JUDGMENT : HARSHA DEVANI, J. 1. Rule. Mr. M. A. Saiyad, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the second respondent. 2. Having regard to the facts of the case and with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. 3. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), the applicant seeks quashing of the first information report registered vide Dhandhuka Police Station I - C. R. No. 17 of 2009. 4. The first respondent lodged the above referred first information report against the applicant herein alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that subsequently the parties viz. the applicant and the first respondent have amicably settled the disputes between them pursuant to which a pursis has been filed in Civil Suit No. 47 of 2009 (Annexure B to the application) whereby the parties had agreed to put an end to all the disputes between them. In the light of the settlement arrived at between the parties, the first respondent has filed an affidavit dated 25th October, 2013 before this Court, wherein, it is stated that he has arrived at an amicable settlement with the applicant herein and therefore he does not want to pursue the first information report. It has been categorically stated that he supports the application for quashing the first information report considering the compromise arrived at between the applicant and the accused. 5. Mr. M. M. Tirmizi, learned advocate for the applicant and Mr. M. A. Saiyad, learned advocate for the first respondent have jointly submitted that in light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, no fruitful purpose would be served by permitting the prosecution to continue and as such the first information report in question and all proceedings pursuant thereto are required to be quashed and set aside. 6. This Court has also heard Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the second respondent. 7. 6. This Court has also heard Mr. Himanshu Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the second respondent. 7. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582 , the Supreme Court was dealing with a case whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under section 406 was not compoundable, the settlement between the parties could not be recognised nor the pending proceedings quashed. The court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words: "6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law. 7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs.250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the latter case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11- 2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed." 8. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions in this regard held thus: "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 9. A perusal of the allegations made in the first information report reveal that the dispute involved is purely private and personal in nature and the offences alleged are not grievous in nature. Under the circumstances, when the parties have amicably settled the dispute between them, no useful purpose would be served by permitting the proceedings to continue. Besides, in the light of the settlement arrived at between the parties, there are hardly any chances of an ultimate conviction. The interests of justice would best be served if the first information report in question and all the proceedings pursuant thereto, are quashed. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the application succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide Dhandhuka Police Station I - C. R. No. 17 of 2009 is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted. Application Allowed.