JUDGMENT K. KANNAN J.(ORAL) 1. The petition is at the instance of the tenant, who challenges the order of ejectment passed on an application filed under Section 13B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The landlord claimed the property as belonging to his father absolutely and claimed that after the death of his father on 27.12.1991, it was inherited by the mother and two sons. The mother had also expired four to five years back and that he had inherited the property along with his brother. The petitioner's contention was that he required this for his personal use and he being a person of Indian origin with his residence at Ludhiana but had been settled outside India, was entitled to obtain the status as a Non-Resident Indian and secure the ejectment in the manner provided under the said provision. 2. The contest was entered by the tenant contending that the landlord had been issued with the passport by the United States of America and that he had been shown as a US national. His contention, therefore, was that he being a US citizen under the provisions of the Citizenship Act, cannot become an Indian citizen unless he gives up his citizenry in USA and registers himself as a citizen of India. The further contention is that the petitioner has not given any details of the actual year of death of the mother and since the Act requires the ownership of the property for a period not less than 5 years, without a disclosure of fact that the death of mother had taken place more than 5 years prior to the institution of the petition, the landlord was not entitled to maintain the petition. Learned counsel would further argue that the mutations brought about in the official records of the Corporation do not record the petitioner as the owner and that it stands in the name of the father himself. 3. The issue of bona fides itself was not argued and the learned counsel rest contended with the legal issues of whether the landlord obtained a status of Non-Resident Indian to invoke the provisions under Section 13b. 3. The issue of bona fides itself was not argued and the learned counsel rest contended with the legal issues of whether the landlord obtained a status of Non-Resident Indian to invoke the provisions under Section 13b. The definition of “Non-Resident Indian” is contained under Section 2(dd) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which is reproduced as under:- "2(dd) "Nor resident Indian" means a person of Indian origin, who is either permanently or temporarily settled outside India in either case— (a) for or on taking up employment outside India; or (b) for carrying on a business or vocation outside India; or (c) for any other purpose, in such circumstances, as would indicate his intention to stay outside India for a uncertain period.” 4. This Section does not require any more than the fact that the person must be of Indian origin and must fall within any of the three clauses mentioned in clauses (a) to (c). It is not denied that the petitioner fulfills each one of the requirements namely he is a person of Indian origin whose parent was an Indian. He was employed outside India. He was having business outside India. The Section nowhere requires that he should be an Indian national. NRI definition is wider than the definition of a citizen under the Citizenship Act and would not be restricted to a person, who is an Indian national. All that the provision requires is that he should be a person of Indian origin. I reject, therefore, the contention urged by the learned counsel that the petitioner was taking a passport issued by the US Government as forfeited his right to his status as NRI. 5. Learned counsel's contention that the petitioner-landlord had not given the exact details of the year of death of the mother and the prevarication of the landlord that she would have died four or five years prior to the institution of the petition makes possible even a plea that the mother had died about four years back in which event the statutory requirement of person being an owner for a period of five years is not satisfied. This, in my view, again misses the point that the landlord was not staking claim to the whole of the property through the mother. This, in my view, again misses the point that the landlord was not staking claim to the whole of the property through the mother. On the other hand, his contention was that the property belonged to the father absolutely and that the father had died on 25.12.1991, which was admittedly more than five years prior to the filing of the petition. The fact that he must have been a co-owner with his mother, who may have died only within a period of five years does not make a difference if he had been a co-owner to the property even earlier to the period of five years. A subsequent acquisition of larger interest namely the share along with his brother and the mother also does not take away interest, which already vests in him in his capacity as a co-owner. The law does not again require that the NRI, who applies for eviction under Section 13B, must be the absolute owner in respect of whole of the property, which is sought to be evicted. A fractional share in the property if he is landlord and if the requirement is placed for his own, he could be competent to maintain an application under Section 13B. 6. The objection of the learned counsel that the property stands registered still in the name of Dalip Singh in the revenue records also could have no effect on the devolution of interest that takes place by operation of law. On the death of the father by virtue of operation of the Hindu Succession Act, the title devolves on the widow and children. The petitioner's status as a son of Dalip Singh itself is not in dispute. The revenue entries or the mutation that take place is only for the purpose of collection of revenue by the public bodies and will not defeat the devolution of interest from taking place. It is axiomatic that the title does not hang in the air and the devolution operates co instanti to the legal heirs the moment the last owner dies. If the landlord therefore became a heir to the father, it is immaterial that the public records have not carried out the corrections, for mutation in public records is merely an evidence of tile and not a document of title itself. If the landlord therefore became a heir to the father, it is immaterial that the public records have not carried out the corrections, for mutation in public records is merely an evidence of tile and not a document of title itself. In this case, document of title is the title that stands in the name of the father and if the title of the father was an established fact, the claim to status as an owner of the son is indefeasible at least so far as the resistance to such claim is made by the non-heir, such as a tenant. 7. The order of ejectment passed, therefore, conforms to law and there is no scope for intervention in revision. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that even when there had been an order of stay of operation of the decree, the landlord had deliberately usurped his possession and demolished the whole building. I cannot avail to tenant any benefit at this stage if the property had been demolished and he had lost his possession. The tenant shall be at liberty to file a suit for damages to the extent he was damnified by the alleged illegal act of the landlord. The bona fide prosecution of the proceedings before this Court could be taken as a ground for exclusion of time if he can make out such a case in the manner required by law under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act.