their behalf on the basis of the said Power of Attorney. Admittedly the said Power of Attorney was executed out of India, hence it had to come through the Foreign Department of that country and the Embassy concerned. In addition to that it had to be taken within a period of three months to the Collector for getting it stamped in the manner prescribed in the Rules with a stamp of such value as the person so taking such instrument may require and pay of, as has been provided in section 18 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 55. Admittedly the said Power of Attorney is not stamped as per the aforesaid provision of law and hence it is not a legal and proper document on the basis of which the said tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 was executed by Mrs. Neena Girish on behalf of the heirs of Late Anil Kumar Sinha. 55. Admittedly the said Power of Attorney is not stamped as per the aforesaid provision of law and hence it is not a legal and proper document on the basis of which the said tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 was executed by Mrs. Neena Girish on behalf of the heirs of Late Anil Kumar Sinha. Thus the said Power of Attorney is clearly an illegal document having no force of law and hence it was fraudulently and mischievously used for execution of the tripartite agreement dated 03.06.2002 in favour of opposite party no.2 Smt. Neena Prasad merely with a view to disentitle the petitioner from his claim and possession over the M.I.G. House in question. 56. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this court finds that the aforesaid three documents, namely the order and letter of allotment dated 02.05.1975, the tripartite agreement for perpetual lease dated 03.06.2002 executed by opposite party no.1, opposite party no.2 and alleged attorney of the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha as well as the alleged Power of Attorney dated 18.08.2001 said to have been executed in Chicago by the heirs of Anil Kumar Sinha in favour of the alleged attorney Mrs. Neena Girish, who executed the tripartite agreement on their behalf, are fraudulent, forged and fabricated documents which were mere nullity in the eye of law and the opposite parties have played fraud upon the court also by relying upon the said documents and producing them before this court. 57. So far the question of possession is concerned, it is admitted that Anil Kumar Sinha never came in possession of M.I.G. House No.237 at Lohiya Nagar, Patna allegedly allotted to him in 1975 which was also cancelled by the Board subsequently on 23.12.1995, rather it was the petitioner, who came in possession of the said house in the year 1979 on the basis of the order of the Chairman of the Board dated 11.02.1979 and throughout remained in possession till 05.10.1998. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner was never evicted by the Board in compliance of the order of a Bench of this court dated 02.09.1998 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6617 of 1988 or by any procedure prescribed in law, rather he, his wife (since deceased) and children were forcibly ousted from the said house by the police in execution of order dated 05.10.1998 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna under section 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Patrakar Nagar (Kankarbag) P.S. Case No.628 of 1998 in which the accused were only the two sons of petitioner, whose names were also not correctly given. 58. However in Sessions Trial No.240 of 1999, arising out of the said P.S. Case, the above named accused were finally acquitted. Hence the proper and legal course for the Board was to first allow the possession of the petitioner to be restored over the said M.I.G. House after the judgment of the Sessions Court, as till then he was in legal possession of the M.I.G. House through the court. Only thereafter the Board could have taken steps for eviction of the petitioner in accordance with the provision of law or the order of this court. But in the meantime the authorities of the Board having other nefarious and illegal designs put opposite party no.2 in possession of the House in question on the basis of the above mentioned fraudulent documents including the tripartite agreement for lease dated 03.06.2002, although her alleged predecessor in interest had never come in possession thereof. 59. Thus Title Suit No.335 of 2006 filed by the petitioner for his right, title and possession and now pending before learned Subordinate Judge 10, Patna has to be decided expeditiously after hearing all the concerned parties, who are already impleaded in the suit, keeping in view the aforesaid settled principles of law, which are applicable to the pleadings of the parties as well as the validity or otherwise of the documents relied upon by the opposite parties as discussed above. 60. With the aforesaid observations/directions, this M.J.C. petition is disposed of.