JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to impugn his termination order dated 4th December, 1993 passed by the Director, Samaj Kalyan Department, Uttar Pradesh, the respondent No. 2 herein, as being illegal and arbitrary. 2. A brief reference to the factual aspect would suffice. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Supervisor in the Social Welfare Department on 19th April, 1991 and was posted at Special House (Children Home, as stated by the respondents), Etawah. In August, 1992 the Superintendent of Special House, Etawah was on leave, therefore, the petitioner was officiating his office. In the special house, convicted juveniles are kept for their reform. It is alleged that on 21st August, 1992, 11 children escaped from the special house. In respect of such incident, a preliminary inquiry was conducted, report of which was submitted on 25th August, 1992. In the preliminary inquiry, the petitioner-Sudhir Kumar Saxena and three others, namely, Kunwar Bahadur Singh, Kunwar Pal Singh and B.K. Ram, who were Gate Keeper, Peon and Superintendent of the Special House respectively, were found guilty of negligence and carelessness. On the basis of the preliminary inquiry, the appropriate authority took the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. On 25th August, 1992 the petitioner was placed under suspension. Thereafter a charge-sheet dated 21st October, 1992 was served on the petitioner. The charge-sheet contained five charges pertaining to the same incident. It is stated that the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 20th November, 1992. It appears that the Inquiry Officer after examining the reply furnished by the petitioner submitted inquiry report dated 23rd February, 1993 to the disciplinary authority, who, as stated by the petitioner, without issuing any show-cause notice to the petitioner, passed the order dated 4th December, 1993 dismissing the petitioner from services. Such order of dismissal is impugned in this petition. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the petitioner was given full opportunity in the preliminary inquiry but he refused to cross-examine the witnesses. However, there is no averment with regard to the procedure adopted in the regular inquiry. 5. I have heard Sri B.B. Jauhari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and learned Standing Counsel. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the petitioner was given full opportunity in the preliminary inquiry but he refused to cross-examine the witnesses. However, there is no averment with regard to the procedure adopted in the regular inquiry. 5. I have heard Sri B.B. Jauhari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and learned Standing Counsel. Sri Jauhari submits that the entire disciplinary proceeding is a farce and eyewash. No oral inquiry was conducted and no witness was examined by the Inquiry Officer nor any date, time or place was fixed. It appears that only on the basis of reply submitted by the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report. He further urged that neither the copy of the inquiry report was served nor any show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority before passing the impugned order, whereby a major penalty has been imposed upon him. 6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that copy of the report of preliminary inquiry was served upon the petitioner and during the preliminary inquiry he has submitted an application that he would not like to cross-examine any witness. He has drawn attention of the Court to paragraph-6 of the counter-affidavit, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was given full opportunity in the disciplinary proceeding. 7. I have considered the respectful submissions of the parties and perused the record. I find that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted against the petitioner in the year 1992. The disciplinary proceeding, at that point of time, was governed by the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, as applicable in Uttar Pradesh, (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules, 1930”). Rule-55 of the Rules, 1930 provides a detailed procedure for holding the disciplinary proceedings. The Rules, 1930 has subsequently been repealed by the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules, 1999”). From a close look at the gamut of the Rules, 1930 and Rules, 1999, it instantly comes out that almost same procedure, as has been laid down under the Rules, 1930, has been incorporated under the Rules, 1999. Rule-55 of the Rules, 1930, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereunder: “55. From a close look at the gamut of the Rules, 1930 and Rules, 1999, it instantly comes out that almost same procedure, as has been laid down under the Rules, 1930, has been incorporated under the Rules, 1999. Rule-55 of the Rules, 1930, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereunder: “55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servant Inquiries Act, 1850, an order (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal Court or by a Court-material) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is member of a Civil Service, or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The Grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant. (2) Where the punishing authority itself inquires into any charge or appoints an inquiring officer for holding an inquiry into such charge, the punishing authority, if it considers it necessary to do so, may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as “Presenting Officer” to present on its behalf the case in support of the charge. (3) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer appointed by the punishing authority is a legal practitioner or the punishing authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. (4) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived, where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule those requirements can in the opinion of the inquiring officer be waived without unjustice to person charged. (5) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of either a temporary Government servant or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation. In such cases a simple notice of termination, which in the case of a temporary Government servant must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.” 8. From the plain reading of the said rule it is evident that oral inquiry is necessary in respect of the allegations, which are not admitted. The word “shall” has been used under Rule-55. Thus, it can be safely held that oral inquiry is a mandatory in case the delinquent employee denies the charges levelled against him. Similar provision has been made under the Rules, 1999 also. In the present case, it appears that the disciplinary authority misdirected himself with regard to scope of preliminary inquiry and regular inquiry. Thus, it can be safely held that oral inquiry is a mandatory in case the delinquent employee denies the charges levelled against him. Similar provision has been made under the Rules, 1999 also. In the present case, it appears that the disciplinary authority misdirected himself with regard to scope of preliminary inquiry and regular inquiry. It is a trite law that the preliminary inquiry is conducted only for the satisfaction of the employer and to collect the materials against the employee. The principles of Article 311 of the Constitution are not applicable in preliminary inquiry. Reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India, 1967 SLR 185. After the submission of report of the preliminary inquiry, if the employer is prima facie satisfied that the allegations are very grave and serious and there are the grounds to conduct regular inquiry against the employee, then he may proceed to hold the regular inquiry. 9. In the present case, Sri P.P. Chaturvedi, Chief Probationary Officer, U.P., Lucknow was appointed to hold the preliminary inquiry, who submitted his report on 25th August, 1992. One magisterial inquiry was also conducted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Etawah, namely, Sri Sanjay Bhus Reddy, who had submitted his report on 29th August, 1992. After submission of report of the preliminary inquiry, the disciplinary authority took a decision to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and put the petitioner under suspension. The disciplinary authority vide order dated 21st October, 1992 appointed Sri V.K. Misra, Deputy Chief Probationary Officer, Kanpur Mandal, Kanpur as an Inquiry Officer to conduct the regular inquiry. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner, who submitted his reply on 20th November, 1992. Inquiry Officer, namely, Sri V.K. Misra submitted his inquiry report dated 23rd February, 1993. From the perusal of report of the Inquiry Officer, it is evident that he has only considered the reply submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet and no oral inquiry was conducted. The petitioner has stated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the writ petition that neither oral inquiry was conducted in the matter nor any witness was examined by the department in the inquiry nor any date, time and place was fixed for holding the inquiry. The petitioner has stated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the writ petition that neither oral inquiry was conducted in the matter nor any witness was examined by the department in the inquiry nor any date, time and place was fixed for holding the inquiry. Reply of the aforesaid paragraphs of the writ petition have been given in paragraph-6 of the counter-affidavit but specific denial has not been made. A perusal of paragraph-6 of the counter-affidavit would indicate that an evasive reply has been given. It appears that the disciplinary authority as well as the deponent of the counter-affidavit were confused with regard to the scope of preliminary inquiry and regular inquiry as an averment has been made in paragraph-7 of the supplementary counter-affidavit that the petitioner was given full opportunity in the preliminary inquiry but he failed to avail the same. 10. The scope of preliminary inquiry and regular inquiry has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 , and Employers of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (Private) Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 . In the present case, it is also established from the record that the copy of the inquiry report was not served upon the petitioner. In paragraph-15 of the writ petition it has been specifically stated that the copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. Such paragraph has been replied in paragraph-8 of the counter-affidavit, wherein neither there is specific denial nor any submission to that effect on the part of the respondents. Thus, it is established from the record that the inquiry report was not served upon the petitioner. This inquiry was conducted after the year 1991, therefore, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , is applicable. As the present case pertains to the period after the judgement of Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 , therefore, the law laid down therein will also be applicable herein. 11. I further find that the aforesaid fact is also established from the dismissal order itself, wherein it is mentioned that the petitioner was given copy of the preliminary inquiry report alongwith the charge-sheet. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 , therefore, the law laid down therein will also be applicable herein. 11. I further find that the aforesaid fact is also established from the dismissal order itself, wherein it is mentioned that the petitioner was given copy of the preliminary inquiry report alongwith the charge-sheet. However, there is no statement of the fact in the dismissal order that the copy of the inquiry report was given to the petitioner. It is also established from the record that after receiving the inquiry report from the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority chose to pass the dismissal order straight away without issuing any show-cause notice to the petitioner. 12. Another submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that no date, time and place was fixed for holding the inquiry, has also merit acceptance, as the said statement mentioned in paragraph-11 of the writ petition is not specifically denied in the counter-affidavit. It is trite law that mere denial is not enough unless the fact is specifically denied. This Court also in the following cases has held that if the date, time and place is not fixed, then the inquiry is vitiated. It has also been held that in case of imposition of major penalty if no oral evidence is adduced, then the inquiry becomes illegal and vitiated. Reference may be made to some of the judgements of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 ; Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 and also of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhas Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, 2000 (1) UPLBEC 541 ; Subhas Chandra Sharma v. U.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills and others, 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1475 ; Mahesh Narain Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, (2011) 2 ILR 570; and Subhas Chandra Gupta v. State of U.P., 2012 (1) UPLBEC 166. Against one of the judgements of Subhas Chandra Gupta’s case a special leave petition was filed before the Supreme Court and the same has been dismissed. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was a Member) in the judgement dated 11th January, 2013 delivered in Writ-A No. 43331 of 2000 (Sohan Lal v. U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. and another) has taken the same view. 13. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was a Member) in the judgement dated 11th January, 2013 delivered in Writ-A No. 43331 of 2000 (Sohan Lal v. U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. and another) has taken the same view. 13. After careful consideration of the materials on record and the respectful submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned order dated 4th December, 1993 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No. 2 cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 4th December, 1993 is quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to complete the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner strictly in terms of the relevant Rules and the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, mentioned herein-above. In terms of the rules, the petitioner shall be placed under suspension during inquiry. Since the petitioner is out of service since 1994, it is expected that the disciplinary proceeding shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the disciplinary authority. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has assured that the petitioner shall fully cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding and he will not take unnecessary adjournments. 14. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner prays that a direction may be issued for payment of subsistence allowance as the petitioner is out of job since 1994, I am of the view that there is no need to issue such direction. The petitioner is at liberty to move appropriate application before the disciplinary authority, who will pass the appropriate order in accordance with law. 15. Parties shall bear their own costs. —————