Judgment : Ramachandran Nair, J. 1. Both these writ appeals arise from a common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) Nos.5513/2012 and 5514/2012. Since common questions have been considered by the learned Single Judge, the appeals have been heard together. 2. The writ petitions were filed by the appellants as petitioners, along with the sixth respondent State Bank of Travancore, Konni Branch. The petitioners mainly challenged the proceedings by way of notices of attachment issued under the Revenue Recovery Act by the Tahsildar for recovery of sales tax arrears against the respective items of properties. The requisition for revenue recovery was preceded by issuance of assessment orders under Section 17(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (for short, the 'KGST Act'). In W.A. No.1262/2012 the property is having an extent of 8.86 ares with a building and improvements in Sy. Nos.67/16, 67/16-1, 67/20 and 67/21 in Block No.33 of Konni Village. Revenue recovery proceedings were initiated for recovery of arrears of sales tax due from respondents 4 and 5 for the period viz. 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. In W.A.No.1263/2012 the property is having 7.89 ares in extent with a building and improvements in Sy. No.1207/73 in Block No.33 of Konni Village. Therein also the arrears of sales tax allegedly due from respondents 4 and 5 for the period 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 were sought to be recovered. 3. In both these cases the appellants contend that the respective items of properties were sold by the sixth respondent Bank and sale certificates have been issued in favour of the appellants under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, the 'SARFAESI Act') without notice of the dues if any of respondents 4 and 5 to the Sales Tax Department and without notice of any charge. 4. Since some of the relevant dates have been made mention of, we will refer to the bare facts. As far as W.A. No.1262/2012 is concerned, respondents 4 and 5 availed credit facilities from the 6th respondent Bank by creating equitable mortgage in respect of the property, on 28.9.2004. When the account became NPA, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated and finally the property was brought to sale on 9.6.2008. Ext.P1 is the copy of the sale certificate dated 19/09/2009. Ext.P1(3) sale certificate is still later, i.e. dated 19.6.2010. 5. When the account became NPA, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated and finally the property was brought to sale on 9.6.2008. Ext.P1 is the copy of the sale certificate dated 19/09/2009. Ext.P1(3) sale certificate is still later, i.e. dated 19.6.2010. 5. In W.A. No.1263/2012 respondents 4 and 5 availed credit facilities from the sixth respondent Bank by creating equitable mortgage in respect of the property in question on 29.9.2004. The property was brought to sale on 12/01/2010 under the SARFAESI Act and sale certificate has been issued. Ext.P1 produced in the writ petition is the copy of the sale certificate dated 26/04/2010. Ext.P4 reply given to the Appellants by the Tahsildar will show that notice for completing the assessment, for the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 dated 22/11/2008 was issued to the 4th respondent on 25/11/2008, and assessment was completed on 01/12/2008 under Sections 17(3) and 17D of the KGST Act. In respect of the 5th respondent, the notice and the proceedings are of the same date and the assessment year is 2004-2005. 6. In both the appeals the common contention raised is that revenue recovery proceedings for attachment and sale of the properties cannot bind the appellants, as they are purchasers for value and there is no notice of the charge in the sale conducted by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act. In both the cases the notices issued to the Tahsildar by the appellants have been produced as Ext.P3 and, Ext.P4 produced in both the cases is the reply furnished by the Tahsildar, wherein the stand taken is that in the light of Section 26A of the KGST Act, any transfer of property made by the defaulter during the pendency of any proceedings under the KGST Act or after the completion thereof is not binding on the Government and under Section 26B of the Act, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and other amount payable by a dealer or any other person under the said Act shall be first charge on the property. 7. The appellants, by relying upon Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, contended that no charge shall be enforced against the purchaser for value and without notice of the charge. 8. 7. The appellants, by relying upon Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, contended that no charge shall be enforced against the purchaser for value and without notice of the charge. 8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions by holding that for the applicability of Section 26A of the KGST Act, assessment need not be completed and reliance is placed on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Hamsa v. Assistant Commissioner (2008 (3) KLT 180). It was held that tax is due from the mortgagors for the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 and charge was created at a time when the proceedings under the KGST Act were pending against them. 9. The next contention that Section 26A of the KGST Act will not apply to cases where involuntary transfers take place, was rejected in the light of the judgment of this Court in Lucy Vincent v. District collector ( 2008 (4) KLT 876 ) and Shini Linson v. Tahsildar (2010 (4) KLT SN 90 Case No.104). 10. The further contention regarding Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act was also rejected by the learned Single Judge, by relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sherry Jacob v. Canara Bank ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ). 11. We heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Shri P.B. Suresh Kumar and learned Government Pleader Shri Bobby John Pulikkaparambil. 12. Shri P.B.Suresh Kumar, learned Senior Counsel elaborated his contentions by submitting that even though under Section 26B of the KGST Act arrears of sales tax, penalty and interest is a first charge on the property of the defaulter, under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act no charge shall be enforced against the property in the hands of the purchaser for value and without notice of the charge. The appellants being purchasers for value and without notice of the charge, the property is not liable to be proceeded against. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that unless there is a specific provision in the statute enabling the enforcement of a statutory charge, even as against the bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of charge, the said charge could not be enforced. 13. With reference to the facts of the case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the mortgage was created in favour of the Bank on 28.9.2004. 13. With reference to the facts of the case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the mortgage was created in favour of the Bank on 28.9.2004. The arrears of sales tax are related to the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. The appellants in W.A.No.1262/2012 purchased the property on 09.06.2008. The notices issued under Section 17(3) of the KGST Act is subsequent to it, viz. 25.11.2008. As far as Section 23 of the KGST Act is concerned, a demand notice is necessary for creating a charge and Section 26B applies only if a charge is created. Therefore, the provisions of Section 26B will not apply. 14. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Asstt. CST ( AIR 1964 SC 766 ) in support of the plea that assessment proceedings as far as a Taxing statute is concerned, can be stated to be pending only if a notice has been issued against the defaulter. The next decision relied upon is that of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai { (1971) 1 SCC 757 }, with regard to the scope and applicability of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decisions of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd. { (2006) 1 SCC 615 } and AI Champadany Industries Ltd. v. Official Liquidator { (2009) 4 SCC 486 } have also been relied upon in that context. Learned Senior Counsel Shri P.B. Suresh Kumar also raised a contention that the sale being an involuntary one, it will not be hit by Section 26A of the KGST Act. 15. Shri Bobby John Pulikkaparambil, learned Government Pleader submitted that going by the provisions of the KGST Act and the relevant rules, the assessee's liability arises on a monthly basis, viz. after collection of tax he is under an obligation to file monthly returns. On collection of the tax the payment alone is outstanding and therefore the incidence of tax is already there. Apart from the same, going by Section 23(3) of the KGST Act, there is a liability for payment of interest also, if the tax or any other amount assessed or due under the Act is not paid by a dealer or other person within the time prescribed therefor. The last date for filing the monthly return is the date from which it becomes payable. The last date for filing the monthly return is the date from which it becomes payable. Therefore, the first charge is created from the date of payability of tax as well as the date from which interest is payable. In fact, learned Government Pleader submitted that creation of charge or parting of possession are quite different. By referring to the provisions under Sections 26A and 26B of the Act, it is submitted that the transfers will be void going by Section 26A as against the claim in respect of the tax or any other sum payable by the assessee under the Act which is important. According to the learned Government Pleader, involuntary transfers are also taken care of in Section 26A of the Act. 16. With regard to the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel by relying upon Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, learned Government Pleader submitted that Section 26B of the KGST Act creates a first charge on the property itself and therefore the State gets precedence. Section 26B contains a non obstante clause. Therefore, it has got an overriding effect over other laws. Apart from that, KGST Act is a special law and the Transfer of Property Act is a general law and for the said reason also the argument of the learned Senior Counsel cannot be accepted. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the following decisions, in support of his contentions: Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala [(2009) 17 KTR 189], Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the following decisions, in support of his contentions: Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala [(2009) 17 KTR 189], Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. [ (2000) 5 SCC 694 ], Union of India v. SICOM Ltd. and another [ (2009) 2 SCC 121 ], Builders Supply Corporation v. Union of India [(1965) 56 ITR 91], Sree Durga Distributors v. State of Karnataka [(2008) 16 KTR 55 SC], Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank v. Assistant PF Commissioner [ (2009) 10 SCC 123 ], Recovery Officer EPF v. KFC [ILR 2002 (3) Kerala 4], Hamsa v. Assistant Commissioner [2008 (3) KLT 180], Lucy Vincent v. State [ 2008 (4) KLT 876 ], Shiny Linson v. Tahsildar [2010 (4) KLT (SN) 90 (Case No.104)], Sherry Jacob v. Canara Bank [ 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ], Kalwa Devadatton and others v. Union of India and others [(1963) 49 ITR 165 SC], Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Madras v. KSN Bhatt [(1984) 145 ITR 1 SC], State Bank of Bikaner v. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation and others [ (1995) 2 SCC 19 ], Dattatreya Shankar Mote and others v. Anand Chintaman Datar and others [ (1974) 2 SCC 799 ], West Minister C City Council v. Haymarket [(1981) 2 All ER 555] & Jaya v. State of Kerala [2005 (2) KLT 543]. 17. We will first come to the provisions of the KGST Act. Section 23 is under the heading “Payment and recovery of tax”. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) read as follows: “23. Payment and recovery of tax:- (1) The tax assessed or any other amount demanded under this Act shall be paid in such manner and in such instalments, if any, and within such time, as may be specified in the notice of demand, not being less than twenty one days from the date of service of the notice. If default is in paying according to the notice of demand, the whole of the amount outstanding on the date of the default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the person or persons liable to pay the tax or other amount under this Act: Provided that the time limit of twenty-one days for a notice under this subsection shall not apply to casual traders. (2) Any tax assessed or any other amount due under this Act from a dealer or other person may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recovered, (a) As if it were an arrear of land revenue: (b) on application to any Magistrate, by such Magistrate, as if it were a fine imposed by him: Provided that no proceedings for such recovery shall be taken or continued as long as such dealer or other person has, in regard to the payment of such tax or other amount, as the case may be, complied with an order by any of the authorities to whom he has appealed or applied for revision, under the provisions of this Act. (3) If the tax or any other amount assessed or due under this Act is not paid by any dealer or other person within the time prescribed therefor, in this Act or in any rule made thereunder and in other cases within the time specified therefor in the notice of demand, the dealer or other person shall pay, by way of interest, in the manner prescribed, in addition to the amount due, a sum equal to,- (a) one per cent of such amount for each month or part thereof for the first three months after the date specified for its payment; (b) two per cent of such amount for each month or part thereof subsequent to the first three months aforesaid. [Explanation:- Where the period of default is less than one month, interest shall be calculated for the actual number of days of default].” Going by Section 26A, to attract the same, the assessee should have created a charge on or part with the possession by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever, of any of his assets in favour of any person. It is provided that if such a charge is created, at any rate, during the pendency of any proceedings, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee under the Act. Going by Section 26B, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other amount, if any, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person. Going by Section 26B, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other amount, if any, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person. The same is notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. Rule 18 of the KGST Rules has been relied upon by the learned Government Pleader to explain the Scheme. Sub-rule (1) provides for filing annual return in Form No.9. It should be filed on or before the first day of May in every year, to the assessing authority, showing the total turnover and taxable turnover for the preceding year, the amounts by way of tax or taxes due on the taxable turnover during the year. Rule 21 relates to submission of monthly returns. 18. The relevant assessment years are 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 as far as the fourth respondent and 2004-05 as far as the fifth respondent. In W.A.Nos.1262/2012 and 1263/2012 respondents 4 and 5 had availed credit facilities from the 6th respondent Bank on 28/09/2004 and 29/09/2004 respectively. 19. Along with I.A.No.10/2013 in W.A.No.1262/2012 the appellants have produced the copies of assessment orders. Annexures 1 and 2 are the copies of the same in respect of the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 dated 1.12.2008 issued to the fourth respondent. Annexure 3 is the copy of the assessment order dated 1.12.2008 issued against the fifth respondent. 20. The legal questions raised therefore will have to be considered in the light of the above factual setting. First we will consider the principles stated in various decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. 21. In Ghanshyamdas's case ( AIR 1964 SC 766 ) the question posed is: When do the proceedings under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act in respect of a registered dealer commence and when do they terminate? The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the said proceedings only starts after the appropriate authority issued notice under Section 10(1) of the Act, whereas learned counsel for the official respondents contended that in the case of a registered dealer the proceedings commence from the date fixed in the registration certificate, within which the dealer has a statutory obligation to furnish return. In para 17 it was held as follows: “17. In para 17 it was held as follows: “17. It is manifest that in the case of a registered dealer the proceedings before the Commissioner starts factually when a return is made or when a notice is issued to him either under S. 10 (3) or under S. 11 (2) of the Act. The acceptance of the contention that the statutory obligation to file a return initiates the proceedings is to invoke a fiction not sanctioned by the Act. The obligation can be enforced by taking a suitable action under the Act. Taking of such an action may have the effect of initiating proceedings against the defaulter. The default may be the occasion for initiating the proceedings, but the default itself proprio vigore cannot initiate proceedings. Proceedings in respect of the assessment of the turnover for the relevant period cannot, therefore, be said to be pending before the Commissioner.” It is of importance to notice that the Apex Court was of the view that the default itself proprio vigore cannot initiate proceedings. 22. Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act came up for interpretation in an important decision of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case { (1971) 1 SCC 757 }. In para 4 it has been held as follows: “4. This section in unambiguous language lays dawn that no charge is enforceable against any property in the hands of a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge except where it is otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force. The saving provision of law must expressly provide for enforcement of a charge against the property in the hands of a transferee for value without notice of the charge and not merely create a charge. We now turn to Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 to see if it answers the requirements of Section 100 of Transfer of Property Act. This section reads: Section141. We now turn to Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 to see if it answers the requirements of Section 100 of Transfer of Property Act. This section reads: Section141. "Property taxes to be a first charge on premises on which they are assessed: (1) Property taxes due under this Act in respect of any building or land shall subject to the prior payment of the land revenue, if any due to the State Government thereupon, be a first charge, in the case of any building or land held immediately from the Government, upon the interest in such building or land of the person liable for such taxes and upon the moveable property if any, found within or upon such building or land and belonging to such person; and, in the case of any other building or land, upon the said building or land and upon the moveable property, if any, found within or upon such building or land and belonging to the person liable for such taxes. Explanation. - The term "Property taxes" in this section shall be deemed to include charges payable under Section 134 for water supplied to any preemies and the costs of recovery of property-taxes as specified in the rules. (2) In any decree passed in a suit for the enforcement of the charge created by sub-section (1), the Court may order the payment to the Corporation of interest on the sum found to be due at such rate as the Court deems reasonable from the date of the institution of the suit until realisation, and such interest and the cost of enforcing the said charge, including the costs of the suit and the cost of bringing the premises or moveable property in question to sale under the decree, shall, subject as aforesaid, be a fresh charge on such premises and moveable property along with the amount found to be due, and the Court may direct payment thereof to be made to the Corporation out of the sale proceeds." Sub-section (1), as is obvious, merely creates a charge in express language. This charge is subject to prior payment of land revenue due to the State Government on such building or land. This charge is subject to prior payment of land revenue due to the State Government on such building or land. The section, apart from creating a statutory charge, does not further provide that this charge is enforceable against the property charged in the hands of a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge.” 23. The above will show that under Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 it was provided that property taxes to be a first charge on premises on which they are assessed. The Apex Court was of the view that “sub-section (1), as is obvious, merely creates a charge in express language. This charge is subject to prior payment of land revenue due to the State Government on such building or land. The section, apart from creating a statutory charge, does not further provide that this charge is enforceable against the property charged in the hands of a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge.” Their Lordships have further held as follows: “ What is enacted in the second half of Section 100 of Transfer of Property Act is the general prohibition that no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge and the exception to this general rule must be expressly provided by law. The real core of the saving provision of law must be not mere enforceability of the charge against the property charged but enforceability of the charge against the said property in the hands of a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge. Section 141 of the Bombay Municipal Act is clearly not such a provision.” 24. The Apex Court considered a similar question in Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd.'s case { (2006) 1 SCC 615 }. Therein, the matter arose under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The purchaser of assets of a concern sold by a State Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 challenged the proceedings under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act against the very same property. The relevant provision, viz. Section 13(2)(i) of the KST Act creates a charge. The purchaser of assets of a concern sold by a State Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 challenged the proceedings under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act against the very same property. The relevant provision, viz. Section 13(2)(i) of the KST Act creates a charge. The said provision reads as follows: “13(2)(i): If a default is made in making payment of sales tax, then: The whole of the amount outstanding on the date of default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the person or persons liable to pay the tax or any other amount due under this Act.” With regard to the question under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was held as follows in paragraphs 20 and 22: “20. As the section itself unambiguously indicates, a charge may not be enforced against a transferee if she has/had no notice of the same, unless by law, the requirement of such notice has been waived. This position has long been accepted by this Court in Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar, - (1974) 2 SCC 799 and in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai - (1971) 1 SCC 757 (hereinafter "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation").” 22. In the present case, firstly, no provision of law has been cited before us that exempts the requirement of notice of the charge for its enforcement against a transferee who had no notice of the same.” Finally, in para 23 it was held as follows: “In these circumstances, we are of the view that the First Respondent was a purchaser for value without notice of the sales tax arrears of the Defaulting Company or the consequent charge on the property. This would, therefore, attract the principle laid down by this Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, - (1971) 1 SCC 757 - which is also embodied in the proviso to Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, the property in the hands of the First Respondent was free of the charge and it is not open to the appellants to enforce the liabilities of the Defaulting Company in this manner against the First Respondent.” 25. Thus, the property in the hands of the First Respondent was free of the charge and it is not open to the appellants to enforce the liabilities of the Defaulting Company in this manner against the First Respondent.” 25. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants heavily relied upon the above decisions and drew parallel from the provisions under the KGST Act. We have noticed that there is some difference between the provisions under Section 13(2)(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act and Section 26B of the KGST Act. Section 13(2)(i) of the Karnataka Act applies in a case of default in making payment of tax and the whole amount outstanding shall be a charge against the properties of the person or persons liable to pay tax, where as Section 26B of the KGST Act makes it a first charge on the property. This distinction will be significant. Section 13(2) (i) does not contain a non obstante clause as contained in Section 26B of the KGST Act. We may advert to it later, in the judgment. 26. AI Champdany Industries Ltd.'s case { (2009) 4 SCC 486 } is a case where the property was having Municipal tax dues and it was sold in court sale in liquidation proceedings of a Company. The appellant purchased the said assets of the company in liquidation in the court sale. Later, he was served with a notice by the Municipality claiming arrears of property tax and he disputed the liability by contending that the same has to be adjusted against the sale proceeds. In para 10 it was held that dues in relation to the municipal tax in terms of the provisions of the said Act do not create any encumbrance on the property. It does not create any charge. It is considered to be a personal liability. In para 15, it was held that the respondent municipality was an unsecured creditor. In that capacity it cannot stand on a higher footing than an ordinary unsecured creditor who is required to stand in queue with all others similarly situated for the purpose of realisation of their dues from the sale proceeds. It was further noticed that Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act provides the property taxes to be a first charge on the premise for which they are assessed. It was further noticed that Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act provides the property taxes to be a first charge on the premise for which they are assessed. After considering Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was held in para 18 that “there cannot thus be any doubt or dispute that a provision of law must expressly provide for an enforcement of a charge against the property in the hands of the transferee for value without notice to the charge and not merely create a charge.” Reliance was placed on the judgment in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case { (1971) 1 SCC 757 }. 27. Therefore, the next question is: How far Section 26B of the KGST Act could be invoked by the State Government herein? According to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, in the absence of a saving clause providing for enforcement of a charge, it cannot be invoked. The contention raised is that Section 26B only creates a charge and there is no other provision under the Act for enforcement of the charge against the property in the hands of a transferee for value without notice of the charge. 28. The answers given by the learned Government Pleader to the above question are many fold. The decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Builders Supply Corporation v. Union of India and others (AIR 1965 SC 91) is relied upon to contend that Crown debts get priority. The said principle, it is well settled, may apply in a case where it is sought to be applied against unsecured creditors which is clear from the said judgment itself. But herein the impact of Section 26B of the KGST Act will have to be analysed. 29. Before going further into the said question, we will first consider the requirements under Section 26A of the KGST Act, so as to attract the said provision. 30. The position is no longer res integra in the light of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hamsa v. Asst. Commissioner (2008 (3) KLT 180). Therein, the Bench was of the view that to attract Section 26A, it is not necessary that the assessment should be completed. It is also not necessary that a demand should be made to the assessee to pay any amount. Commissioner (2008 (3) KLT 180). Therein, the Bench was of the view that to attract Section 26A, it is not necessary that the assessment should be completed. It is also not necessary that a demand should be made to the assessee to pay any amount. In para 9, it was explained thus: “To attract S.26A, it is not necessary that the assessment should be completed. It is also not necessary that a demand should be made to the assessee to pay any amount. If the transfer is made by the assessee during the pendency of any proceedings, such transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee under the K.G.S.T. Act. Inspection of the shop, factory or business premises of the assessee by the sales tax officers would also come within the meaning of the expression “during the pendency of any proceedings” under S.26A. The transfer as such is not void. It would be a valid transfer as between the transferor and the transferee. But it would be void against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee-transferor under the Act. The transferee is not entitled to put forward any defence that the transfer was made for valid consideration or that he is a bonafide purchaser for value. Such defences are outside the purview of S.26A of the Act. Once the ingredients of S.26A are attracted, the transfer made by the assessee would be void. The transferee cannot claim any valid title in such cases as against “any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assesee” under the K.G.S.T. Act.” It was held that the transferee is not entitled to put forward any defence that the transfer was made for valid consideration or that he is a bonafide purchaser for value and that once the ingredients of Section 26A are attracted, the transfer made by the assessee would be void. Exts.R1(a) to (k) produced along with the counter affidavit filed in W.A.No.1262/2012 are the copies of monthly returns for the year 2004-05 except March 2005 filed by the fourth respondent. Annexure-I Assessment Order against the fourth respondent for the year 2003-04 will show that he filed annual returns for the year 2003-04. These will satisfy the requirements of Section 26A. 31. Annexure-I Assessment Order against the fourth respondent for the year 2003-04 will show that he filed annual returns for the year 2003-04. These will satisfy the requirements of Section 26A. 31. Therefore, the pendency of the proceedings alone will attract the provisions under Section 26A of the Act. The same position has been reiterated by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Shini Linson v. Tahsildar (2010 (4) KLT SN 90 (C. No.104), by relying upon Hamsa's case (2008 (3) KLT 180) and Lucy Vincent's case ( 2008 (4) KLT 876 ). 32. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Jaya v. State of Kerala (2005 (2) KLT 543) upholding the constitutional validity of Section 26A of the Act, is also relied by the learned Government Pleader. 33. Now we will come to the decisions which have discussed the impact of statutory first charge over a mortgage. 34. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation and others { (1995) 2 SCC 19 }, Section 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 which creates a first charge over the property of a dealer, came up for consideration before the Apex Court. It is a provision similar to Section 26B of the KGST Act. We extract Section 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act hereunder: “11-AAAA. Liability under this Act to be the first charge.-- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, any amount of tax, penalty, interest and any other sum, if any, payable by a dealer or any other person under this Act, shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer, or such person.” In para 7, their Lordships considered the effect of the said provision on an existing mortgage in respect of the property of the dealer. It was held in para 8 that when a statutory first charge is created on the property of the dealer, the property subjected to the first charge is the entire property of the dealer. We extract the said findings in para 8 as follows: “The title to the property remains with the mortgagor. Therefore, when a statutory first charge is created on the property of the dealer, the property subjected to the first charge is the entire property of the dealer. We extract the said findings in para 8 as follows: “The title to the property remains with the mortgagor. Therefore, when a statutory first charge is created on the property of the dealer, the property subjected to the first charge is the entire property of the dealer. The interest of the mortgagee is not excluded from the first charge. The first charge, therefore, which is created under Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act will operate on the property as a whole and not only on the equity of redemption as urged by Mr. Tarkunde.” 35. The facts of the case show that there was a mortgage with the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur for availing cash credit facilities and later the Bank filed a suit for recovery of money due under the cash credit facility and while the suit was pending, the Commercial Tax Officer who was impleaded in the suit, claimed priority for the recovery of the sales tax dues. In para 10 of the judgment, it was held that “in the present case the section creates a first charge on the property, thus clearly giving priority to the statutory charge over all other charges on the property including a mortgage”. The contention that the statutory first charge created by Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act can operate only over the equity of redemption was not accepted. 36. Importantly, in para 11 of the judgment the effect of the first charge was also considered and it was held that charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar { (1974) 2 SCC 799 }. We extract paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 } which read as follows: “10. In the present case, the section creates a first charge on the property, thus clearly giving priority to the statutory charge over all other charges on the property including a mortgage. The submission, therefore, that the statutory first charge created by Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act can operate only over the equity of redemption, cannot be accepted. The charge operates on the entire property of the dealer including the interest of the mortgagee therein. 11. The submission, therefore, that the statutory first charge created by Section 11-AAAA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act can operate only over the equity of redemption, cannot be accepted. The charge operates on the entire property of the dealer including the interest of the mortgagee therein. 11. Looked at a little differently, the statute has created a first charge on the property of the dealer. What is meant by a "first charge"? Does it have precedence over an earlier mortgage?Now, as set out in Dattatreya Shanker Mote's case ( 1974 (2) SCC 799 ) (supra), a charge is a wider term than a mortgage. It would cover within its ambit a mortgage also. Therefore, when a first charge is created by operation of law over any property, that charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage. The provisions contained in Section 11-AAAA of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act as well as that of KGST Act are in pari materia and Section 26B of the KGST At also creates a first charge. Therefore, evidently, the first charge under Section 26B of the KGST Act going by the dictum laid down above, will have precedence over an existing mortgage. 37. In para 7 of the decision of the Apex Court in Dattatreya Shanker Mote's case { (1974) 2 SCC 799 } the meaning of the word 'charge' arising in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act was explained thus: “A charge does not amount to a mortgage though all the provisions which apply to a simple mortgage contained in the preceding provisions shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. While a charge can be created either by act of parties. A charge is thus a wider term as it includes also a mortgage, in that every mortgage is a charge, butt every charge is not a mortgage.” 38. The next decision relied upon by the learned Government Pleader is that of the Apex Court in Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co.{ (2000) 5 SCC 694 }. Therein, the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 came up for consideration. Para 6 of the judgment shows that the first question considered was whether the recovery of sales tax dues (amounting to Crown debt) shall have precedence over the right of the Bank to proceed against the property of the borrowers mortgaged in favour of the Bank. Therein, the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 came up for consideration. Para 6 of the judgment shows that the first question considered was whether the recovery of sales tax dues (amounting to Crown debt) shall have precedence over the right of the Bank to proceed against the property of the borrowers mortgaged in favour of the Bank. The principles concerning the priority or precedence of Crown debts were examined from para 7 onwards and after referring to various earlier decisions of the Apex Court, their Lordships summed up the relevant principles in para 8 in the following manner: “1. There is a consensus of judicial opinion that the arrears of tax due to the State can claim priority over private debts. 2. The common law doctrine about priority of crown debts which was recongnised by the Indian High Courts prior to 1950 constitutes "law in force" within the meaning of Article 372 (1) and continues to be in force. 3. The basic justification for the claim for priority of State debts is the rule of necessity and the wisdom of conceding to the State the right to claim priority in respect of its tax dues. 4. The doctrine may not apply in respect of debts due to the State if they are contracted by citizens in relation to commercial activities which may be undertaken by the State for achieving socio-economic good. In other words, where welfare State enters into commercial fields which cannot be regarded as an essential and integral part of the basic government functions of the State and seeks to recover debts from debtors arising out of such commercial activities the applicability of the doctrine of priority shall be open for consideration.” It was held in para 10 that the Crown's preferential right to recovery of debts over other creditors is confined to ordinary or unsecured creditors. Thereafter, Sections 158 and 190 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 as well as Sections 13 and 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 were examined. Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act says that claim of State Government will have precedence over all other debts. Thereafter, Sections 158 and 190 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 as well as Sections 13 and 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 were examined. Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act says that claim of State Government will have precedence over all other debts. It was held in para 15 that “Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act not only gives a statutory recognition to the doctrine of State's priority for recovery of debts but also extends its applicability over private debts forming subject matter of mortgage, judgment-decree, execution or attachment and the like.” Of course, the decision will show that Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 was crucial for coming to the said conclusion. 39. Union of India and others v. SICOM Ltd. { (2009) 2 SCC 121 } also examined the priority of Crown debts and reiterated the principles stated in Dena Bank's case { (2000) 5 SCC 694 } and other decisions. Heavy reliance is placed by the learned Government Pleader on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Recovery Officer, Employees Provident Fund v. Kerala Financial Corporation (ILR 2002 (3) Ker. 4), wherein Section 11(2) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 came up for consideration. It was held that the same overrides all provisions of other enactments including Section 45B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. In para 9 of the judgment, the Division Bench relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 } and Dattatreya Shanker Mote's case { (1974) 2 SCC 799 }. 40. Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and others { (2009) 10 SCC 123 } is also a decision interpreting the provisions of Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Apex Court held that the priority clause under Section 11 will operate against statutory as well as non statutory and secured as well as unsecured debts including mortgage or pledge. 41. We will now come to certain other decisions of this Court and the Apex Court wherein Section 26B of the KGST Act itself came up for consideration. First one is that of a Division Bench of this Court in Sherry Jacob's case ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ). 41. We will now come to certain other decisions of this Court and the Apex Court wherein Section 26B of the KGST Act itself came up for consideration. First one is that of a Division Bench of this Court in Sherry Jacob's case ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ). There also the question was whether the State can claim precedence over the claims of a secured creditor. Therein also the transaction with the Bank was by way of mortgage. The facts of the case show that the company, viz. M/s. Thomas Stephen & Company, Kollam availed various loans from Canara Bank at Thamarakkulam and as security for repayment of the debt, in addition to creating mortgage by deposit of title deeds of certain items of immovable property, the company had furnished sufficient security as a continuing collateral security. The Bank instituted a suit for recovery of money when payment was defaulted. Later, the suit was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam. The Tribunal allowed the application and the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal issued a sale proclamation for sale of two items of the mortgaged properties in execution of the decree. It was bid in auction by one Shri Ahammed Koya and the certificate of sale and an order of confirmation followed. But long prior to the sale, the Tahsildar (Revenue Recovery) had issued a notice on 18.7.2000 for attaching the property belonging to the company for default in payment of sales tax arrears for the assessment years 1974-75 to 1997-98. It was followed by a notice of sale of the property under Section 49(2) of the Revenue Recovery Act. The Bank approached this Court by filing an original petition to quash the sale notice. The State Government filed another writ petition to quash the sale proceedings initiated by the Recovery Officer of the Tribunal and the auction purchaser had also filed a writ petition for various reliefs. 42. The Division Bench considered various questions. The State contended for the position that in the light of Section 26B of the KGST Act, a first charge is created and the State gets priority over the claims of secured creditors. The Division Bench held in para 19 as follows: “19. A perusal of the above statutory clause unambiguously shows that any amount of tax, penalty etc. The State contended for the position that in the light of Section 26B of the KGST Act, a first charge is created and the State gets priority over the claims of secured creditors. The Division Bench held in para 19 as follows: “19. A perusal of the above statutory clause unambiguously shows that any amount of tax, penalty etc. payable by a dealer "shall be the first charge on the property of the dealer or such person" (emphasis supplied). S.26-B starts with a nonobstante clause, which necessarily gives it an overriding effect to any other law in force. It creates a first charge on the property of the dealer in no uncertain terms. But does this statutory first charge have an overriding effect on the preexisting mortgage right of a secured creditor? Can the State take the plea that the "statutory first charge" operates on the entire property under mortgage and not only on the right of equity of redemption available to the mortgagor/dealer? (emphasis supplied) It was held that the non-obstante clause necessarily gives an overriding effect to any other law in force. After relying upon the dictum laid down in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 } and a later decision in State of Madhya Pradesh & another v. State Bank of Indore & others {(2002) 10 KTR 366 - SC), in para 22 it has been held as follows: “22. In view of the above two decisions of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and State Bank of Indore (supra) which had dealt with two exactly identical statutory provisions as contained in S.26-B of the KGST Act, we have no hesitation to hold that the statutory first charge will prevail over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor. The statutory first charge gets precedence over an existing mortgage right. The precedence or priority is not confined to right of redemption alone.” The Division Bench noticed in para 21 that Section 33-C of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act is also identical to Section 26B of the KGST Act. Thereby, the crucial finding is that the statutory first charge will prevail over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor and the statutory first charge gets precedence over an existing mortgage right. Thereby, the crucial finding is that the statutory first charge will prevail over any charge or right created in favour of a mortgagee/secured creditor and the statutory first charge gets precedence over an existing mortgage right. On the facts of the case, it was held in para 26 as follows: “26. In view of the above legal position, it has to be held that the right, if any, of the Recovery Officer to conduct sale of the mortgaged property in question was only subject to the statutory first charge available in favour of the State to recover the sales tax arrears from the Company. The admitted position is that the revenue authorities had effected attachment of the property even prior to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer. Though a sale notice was published by the Revenue Officers, the sale did not take place. This sale notice was also long prior to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer. Thus in any view of the matter, the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer without notice to the Revenue is liable to be set aside.” For the purpose of this case, the finding in para 22 of the judgment quoted above will be crucial. 43. The above judgment was considered in a similar context in South Indian Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ) by another Division Bench. Therein, the question which arose was, whether a decree obtained by a Bank before the introduction of Section 26B of the KGST Act would override the first charge created in favour of the State. The facts of the case show that the suit filed by the Bank for realisation of amount due on the loans which were secured by equitable mortgage of immovable properties was decreed on 30.1.1995. Para 3 of the judgment will show that the Tahsildar (Revenue Recovery) had issued a notice for attachment and the attachment was effected on 25.6.1993. The contention raised mainly was that the provision under Section 26B of the KGST Act introduced with effect from 1.4.1999, has no retrospective effect and will not override the decree of the civil court passed on 30.1.1995. It was also contended that the notice issued by the second respondent was long after the decree, viz. The contention raised mainly was that the provision under Section 26B of the KGST Act introduced with effect from 1.4.1999, has no retrospective effect and will not override the decree of the civil court passed on 30.1.1995. It was also contended that the notice issued by the second respondent was long after the decree, viz. 2.6.1999 and that the Bank has got prior charge over the immovable properties proposed to be sold for sales tax arrears by virtue of equitable mortgage created as early as 12.6.1984. The Division Bench considered various decisions of the Apex Court including State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 }, Dattatreya Shanker Mote's case { (1974) 2 SCC 799 } and Dena Bank's case { (2000) 5 SCC 694 }. Significantly, the Division Bench also considered the decision in State of M.P. v. State Bank of Indore {(2002) 10 SCC 441} wherein the interpretation of Section 33-C of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act came up for consideration. Finally, in para 7 it was held as follows: “7. Right of the State to have priority in the matter of recovery of sales tax from the defaulters over the equitable mortgages created by them in favour of Banks and Financial Institutions is no more res integra. Dealing with the provisions parallel to S.26B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act by the various Sales Tax Laws of other States, Supreme Court has already recognized the statutory first charge in respect of sales tax arrears. Reference may be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. National Iron & Steel Rolling Corporation & Ors. (1995) 96 STC 612 ), Delhi Auto and General Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Tax Recovery Officer & Ors. (1999) 114 STC 273 ), Dattatreva Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar (1974) 2 SCC 799 ), Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Prakash Co. (2000) 5 SCC 694 ) and various other decisions. We may refer to the latest decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. State Bank of Indore, (2002) 10 SCC 441) wherein the court examined the charge created under S.33C of the M.P.General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and held that S.33C creates a statutory first charge that prevails over any charge that may be in existence. We may refer to the latest decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. State Bank of Indore, (2002) 10 SCC 441) wherein the court examined the charge created under S.33C of the M.P.General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and held that S.33C creates a statutory first charge that prevails over any charge that may be in existence. The Court held that the charge thereby created in favour of the State in respect of the sales tax dues of the second respondent prevailed over the charge created in favour of the Bank. Judicial pronouncements settled the law once for all stating that State has got priority in the matter of recovery of debts due and the specific statutory charge created under the Sales Tax Act notwithstanding the equitable mortgages created by the defaulters in favour of the Banks prior to the liability in favour of the State. A Division Bench of this Court in Sherry Jacob v. Canara Bank, ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ) held that revenue recovery authorities shall have the liberty to proceed against the property of the company under the Revenue Recovery Act on the strength of the first charge created over the property by virtue of S.26B of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The Court held that the statutory first charge would prevail over any charge or right in favour of a mortgage or secured creditors and would get precedence over an existing mortgage right.” Reference was also made to Sherry Jacob's case ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 }. In para 8 with regard to the question whether Section 26B of the KGST Act will take away the efficacy of a decree passed by the civil court prior to the introduction of the said provision, the Bench held as follows: “8...................When a first charge created by the operation of law over any property, that charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage and the decree obtained by the bank against the mortgagor will not affect the State since State was not a party to the suit. Decree has only conclusively determined the rights between the mortgagor and mortgagee which would not affect the statutory rights of the State. The expression “rights of parties” used in S.2(2) means rights of parties to the suit. Decree has only conclusively determined the rights between the mortgagor and mortgagee which would not affect the statutory rights of the State. The expression “rights of parties” used in S.2(2) means rights of parties to the suit. State which has got a statutory first charge under S.26B of the K.G.S.T. Act would prevail over the rights created in favour of the Bank by an unexecuted decree. We therefore hold that the decree obtained by the Bank will not have any precedence over the first charge created in favour of the State under S.26B of the K.G.S.T. Act. “ Therefore, it is evident that the first charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage. The statutory first charge under Section 26B of the KGST Act would prevail over the rights created by the Bank over an unexecuted decree and finally in para 9 the Bench declared the law thus: “By virtue of operation of law State will have prior charge over the properties in question.” This exposition of law is significant and applies to the present context also. 44. The next important decision is that of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India & others v. State of Kerala and others {(2009) 17 KTR 189 - SC) interpreting Section 26B of the KGST Act itself. The Division Bench decisions of this Court in Sherry Jacob's case ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ) and South Indian Bank Ltd's case ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ) have been affirmed by the said judgment. The Apex Court considered identical provisions in Section 38C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and Section 26B of the KGST Act. The question was whether they are inconsistent with the relevant provisions contained in Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act (DRT Act) and SARFAESI Act. The facts of the case stated in para 4 of the judgment will show that in the case which arose from this Court under KGST Act, the bank obtained a decree from the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Tahsildar claimed the benefit under Section 26B of the KGST Act. The notice issued by the Tahsildar was challenged by the Bank. While considering the non obstante clauses in Section 34(1) of the DRT Act and Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act and its effect, the Apex Court has held in para 33 hereunder: “33. The notice issued by the Tahsildar was challenged by the Bank. While considering the non obstante clauses in Section 34(1) of the DRT Act and Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act and its effect, the Apex Court has held in para 33 hereunder: “33. The non obstante clauses contained in Section 34(1) of the DRT Act and Section 35 of the Securitisation Act give overriding effect to the provisions of those Acts only if there is anything inconsistent contained in any other law or instrument having effect by virtue of any other law. In other words, if there is no provision in the other enactments which are inconsistent with the DRT Act or Securitisation Act, the provisions contained in those Acts cannot override other legislations. Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the Kerala Act also contain non obstante clauses and give statutory recognition to the priority of State's charge over other debts, which was recognized by Indian High Courts even before 1950. In other words, these sections and similar provisions contained in other State legislations not only create first charge on the property of the dealer or any other person liable to pay sales tax, etc. but also give them overriding effect over other laws.” (emphasis supplied by us) Therein, significantly, it was held thus that Section 26B, apart from creating a first charge, gives an overriding effect over other laws. In para 36 the Apex Court relied on the dictum laid down in State Bank of Indore's case {(2002) 10 SCC 441} wherein the crucial portion shows the following: "Section 33-C creates a statutory first charge that prevails over any charge that may be in existence. Therefore, the charge thereby created in favour of the State in respect of the sales tax dues of the second respondent prevailed over the charge created in favour of the Bank in respect of the loan taken by the second respondent. There is no question of retrospectivity here, as, on the date when it was introduced, Section 33-C operated in respect of all charges that were then in force and gave sales tax dues precedence over them." Section 33C of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act was the provision under discussion. 45. After considering the provisions of the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act containing the non obstante clauses, viz. 45. After considering the provisions of the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act containing the non obstante clauses, viz. Section 34(1) and Section 35, the Apex Court in para 39 explained the legal position further as hereunder: “The Court could have given effect to the non obstante clauses contained in Section 34(1) of the DRT Act and Section 35 of the Securitisation Act vis-a-vis Section 38C of the Bombay Act and Section 26B of the Kerala Act and similar other State legislations only if there was a specific provision in the two enactments creating first charge in favour of the banks, financial institutions and other secured creditors but as the Parliament has not made any such provision in either of the enactments, the first charge created by the State legislations on the property of the dealer or any other person, liable to pay sales tax etc., cannot be destroyed by implication or inference, notwithstanding the fact that banks, etc. fall in the category of secured creditors.” (emphasis supplied by us) 46. With regard to the question of primacy of Section 26B of the KGST Act over the Bank's dues, the Apex Court in para 61, while considering C.A.No.3973/2006 affirmed the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in South Indian Bank Ltd's case ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ) in the following words: “In our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that the first charge created by Section 26B of the Kerala Act will have primacy over the banks' dues.” In para 63, while considering C.A.No.4909/2006, the dismissal of the writ petition by this Court after relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Dena Bank's case { (2000) 5 SCC 694 } and that of this Court in Sherry Jacob's case [ 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ], has been upheld by the Apex Court and it was held that “in our opinion, the High Court rightly held that the Tahsildar was entitled to give effect to the primacy of statutory first charge created on the property of the dealer under Section 26B of the Kerala Act.” 47. We will sum up the legal position now. We will sum up the legal position now. The argument that involuntary transfers are not covered by Section 26A of the KGST Act, will not hold good in the light of the decisions of this Court in Lucy Vincent's case ( 2008 (4) KLT 876 ) and Shini Linson's case (2010 (4) KLT SN 90). A Division Bench in Hamsa's case (2008 (3) KLT 180), has held that to attract Section 26A of the KGST Act, it is not necessary that the assessment should be completed. As far as the applicability of the principles governing precedence to the first charge for the tax dues are concerned, going by the decisions of the Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 }, Dena Bank's case { (2000) 5 SCC 694 } and State Bank of Indore's case {(2002) 10 SCC 441} a statutory first charge has been created by Section 26B of the KGST Act which will prevail over the mortgage created in favour of the Bank. These decisions have been followed in the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Sherry Jacob's case ( 2004 (3) KLT 1089 ) and South Indian Bank Ltd.'s case ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ). The consistent view taken, therefore, is that the statutory first charge created will have precedence over an earlier mortgage. The creation of such a charge by operation of law amounts to statutory recognition of priority over private debts including mortgage, as held by the Apex Court in Dena Bank's case { (2000) 5 SCC 694 }. Section 23(2) of the KGST Act provides that “any tax assessed or any other amount due under this Act from a dealer or other person may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue.” The law is also now settled in the light of the decisions of this Court and the Apex Court referred to above and further by the decision of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India's case {(2009) 17 KTR 189 - SC). The non obstante clause in a statutory provision like the one in Section 26B of the KGST Act will override all other laws in force which definitely will include Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. The non obstante clause in a statutory provision like the one in Section 26B of the KGST Act will override all other laws in force which definitely will include Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. The provision under Section 26B of the KGST Act was introduced with effect from 1.4.1999, long prior to the sale conducted by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act, herein. Therefore, any sale conducted by the Bank is subject to the said statutory charge. We are fortified in this view in the light of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in South Indian Bank Ltd's case ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ) which has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Central Bank of India's case (supra). The sale conducted by the Bank was without notice to the State and the assessee did not disclose the liability towards sales tax also. 48. Therefore, we are of the view that the absence of a provision for enforcing a charge in the KGST Act will not whittle down the effect of Section 26B of the Act. This is especially since by virtue of the operation of law the State will have prior charge over the properties in question which will prevail over all rights created by the Bank. 49. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Suresh Kumar argued that as far as the sale of the property of the fourth respondent for arrears for the year 20032004 is concerned, the same will have to be saved, as the notice of assessment is dated 17.11.2008. In the light of the principles stated in South Indian Bank Ltd's case (supra), as we have already held, the sale conducted by the Bank will not have precedence over the first charge created in favour of the State under Section 26B of the KGST Act. In that case the decree itself was passed on 30.1.1995 whereas Section 26B was introduced on 1.4.1999. 50. We notice that in one of the decisions, viz. in Central Bank of India's case {(2009) 17 KTR 189 - SC) in para 58 the Apex Court rejected a similar plea in C.A. No.2811/2006, wherein the Bank had taken possession of the mortgage assets on 15.2.2005 and sold the same. 50. We notice that in one of the decisions, viz. in Central Bank of India's case {(2009) 17 KTR 189 - SC) in para 58 the Apex Court rejected a similar plea in C.A. No.2811/2006, wherein the Bank had taken possession of the mortgage assets on 15.2.2005 and sold the same. On 11.7.2005, the officers of the Commercial Taxes Department informed the Bank about the outstanding dues of sales tax amounting to Rs.3,62,82,768/- and a notice under the Bombay Act was issued for recovery. The Bank's claim for priority was rejected by the High Court stating that Section 35 of the Securitisation Act does not have overriding effect on Section 38C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The Apex Court in para 58 held that the view taken by the High Court was unexceptional and calls for no interference. Section 38C of the Bombay Act is similar to Section 26B of the Kerala Act, the interpretation of both of which we have already adverted to. Section 38C of the Bombay Sales Tax Act is under the heading “Liability under this Act to be First Charge” and Section 26B of the Kerala Act makes a tax payable to be first charge on the property. 51. Apart from the same, we also notice from the decisions of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's v. { (1971) 1 SCC 757 }, Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd.'s case { (2006) 1 SCC 615 } and AI Champdany Industries Ltd.'s case { (2009) 4 SCC 486 ) relating to Section 141 of Bombay Provincial (Municipal Corporation) Act, 1949 and that of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act that the respective provisions did not contain any non obstante clause also. The same is also therefore significant. 52. Herein, in W.A.No.1262/2012, even though the sale was scheduled on 09/06/2008, the sale certificate is on 19/09/2009 (Ext.P1) by which alone possession was handed over to the appellants. In W.A.No.1263/2012, the sale was on 12/01/2010 and the sale certificate is dated 26/04/2010. The assessment proceedings were pending and were finalised before these dates as already noted. 53. In the light of the above, we are of the view that the appellants are not entitled to succeed in the appeals. In W.A.No.1263/2012, the sale was on 12/01/2010 and the sale certificate is dated 26/04/2010. The assessment proceedings were pending and were finalised before these dates as already noted. 53. In the light of the above, we are of the view that the appellants are not entitled to succeed in the appeals. The argument whether there should be a separate provision for enforcement of the first charge raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, cannot hold good especially in the light of the non-obstante clause in Section 26B of the KGST Act and in the light of the view taken in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur's case { (1995) 2 SCC 19 } in para 11 that “when a first charge is created by operation of law over any property, that charge will have precedence over an existing mortgage”, which is reiterated in Central Bank of India's case {(2009) 17 KTR 189 - SC). The Apex Court in the later decision, has upheld the Division Bench decision in South Indian Bank Ltd's case ( 2006 (1) KLT 65 ) regarding the effect of Section 26B of the KGST Act. In the light of the above, we reject the contentions of the appellants and dismiss the appeals. No costs.