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Allahabad High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 711 (ALL)

ASHOK v. STATE OF U. P.

2013-03-05

DHARNIDHAR JHA, PANKAJ NAQVI

body2013
Pankaj Naqvi, J. 1. Five accused persons were put on trial by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut in a bunch of three Sessions Trials bearing No. 124, 125 & 126, all of year 2003 and by Judgment dated 05.03.2005, two of them, namely, Om Pal and Jagdish Pal @ Munnu were acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC r/w Section 120-B IPC. Out of the present set of three appeals Crl. Appeal No. 1499/2002, has been preferred by Ashok, Ravi Sharma and Pankaj @ Sonu, who were found guilty for committing offences under Sections 148 & 302/149 IPC and each of them was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and for life respectively for their conviction under the two above counts with further sentence of fine of Rs.5000/- being imposed upon each of them for their conviction under Sections 302/149 IPC. The learned Trial Judge directed that in case of non-payment of fine, each of the three appellants was to suffer additional term of rigorous imprisonment for a year. Two of the appellants Ashok and Ravi Sharma were also tried for charges under Section 25 of the Arms Act and they were individually held guilty of committing that offence and each of them was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years as also to pay fine of Rs.1000/-, else to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. For their individual conviction under Section 25 Arms Act, appellants Ashok and Ravi Sharma preferred separate-connected-appeals bearing No. 1668/2005 and 1669/2005. For, the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence was passed by a common Judgment, we have heard the three appeals together and are disposing them of by this Judgment. 2. PW-1 Smt. Suman Devi, who happened to be the wife of deceased Baljeet Singh, filed a written report at PS Mundali in the district of Meerut, stating therein that she along with her husband, deceased Baljeet Singh, her father-in-law Mahkar Singh ( not examined), her daughter Kumari Baby ( not examined) and the elder brother of her husband, namely, Udaivir Singh ( PW-2) were de-weeding her sugarcane field from about 9 A.M,. on 03.07.2002. on 03.07.2002. At about 10 A.M., the informant stated, they came to drink water at the tube-well and while they were drinking, the three appellants along with two unknown persons came there with arms and fired at her husband telling him that he had to be taught a lesson on account of having contested the elections. PW-1 stated that they had fired multiple shots, as a result of which her husband Baljeet Singh breathed his last on the spot. 3. It was stated by PW-1 in her written report that she raised hue and cry, which attracted Bhanwar Singh ( not examined), and Indra Raj Singh ( not examined) to the scene of occurrence, who also saw accused persons running away from the spot. It was stated further that while running away, the accused persons warned her that in case she lodged a report by informing the police and had further deposed against them, she shall also have to face the same consequences. PW-1 stated that the murder of her husband had been committed only because of the animosity which arose on account of elections and under the conspiracy hatched out by acquitted accused persons Om Pal and Jagdish Pal @ Munnu. PW-1 stated that she had come with a written report to lodge the case. 4. PW-7 Karan Singh was posted in PS Mundali as Constable Clerk. On 03.07.2002, he was on his duty and at about 11.45 A.M. he drew up the FIR Ex. Ka.3 of the case on the basis of written report of PW-1, Ex. Ka.1. He, thereafter, scribed the copy of the report and obtained signature of PW-1 in token of its correctness and made an entry in that regard in the general dairy dated 03.07.2002, which has been marked as Ex. Ka. 4. 5. PW-10, SI R K Singh, was the Officer In-charge of PS Mundali and he stated that the FIR of the case was drawn up in his presence and he, thereafter, took up the investigation of the same by recording the statement of PW-1 in the Station Diary. He, thereafter, started with a contingent of armed constables by the official vehicle to the place of occurrence and reached village Ataula, where the incident had occurred. He, thereafter, started with a contingent of armed constables by the official vehicle to the place of occurrence and reached village Ataula, where the incident had occurred. He was shown the place of occurrence by the informant and after inspecting the same, he drew up the site plan with all necessary details, which has been marked Ex. Ka. 14. He, thereafter, held the inquest on the dead body of deceased Baljeet Singh and got the report prepared by ASI Satyapal Vats, who was accompanying him and also got the dead body sealed and despatched to the hospital for postmortem examination with other relevant records. PW-10, during the course of inspection of place of occurrence, seized the blood-stained earth by preparing the memo in that behalf, in the presence of witnesses. The seizure memo was marked Ex. Ka.7. During the course of evidence, PW-10 produced a bundle of clothes, worn by the deceased at the time of occurrence and also produced before the court below the seized blood-stained earth. PW-10 stated that he made search of the accused persons before arresting them but could not find anyone. He received the copy of the postmortem report on 04.07.2002 and, thereafter, recorded the statement of witnesses on different dates. 6. He arrested appellant Ravi Sharma on 05.07.2002 and found in his possession a country-made Pistol along with two cartridges and after arresting him, seized the arms and ammunition by preparing the recovery memo Ex. Ka. 8. Likewise, he arrested acquitted accused Jagdish Pal @ Munnu and appellant Ashok on 07.07.2002 and 13.07.2002 respectively and found appellant Ashok in possession of an illegal arms and ammunition and again prepared the seizure memo after seizing the same. He recorded the statement of PW-2, Udaivir Singh and other family members of the deceased including the daughter of the deceased and also inspected the places from where recoveries were made and then sent up the five accused persons to be put on trial by the court below. 7. He recorded the statement of PW-2, Udaivir Singh and other family members of the deceased including the daughter of the deceased and also inspected the places from where recoveries were made and then sent up the five accused persons to be put on trial by the court below. 7. The defence of the appellants was that the whole case was a rank fabrication, done after bringing the police in their collusion and the deceased having a criminal history, was possibly killed by persons who could not be known while he was in his pumphouse situated at his sugarcane field and further that when she had learnt about the death of her husband, she came there with others of her village. These facts appear suggested to PW-1 in paragraph 34 of her deposition. As regards the conviction of the appellants Ashok and Ravi Sharma, the defence appears suggesting that there was no recovery of any arms and ammunitions from anyone and fabricated records were prepared. Suggestion also was that investigation of cases under the Arms Act was handed over to officers subordinate to the officer-in-charge of the police station to ensure that the appellants were convicted and punished. 8. For bringing the charges home against the accused persons, the prosecution examined a total number of 12 witnesses. PW-1 Smt. Suman was the informant and the wife of the deceased as already noted. Udaivir Singh ( PW-2) was the full brother of the deceased and as per the FIR he was working in the sugarcane field simultaneously with the informant on the date of occurrence. PW-3 Vir Singh and PW-6 Bijendra are witnesses, who were stating that they had been told by acquitted accused Om Pal and Jagdish Pal @ Munnu that they were likely to kill the deceased. Thus, they were giving evidence on conspiracy part of the charges. However, we find that considering the evidence of PWs 3 & 6, is of not much importance as the charges under Sections 302/120-B IPC, which were framed against Om Pal and Munnu, were not found substantiated by the learned Trial Judge, which culminated in the acquittal of the two accused persons. PW-4 Dr. P K Bansal had held postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 03.07.2002 at about 11 P.M. and had issued the postmortem examination report Ex. Ka. 2. PW-4 Dr. P K Bansal had held postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 03.07.2002 at about 11 P.M. and had issued the postmortem examination report Ex. Ka. 2. PW-5 Constable Amar Singh had been handed over the dead body along with copies of the inquest report, the dead body challan and forwarding letter addressed to the Chief Medical Officer, Meerut for facilitating the holding of postmortem examination and he took the dead body to the mortuary. PW-7 Karan Singh, we have already noted, had drawn up the FIR, had further created the copies of the FIR and other documents besides making entries regarding the institution of the case in the General Diary and had further made entries about the institution of the case under the Arms Act and recovery and deposit the illegal arms by PW-10 SI R K Singh, IO of the case. PW-8 SI V K Singh had prepared the seizure memo of the blood-stained earth and had also drawn up the memorandum of arrest of appellant Ravi Sharma while investigating the case under the Arms Act. Likewise, SI Satyapal Vats ( PW-9) besides preparing the inquest report had also created the arrest memo in respect of appellant Ashok, besides investigating the case under Section 25 of the Arms Act. PW-11 SI K P Singh and PW-12 SI Netra Pal Singh, were the Investigating Officers, who were handed over charge of investigation of cases under the Arms Act. 9. The defence also examined a solitary witness, namely, DW-1 Kishan Pal. His evidence was in respect of under trial prisoner Jagdish Pal @ Munnu that he was lodged in Central Jail, Tihar, Delhi on the date of occurrence and the record to that effect was produced by DW-1. 10. After considering the evidence of two sides, the court below held the three appellants guilty of committing the offences for which they were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. Accused Om Pal and Jagdish Pal @ Munnu were acquitted by the court below. 11. Sri Rahul Mishra, the learned amicus curiae, appearing on behalf of the three appellants, took us through the evidence of witnesses and submitted that what appears is that the written report was an after-thought, might be that it was brought after some days of the incident in collusion with the police. 11. Sri Rahul Mishra, the learned amicus curiae, appearing on behalf of the three appellants, took us through the evidence of witnesses and submitted that what appears is that the written report was an after-thought, might be that it was brought after some days of the incident in collusion with the police. It was next submitted by Sri Mishra that presence of eye witnesses at the place of occurrence was highly improbable as regards their claim and their own evidence indicated that they were not trustworthy witnesses. Submission was that it was an unusual prosecution version on account of certain facts asserted by the prosecution which shows that some statements of facts are absurd and are not fitting in with the normal course of natural events. It was contended in this connection that it was absurd to think that on one of the hottest days of July, the informant and others would go out to de-weed the sugarcane field at about 9 A.M. The last submission was that many independent persons were present around the place of occurrence, as stated by the informant herself in her report, but none was coming forward to lend support to the prosecution story and the worst was that some of her family members, who were allegedly present at the scene of occurrence, were also not turning up to support PW-1 on her story. 12. We had the privilege of being assisted by Sri V M Zaidi, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the informant and Sri K N Bajpai, learned AGA on behalf of the State. Sri Zaidi was citing a case before us reported in 2003 SCC ( Crl) 1372, without producing the report, to submit that if the case was based on direct evidence, it was useless to argue that motive was required to be proved like any ordinary fact by the prosecution. It was further argued that still the motive had sufficiently been proved as may appear from the evidence of PWs 1 & 2. Submission was that the evidence of witnesses noted above indicated that they were present at the place of occurrence and they were reliable witnesses and the manner of occurrence which was criticised by learned amicus curiae, was not absurd. 13. Submission was that the evidence of witnesses noted above indicated that they were present at the place of occurrence and they were reliable witnesses and the manner of occurrence which was criticised by learned amicus curiae, was not absurd. 13. Sri K N Bajpai, learned AGA was extremely lukewarm in supporting Sri Zaidi as regards his submission in counter to that of the learned amicus curiae on the proof of motive, rather Sri Bajpai was submitting that the facts were too feeble to sustain the resistance of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the informant that motive had been established. However, what was submitted by Sri Bajpai was that there were other features of the case which could be indicating that witnesses could not be distrusted on their claim of remaining present at the scene of occurrence, even if the Court was of the opinion that there was an old partition of properties between the deceased and his full brother ( PW-2), the fact remained that the holdings might have been partitioned, but they had never been situated away from the share of one of the co-sharers in the same plot. The next submission was that the evidence on manner of occurrence should not be read and considered as if the deceased were a statue, whose position was fixed and everyone was coming to shots from the same position, as a result of which injuries could be found on any particular side of the dead body. A human being reacts to the change in his surrounding or gets stimulated by changing circumstances and the deceased ought to have reacted and must have changed his position and, as such, it was not enough that the evidence of the Doctor, who was finding the injuries on the left side of the dead body though the oral evidence suggested them caused on the right side of the body of the deceased, that the argument on proof of manner of occurrence be upheld. 14. We are aware that in a case of direct evidence, there may not be any inquiry regarding proof or non-proof of the motive, but in spite of that we cannot simply forsake our conscience of the real facts which are coming out on the records as regards the reason which might be equally good for killing the man or for implicating the accused falsely. The defence of the accused was that on account of any particular reason or ill-will, they had been implicated; the case of the prosecution was that on account of having contested election against appellant Ashok, ire was being let out in the form of violence by firing incessant shots at the deceased so as to laying him dead. The view of the Supreme Court is dichotomous on the requirement of proving motive in a case. One view is that it was true that motive was not a point to be inquired into by courts of facts, if other material direct evidences coming from trustworthy witnesses were clinching or persuasively acceptable. But, in spite of that if any particular fact has been alleged to have impelled the accused to commit the offence, then the Court must inquire about the proof of that fact to the hilt like any other fact, which position is obtained in the present case. There is no other fact alleged by the prosecution nor we find anything from the record on account of which it could be said that the appellants could have been impelled to take up violence so as to satiate their grudge and animus. There is definite allegation that the deceased Baljeet Singh had contested the election for Pradhanship against appellant Ashok and on account of that particular reason, the accused persons came together to the sugarcane field and killed him. In the background of a clean sheet as regards the animosity of the appellants and the informant and a mere bad blood, which appears arising due to contesting the election by the deceased against them, to our mind, required making inquiries very seriously from both the counsel of the informant and the State as to why it was in absence of previous animosity or ill-will that the appellant should take up arms to liquidate a life who had never been harmful to anyone among the appellants. Emphasis was there to consider that the motive was proved and that impelled us more to have a deeper forensic view of the evidence so as to examine its impact on the proof of the motive and we want to record that the very evidence of PW-1 which was coming before the court below, could be sufficient enough to record that the prosecution had miserably failed in establishing that the accused persons had any motive to kill the deceased. 15. PW-1, who was the wife of the deceased, could not have been an incompetent person to know about the background of the relationship between her husband with any other person, at best with persons like the appellants. As such, we do not treat the evidence of PW-1 as evidence, which was coming from a person, who could have second hand or third hand information on relationship between her husband and the appellants. Hers was almost the primary evidence regarding the facts on motive. PW-1 was stating in examination-in-chief at page 24 of the paper book that her husband had contested elections twice against appellant Ashok and on that account appellant Ashok was carrying a serious ill-will against him. After having said the above fact, she modified the statement and stated that no, her husband had fought a solitary election and contested it against appellant Ashok and that was the reason Ashok and others had come together to kill her husband. PW-1 was cross-examined by the defence on the above fact and we find from paragraph 17 of her deposition sheet, which appears at page 27 of the paper book, that the election for the Pradhanship had taken place in May, 2002 and there was a multi-corner contest between her husband Baljeet Singh, accused Ashok, Bijendra and Munesh in which Ashok had won. Prior to this election, Dharmveer had been murdered. This is what we find and further, that after the murder of Dharmveer, second election had been necessitated which was a multi-corner contest, as has been stated by PW-1. But what we further find is that in the next election which followed the second election, it was also a multi-corner contest but appellant Ashok was elected un-opposed and unanimously. This is what we find and further, that after the murder of Dharmveer, second election had been necessitated which was a multi-corner contest, as has been stated by PW-1. But what we further find is that in the next election which followed the second election, it was also a multi-corner contest but appellant Ashok was elected un-opposed and unanimously. If this was the trend of electing a Pradhan and if Ashok was elected un-opposed on the last occasion when the elections were called in, we fail simply to persuade ourselves to accept that Ashok should carry an ill-will as strong enough as to take extreme steps of violence by using a fire arm to kill a person, who could allow him being elected un-opposed. This inference of ours' is further strengthened when PW-1 admitted in paragraph 19 that after that particular election, there had never been further election. We have already noted that the evidence was coming on motives from none else than the wife of the deceased who had probably contested some elections. She could be a person who could be fully aware of the state of things in respect of elections and if Ashok had been elected in the last election un-opposed, there does not appear any reason for us to accept the views of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the informant that in the face of the direct evidence, we should not read this material evidence coming from PW-1 and proceed to uphold the judgment of conviction in respect of appellants. We, rather, find that if the appellants did not have any motive as strong as was alleged then it was a serious defect in the prosecution case, as we are convinced that the appellants surely had no reason to kill the deceased Baljeet Singh. 16. Principles of law do not decide an appeal. Criminal appeals, or in some part, appeals of other class do also turn on the facts of the case. When it is a criminal trial, then it is out and out, appropriate appreciation of facts on which they are decided. While appreciating the facts, any Court of law must remind itself that there are certain principles which could not be divorced while considering the propriety of findings of guilt or findings of acquittal. When it is a criminal trial, then it is out and out, appropriate appreciation of facts on which they are decided. While appreciating the facts, any Court of law must remind itself that there are certain principles which could not be divorced while considering the propriety of findings of guilt or findings of acquittal. Some of the principles were long enunciated in the light of the principles of criminal jurisprudence adopted and pursued by us and two of the decisions, which are still holding good, are celebrated case of K.M. Nanawati v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1962 SC 605 and Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1977 SC 170 . In our view, these are not the only judgments which finally lay down the principles. They, in fact, reminisced those principles by noting as to what should be the approach in judging the facts in a criminal trial. We do not want to quote any passages from the two judgments, we simply want to note that the accused has to be presumed to be innocent and their presumption of innocence continues till all fora of justicing gets exhausted. The second aspect of the principle is that there are two things which have to be kept in mind, i.e., the onus of proof always lies on the prosecution which never shifts. What we mean to point out is that if the accused persons were charged with murder then the prosecution must prove all ingredients of the offence of murder and that too by acceptable, admissible evidence. If the prosecution has succeeded in satisfying the conscience of the Court, then it could be said that the charges had been proved and the prosecution had succeeded in discharging its onus. As soon as the onus is discharged by the prosecution, the burden is created on the accused to show or explain as to why he should not be convicted. The accused then, from the very evidence of the prosecution, may show that there were probabilities appearing therefrom which may shake the foundation of the prosecution case, as a result of which a doubt could be created in the story, which may entitle him to acquittal. The other way by which the accused could ask the Court not to convict him, may be that he had produced his own evidence. The other way by which the accused could ask the Court not to convict him, may be that he had produced his own evidence. In such a case, the Court which appreciates the facts, like, us or the trial court, shall have to consider the impact of the evidence of the prosecution and the defence in such a way as to reach the inference simultaneously arising out of the two sets of evidence. While considering the evidence, which could be based on the very material facts produced by the prosecution, the Court could be shown admission of a witness which could be probablising his defence and thus could tilt the probability of his version and thus shake the very foundation of the prosecution case entitling him to acquittal. All these principles were considered by the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar Dey ( supra) and their Lordships' laid the law regarding appreciation of evidence in a criminal trial. It was held that if the balance of probability is tilted by admission of facts or by introducing the facts through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in favour of the accused, then there is the preponderance of probability of the defence version and the accused becomes entitled to acquittal by being extended the benefit of doubt. 17. Keeping these principles, in our opinion, we have proceeded to consider the evidence of witnesses. We have, firstly, considered as to whether the claim of the witnesses regarding their presence at the place of occurrence could be acceptable. We find from the very basic prosecution story that the informant along with other witnesses, like, PW-2 and the deceased were de-weeding the sugarcane field. As facts stand, and as was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the informant and the learned AGA, the witnesses along with the deceased were working in a single field and as such they were together and their presence could not be ruled out. We had made inquiries from the evidence as also from both the counsel appearing for the informant and the State and we have a very difficult proposition which rather persuades us to take a view different from the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the informant and the learned AGA as regards the claim of witnesses regarding their presence at the place of occurrence. We find that it could be improbable that they could be working in the field simultaneously and together rather some of the admitted facts which were introduced through cross-examination of PW-1 probablised as if the witnesses had not been working together. The first reason which we read out of the evidence of PW-1 was that there was a partition between the deceased and PW-2 long back, some 16-17 years prior to the occurrence. This appears from the combined reading of paragraphs 10 & 11 of the evidence of PW-1, which appears at page 26 of the paper book. Sri Bajpai, very strenuously submitting before us, that it might be the case that there was a partition, still there could not be any improbability if the two families, i.e., the family of the deceased and PW-2 were working together in their respective fields because in spite of partition the same plot could be lying side by side in two parts due to the partition and each share-holder was working in the field of his. We find that this was not the probability as PW-1 was suggested at page 14 as to whether the field in which she was working was in the share of her Jeth-PW-2. She was stoutly refuting the suggestion and was giving out that no, she was working in her own field. Thus, we find that partition was complete and it further appears that the deceased was working in his own field and PW-2 might be working in his own field. This appears further the probability on account of the fact that PW-1 stated that the de-weeding in her field had been done in a particular area and the de-weeded grass plants had been stacked in the field, whereas PW-2 had run the electric motor to take water into his own field. This appears from paragraph 7 of evidence of PW-1 and paragraph 20 of her evidence. But the difficulty which we confront is that neither the Investigating Officer was finding any stack of weeds nor he was shown the irrigated field of PW-2. If there was de-weeding, it was the primary duty of the Investigating Officer to have inspected the field to find out as to whether de-weeding exercise had been carried out in either of the fields of PW-1 and PW-2. If there was de-weeding, it was the primary duty of the Investigating Officer to have inspected the field to find out as to whether de-weeding exercise had been carried out in either of the fields of PW-1 and PW-2. PW-1 has very fairly admitted that she did not show any field to the Investigating Officer nor she did show the heap of grass plants which were de-weeded. Watering or irrigating the field for de-weeding, could have been the best evidence produced before the Court to show that PW-2 was present at the spot. Not having been satisfied on these aspects of the case and further finding that the Investigating Officer did not find any instruments by which de-weeding was being carried out, we have every reason not to accept the claim of prosecution. Besides the above on the presence of witnesses and specially that of PW-2, what we find is that PW-2 had admitted in his evidence that he had never given any statement to the Investigating Officer. This fact has come in paragraph 13 of his evidence at page 33 of the paper book. This evidence of PW-2 makes his evidence completely inadmissible. 18. There were certain reasons appearing from the evidence of PW-1 which indicated as if she may not be a witness competent enough or may be that she was not present at the scene of occurrence. She stated that the accused persons came from the north side near the tube-well while the deceased and PW-1 were sitting on a platform and as soon as they came one shot each was fired by each of the five accused persons. At that particular moment, the deceased was facing west. Though we have noticed and held that the evidence of PW-2 was inadmissible, but finding that Sri Bajpai had pointed out one particular aspect which we have already noticed when he was submitting that a human being is not a statue and he must react to the change in his surrounding circumstances, we examined the evidence of PW-2 also and we find that PW-2 stated in paragraph 5 of his evidence that as soon as the accused persons fired, the deceased Baljeet got up to run away. There is no evidence indicating that the deceased Baljeet had taken any turn or had run in a particular direction or even moved a single step or an inch. There is no evidence indicating that the deceased Baljeet had taken any turn or had run in a particular direction or even moved a single step or an inch. In that case, we have to assume that the shots must have hit the deceased on the right hand side of his body. Curiously enough, PW-4 Dr. P K Bansal found all entry wounds on the left hand side of the dead body indicating the reverse positioning of the assailants of the deceased. This particular fact probablises the plea of the defence that witness PW-1 might not have remained present at the scene of occurrence and she probably was imagining situations to narrate some facts to the Court. 19. There was other submission also, like, admission of certain facts which were indicating lodging of report at a point of time than asserted by the prosecution and thus indicating that it was a collusive report which was lodged by the prosecution in league with police. In the above connection, our attention was drawn to the evidence of PW-1, specially to that part of her statement in which her attention was drawn to some part of her statement made in Court and those made in her report. It was submitted by drawing our attention to paragraph 24 of PW-1 that she went to the police station for lodging the report with her father-in-law, but did not get anything scribed there and handed over the already drafted report only, which was brought by her. Contention was that PW-1 was admitting that she had already got this fact stated in her written report that PW-1 and her father-in-law had come to the police station for lodging a report or getting the report scribed. There could be some meaning of this line but we are not convinced on the submission of Sri Mishra that the statement of PW-1 meant only that she went to the police station empty handed for getting the report scribed and we should assume that she did not carry any drafted report. In our opinion, the lines of paragraph 24 may also mean that she came to the police station for institution of the FIR. As such, it was not having much value on that particular aspect of the case to take a view that the report was ante-dated or it was collusive. In our opinion, the lines of paragraph 24 may also mean that she came to the police station for institution of the FIR. As such, it was not having much value on that particular aspect of the case to take a view that the report was ante-dated or it was collusive. However, we find that in spite of the report being there it could have been lodged on an apriori suspicion which was driving the informant and her family members to the conclusion that it were the accused persons who had committed the act. We have some admitted facts regarding the antecedents of the deceased in paragraph 15 of the evidence of PW-1. She stated that the deceased was an accused in a murder case, who might be keeping bad companies. Therefore, no surprise that some persons whose identity could not come into light, could have injured or could for any particular reason have killed the deceased. 20. On an appraisal of the evidence what we find is that the evidence which was adduced by the prosecution was suffering from many defects and there were probabilities that the accused persons had been falsely implicated as they did not have any particular motive to committing the murder of Baljeet nor the evidence appears trustworthy. May be that when the deceased had been killed, no one had really seen it being committed and the informant and her family members on account of serious suspicion, had lodged the report naming appellants. The appellants deserve to be extended the benefit of doubt and in that view we allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed upon each of them. The three appeals are accordingly allowed. The three appellants are on bail. There are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds. 21. We record the sincere efforts and assistance, rendered to as by Sri Rahul Mishra as amicus curiae and we direct the Registrar General of the Court to ensure the payment of Rs.11,000/- ( Rs. Eleven thousand only) to Sri Rahul Mishra as fee from the appropriate head.